

This book is the fourth in a series on the topical problems of the history, theory and modern experience of the national-liberation struggle in Asian and African countries. The previous three were *The Comintern and the East. A Critique of the Critique* (1981), *The Comintern and the East. Strategy and Tactics* (1984) and *The Revolutionary Process in the East: Past and Present* (1985).

This is a product of integrated research on the specific features of the revolutionary democracy of Asian and African countries and its numerous varieties with differing classes and political content.

Considerable space is given to an analysis of the concepts and experience of non-capitalist development. This is an account of the formation of the communist movement in Asian countries and the trend for revolutionary democrats there to pass over to Marxism.

This collective monograph is distinguished by the relevance and wide range of the problems covered, natural combination of theoretical and specific historical experience, scientific accuracy and clarity in posing and explaining the problems under consideration.

REVOLUTIONARY DEMOCRACY AND COMMUNISTS IN THE EAST

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РЕВОЛЮЦИОННАЯ ДЕМОКРАТИЯ И КОММУНИСТЫ ВОСТОКА

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CONTENTS

Preface	7
R. A. Ulyanovsky. National and Revolutionary Democracy and Their Evolution	12
O. V. Martyshin. Lenin's Concept of Revolutionary Democracy and the Developing Nations	27
A. V. Gordon. Revolutionary-Democratic Concepts of Non-Capitalist Development. Cultural and Historical Perspective (Premises, Peculiarities and Significance)	91
V. G. Khoros. Non-Capitalist Development: Theory and Practice	127
M. A. Persits. The Formation of the Communist Movement in Asia and Revolutionary Democracy in the East	179
M. F. Yuriev, A. V. Pantsov. Comintern, CPSU(B) and Ideological and Organizational Evolution of the Communist Party of China	283
S. L. Agayev. The Left Forces and the Islamic Regime in Iran (1979-1983)	333
Name Index	381

PREFACE

By Professor Rostislav Ulyanovsky

A research group was set up about a score of years ago in response to a proposal of the Institute of the International Working-Class Movement of the USSR Academy of Sciences to study the major problems of the revolutionary development of Asian and African countries after the victorious socialist Revolution in Russia in 1917.

It has since produced three books which have gained recognition at home and abroad. The first dealt with the policy of the Comintern in the national liberation movement of Asia and Africa, the second was a refutation of theories misrepresenting the Comintern's Eastern policy, and the third reviewed major trends of the revolutionary process in the East in general and in a number of Asian countries in particular, including the 1979 revolution in Iran.*

The present, fourth study, is concerned with revolutionary democracy in the East. The relevance of the subject can hardly be overemphasized. The prospect of further social change in the developing countries largely depends on the pattern of evolution of revolutionary democracy in those countries, which is distinguished today by a great diversity. The subject is not a new one for Soviet scientific publications. Much has been written in recent years about the contemporary revolutionary democracy of African and Asian countries, particularly in connection with the new expe-

* These three books have been put out in English by Progress Publishers: *The Comintern and the East. A Critique of the Critique*, in 1981; *The Comintern and the East. Strategy and Tactics*, in 1984 (a Japanese edition appeared in Tokyo in 1971), and *The Revolutionary Process in the East: Past and Present*, in 1985.

rience of non-capitalist development or socialist orientation. Without posing this problem, it would be inconceivable to make a serious study of the revolutionary process in former colonial and semi-colonial countries. So the present book purports to show how the concepts of non-capitalist development, arising from the evolution of the ideas of national liberation and social justice and the trend for foremost fighters for independence and progress to embrace scientific socialism, emerge and mature in the East in the context of the general crisis of capitalism and the rising influence of scientific socialism. The book also considers the experience of the development of a number of countries of Asia and Africa along the non-capitalist road, noting their achievements as well as objective and subjective difficulties, and analyzing, in particular, the essence of the agrarian policy of revolutionary democratic forces at various stages of history.

The headway made by Soviet scholars in exploring the problem of socialist-oriented development is obvious, but the subject cannot be considered to have been studied in full, not only because revolutionary democracy is in a state of flux, with new forms arising all the time, but also because far from all the modes of approach to the subject have been used effectively enough. Any science lives through periods when new areas of research are discovered, assumptions made, and facts collected, systematized and analyzed. These are followed up by stock-taking, record evaluation and heightened interest in method.

The elaboration of the theory of the non-capitalist option or socialist orientation of African and Asian nations already has an instructive history of its own. The authors of the present work do not give a systematic analysis of the preceding publications, leaving it as a task yet to be accomplished. But they have borne witness to or taken part in the elaboration of the issue and attempted its solution with due regard for the positive and negative elements of the experience gained. These considerations are behind the attention they give to the methodological and historical aspects of the study.

Before analyzing present-day revolutionary democracy, it is worth trying to clear up some of the terms used. What is revolutionary democracy? When did it arise? Do the present-day revolutionary democrats have any predecessors? What are the historical types of revolutionary democracy? How does it relate to such

concepts as socialist orientation, national democracy, people's democracy etc.? The authors have attempted to draw on the past experience in considering these problems and make a synthesis of history and modernity.

An examination of Lenin's views prompts the conclusion that revolutionary democracy is not a precise and unconditional definition of class and party affiliation but a rather broad social and political concept having a particular meaning in particular historical conditions. Revolutionary democracy is many-faced and heterogeneous as is the revolutionary process which has particular objectives to realize in line with different historical conditions and the call of the times. Revolutionary democracy grows, deepens and changes along with the development of the revolutionary process. In doing so, it changes its class and political essence; there is constant infighting going on, some elements break away from it, while others join it, and it consolidates itself on a new basis. Lenin stressed that there is the revolutionary democracy of the capitalists, the petty bourgeoisie and the proletariat. But it is by no means in each historical epoch that all of these classes are capable of being revolutionary and democratic. The revolutionism of the bourgeoisie ends up with bourgeois revolution. It is cut to the bone wherever bourgeois revolutions come too late and the contradictions of feudalism are compounded by those peculiar to capitalist society. Petty-bourgeois revolutionism, for all its verbal radicalism, does not go beyond general democratic change. Only people committed to the cause of the politically conscious working class are capable of making a socialist revolution. A dialectical evaluation of revolutionary democracy implies considering its unity and non-uniformity breeding class-based conflicts and rifts.

In the age of the collapse of the colonial system of imperialism, Asian and African countries have produced an extremely wide diversity of revolutionary-democratic movements, drawing socially, economically and culturally diverse population groups into the revolutionary process. This is due to the sweeping pace of contemporary historical development which causes epochs to overlap or mix up, so to speak, in what was once the colonial periphery. The social and economic backwardness of the East, due to centuries of colonial domination, led to historical objectives, which took centuries to accomplish in the context of in-

dependent development of European countries, being compressed and concentrated in the East and requiring to be realised within the shortest-ever time-limits. Capitalism has not yet altogether superseded feudal, semi-feudal and even patriarchal-communal relations, while the logic of the worldwide historical process makes it imperative for capitalism to be bypassed and the exploitation of man by man eradicated.

Fighting for political independence and enhanced national sovereignty and for overcoming neocolonial exploitation, fighting against the feudal scheme of things and the feudalising clan and tribal upper crust, restricting and eliminating capitalist trends—all these objectively existing tasks create fertile ground for a sweeping expansion of revolutionary democracy and at the same time for dramatic conflicts and clashes within its midst, clashes with those who seek to keep things as they are, who forget that a revolution cannot mark time, and so quickly lose their revolutionary potential. Lenin's idea that one can be neither a revolutionary nor a democrat without moving towards socialism is of special relevance for Afro-Asian countries nowadays. Those who do not follow this principle inevitably end up in the camp of reaction. The developments of recent years in a number of countries of Asia and Africa have demonstrated that with ample evidence.

Revolutionary democracy is a high title to be won only by an incessant struggle in the name of revolution. It must be safeguarded from being vulgarised by petty-bourgeois ex-revolutionaries torn by contradictions between sympathy for working people and the pursuit of enrichment. It is apparently this vulgarising, misguided identification of revolutionary democratism with petty-bourgeois revolutionism and opposing it to scientific socialism that lie behind the distrustful and sometimes contemptuous attitude of a number of foremost militants of developing countries to this noble title. For the vanguard of the revolutionary forces to embrace Marxism-Leninism does not mean to overcome or reject revolutionary democracy, but to assume its highest, most consistent and pure forms. Hence the natural connection of all genuine revolutionary democracy with the international communist movement. The history of the formation of the communist movement in Asia, considered in the book, indicates that this movement has been initiated precisely by revolutionary dem-

ocratic or national revolutionary intellectuals constituting the most radical contingent in the Eastern peoples' struggle for liberation. Moreover, the most consistent elements among them have crossed over to scientific communism by the bridge of anti-imperialism, anti-despotism and humanism. They absorbed the substance of Marxism in passing and it has taken some time to occupy its proper place in the value scale of their political thinking. The proletariat joined the communist movement at a later stage when it began to turn into a class for itself and realize the necessity of fighting for socialist goals.

It would be naive to think of clearing up all problems of revolutionary democracy in a single book. They are as infinite as history itself. The authors will deem their task accomplished if they succeed in attracting attention to some new aspects of the subject under study, specifying a number of fundamental points and contributing towards greater unity of all social-political forces in the countries of Asia and Africa who are capable of a consistent effort for revolution and democracy.

NATIONAL AND REVOLUTIONARY DEMOCRACY AND THEIR EVOLUTION

By R. A. Ulyanovsky

National democracies, as the ARE, Burma, Ghana, Algeria, Mali and Syria, arose in the course of the revolutionary process in Asia and Africa in the late '50s and the early '60s. The 1960 Moscow International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties went on record for a non-capitalist development of the countries that were liberating themselves from colonial dependence to develop as national democracies. That was a bold theoretical conclusion of tremendous significance. The process was in its initial stages at the time. Yet it was taken as the starting point for the discovery and theoretical substantiation of the major route to follow in promoting national and social progress. It was also suggested in Marxist publications at the time that it would most likely take decades to bypass capitalism. More than 30 years have since elapsed, furnishing us a wealth of historical experience. This experience must serve to clarify the basic ideas behind the concepts of non-capitalist development and, subsequently, of socialist orientation. But it is the actual revolutionary process that has to be relied on in rethinking these concepts now just as it was in working them out 30 years ago. Because for all the particularity of the present stage of historical development and for all the immense favourable opportunities created for revolution and progress in former colonies by the transformation of the socialist system into the leading force of world development, there are many internal factors and social forces at work in the countries of Asia and Africa which have more than once operated in the international arena. These pertain to what is, theoretically, an old, yet actually an ever new problem of the general and the particular, of universal fundamental laws and specific national and historical circumstances.

A historical comparison can be of great value, furthermore,

in analysing one of the basic problems of socialist orientation—the problem of characterisation of revolutionary democracy. This problem is one of directing the revolutionary process, political organisation and political power and it is only too natural for it to attract the special attention of researchers. The notion of “revolutionary democracy” as applied to the socialist-oriented countries is one that we use very widely and, unfortunately, not always correctly. It is rather loose, by nature, and to use it without clearing up the meaning can lead to theoretical and, consequently, political mistakes. The term “revolutionary democracy” is sometimes used just as “social democracy” and “national democracy” etc., as if it stood for a quite definite substance. However, such substance has yet to be put into the notion of “revolutionary democracy”, it has yet to be defined, for by itself it is not definite.

It is logically possible to give a generic definition of revolutionary democracy: “. . . to be a democrat means reckoning in reality with the interests of the majority of the people and not the minority, . . . to be a revolutionary means destroying everything harmful and obsolete in the most resolute and ruthless manner,”¹ Lenin wrote. That was a bold and progressive definition, a universal term. It is common knowledge that one cannot be a democrat without expressing the will and interests of the majority any more than one can be a revolutionary without being a radical. At the same time, such a definition had to be specified as a class, political, historical and party characteristic. That is why, in the period from February to October 1917, when so-called revolutionary democracy in Russia, setting itself up against the revolutionary movement of the Russian proletariat, seemed to be thriving, Lenin objected to a thoughtless, inconcrete application of the term and insisted on its class and historical meaning being clearly established in each particular case. “How can a Marxist forget that in the history of all countries the capitalists, too, have often been ‘revolutionary democrats’, as in England in 1649, in France in 1789, in 1830, 1848, and 1870, and in Russia in February 1917? Can you have forgotten that the revolutionary democracy of the capitalists, of the petty bourgeoisie and of the proletariat must be distinguished one from the other? Does not the *whole* history of *all* the revolutions I have just mentioned show a distinction of classes *with-*

in 'revolutionary democracy'?² This is Lenin's approach to the subject: not revolutionary democracy in general, but the revolutionary democracy of the capitalists, the petty bourgeoisie (including the peasantry), or the proletariat. This strictly scientific and historically substantiated definition takes into account the struggle of classes within revolutionary democracy and around it.

There is one path of development that appears to be logically right, that which leads from revolutionary democracy to Marxism. But there has been a different path, the path of decline and descent, the path that, rather than leading to Marxism, leads away from Marxism and to something that is contrary to Marxism. Counter-Marxist revolutionary democratic trends were concomitants of all three Russian revolutions and had, as Lenin pointed out, a certain revolutionary potential and support from the masses, witness the Bolsheviks' alliance with Left Socialist-Revolutionaries who treacherously broke it in 1918.

There was a period of nearly half a century—from the 1870s to 1918—that saw Russian revolutionary democracy develop in a non-Marxist way. One can hardly do without considering that process and without studying its tremendous historical experience while thinking over the destinies of contemporary revolutionary democracy in Asia and Africa. That evolution of Russian revolutionary democracy through the flames of Russian revolutions was not only a departure from the ideas of the founders of Russian democracy. On the contrary, it was a result of the dogmatic and uncritical attitude to some of those populist ideas in the changed historical circumstances which deprived them of all positive revolutionary character. That was a "legacy" that had to be dropped in the interest of the revolution, as it had become a burden dragging revolutionary democrats into the quagmire of bourgeois reformist politics. And dropped it was by Plekhanov and Lenin.

Yet it is that way of development, which has been followed in a number of countries of Asia and Africa by revolutionary democrats inclined to conciliation with the national bourgeoisie and imperialism, that has sometimes been consigned to oblivion without good reason when revolutionary democracy began to be talked about in connection with the non-capitalist path or socialist orientation.

The Russian revolutionary democrats of the 1840-1860s expressed the interests of the peasantry and uncompromisingly opposed serfdom. They were already disappointed with capitalism and explicitly rejected the prospect of bourgeois development for Russia. They were the products of the social nature of Russia and of the class division in Russian society. They represented working people, above all, the peasantry, including the poor peasants, and their entire political line was one of opposition to the landed classes and the bourgeoisie. Revolutionary democracy in Asia and Africa in the 1960s arose not from the class struggle, pure and simple, but, first of all, from the national liberation, anti-imperialist and anti-racist struggle and that, even if it had no subjective illusions about a national class peace, objectively was bound to produce a fundamentally different type of social framework, that of national liberation. In Russia there were the exploited classes opposed to the exploiter classes, while in the countries of Asia and Africa, it was entire nations, or all of their representatives who had not lost their national awareness in the decades and centuries of domination by foreign colonialists, that were opposed to the imperialist oppressors and conquerors. In these countries, workers, peasants, smallholders, capitalists and quite often even feudals find themselves in one camp and in action against a common enemy. And it is natural for their interests to be represented by an entirely new, special anti-imperialist national brand of revolutionary democracy.

It was by no chance at all that the term "revolutionary democracy" was not used in connection with the non-capitalist way in the communist movement's documents of the early 1960s. It must be presumed that the writers of those documents had not forgotten about its existence but evidently wanted to avoid unclarity, ambiguity and unjustified associations. They understood perfectly well that there was no general notion of "revolutionary democracy" and therefore they gave the new phenomenon a new name—"national democracy". However relative, this term effectively underlined a number of major features of this phenomenon: its essential novelty, its predominantly national character and its broadest and by no means homogeneous social base.

There is still no reason to drop this concept. Yet it is necessary to consider its relation to the term "revolutionary democracy" which has also come into use as applied to the problems

of non-capitalist development in the course of the actual revolutionary struggle and reflects the process of class differentiation of the unified national front. Moreover, it has to be borne in mind that we still quite often share a restricted understanding of "revolutionary democracy" as an approximate equivalent of the Russian revolutionary democracy of the 1840s-1860s. These two notions should not be used as identical, without bringing out their essence let alone by proceeding from the subjective conviction that "national democracy" is always inadequate, by the extent to which it is progressive and revolutionary, to the forces working for a socialist option. Revolutionary democracy was normally identified exclusively with workers' and peasants' leadership and with the elimination of national vested interests from the ruling bloc. It was viewed as an advance over national democracy. *And that was right.* In principle, it is possible not only in former colonial countries for national democracy to make headway and turn into the revolutionary democracy of *working people*, progressively passing through a number of stages. It was theoretically possible in Russia, too, but the intensity of the three democratic revolutions came to ahead within the short space of 12 years and put *all* classes face to face with a socialist revolution. Yet there was no time in Russia for that kind of change. Revolutionary democracy did not stand the test. Much of it took up a defencist posture during the years of the First World War and then came out against the socialist revolution.

Such transformation began in some socialist-oriented countries roughly in the mid-1970s and followed the emergence of the so-called second echelon of revolutionary and national democracy. But in this case, just as in the Russia of the mid-19th century, such an indefinite content of "revolutionary democracy", as a class notion, requires a class-based and specific historical clarification. It is not correct to evaluate any movement as revolutionary democratic without clearing up its class meaning. Everything is determined by the class structure of society and by the struggle of classes within and around revolutionary democracy.

I think that if one proceeds from such an understanding of revolutionary democracy, which is just what Lenin called for, a possible terminological dispute over "national democracy" versus "revolutionary democracy" will prove superfluous. Every-

thing is determined by the meaning read into these notions and by the kind of revolutionary or national democracy in question. Considering the diversity of revolutionary democracy, one can regard what was called national democracy in the early 1960s as one of the stages, as a historical form, as a kind of revolutionary democracy. In this case, the whole path of socialist orientation can be seen within the framework of "revolutionary democracy", given one indispensable condition: its character and the variations of its class content in each stage have to be clearly defined.

Such are the methodological criteria objectively emanating from the preceding historical experience for evaluating the contemporary phenomenon of non-capitalist development, i.e., the socialist orientation of domestic and foreign policies.

Now for a broad outline of the evolution and class essence of national and revolutionary democracy of African and Asian countries committed to the non-capitalist option.

As I have noted, the evolution of national democracy began in the wake of the victory of the united anti-imperialist front. It was started off by the general national liberation struggle and was therefore distinguished by broad-based national unity. Representatives of the national business community, predominantly medium and small, entered that bloc, in one form or another, but were barred from a monopoly of leadership. Power was, as a matter of fact, in the hands of a group of national revolutionaries rallied behind a recognised national leader. Those were, as a rule, military, rather than political, leaders who had earned esteem by their courageous struggle against foreign oppression in colonial times. The platforms of national democracy of that initial period (until about the mid-1960s) did not name any social group as dominating the movement. They rejected antagonism between the component parts of national forces. That was a broad national democratic front with no clearly expressed class leadership. The upsurge of the political and economic movement of working masses increasingly deprived the exploitative elements of an opportunity to establish undivided rule which they sought to bar the way to social change. The petty-bourgeois group, taking advantage of an unstable balance and the inability of its class antipodes to go all-out for power, aspired to the role of an independent political force. The main thrust of pol-

itics was fighting for genuine independence and against imperialism and its domestic allies—feudals and compradors. That created an objective base and favourable social climate for unity and the struggle for a new social order.³

Now, the ideological and political platform of the emergent left wing of national democracy, i.e., revolutionary democracy, was a mixture of revolutionary aspirations and reformist nationalistic ambitions. And that is quite understandable for it combined attempts at transcending the limits of the national type of socialism that was in the making with an effort to preserve many of its features. By and large, the left wing of national democracy was distinguished by a fierce battle against imperialism, recognition of class contradictions in local society, criticism of contemporary capitalism, sympathy for the ideas of scientific socialism and which is very important as far as an actual political course is concerned—a tendency towards alliance with socialist countries to resist imperialist powers. At the same time, the right wing of national democracy advocates a “third way” and the argument about the innate peculiarities of the “African” or “Arab personality” making it ungovernable by the general historical laws, denies the presence of antagonistic contradictions within the united front of national anti-imperialist forces, organises anti-communist activities and persecution of local Marxists. National democracy is in the throes of a deepgoing internal crisis; it is in a process of differentiation and stratification. Old things are dying out, while new ones are cropping up. The old things are still strong, the new ones are only gathering strength. The class struggle is striking deeper roots. Part of national democracy is becoming “reactionary democracy”, while another part is following a revolutionary course, moving on towards scientific socialism. A new situation is taking shape. The internal crisis of national democracy is producing a new positive trend: many of its leaders and the masses following them are passing over to class positions.

They have a good deal of achievement to their credit in advancing the revolutionary process in Asia and Africa. They have assured militant anti-imperialism and radicalised domestic political life, depriving the local bourgeoisie and capitalist elements of one monopoly of representation of the national interests and bringing democratic elements left of centre and left of the na-

tional bourgeoisie into the forefront. They have boldly carried through anti-feudal and anti-monopoly changes, helped propagate the ideas of socialism and taken first steps on the way to it.

But that movement had serious weaknesses, too, which made themselves felt before long. It was ideologically, politically, organisationally and socially loose. The point is not that its class composition was not uniform, but that in a number of countries the movement had no proletarian backbone which could have fixed it on a truly revolutionary and democratic platform enabling it to move on to scientific socialism. The national democracies of African and Asian countries and the left elements within them can hardly be reproached with being too slow and lagging behind the revolutionary process. On the contrary, there have been some cases of obvious rushing ahead in striving for economic change which experience proved had to be stopped. What is important is that in a number of countries (like Egypt, Mali, Sudan, Indonesia, or Ghana) they failed to create a revolutionary organisation that would make secure positive, genuinely left revolutionary and democratic gains. Since the authentically revolutionary forces had no organisation of their own, they had to operate through a military, party and state machinery which was fast getting bureaucratised. Having no dependable proletarian support from the masses, they banked on a national leader relying on the army, security forces, clan or tribe. Most national democrats of that period showed themselves to be distrustful of working classes or incapable of mobilising and organising them as revolution-conscious and coming near to being class-conscious. In these circumstances, internal social antagonisms sharpened, while their intensity was certainly underestimated. Bourgeois elements recovered and gathered strength and learned to operate the military and state bureaucratic machine. An obvious gap between word and deed and between slogans and reality engendered the apathy of the masses, of course.

It is well known that all those developments led to the setbacks of national democracy in the latter half of the 1960s and in the early 1970s. The movement was living through trying times. Opponents of the theory of the non-capitalist option and socialist orientation began to talk about its bankruptcy. At the same time there was a growing trend since the late 1960s for the revolutionary democrats who retained power to oust bourgeois

elements politically and to declare peasants and workers to be the leading force in an association of progressive classes. However, these declarations were still far from being effectively translated into reality. Genuine class organisations of working people were not encouraged. For these reasons, in a number of socialist-oriented countries, where this process was not interrupted by a coup (Ghana, Mali) or by an obvious degeneration of the ruling groups (the Sadat regime in Egypt), there was and there still is some stagnation (as in Burma). The new forms which revolutionary democracy acquired in the mid-1970s were, to a certain extent, a reaction to this stagnation and were prompted by the conclusions drawn from the experience of the predecessors, their advances and setbacks.

A new group of revolutionary democrats moved into the forefront of revolutionary change in former colonial countries in the mid-1970s, those who saw the achievement of socialism as their ultimate goal and by their activities conclusively dispelled doubts regarding the reality of socialist orientation for Asia and Africa. I mean the ruling parties of the former Portuguese colonies, the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, Madagascar, Afghanistan, Ethiopia etc. The formation of the main contingents of this new revolutionary democracy, connected with working people, has a rather distinctive history behind it. What was characteristic of Ethiopia, for instance, was not a national liberation movement, but a pitched class and social battle within the national camp against the feudal élite headed by a monarch, which contributed towards the maturation of class consciousness. For the revolutionary democracies of former Portuguese colonies, the sustained armed struggle against colonialists in combination with organising work as, essentially, ruling parties in liberated regions, served as a great political school.

Revolutionary democrats of a new type are more resolutely coming over to scientific socialism both in theoretical and practical respects. In practical terms, they are taking co-operation with socialist countries a stage ahead and striving to broaden it in every area. They have no mistrust of the socialist community or fear of "communist penetration" as sometimes still do revolutionary or national democrats of the older generation. In the field of theory, they are embracing the Marxist-Leninist propositions regarding the social structure of society and the class strug-

gles, socialism and socialist revolution, economics and politics in the period of transition to socialism.

This group of revolutionary democrats is not uniform. Some of them unequivocally declare scientific socialism (Marxism-Leninism) to be the ideological base of their movement. They advance the slogans of an alliance of the working class and the peasantry or the leading role of the working class, emphasise the class character of the state and the ruling party, consider their parties Marxist-Leninist etc. Others still stand by the concept of national front, but base it on a clear class approach. In the latter case (PAIGC, PAICV), the Marxist analysis is not advertised, though there is no doubt that the impact of scientific socialism on the late ideologue of these parties, Amilcar Cabral, was quite profound.

This is not the first time Afro-Asian revolutionary democracy of our times turns to scientific socialist ideology. But it develops fundamentally new features. In earlier times such trends were often connected with ultra-leftism. A classical case in point is Kwame Nkrumah after the 1966 coup. His "change-over" from "African socialism" to "scientific socialism" involved skipping stages in the revolutionary process, proclaiming socialist revolution to be the short-term goal of the liberation movement and refusing an alliance not only with bourgeois, but even with petty-bourgeois elements. Revolutionary democrats whom we hold to be a new type proceed from concepts of *stages* of revolutionary struggle and of the necessity of a national democratic revolution. They consider socialism to be their long-, not short-term, objective. True, there is the impression in some cases of a revolution being forced through stages. The boundaries of these stages are not always reasonably delimited. Some revolutionary democratic parties of Africa consider the national democratic stage of the revolution to be over upon the conquest of power. This hardly conforms to the understanding of national democratic revolution in Marxist publications of the last two decades.

With the formation of a new contingent of revolutionary democracy, veterans of this movement have not left the historical arena. The revolutionary process continues to develop in Algeria, Tanzania and other countries. Their ruling parties have not used up their revolutionary anti-imperialist potential. Finally, there are national democratic and revolutionary democratic currents

which continue to operate or arise anew and which have not yet shown all they are worth (Ghana, 1982; Upper Volta, 1983; Benin, etc.).

The diversity of revolutionary processes is natural. It will not diminish as time goes on. And it would be impossible to make it all uniform. How should one view, in this context, various currents within the camp of national and revolutionary democracy?

It is beyond doubt that the latest reinforcement of revolutionary democracy stands closest to Marxists ideologically and politically and that its appeal to scientific socialism is a factor of great positive significance. However, one should not see this process as absolute and as the only practicable version of socialist orientation in present-day conditions. Such concepts do arise and they are evidently attributable to sceptical reactions to previous, not always successful forms of the movement along the non-capitalist road and, indeed, to this very phenomenon in principle because it is not identical with the socialist revolution accomplished in the Soviet Central Asian republics, Mongolia, Vietnam and elsewhere. It has been suggested that national democracy has no viable prospects, that the future of socialist orientation is connected with a Vietnam-type option and that the change now being carried through in Angola, Mozambique, the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, Ethiopia and other countries is a repetition of Vietnam's experience.

There is one extremely important circumstance that cannot be overlooked in this context. The concept of non-capitalist development was advanced by Lenin, the CPSU and the Comintern and thought to apply to countries which had no conditions present as yet for an immediate socialist revolution under the leadership of Marxist parties. This is a long-lasting objective phenomenon that exists for decades in the age of transition from capitalism and pre-capitalism to socialism and it has not changed at all just because a particular party may have declared itself Marxist-Leninist. Now, since that is so, the idea of approaching socialism without a well-established communist vanguard, the idea of making radical and consistent general democratic change under the leadership of national and revolutionary democrats is no less relevant today than it was 20 years ago. Efforts are being made to resolve in a new form and in a new way the issue that preoccupied the Comintern in the 1920s-1930s, that of alliance

with the entire revolutionary democratic movement. The final decision to work towards an alliance with the entire democratic movement and with the entire anti-imperialist and anti-war movement was made after the Seventh Congress of the Comintern and the International Meetings of Communist and Workers' Parties in Moscow in 1957, 1960 and 1969, and this alliance is of tremendous importance in the present international situation. The diversity of the forms of socialist orientation and the revolutionary movement of national democracy remains axiomatic for us. One can speak of at least two forms of the non-capitalist course of African and Asian countries and the socialist orientation of some of them pursued under the leadership of the first and second generations of revolutionary democracy. Neither the experience of the first nor second generation should be regarded as absolute. Not everything in that experience itself appears to be unquestionable and uniform, but requires a comprehensive study, realisation and selection of good models.

What accounted for the mistakes of national democrats in the 1960s was not a lack of radicalism, but an inability to back up the revolutionary beginnings with social-economic and political organizational measures, above all, with party activities. It is in this sense, first and foremost, that the record of national democracy has to be evaluated. A modification of an ideological platform is a major accomplishment, but it resolves little without the actual implementation of its basic principles. Deep-going revolutionary change could and can be made on the ideological grounds of national and revolutionary democracy, especially if one remembers that it is far more difficult to secure real change of social and political essence than to declare it. Declarative radicalism, far from leading to it, does not always make for it, causing an excessive aggravation of the social-class situation.

Commitment to scientific socialism is an achievement of the best contingents of revolutionary democracy, but by no means the only and the surest sign of actual progress towards scientific socialism.

One must not fail to see that it is progressively becoming a matter of objective necessity for scientific socialism to be proclaimed the theoretical base of the ruling parties in socialist-oriented countries. Perhaps, this comes ahead of ideological preparation in some cases, but it is always necessary to have a long-term

revolutionary perspective. At the same time, any revolutionary party has to stand by the actual realities of the day, whether in ideology or in politics, in proper association with the long-term perspective. Party ideology involves not only theoretical treatises and scientific quest. It is, above all, a means of resolving today's and tomorrow's social, economic and political problems. Artificial rushing ahead or lagging behind in such a matter may cause ideology to lose its force of influence on the masses, its ability to resolve top priorities and the support and active sympathy of the majority of the people so essential for victory. For example, can the arguments about the leading role of the working class, the working-class party, and the dictatorship of the proletariat serve as a means of mobilising the essentially tribal peasant community? Are they understandable to rural workers? Can the young, unfledged and politically immature working class properly appreciate them? Isn't there an underestimation of the specific features of the emergent countries and a neglect of Lenin's idea of peasant councils and of translating scientific socialism into the peasant vocabulary? It is worth remembering how several years ago some ultra-left leaders in Afghanistan spoke of the dictatorship of the proletariat existing there under feudalism, apparently believing such a contention to be an important contribution to scientific socialism. In any case, such slogans cannot be recommended as a model to emulate or seen as evidence of a quantum leap in the revolutionary process.

How should one view, in this context, the fact that revolutionary democratic parties in economically and socially backward countries have been declaring Marxism-Leninism to be their ideology and proclaiming ideas about the vanguard party of the working class and the dictatorship of the proletariat? It is easy to schematize the accelerated transformation of these parties into communist ones. Such schemes already exist and comprise four stages of their evolution: 1) national democracy (a broad-based bloc of social forces, including the national vested interests); 2) revolutionary democracy—without the national vested interests—under workers' and peasants' leadership (mixtures and modifications are possible in both cases); 3) vanguard revolutionary party on course for scientific socialism; 4) Marxist-Leninist party.

The main defect of such presumed, though theoretically possible classification is a manifest lack of practical historical expe-

rience. It proceeds primarily from ideological criteria and treats them as being too abstract, obscures both the fundamental and practical similarity of different forms of socialist orientation. In substance, all of the stages just mentioned lie within broad limits of national and revolutionary democracy and, taking actual experience, rather than ideological guidelines alone, as the basic standard of reference, it can be seen that there are no clear boundaries between them. Is there a revolutionary democratic party in which the power-wielding elements out of the bourgeois democratic and petty-bourgeois revolutionary midst have already succeeded in assuring effective leadership by workers and peasants, presupposing a certain level of their class political consciousness and their independent organisation? Socialist orientation is just beginning to produce such examples.

In this connection, noting ideological dissimilarities and the appearance of two groups within the framework of national and revolutionary democracy, one may say with confidence that ideological evolution towards socialism is unquestionably right, attests to a higher stage of development and, of course, requires a long record of organising and political practice which is ultimately crucial to the success of the entire process.

One can make schemes of the development of national liberation revolutions into socialist ones (for instance, national democracy, revolutionary democracy, people's democracy, "left-wing people's democracy" or something else of this kind). They can be right in the purely theoretical sense, although, while making them, one should, of course, square a scheme with reality and with the prospect of the struggle, and never rush into accepting it as something that has already occurred and come off and so can be written down in the records of history. All schemes are abstract unless made to concentrate on practicable and urgent needs of the revolutionary process. I presume one can claim that in the given period this process has nowhere yet gone beyond the stage of national democratic revolution directed by revolutionary democrats coming near to embracing the ideology of scientific socialism. The strategy and tactics of *this stage* both in ideology and in the political and economic practice of the revolutionary struggle demand a concentrated effort of revolutionary democrats for its effective continuation and completion.

- ¹ V. I. Lenin, "The Impending Catastrophe and How to Combat It", *Collected Works*, Vol. 25, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1980, p. 337. Here and hereafter V. I. Lenin's comments are quoted from the Progress Publishers edition of his *Collected Works* (except if otherwise stated), and those of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, from their *Collected Works*.
- ² V. I. Lenin, "The Petty-Bourgeois Stand on the Question of Economic Disorganisation", Vol. 24, 1980, p. 563.
- ³ In the 1960s, the years of a turning point, the upsurge of the mass movement against imperialism, national Big Business and feudals was manifest in many countries: Egypt (Nasser's so-called socialist decrees); Burma (the 1962 coup and the subsequent "Burmese Road to Socialism"); Syria (power takeover by the Left Baath); Algeria (the victory of a national democratic revolution), and so on.

LENIN'S CONCEPT OF REVOLUTIONARY DEMOCRACY AND THE DEVELOPING NATIONS

By O. U. Martyshin

The times of social upheavals invariably bring various currents of revolutionary democracy into the foreground of political life. The history of the anti-imperialist struggle of the peoples of former colonial and dependent countries—from the “awakening of Asia” to the final collapse of the world system of colonialism—is no exception. So much has been written about the modern revolutionary democracy of developing countries and so conflicting judgements and forecasts have been expressed on a number of issues that to grasp the essence of what is still a topical problem it will, apparently, be not beside the point to turn to the very notion of “revolutionary democracy” and to try and establish some of its typical features by examining historically specific models preceding the present generation of revolutionary democrats.

Lenin on Revolutionary Democracy

“Revolutionary democracy” is so broad a term as to be hardly applicable as a full and precise social and political definition without specifying its substance and reading a concrete class-governed and historically justified meaning into it. If we often use this term without explaining and deciphering it, we do so only because a particular perception of this phenomenon is presumed to be obvious and generally accepted. What we deal with in each particular case is the revolutionary democracy of a particular time and country setting itself and realizing certain objectives etc.

Still there is a general concept of “revolutionary democracy” but this is a logical rather than social-political, historical or class notion. In the period between February and October 1917, when

many opportunists and conciliators donned the mantle of "revolutionary democracy", Lenin expressed a number of relevant considerations which are of methodological importance and interest to this day. "If we do not employ the phrase 'revolutionary democracy' as a stereotyped ceremonial phrase, as a conventional epithet, but *reflect* on its meaning, we find that to be a democrat means reckoning in reality with the interests of the majority of the people and not the minority, and that to be a revolutionary means destroying everything harmful and obsolete in the most resolute and ruthless manner",¹ Lenin wrote in his work "The Impending Catastrophe and How to Combat It". The same idea was repeated in his article "How to Guarantee the Success of the Constituent Assembly".² As early as 1912 Lenin gave an assessment of democracy consonant with the points just quoted: "Democrats represent the broad mass of the population. A democrat is not afraid of the movement of the masses but believes in it."³

While proposing a general definition of "revolutionary democracy", as one among the broad and somewhat abstract notions (e.g. liberal, conservative, revolutionary, progressive) Lenin warned against its thoughtless application. He understood perfectly well that this definition was relative, insufficient and incomplete, that it has to be supplemented with a class-oriented assessment and based on Marxian concepts of classes and class struggle as the major determining factor and the main substance of social and political life. "... It is high time to stop talking about 'revolutionary democracy', handing out mutual congratulations on 'revolutionary democracy', and get on with a *class* definition, as we have been taught by Marxism, and by scientific socialism generally,"⁴ Lenin said at the First All-Russia Congress of Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies on June 4 (17), 1917. A few days earlier, he went into greater detail in speaking about the same idea in the article "The Petty-Bourgeois Stand on the Question of Economic Disorganisation" in *Pravda*. Lenin recalled that capitalists had more than once been revolutionary democrats during the bourgeois revolutions of the 17th through 20th centuries in England, France and other countries, and, in that context, insisted on distinguishing the revolutionary democracy of capitalists from that of the petty-bourgeoisie and the proletariat. He wrote that the distinction of classes within the frame-

work of revolutionary democracy was inevitable in principle and stressed that this was precisely what the history of the revolutionary movement was about.⁵

Lenin never saw revolutionary democracy, united by a certain convergence of interests, as a uniform social and political entity. On the contrary, he always regarded it as being heterogeneous, diversified and variegated in class types. As early as the spring of 1905 Lenin underlined in the "Draft Resolution on the Participation of Social Democracy in a Provisional Revolutionary Government", drawn up in advance of the Third Congress of the RSDLP, that "various bourgeois and petty-bourgeois sections of the population, the peasantry, etc., are now coming out in increasing numbers with revolutionary-democratic slogans", and spoke of the autocracy having to be replaced by a provisional revolutionary government, "supported by *all revolutionary-democratic classes and class elements in Russia* [Emphasis added—O.M.]".⁶

As Lenin had no opportunity to make a special study of the problem of revolutionary democracy, as, indeed, of many other problems, he produced no "theory of revolutionary democracy". His comments on the subject are scattered through numerous speeches and publications which appeared in the course of pitched political battles and responded to the current requirements. However, an analysis of these judgements shows them to add up to a clear-cut concept of revolutionary democracy.

Lenin was mostly preoccupied with revolutionary democracy in Russia, and the Russian conditions materially narrowed the wide dimensions of revolutionary democracy outlined by Lenin's general methodological remarks on that phenomenon. The specific features of the development of capitalism in Russia as good as totally excluded the revolutionary democracy of capitalists. The Russian bourgeoisie was incapable of any consistent revolutionary democracy to speak of. The utmost expression of its democratic possibilities turned out to be what Lenin described as the liberal-monarchist position⁷ of the Cadets (Constitutional Democrats) craving for a deal with the old system of power, fearing the revolutionary initiative of the people⁸ and ganging up time and again with the outspokenly counter-revolutionary government camp.

In such conditions Russian revolutionary democracy as a trend distinct from social democracy (the proletarian revolutionaries can be regarded as part of the broad movement of revolutionary democracy and as a particular and quite independent phenomenon opposing petty-bourgeois democracy, as Lenin saw it, which I shall yet refer to) was of an entirely petty-bourgeois, peasant character. But that does not mean at all that it was completely uniform. "The variety of types and shades of this trend," Lenin explained, "fully corresponds to the variety of types and vast numbers of the 'toiling' petty bourgeoisie in Russia. The main bulwark of this trend, of these parties, is the peasantry."⁹ Lenin pointed out that the elements of revolutionary democracy "capable of waging a struggle and not acting as brokers" were most numerous among the peasantry. "In classifying the big social groups according to their political tendencies," he wrote, "we can, without danger of serious error, identify revolutionary and republican democracy with the mass of the peasants—of course, in the same sense and with the same reservations and implied conditions that we can identify the working class with Social-Democracy".¹⁰

Considering that the peasantry acted as the main carrier of revolutionary-democratic principles, Lenin spoke of "the peasant or revolutionary democrats"¹¹ or of "the peasant and revolutionary democrats".¹² "It is natural. . .," he wrote, "that the peasantry should clothe its aspirations in the mantle of utopias, i.e., unrealisable hopes, such as equalised land tenure under capitalism".¹³ Hence a populist complexion of all Russian revolutionary democracy. Its ideologues and trumpeters couched their determination to put an end to serfdom and absolutism in pseudo-socialist terms, while real democracy was combined with subjective socialism and anti-bourgeois trends.

It is interesting to note the class-based assessment of revolutionary or peasant democracy. Lenin never doubted its bourgeois nature which he underlined quite consistently many times. Lenin spoke of "non-proletarian, i.e., bourgeois, democracy" and emphasised that "the principal class support for Russian bourgeois democracy is the peasantry".¹⁴ "The *democratic bourgeoisie* of Russia is represented by the Narodniks of all shades, from the most Left Socialist-Revolutionaries to the Popular Socialists and Trudoviks," he explained. "They all readily mouth 'socialist'

phrases, but it would be impermissible for a class-conscious worker to be deceived as to the real meaning of those phrases.”¹⁵ To explain why he ranked all populist trends as part of bourgeois democracy, Lenin said in 1912: “In Russia the democrats are represented by the Trudoviks and Left ‘Narodniks’ in general. The Marxists call them *bourgeois* democrats, not at all because they want to ‘offend’ them, but because no redivision of the land and no democratic changes in the state are *sufficient to remove* the rule of capital, of the bourgeois system.”¹⁶

However, Lenin’s definition of peasant revolutionary democracy as an ultimately bourgeois trend was no more than the starting point in his evaluation of its class and political character. “The peasants are also ‘bourgeois democrats’, but entirely different in ‘colour’ from the Cadets or Octobrists,” Lenin wrote in 1906. “Before *these* bourgeois democrats, irrespective of what they themselves want, *history has set* aims that are genuinely revolutionary as regards the ‘old order’ in Russia. *These* bourgeois democrats are compelled to fight against the *very foundations* of landlord power and the old state authority connected with it.”¹⁷

The dialectical flexibility of Lenin’s assessment of the class essence and political role of peasant democracy is extremely instructive. Lenin did not limit himself to any one definition in this case. He drew no hard line between bourgeois and petty-bourgeois democracy, but preferred to speak of both at once. He found peasant revolutionary democracy to be a phenomenon of broad social-political dimensions. So it was possible for peasant democracy either to merge with liberal bourgeois democracy or to enter into an alliance with the revolutionary working class. In the former case it lost its “colour” and ceased to be revolutionary.

So wide a choice of positions was determined by the economic condition of the peasantry rather than by moral considerations. Lenin invariably underlined the economic rationale for a social-political platform as applied to the peasantry, just as to any other class. “What, in general, pushes the small producer in a commodity economy over to the side of reaction and to counter-revolution?”, Lenin asked in his work “The Victory of the Cadets and the Tasks of the Workers’ Party” (1906). “The position he occupies in capitalist society between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. The petty bourgeois inevitably, in all countries and

in every combination of political circumstances, vacillates between revolution and counter-revolution. He wants to free himself from the yoke of capital and to strengthen his position as a small proprietor. This is virtually impossible; and the vacillations of the petty bourgeois are inevitable and ineradicable owing to the very system of modern society."¹⁸

Lenin was against any depersonalization or standardization of the peasantry. He had begun his theoretical activities by refuting the populist illusions about a uniform toiling peasantry. Lenin saw the class differentiation within the peasant community, caused by the development of capitalism, not just as an axiom but as a genuine basis for working out the strategy to apply in respect of the peasantry in bourgeois-democratic and socialist revolution: "...The peasantry does not constitute a single class (—an illusion only to be explained, perhaps, by the reflected influence of the epoch of the fall of serfdom, when the peasantry did indeed come forward as a *class*, but only as a class of feudal society), for within it a bourgeois and a proletarian class are forming," Lenin wrote in his book "What the 'Friends of the People' Are and How They Fight the Social-Democrats".¹⁹ In "Two Tactics of Social-Democracy in the Democratic Revolution" he pointed out that "the peasantry includes a great number of semi-proletarian as well as petty-bourgeois elements".²⁰

But Lenin did not regard this division into semi-proletarian and petty-bourgeois elements (by the economic principle, above all, by the modes of economic activity) in the context of an undeveloped class struggle in the peasant midst and community of the interests of the entire peasantry in the bourgeois-democratic revolution as a matter of absolute significance, any more than the division into bourgeois and petty-bourgeois democracy. Economic distinctions did not rule out the convergence not only of the short-term real interests but of the outlook, inducements, social likes and dislikes, and political behaviour. In this connection Lenin more than once referred to the peasantry in its entirety as a petty-bourgeois stratum because its poorest elements, getting impoverished and degenerating into semi-proletarians, could not still give up the notions, ideals and habits of small proprietors. Therefore, even on the eve of the socialist revolution, Lenin wrote: "...the peasants are the most numerous section of the entire petty-bourgeois mass".²¹

In 1905 Lenin opposed the concept of "labouring peasantry" advocated by the Socialist-Revolutionaries with his own definition of "bourgeois-proprietary and at the same time toiling peasantry".²² He considered not only the real economic condition but also the potentialities and inclinations produced by the peasant social-economic mode of living. "The experience of all the world goes to show," Lenin wrote in 1914, "that the more land (and the cheaper) the peasants have received from the feudalists, the more 'land and liberty' there has been, the *more rapidly* capitalism has developed and the *more speedily* the *bourgeois* nature of the peasants has been revealed".²³ Lenin laid bare this nature which did not always manifest itself in the context of landlord-capitalist exploitation and ruin. He emphasized that Russia's peasant democracy "is by no means socialist but as bourgeois as was democracy in America in the 1860s, in France at the close of the eighteenth century, in Germany in the first half of the nineteenth century, etc., etc. . .".²⁴

These comments of Lenin's once more showed the boundary line between the bourgeoisie and the petty bourgeoisie and between bourgeois and petty-bourgeois democracy to be relative. "What brings the Trudoviks and the Cadets close to one another are the common bourgeois prejudices characteristic both of the big and the small proprietor," he wrote.²⁵ But let me repeat that coming close to the Cadets was only one of the possible lines of action by the peasantry (by some part of it, to be exact), another possibility was that of coming close to the proletariat, and still another—an attempt to hold their specifically peasant petty-bourgeois ground. "A section of the peasantry will, of course, understand the consistent point of view of the Social-Democratic proletariat; but the other section will undoubtedly regard 'equalised' land tenure as the solution of the agrarian problem."²⁶

Such is the most general approach to a definition of the character of revolutionary or peasant democracy in Russia. Lenin backed it up with an analysis of the particular historical phenomena, producing an assessment of the entire relatively short history of bourgeois revolutionary democracy in Russia.

Lenin more than once spoke of A. I. Herzen and N. G. Chernyshevsky, great Russian revolutionary democrats, as exponents of

bourgeois democracy. They had been the ideological forerunners and, in a way, pioneers of populism ("Narodism") and opened up the epoch when "democracy and socialism were undivided"²⁷ in Russia. While being critical of their utopian petty-bourgeois socialism, Lenin very highly appreciated their immense contribution to the emancipation movement in Russia, their revolutionary enthusiasm and militant democratism (particularly those of Chernyshevsky who did not exhibit liberal vacillations like those of Herzen). Lenin extended that assessment to Herzen's and Chernyshevsky's followers—revolutionary populists (Narodniks). Lenin criticized not only their utopian socialism, but also economic romanticism and subjective sociology inseparably connected with it, and laid bare the weaknesses of populism as a social movement: incomprehension and negation of the role of factory workers as the foremost fighters for the interests of all the exploited classes and the original unequivocally negative attitude (before the organization of Narodnaya Volya—People's Will) to political struggle, political revolution and political freedom, the advocacy of an immediate socialist coup, originating from the peasant community, based on an incomprehension of the class nature of the autocracy and of the necessity of consistently fighting it as the opening move of the revolution. The populist tendencies for politically barren activities and anarchism (their impact had never been limited to Mikhail Bakunin's disciples) did not disappear but were simply expressed in a new way even after the establishment of the People's Will attesting to a revision of the attitude to political struggle. The People's Will men did not renounce the theory of the non-class origin of the Russian state; following the tradition of Bakunin and Tkachev, they viewed the autocracy not as an instrument of class domination but as an organization existing exclusively in order to further its own interests, i.e., as if "suspended in mid air", as P. N. Tkachev said.²⁸ Hence the Blanquist notions of political revolution—power takeover through a conspiracy—peculiar not only to the "rebel" contingent of the populists but also to their "Enlighteners" led by Pyotr Lavrov.

However, the said qualities of the Narodism of the 1860s and 1870s, which the onset of a new stage of the revolutionary movement in Russia conclusively proved to have been theoretically inconsistent, reflected a certain level of development of that move-

ment and were a product of specific conditions and, perhaps, the only possible expression of revolutionary sentiment under the circumstances. While criticizing the ideology of populism, Lenin, however, described the revolutionary democrats of the 1860s and 1870s as "the finest people of their time", spoke of their "immense historical services" and stressed that their political programme had been designed "*to arouse the peasantry for the socialist revolution against the foundations of modern society*". "That, substantially, was what all our old revolutionary programmes amounted to," Lenin explained, "from those, say, of the Bakuninists and the rebels, to those of the Narodniks, and finally the Narodovoltsi".²⁹

The populism of the 1860s and 1870s made itself noted not only by its courage, energy and readiness for self-sacrifice. It was the greatest revolutionary movement of its time, the voice of all the oppressed working masses of Russia. It is the Narodniks' activities that led the founders of scientific socialism to conclude that the centre of the world revolutionary process had shifted to Russia.

The attitude of the Russian revolutionaries of the 1860s and 1870s to the teachings of Marx and Engels as well as to the founders of scientific communism themselves was not uniform. Some were opponents of Marxism (e.g. M. A. Bakunin), others, like P. L. Lavrov, were close to Marx and Engels and fought the revolutionary Narodniks opposing Marxism. Yet the revolutionary Narodniks were the first to propagate the ideas of scientific socialism in Russia. There had objectively been no antagonisms between Marxists and revolutionary Narodniks (populists) before the emergence of the social-democratic movement in Russia. That was realized both by Marx and Engels who combined their criticism of the Narodniks with great respect for their revolutionary potential and with an earnest desire to help them, and by the best of Russian revolutionaries who trusted Marx to represent the Russian Socialists in the First International.

By the early 1880s revolutionary populism had used up its strength. The assassination of Alexander II after years of preparations, repeated attempts and tremendous losses, which could have seemed to be a triumph of the movement, was the beginning of its end. The revolutionary populists were broken not so much by the repression of unprecedented proportions and cruel-

ty in the years of rampant reaction, as by their disappointment in their own methods and in the ability of a few heroes to galvanize the mass of the people into action by the "folly of the brave" and to arouse the peasantry for a socialist revolution. So, overwhelmed by disillusionment and doubts and also by the suppression of their underground organization, the Narodniks developed predominantly liberal tendencies.

"The feudal landlords, not completely crushed by the Reform, which was so outrageously mutilated in their interests, revived (for a time)," Lenin wrote, "and showed vividly what these other than bourgeois social relations of ours were, showed it in the form of such unbridled, incredibly senseless and brutal reaction that our democrats caught fright, subsided, instead of advancing and remoulding their naïve democracy—which was able to sense what was bourgeois but was unable to understand it—into Social-Democracy, went backwards, to the liberals, . . . and the naïve illusions of petty-bourgeois socialism gave way to the practical sobriety of petty-bourgeois progress."³⁰ But parallel with the strangulation of revolutionary populism by czarist security police there was another process under way also destructive to its base—a class differentiation of the peasantry, which was barely visible at the dawn of the populist movement. "The countryside long ago split up completely," Lenin wrote, bringing out the basic social-economic causes of the break-up of populism. "And the old Russian peasant socialism split up with it, making way for workers' socialism, on the one hand, and degenerating into vulgar petty-bourgeois radicalism, on the other."³¹ These were the two ways of the evolution of revolutionary democracy in Russia and also the two options before revolutionary democracy in any country having to consider passing over to socialism in practical terms.

Lenin noted the quantum leap in the development of populism (Narodism) and the appearance of what was, in substance, a new phenomenon. "Only," he said, "it is not Narodism at all (in the old, customary meaning of that term). . . [Its] tremendously widespread character [has] been achieved at the cost of vulgarising Narodism, converting social-revolutionary Narodism, which was sharply opposed to our liberalism, into uplift opportunism, that merges with this liberalism and expresses only the interests of the petty bourgeoisie."³² The political essence of pop-

ulism changed: revolutionism yielded ground to liberalism; its class nature changed, too: with the peasantry split up, what it represented were not the peasants' interests in their totality any longer but those of the rural petty bourgeoisie; and so did its attitude to Marxism and to Social Democracy: instead of certain mutual understanding, co-operation, contacts and even alliance, typical of the 1870s, liberal populism, as represented by its mouth-piece *Russkoye Bogatstvo* (Russian Wealth) and its ideological moving spirit N. K. Mikhailovsky, "has launched a campaign against the Social-Democrats"³³ and started systematic hostile and unobjective criticism of Marxism. And yet it was the same old Narodism in the sense of its uncritical and even dogmatic faith in a number of basic theoretical propositions and its inability or unwillingness to develop them, change them or drop them as required by the new times and the new phase of the revolutionary struggle. These elements of continuity and fundamental ideological community, just as the underlying factor behind such evolution under certain circumstances, were also discovered by Lenin: "I have throughout tried to show that such a degeneration of the old theories was inevitable. I have throughout tried to devote as little space as possible to criticism of these gentlemen in particular and as much as possible to the general and fundamental tenets of the old Russian socialism."³⁴

Lenin applied, in broad outline, the assessment he made of liberal Narodism in the mid-1890s to the Socialist-Revolutionary Party created in 1901 and to all the parties and groups which branched off from it later on. "The Socialist-Revolutionary Party," Lenin wrote, "is, actually, nothing but a *subdivision* of the bourgeois democrats, a subdivision which in its composition is primarily intellectual, in its standpoint is primarily petty-bourgeois, and in its theoretical ideas eclectically combines latter-day opportunism with old-time Narodism."³⁵

The liberal tendencies of the Socialist-Revolutionaries came into conflict with the spontaneous democratism of the peasantry and restrained it. Lenin drew attention to this collision in 1913 in his article "What Goes On Among the Narodniks and What Goes On in the Countryside", analyzing the verbatim reports of the First and Second State Dumas. "The chief conclusion to be drawn from this material," Lenin wrote, "is that the Trudovik *intellectuals* (including the Socialist-Revolutionary intellectuals)

and the *peasant* Trudoviks represent essentially distinct political trends. The intellectual Narodniks gravitate towards conciliatory or 'philanthropic' phrases. One always senses the liberal in them. . . . The peasant Narodniks in both of the early Dumas were full of fire and passion. They were eager for direct and resolute action. . . . In other words, the Narodnik intellectuals are very bad socialists and lukewarm democrats. The peasant Trudoviks are far from playing at socialism, which is quite alien to them, but they are honest, sincere, ardent and strong democrats."³⁶ "Socialism as humane phrase-mongering—yes, we are for it; revolutionary democracy—no, we are against it"³⁷—that is how Lenin defined the position of the Socialist-Revolutionaries. Lenin made the conclusion that populist socialism in Russia was dead, that it had been killed by the Revolution of 1905, with nothing left of it but a rotten phrase, while peasant democracy in Russia was alive, and if it could win through, it was only in spite of the tendencies that populist intellectuals had brought with them.³⁸

But this apparently devastating assessment of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party was consonant with another one, given in the same context seven years before, in May 1906, right after the formation of the Trudovik group in the First State Duma and its political merger with the Socialist-Revolutionaries "into one *revolutionary democracy*". "The *rapprochement* between the Peasant, or 'Trudovik', Group in the Duma and the Socialist-Revolutionaries is not an accident," Lenin wrote. Earlier on he remarked: "Taken by themselves, the Socialist-Revolutionaries are a cipher. But as exponents of the spontaneous aspirations of the peasantry, the Socialist-Revolutionaries are a part of the broad, mighty revolutionary-democratic masses without whose support the proletariat cannot even think of achieving the complete victory of our revolution."³⁹ Lenin said it was imperative to see the weaknesses and inconsistency of the blind advocates of Narodism, their lurch to liberalism and their departure from revolutionary democracy and, at the same time, to reckon with their revolutionary potential, not yet used up, and with the confidence they enjoyed among spontaneous democrats—the peasants, and not to rule out the possibility of them producing new revolutionary trends and support such "active live forces". He set a model of such policy, welcoming the revolutionary democra-

tism of the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries and accepting an alliance with them.

Lenin's analysis of Russian revolutionary democracy was not confined to a definition of its class nature and the basic landmarks of its historical development. Lenin brought out a number of typical features of this movement which we can easily identify when considering the present-day revolutionary democracy of African and Asian nations, and defined its role and place in the revolutionary process and the fundamental attitude of Marxists to revolutionary democracy in the course of the liberation struggle. Let us have a look at these aspects of Lenin's concept.

The coincidence of the interests of large sections of society in the struggle against the autocracy and other vestiges of feudalism provided the natural environment for Russian revolutionary democracy. But it was not peasant democracy alone but liberal bourgeois democracy and Social-Democracy as well that operated in that environment. It was characteristic of revolutionary bourgeois democracy, i.e., peasant democracy in the Russian setting, to see the said coincidence of interests in a specifically subjective way, to exaggerate it and to view it as something absolute, which meant failing to understand and obscuring the class nature of the movement. "Popular and not proletarian"⁴⁰ socialism—that is the sum and substance of Russian petty-bourgeois revolutionary democracy.

"The Trudovik group," V. V. Vodovozov, a man of letters close to the Socialist-Revolutionary Party, wrote in 1912, "proceeds from the belief that at the present historical moment the interests of the peasantry, the working class and the working intelligentsia, far from contradicting each other, are practically identical."⁴¹ "Here we see at a glance the fundamental mistake shared by all the Narodniks, including those who are the most 'left'," Lenin commented on that statement. "...And it is the same sort of illusion as the one entertained by *all* bourgeois-democratic parties of Europe in the period of the struggle against feudalism and absolutism. In one form or another, the idea of a 'non-class party' dominated, but the 'force of historical conditions' invariably refuted this idea and shattered this illusion."⁴²

The supposedly supraclass, universal position of peasant democracy showed itself up in a variety of ways. One of its funda-

mentally important aspects was the negation of the role of the working class as the foremost fighter for democracy and socialism and the view of the "labouring peasantry" as the true Russian proletariat and of the peasant movement as a genuinely socialist movement. Another aspect was its inability to identify the class essence of political institutions, the State, parties, and "the Narodnik brand of anarchism".⁴³ And finally, the third aspect—the voluntarist and moralist approach to politics, based on subjective sociology, i.e., the faith in the good intentions and incomprehension of the social and economic factors behind human behaviour.

Subjective sociology did not boil down to scientific treatises; it invaded politics and led to what Lenin described as senseless and uncritical philistine trust in good wishes. "This petty-bourgeois gullibility is the root of the evil in our revolution,"⁴⁴ Lenin wrote. He described as a case of petty-bourgeois illusion its "unwillingness to admit that in a revolution the enemy classes must be *defeated*, the state power that defends them must be *overthrown* and that the 'will of the majority of the people' is insufficient to bring this about. What is needed is the *strength* of the revolutionary classes that will and can fight, a strength which at the decisive moment and place will *crush* the enemy's strength."⁴⁵

It was the failure to understand the class stratification, the class nature of the revolution and the social heterogeneity that Lenin held to be an important hallmark of petty-bourgeois revolutionary democracy in 1905. Both then and later on he was up against attempts at treating that uncertainty and indifferentiation as a virtue and veiling the class essence of petty-bourgeois parties by the community of their short-term interests. It became common for the ideologues of those parties to invoke "revolutionary democracy" to blur out the real political contradictions. They employed that concept to denote just about the entire opposition to the autocracy. Lenin used it differently. Speaking of revolutionary democracy in Russia, he, as a rule, meant its particular instance—the petty-bourgeois trends which preferred to call themselves nothing short of revolutionary democracy. But Lenin did not by any means exclude the wider notion of "revolutionary democracy" which would, indeed, comprise all consistent and uncompromising opponents of tsarism along

with unfailingly bringing out the class and political distinctions between them. That became perfectly obvious in the context of the new alignment of class forces after the February Revolution. "To continue in Russia to speak of 'revolutionary democracy' in general after the experience of February, March, April and May 1917 is to deceive the people knowingly or unknowingly, consciously or unconsciously," Lenin wrote in June 1917. "The 'moment' of general fusion of classes against tsarism *has come and gone* [Emphasis added—O.M.]. The very first agreement between the first 'Provisional Committee' of the Duma and the Soviet marked the *end* of the class fusion and the beginning of the class struggle. The April crisis (April 20), followed by that of May 6, then May 27-29 (the elections), etc., etc., *have brought about a definite cleavage of classes in the Russian revolution within the Russian 'revolutionary democracy'* [Emphasis added—O.M.]."⁴⁶

Attempts to stick to old concepts in the context of that new differentiation led to petty-bourgeois democrats quickly losing what remained of their revolutionary potential. Lenin wrote in that period about the title of "revolutionary democracy" "to which our Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks lay claim (and which they prostitute)",⁴⁷ and on the eve of the October Revolution he called men like "Lieberdants, Tseretelis . . . reactionary democrats".⁴⁸ Just because of the title of "revolutionary democracy" being vulgarized by the Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik opportunists, Lenin spoke of "the revolutionary Social-Democrats",⁴⁹ i.e., of the genuinely revolutionary force conscious of its organic connection with the class interests of the proletariat.

In his article "The Impending Catastrophe and How To Combat It", Lenin argued that the only ones who could claim to be called revolutionary democrats when a socialist revolution became an immediate task were those who supported the revolutionary proletariat: "The rule of the bourgeoisie is *irreconcilable* with truly-revolutionary true democracy. We cannot be revolutionary democrats in the twentieth century and in a capitalist country *if we fear* to advance towards socialism. . . To be really revolutionary, the democrats of Russia today must march in very close alliance with the proletariat, supporting it in its struggle as the only thoroughly revolutionary class."⁵⁰ Hence "the ne-

cessity . . . for the immediate transfer of all power to *revolutionary democrats, headed by the revolutionary proletariat*".⁵¹

Recalling once more the difference, which Lenin emphasized, between the spontaneous democratism of the peasant masses and the lurch of their intellectual exponents or representatives to liberalism, let me single out three points in his views on the significance of militant peasant democracy. First, he held it to be natural and inevitable in such a petty-bourgeois country as Russia. "Non-party revolutionism is a necessary and an inevitable phenomenon in the period of a bourgeois-democratic revolution," Lenin wrote. "Parties are the result and the political expression of highly developed class antagonisms. The characteristic feature of a bourgeois revolution is that these antagonisms are undeveloped. The growth and expansion of the non-party revolutionary-democratic element is therefore inevitable in such a revolution."⁵² Second, Lenin acknowledged its great revolutionary potential in the struggle against the landed classes and autocracy. Third, he underlined that the attitude of such sections to socialism and socialist revolution was by no means like that to bourgeois-democratic change, that they did not at all share the ultimate interests and goals of the proletariat and that, consequently, for the proletariat to be dissolved in petty-bourgeois democracy would be tantamount to giving up the struggle for socialism. "Their political significance for the *proletarian* movement," Lenin said, "may sometimes be small, if not actually negative. These elements are simply revolutionary and simply democratic because association with the one definite class which has cut loose from the ruling bourgeoisie, viz., the proletariat, is alien to them."⁵³

Lenin used these two points (on the one hand, the inevitable appearance and growing activity of non-proletarian revolutionary democracy and its tremendous revolutionary potential, and on the other, its questionable attitude to socialism and a possible antagonism with the proletariat on that ground) as guideposts for a historically specified definition of attitude to the non-Marxist revolutionary movement. Risking to be schematic, let me try to sketch out the methodological principles behind his approach to this issue.

Lenin was as far as Marx and Engels from imagining that it was nobody but people having a scientific perception of the his-

torical process, of the objectives and driving forces of revolution and revolutionary strategy who would be able to make their contribution towards advancing the revolution.

In the preface to his "The Poverty of Philosophy", Engels wrote: "What is wrong from the formal economic point of view may be correct from the universal historical point of view."⁵⁴ Lenin applied this proposition to revolutionary petty-bourgeois democracy and its "socialist" good wishes. "Narodnik democracy, while fallacious from the formal economic point of view, is correct from the *historical* point of view," he writes. "This democracy, while fallacious as a socialist utopia, is *correct* in terms of the peculiar, historically conditioned democratic struggle of the peasant masses which is an inseparable element of the bourgeois transformation and a condition for its complete victory."⁵⁵

But to support revolutionism in spite of differences of principle does not mean forgetting these differences or being allowed to discount them and to avoid soberly considering the actual possibilities of each political movement. "If we want to put the joint action of different classes on a sound basis, and if we want to ensure the real and durable success of such action, we must be clear as to the points on which the interests of these classes converge and those on which they diverge,"⁵⁶ that was the Marxist principle formulated by Lenin. "The workers have supported the peasants (against the feudal landlords), and will continue to do so," Lenin wrote, "but to confuse these classes, to confuse bourgeois democracy with the socialist proletariat, is reactionary adventurism",⁵⁷ "the proletariat must lead the peasantry, without merging with it".⁵⁸

Alliance with revolutionary democracy is neither unlimited nor unconditional. It is concluded within certain bounds and with certain aims. Lenin declared the organizational independence of the class party of the proletariat to be an indispensable principle of such an alliance.⁵⁹ Its aims were "to do all it can to support the revolutionary democrats in their struggle against the old authorities and the old order, warning the people against the instability of the liberal bourgeoisie, and counteracting the harmful effects of this instability by its fighting agreement with the revolutionary peasantry" and never forgetting about the need "to criticise idle dreams".⁶⁰

While criticizing the petty-bourgeois utopianism of peasant

socialism and castigating the yearning of petty-bourgeois politicians and ideologues for liberalism and opportunism, Lenin was extremely attentive and solicitous in tending the sprouts of true, though not proletarian, revolutionism and the possibilities for the best of petty-bourgeois revolutionaries to embrace scientific socialism.

As early as 1905, Lenin put forward the idea of transitional ideological platforms and political currents between petty-bourgeois and Marxist socialism, which is as relevant as ever and finds more and more confirmation, notably in Asian and African countries. In his article "Petty-Bourgeois and Proletarian Socialism" he wrote: "Some thirty years ago, Marxism was not predominant even in Germany, where the prevailing views of the time were in fact transitional, mixed and eclectic, lying between petty-bourgeois and proletarian socialism".⁶¹ As he examined the draft programme of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party, Lenin found it to indicate "progress from Narodism to Marxism, from democracy to socialism" and a certain effect of criticism by the RSDLP.⁶² Forced to underline their "views common with Marxism", the Socialist-Revolutionaries admitted even the stratification of the peasantry, the presence of kulaks (the wealthy exploiting section of the farming community), etc. Lenin knew what such eclectic views were worth. The platform of the Socialist-Revolutionaries raised what he described as "a pressing political issue which the Russian revolution promises to solve in the very near future: Who will take advantage of whom? Will the revolutionary intelligentsia, which believes itself to be socialist, utilise the toiler conceptions of the peasantry in the interests of the struggle against bourgeois-proprietary principles? Or will the bourgeois-proprietary and at the same time toiling peasantry utilise the socialist phraseology of the revolutionary-democratic intelligentsia in the interests of the struggle against socialism?". "We are of the view," Lenin continued, "that the second perspective will be realized (despite the will and the consciousness of our opponents). We are convinced that it will be realised because it has already nine-tenths been realized".⁶³

And still, in spite of so sceptical an approach to the Socialist-Revolutionary Party, Lenin, far from ruling out the possibility of some consistently democratic elements emerging from their midst, did not dismiss even that of their drawing closer to Marx-

ism. He welcomed each, if uncertain, step in that direction and pinned his hopes on it. He realized that support by such elements was essential for the proletariat. Hence his faith in the left groups of Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks. "...The 'active live forces' of the petty-bourgeois democracy are represented by the Left wing of the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks," he wrote in October 1917. "That this wing has gained strength, particularly since the July counter-revolution, is one of the surest objective signs that the proletariat is *not* isolated."⁶⁴ "Among the petty-bourgeois democrats, who cannot help wavering between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, the turn is objectively evident from the strengthening, consolidation and development of revolutionary internationalist trends: Martov and others among the Mensheviks, Spiridonova, Kamkov and others among the S.R.s",⁶⁵ Lenin stated in September 1917. It was also at that time that Lenin wrote about N. Sukhanov's long evolution from socialist-revolutionism to revolutionary Marxism.⁶⁶

Lenin's hopes regarding Sukhanov as well as Martov, Spiridonova and Kamkov did not come true. The subsequent twists of the revolution arrested their advance and threw them back to petty-bourgeois opportunism. Lenin bore witness to that deplorable and rather typical evolution. Yet he never dropped the idea of a long transition from petty-bourgeois revolutionary democracy to proletarian democracy and from socialist-revolutionism to Marxism. Moreover, he regarded it as one of the major aspects of the revolution, inseparably connected with the relationship of the working class and the peasantry. Lenin insisted on the old Bolshevik approach to the matter in question: "The peasants must be wrested from the influence of the bourgeoisie. That is the sole guarantee of salvation for the revolution".⁶⁷ There were two factors conducive to realizing that objective, as Lenin saw it. On the one hand, "the harsh lessons of capitalism will inevitably enlighten the small proprietors more and more rapidly, convincing them that the Social-Democrats are right, and will induce them to side with the proletarian Social-Democratic Party."⁶⁸ On the other hand, a sensible attitude of the Marxist vanguard to petty-bourgeois revolutionary democracy would be helpful. "We intend to guide (if the great Russian revolution makes progress) not only the proletariat, . . . but also this petty bourgeoisie, which is capable of marching side by side with us," Lenin wrote

in 1905 and called on the Party to raise revolutionary-democratic elements "capable of waging a struggle, and not acting as brokers" up to its own level.⁶⁹ "Today there is nothing more important for the success of the revolution than this organisation, education and political training of the revolutionary bourgeois democrats",⁷⁰ Lenin wrote in May 1906. That remained valid in principle right up to the full solution of the peasant issue in keeping with consistent socialist principles.

Such are, in broad outline, Lenin's views on revolutionary democracy in Russia—its class essence, evolution and prospects. Lenin never doubted the international significance and character of that phenomenon. In 1912, while urging that "Engels's profound thesis ['what is wrong from the formal economic point of view may be correct from the universal historical point of view'—*O.M.*] must be borne in mind when appraising the present-day Narodnik or Trudovik utopia in Russia," he added: "perhaps not only in Russia but in a number of Asiatic countries going through bourgeois revolutions in the twentieth century."⁷¹

Revolutionary Democracy in Eastern Countries in the First Half of the 20th Century

Lenin's prevision came true because it was based on an analysis of the natural laws of historical development. Russia belongs both to Europe and to Asia not only geographically but historically as well. She lies between East and West and is a meeting-place of two (to be exact, many) cultures and traditions. There is no mystery about a certain community of the historical destinies of Russia of the early 20th century and the Eastern nations which have arisen from colonial lethargy. Such a community was determined by their particular stage of the historical process—these were countries "going through bourgeois revolutions in the twentieth century".

Lenin called Russia a petty-bourgeois country, and that is even more applicable to the East as it had no economic admixtures (a kind of superstructure) of advanced capitalism, which were peculiar to Russia at the time. That is the natural ground for the comparability and similarity of the revolutionary democracy of Russia and the East, which led to Eastern countries repeating,

as it were, a number of typical features of that phenomenon which Lenin had studied, considering Russian reality. These comprise the emergence of intermediate sections on the political battlefield, a "factor of the general fusion of classes" (i.e. the convergence of their interests) and the ideas it prompted of the nationwide and supraclass character of the movement, petty-bourgeois trust in good wishes and faith in the force of example, education and influence (analogous with subjective sociology) and socialist dreams appropriate, as Lenin pointed out, to all the democrats of the age of bourgeois revolutions, and so on and so forth.

But the comparison of the revolutionary democracy of Russia and the East, even if chronologically limited to the "awakening of Asia", would be one-sided if it were confined to bringing out similarities and neglected the very essential distinctions produced by the particular historical conditions. That is particularly obvious to judge by later evidence. I refer to the advent of the new historical epoch of the general crisis of imperialism and the victory of socialist revolutions, first in Russia and then in other countries. In those circumstances, the revolutionary democracy of the East was bound to be filled with new substance. It would be absurd to try and apply Lenin's evaluations mechanically to the new historical material. All one can do is to apply the methodological principles which Lenin used in analyzing Russian Narodism (populism).

All Russian revolutionary democracy was painted in populist colours, Lenin emphasized. Although populist illusions are common to many social and political movements in the East, which has been conclusively demonstrated by V. G. Khoros,⁷² it would be wrong to apply Lenin's proposition unconditionally to the countries of Asia and Africa.

Russian populism (Narodism) had been produced by the expectation of a peasant revolution. It tried to prepare and bring it about. The pioneers of Narodism sought to resolve the agrarian issue, which was Russia's gravest social problem at the time, in a revolutionary way. That was their historical predestination. One cannot speak of Narodism in the full sense of the term without considering the peasant issue.

The revolutionary democracy of the East in the age of the awakening of Asia and at a later date had grown from funda-

mentally different ground. It was produced by the protests against colonial or semi-colonial imperialist oppression. It had a more or less pronounced social background in the shape of projected internal reforms and, on rare occasions, even a clearcut and militant social programme. But its primary and paramount task was to resolve the national and colonial question rather than overcome internal social contradictions. Paraphrasing Lenin's definition, one can say that all the revolutionary democracy of the East, but for very few exceptions, is painted in nationalist colours. Here we have a special, additional area of operation of revolutionism and democratism—anti-imperialism, militant nationalism and the struggle for national self-determination. The scope for revolutionary democracy is widening and it has a vaster field to operate in opening up before it. But it would be naive to imagine that all the new historical conditions have done was to supplement the old set of hallmarks of revolutionary democracy (Russian, populist and peasant) with yet another quality—anti-imperialism. If we add radical anti-imperialism to militant democratism and utopian peasant socialism, we will not get a formula of new revolutionary democracy arising from the bowels of the awakening colonial East or, at best, we will get the formula of only one of its variations.

The widening scope of operation of revolutionary democracy brought more of a quantum leap with it. The social nature of revolutionary democracy changed, its class base broadened and that led to a differentiation within it in accordance with the objectives that various classes of society pursued in the anti-imperialist movement. While in relation to Russia, Lenin, recalling the revolutionary democracy of the capitalists, the petty-bourgeoisie and the proletariat, underlined at the same time that all Russian revolutionary democracy (except revolutionary social-democracy) was petty-bourgeois, in relation to Asia and Africa we may also speak of bourgeois revolutionary democracy with admixtures of utopian peasant socialism. The Russian bourgeoisie was counter-revolutionary while the national bourgeoisie in Eastern countries, with national liberation, not socialism, as the goal of their struggle, still had certain revolutionary possibilities. That was the substance of the dispute between Lenin and M. N. Roy, who denied the revolutionary potential of the national bourgeoisie in the colonial countries, when they discussed the strategy and

tactics on the national and colonial questions at the Second Congress of the Comintern. Hence a whole array of revolutionary-democratic currents. Some had their entire revolutionary potential confined to anti-imperialism and militant nationalism, others added anti-feudalism to it, still others combined all that with action against capitalist monopolies, and some were up against capitalism in general. One can be revolutionary in one respect and not revolutionary in another. The whole spectrum of revolutionary democracy—from the revolutionary democracy of capitalists to that of the proletariat—is present in the East although here, too, petty-bourgeois trends predominate again as a general social and ideological background as well as a major political outlook.

The pursuit of common national goals, shared also by representatives of exploiter classes, leaves a peculiar imprint on the revolutionary democracy of the East. Nationalistic ambitions supplant social and class aspirations. The coincidence of the interests of various population groups in the struggle against imperialist exploitation creates an illusion of national unity exploited by domestic big business in a hundred and one ways. In such cases social justice shows itself as a pious wish, rather than a militant programme of consistent democratic change (e.g. that of revolutionary Narodniks). Nationalism, having become the pith and marrow of public life for a time, dislodged populist trends. These endured for the most part as inoffensive reminiscences, memories of good old things, faith in communal relations and national sources, not as a militant programme for resolving the agrarian issue. That was what happened to Mahatma Gandhi who was, of course, committed to militant anti-imperialism, especially during the first national campaign of non-cooperation, but whose nationalism absorbed all of his revolutionism in the agrarian issue and led to him putting it off indefinitely until independence. That was, to a certain extent, also what happened to Sun Yatsen who, having raised the question of equalised land tenure, hoped to get it resolved through national unity, rather than class struggle.

Naturally, the 80 years which have passed since the "awakening of Asia" have offered a wealth of evidence also for identifying an opposite trend, one for class consciousness to arise and consolidate itself on the ground of nationalist consciousness—the

first form of the ideological self-determination of oppressed nations. But that is a product of sustained development of revolutionary democracy, of rifts and divisions within it.

Eastern revolutionary democracy must not be seen as one piece. It was not such even in Russia, and Eastern countries offer still greater diversity. They have a wider range of classes capable of revolutionism and democratism, and some differ markedly by their historical conditions and levels of development. Hence an abundance of revolutionary democratic trends differing by their class content and by the degree of loyalty to the ideals of revolutionism and democratism.

Revolutionary democratic trends arose in each liberation movement that swept across Asia. The Iranian revolution of 1905-1911 began as a united national movement under the direction of moderate elements from among the clergy, merchants and liberal landowners. But no sooner had the Majlis been called and the Shah endorsed, under pressure from the popular movement, the "Addenda to the Fundamental Law of Iran" drafted by the Majlis, than the liberals withdrew from the popular movement. It was at that time, from 1907 on, that small tradesmen and artisans, handicraftsmen, poor townfolk and peasantry, and lower sections of the clergy came into the open as an independent force. The radical trend in the Iranian revolution had its mass support provided by organizations of the underground Society of Mujahidins ("Fighters for the Just Cause"), which sprang up in Iran's northern cities and among the Iranian émigrés in the Trans-Caucasus since 1905, and the enjumens (associations) which at first represented Majlis electoral colleges for specified areas.

Revolutionary democracy reached the peak of its activity in the Iranian revolution of 1905-1911 with the rebellion in Tabriz under the leaders of the armed detachments of fedayeens established by the Society of Mujahidins: Sattár, a peasant, Bagir, a mason, and the leader of the mujahidins, Ali Mossiu. The events in Tabriz reverberated throughout Iran. There were uprisings in many districts to defend the Constitution. Anti-Shah armed forces were created and in July 1909 they captured Tehran. In those circumstances, the liberals began re-joining the popular movement and succeeded in leading the struggle in most

cases. The mass of the people who had cast off the power of the Shah were now entrusting their interests with amazing credulity to the landlords, merchants and businessmen. Only in Iranian Azerbaijan did revolutionary-democratic elements control the situation. Once in power, the liberals, acting at the instance of Britain and Russia, invited the revolutionary detachments of Tabriz fedayeens to Tehran and disarmed them. The revolution was defeated. The only effect achieved because of the weakness of revolutionary democracy and the treachery of the liberals was to have the political system somewhat technically modified and Iran proclaimed a constitutional monarchy.

Since the Iranian liberals defected to the camp of counter-revolution as soon as the least of their demands were met, the social base of revolutionary democracy in Iran shrank and looked rather like the Russian model. Such an alignment of class forces was brought about both by the fact that the struggle was waged against the national government supported by a section of the exploiter classes rather than directly against the imperialist powers, and by the weakness of that government and the relative ease with which it yielded ground to the liberals. By its class essence, Iranian revolutionary democracy was petty-bourgeois, just as that of Russia. What distinguished it was its embryonic, undeveloped character. It had arisen largely spontaneously and had not been prepared either ideologically or politically or organizationally. It had no clear ideological platform, nor any clear action programme. The conspiratorial organizations of the mujahidins with their emphasis on individual terrorism, rather than the political education of the masses, proved to be ill-prepared for serving as revolutionary authorities. Their demands were essentially for political democracy, universal suffrage, freedom of speech, of strikes and public meetings, an eight-hour working day, responsibility of the local administration to the enjuments, the ending of foreign interference, etc. There was the idea to have the Shah's lands expropriated and landed estates bought out and distributed among the peasants. Neither the courage nor the self-sacrifice of revolutionary democracy saved it from weakness. It propelled the revolution but could not take advantage of its gains. That is the fate of any revolutionary democracy that is not prepared to lead a victorious revolution. Lenin, describing this typical situation in relation to the first Russian revolution,

said: while the proletariat fights, the bourgeoisie is stealing its way to power.

The uprising in Gilan under the leadership of Kuchik Khan was one of the most striking episodes of the Iranian democratic movement of the early 1920s, which was a response to the victory of the socialist revolution in Russia. That was a radical nationalist leader. In most resolutely demanding the expulsion of the British and the overthrow of the Shah's regime, he relied on the urban middle classes and the poor Kurd peasants, thus promoting the social aspect of revolutionary democracy which the Tabriz uprising produced only in a spontaneous embryonic form. What was particularly instructive was that Kuchik Khan was not in a hurry to proclaim socialist ideals but held that the revolutionary process had to develop stage by stage and realized that the first step was to be a national revolution requiring united action with bourgeois and petty-bourgeois elements and that it would be right and proper to speak of socialist change only when national sovereignty and democracy had been secured. In reflecting on the particular ways of revolution in the East, Kuchik Khan spoke of the need to reckon with the people's mode of thinking, their traditions, habits and religion. He raised those problems in his letters to Lenin and told him that he found the reckless policies of the ultra-left-minded Iranian Communists to be harmful to the cause of the revolution. Kuchik Khan welcomed the October Revolution and saw an alliance with the Russian Bolsheviks and the creation of a broad-based front of Iranian revolutionary forces as a source of hope for the successful development of the liberation movement in Iran. That was one of the earliest and best theories of transition from nationalism to socialism in Eastern countries. Unfortunately, practical steps in this direction did not succeed. The bodies of government established by the insurgents comprised people of various convictions who proved incapable of hanging together in the face of reaction and imperialism. At first the ultra-left-minded Communists who had entered the government staged a coup and declared that they were going to carry through socialist reforms at once. Then Kuchik Khan, who had a narrow escape, organized a crackdown on Communists. Weakened by internecine strife, the movement was crushed by the Shah's forces at the end of 1921.

The Turkish revolution of 1908 produced a different type of revolutionary democracy. The Young Turk Movement, supporters of the Committee of Union and Progress which sprang up late in the 19th century, set out to limit the rule of the Sultan, to put an end to the feudal and theocratic Ottoman Empire, transform Turkey into a constitutional state, strengthen the economic positions of the Turkish bourgeoisie and bring it into the ambit of political power and safeguard the country against imperialist intervention. A further upsurge of the movement began after the Russian revolution of 1905-1907. The Committee of Union and Progress established contact with the resistance movements of the nationalities oppressed by the Empire (Bulgarians, Albanians and Greeks), and launched a campaign of political education in Anatolia and among the Turkish troops in Macedonia. Early in July 1908, the commander of a Turkish garrison in Macedonia called a rebellion supported by other Turkish units and the local peasantry, whom the Committee of Union and Progress leaflets had promised better conditions. The rebellion quickly escalated into a large revolutionary movement. Battalions moved over from Anatolia to suppress it sided with the insurgents. Fearful of a march of revolutionary contingents on Istanbul, Sultan Abdulhamid II proclaimed the restoration of the Constitution on July 23, 1908.

The Committee of Union and Progress, though not in the government, wielded real power because it had the Army on its side. The first few weeks after the restoration of the Constitution saw an upsurge of the democratic movement and demonstrations of unity of various peoples who trusted that Turkey, once free, would recognize their rights to self-determination. In those circumstances, the programme of the Committee of Union and Progress, published in August 1908, provided for far-reaching democratic change. It even promised land to the peasants. But, as the subsequent events showed, that was no more than a belated echo of the revolutionary struggle.

Once in power, the Young Turks exhibited their bourgeois limitations in three major areas. First, the contradictions which erupted between the Turkish and non-Turkish bourgeoisie quickly exposed the Young Turks as having no sense of democracy as far as ethnic relations were concerned. The times of fraternization and united front action were over. The Young Turks

came out for the Empire to be kept united under the banner of Ottomanism and Pan-Turanism. Second, having won power with support from the working masses, the Young Turks hastened to dissociate themselves from their social demands and cut short their action in defence of their interests. Workers' strikes were suppressed by force. As early as September 1908, the Committee of Union and Progress revised its August programme, dropping a whole series of radical demands which had been put forward "on the spur of the moment". The provision for giving land to the peasants was replaced by an appeal to "assure the possibility" for the peasants to acquire land plots "by granting them loans on moderate terms" and "without any violation of the rights of the landowners".⁷³ Third, realizing that they were losing the confidence of the working masses and ethnic minorities, the Young Turks strove to convince the imperialist powers that they could be relied on and switched over from nationalist to comprador positions.

The history of the Young Turks attested to the extremely limited possibilities of purely bourgeois revolutionary democracy in the 20th century (as distinct from petty-bourgeois democracy with socialist "admixtures"). Their revolutionism boiled down to an armed struggle against the tyranny. Once it was overthrown, the Young Turks, as a noted Soviet Turkologist, A. F. Miller, stated, the Young Turks started quickly developing "from a militant bourgeois revolutionary organization into an undisguised enemy of the mass of the people".⁷⁴

Something like that occurred in Turkey again during the national liberation revolution of 1918-1923. The entire people rose against the imperialist powers which sought to divide the country, and the Sultan's regime which, totally bankrupt, was at their beck and call. The movement, with the insurgent peasants as the main force, was led by the national Anatolian bourgeoisie which found itself opposed to the Istanbul compradors who acted hand in glove with the Sultan and the imperialists. The leader of the movement, Mustafa Kemal, stood for the preservation of the territorial integrity of Turkey, for her full national independence, for the ending of foreign interference and for delivering the country from the fetters of feudalism in the political, intellectual and social fields, which prevented it advancing in step with the times. To achieve these ends, Kemal ventured

into audacious armed action against the Entente forces. But no sooner had the republic been proclaimed and the peasants and workers attempted, in a climate of revolutionary upsurge, to declare their class demands than the bourgeois nature of Kemalism became evident. Kemalism put an end to the Sultanate and displayed certain revolutionism in implanting the principle of laicism and abolishing medieval customs. It was creating conditions based on etatism for the development of national vested interests. But it remained deaf to the needs of the workers and peasants. The Kemalists had no radical democratic agrarian programme. Even the abrogation of the feudal tithe was delayed until 1925. The Kemalists in power were outspokenly hostile to the attempts of working people to defend their class interests. One of their principles—"popularity"—was interpreted as a negation of classes and class struggle in Turkey. The Communist Party was underground and persecuted. In January 1921, a group of Turkish Communists, with the Party's Chairman Mustafa Subhi at their head, were savagely murdered in Trabzon. Kemal tried to combine his anti-communism in domestic policy with a policy of friendship with the USSR whose support in the anti-imperialist struggle he valued highly. However, in the closing years of his life, the first President of the Turkish Republic allowed the effort towards building up links with the USSR to flag and the men who replaced him gave it up altogether.

It was the revolutionary movement in China that produced a model of revolutionary democracy in the days of the "awakening of Asia" which was most advanced politically and ideologically and nearest to Russian populism. Under the leadership of Sun Yatsen, a Chinese Revolutionary League (Tong Meng Hui) was formed out of scattered revolutionary organizations in 1905. It quickly became an influential political force in all the provinces and in the Army. The organization's social composition was motley, consisting as it did of petty bourgeoisie and middle-class elements, peasants and even some liberal-minded landlords. That was a "left-bourgeois bloc", as M. D. Kokin, a scholar of the 1930s, defined it.⁷⁵

The programme of the Chinese Revolutionary League was based on Sun Yatsen's three principles—nationalism, people's rule and people's well-being. At the turn of the century, the first

of them was interpreted by Sun Yatsen as confined to the expulsion of the Manchurian dynasty. People's rule implied deposing the monarchist regime and creating a democratic republic, while people's well-being was said to depend on establishing "equal rights to the land" which Sun Yatsen expected to rid China of capitalism. That was a "socialist increment" to the democratic programme in a quite populist spirit.

Acting under that programme and taking advantage of the national revolutionary situation first evidenced by peasant uprisings and unrest among soldiers in 1906-1908, the Revolutionary League got down to organizing the revolutionary action of the masses and turning "the old-style Chinese revolts ... into a conscious democratic movement".⁷⁶ The uprising of the revolutionary units of the Wuchang garrison on October 10, 1911 sparked off a revolution which quickly swept across the nation. Fifteen provinces refused to obey the Beijing government. A conference of representatives of revolutionary provinces, meeting in Nanjing on December 29, declared China a republic and elected Sun Yatsen its acting President. But following the victory of the revolution, the Revolutionary League, now the ruling party, developed stronger liberal tendencies. That was due, notably, to numerous bourgeois elements and landowners joining the league to be as close to the authorities as possible. They insisted on negotiations with the Beijing government under Yuan Shikai, who was reputed as liberal in monarchist circles. When, faced by the danger of a continuing civil war, the Emperor abdicated and Yuan Shikai became head of the republican government in Beijing, Sun Yatsen submitted to the will of the liberals and resigned, yielding power to Yuan Shikai.

In August 1912, the Revolutionary League merged with a number of liberal organizations to form a People's Party (Guomindang). The programme of that party, with Sun Yatsen still leading it, offered substantial concessions to the liberals (e.g. it had no mention of "equal rights to the land"). Yet Sun Yatsen himself did not lose his revolutionism and, when Yuan Shikai's unpopular and undemocratic policy became obvious, he called for fighting it and urged the people to make a "second revolution". But by that time the Beijing authorities had consolidated themselves and the uprising which began in May 1913 was put down.

In contrast with Turkey, where bourgeois democracy did its best to keep itself safe from genuinely popular social demands, the struggle that the "Chinese Populist" Sun Yatsen waged for popular government was associated, initially at least, with assuring "equal rights to the land" for all. In contrast with Turkey, revolutionary democracy in China did not use up its revolutionism at the outbreak of the struggle nor cynically betrayed its ideals, as one can see from Sun Yatsen's call for a "second revolution" in 1913 and from his entire subsequent activities. As distinct from Iran in 1911 and 1921, it was not quelled by armed force (to be exact, it was quelled only after its self-disarmament—not in 1911, but in 1913-1914). What caused Chinese revolutionary democracy to be defeated was its failure to understand the basic contradiction between revolutionism and liberalism, its inability to fence itself off from the liberals, and even some gravitation towards them, which was so akin to the petty-bourgeois trust in good wishes and fine phrases that Lenin spoke about. The transfer of power to Yuan Shikai by Chinese revolutionary democracy amazingly reminded one of the attitude of the Soviets dominated by the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks to the Provisional Committee of the State Duma in February 1917.

That was no chance situation. It reflected a certain level of the class struggle and class consciousness (to be exact, it showed the revolutionary democrats to have no class self-awareness). They failed to see the distinct class interests behind the distinct tactics of the left Radicals and Liberals, and that accounted for their obvious underestimation of the extent of contradictions between them and for their desire to have "everybody agree and to smooth everything out". Sun Yatsen shared certain illusions of class solidarity on the grounds of national unity. "His lectures about socialism rather clearly prove that having returned home after the overthrow of the monarchy, Sun Yatsen was building castles in the air," L. P. Delyusin, a Soviet Orientalist, wrote. "...He was averse to the idea of sharpening social conflicts and wanted the inequality between the rich and the poor to be ended peacefully. The projects he worked out were all inspired by a desire to help the poor but do it so as to prevent the way to social equality and the equality of property relations from being too thorny for the rich". While counting on the govern-

ment's organizing role, Sun Yatsen "did not consider the role of the people and the forms of their participation in the process of social change. Neither did he link the solution of the agrarian issue with the need for the peasants to be drawn into the movement for a redistribution of the landed estates".⁷⁷ Far from striving to bring about a peasant revolution, he did not even remain loyal, it was said, to the idea of "equal rights to the land".

"In the 1920s," A. V. Meliksetov, a Soviet Orientalist, notes, "Sun Yatsen already happened to formulate his ideal beside the Marxist. Sun Yatsen made it clear enough that he did not accept Marxism. True, he added that Marxism suited the social conditions of the West, but was no good at all for China. At the same time, he was looking for his ideological allies among other non-Marxist European socialist trends", declaring the communism of Proudhon and Bakunin to be authentic.⁷⁸

The conflicting nature of the platform of Chinese petty-bourgeois democracy did not make it incapable of playing a positive and leading role when a revolutionary situation reappeared by the mid-1920s. The First Congress of the Guomindang, meeting in January 1924, complemented Sun Yatsen's "three popular principles" with "three political guidelines" formulated by him, too. Those were: China's alliance with the USSR, the Guomindang's co-operation with the Communist Party of China (CPC), founded in 1921, and the defence of the interests of the peasants and workers.

That was Sun Yatsen's reply to the questions that history put before revolutionary democracy in the 1920s: about the attitude to the victorious socialist revolution in Russia, to the international communist movement and to the Communists of his own country. A positive answer to those questions was Sun Yatsen's greatest historic service, his outstanding contribution to the development of revolutionary democracy and his behest for the revolutionary democrats of subsequent generations in Eastern countries.

However, right after Sun Yatsen's death, the anticommunist elements in the Guomindang, fearful of the surging revolutionary initiative of working people and worried by the rising authority of the CPC, began to depart from united front tactics. In the spring of 1927, the Guomindang swung round to anti-comm

munist positions, at Chiang Kaishek's instance, and set about exterminating Chinese Communists. The action of Chiang Kaishek's men, who trampled Sun Yatsen's political guidelines underfoot, not only did irreparable damage to the Chinese national liberation movement, but had negative international consequences, as well. The Chiang Kaishek treachery contributed to stirring up sectarian dogmatism within the communist movement—dogmatism which turned the Chinese tragedy into a rule—and spreading anti-communism among the national bourgeois forces of the East.

In India revolutionary democratic tendencies were not unfamiliar even to the great national insurrection of 1857-1859. Although it was led by the feudal nobility, the democratic upsurge, combined with a bold appeal to radical means and patriarchal illusions about the pre-colonial paradise, was quite obvious. With the last pockets of resistance to foreign invaders stamped out, revolutionary democracy arose from the peasant movement in the 1870s. Its major exponent was Vasudev Balvant Phadke, a rebel from Maharashtra, who called for an armed struggle against the colonialists and raided the homes of usurpers and landlords with a peasant detachment he had created. That was a spontaneous movement that did not measure its forces and possibilities and was therefore doomed to defeat. Yet, it is those qualities that led to the national and social motives of the struggle being combined, which distinguishes peasant democracy from bourgeois democracy.

It was within the framework of the Indian national liberation movement in the 1880s that revolutionary democracy arose at provincial level (first of all, in Maharashtra) on modern, not feudal, grounds, and assumed national dimensions in 1905-1908. That was a movement of extremists, with Bal Gangadhar Tilak as their most recognized leader. Extremists (Tilak, above all) were the first Indian nationalists to realize that, without turning to the masses, their attempts at achieving self-determination would be doomed to failure. True, Tilak was far from calling for independent action by working people and for them to defend their own class interests rather than common national interests. He carefully pruned his programme of working people's social demands. He was a Hindu conservative as far as social is-

sues were concerned.⁷⁹ Tilak's revolutionism and democratism consisted in his militant anti-imperialism.

In Jawaharlal Nehru's view, Tilak was the first leader of the Indian National Congress (INC) to fetch a response from the masses.⁸⁰ He considered the contradiction between the colonial authorities and subject India to be irreconcilable, roundly condemned the destructive impact of British rule on national life and spoke up for the need to win political power and for self-rule to be recognized as the Indians' birthright. Tilak denounced the begging tactics of the liberals and their passion for petty reforms, instead of political struggle. While refusing to consider an uprising to be a worthwhile form of struggle in India in the 1880s-1890s and even later on, he still did not seek to justify the tactics of passive resistance in the form of a boycott of British goods and of all things British in general by religious, philosophical and ethical reasons, as Mahatma Gandhi did. Tilak preached most extreme nationalism and found it to be impermissible to contain a revolutionary thrust by legal or moral considerations.

The revolutionary democratic trends gained more ground in the liberation movement as the left wing of the INC became more active in the late 1920s and in the 1930s. Strongly impressed by the ideas and practice of scientific socialism, Jawaharlal Nehru, back from the Congress of Oppressed Nationalities in Brussels and a brief visit to the USSR, attempted to induce the moderate INC leadership to resolute anti-imperialist action. He put forward the demand of full political independence and called for social problems to be resolved to the benefit of working people, with some socialist change as an eventual prospect. That was the first time that the question of nationalism being limited and insufficient and of a socialist perspective being indispensable for the liberation movement was raised in India outside the framework of the communist movement. Nehru urged bringing up the masses in a revolutionary spirit and fostering their initiative.

Nehru tried to get his programme carried out through the Independence for India League, created on his initiative, which had central and local bodies. Its branch in the United Provinces (the strongest of the League's local organizations) was, as Nehru believed, manifestly socialist by its outlook.⁸¹ The programme of that branch spoke of a reform of the existing feudal and capi-

talist base of society, the prospective socialist state, and the imposition of control over the means of production and distribution. As the short-term priorities, it called for setting up trade unions and peasant unions, introducing progressive and steeply graduated taxation on profits (including planned land revenues) and inheritance taxes, carrying out a radical agrarian reform with the removal of all intermediaries and partial cancellation of peasant debts, introduction of universal suffrage, the right to strike, the eight-hour working day, abolition of untouchability, declaration of women's equality, and so on and so forth.⁸²

The UP branch programme was revolutionary, but it did not correspond to the ideological and organizational level of the movement which was manifestly loose and still under top-level INC influence. As Congress showed signs of growing militancy the League was withering away. With the launching of the campaign of civil disobedience in 1930, it merged with Congress and ceased to exist in its own right.

The left forces in the INC were not uniform. Quite a considerable group consisted of Socialists—members of the Congress Socialist Party, founded in 1934, which broke up into three trends, at least. Some held themselves to be Marxists (Jay Narayan and Narendra Deva), while others adhered to social-democratic views (Asoka Mehta and Minoo R. Masani), and still others maintained their faith in Gandhian principles but considered it necessary to apply them more resolutely and uncompromisingly (Ram Lohia and Achyut Patwardhan). The so-called Marxists in the INC were few, but enjoyed respect. They frightened moderate Congress leaders by their bold criticism of Gandhism and disrespect for non-violence. They obviously dominated the scene in setting ideological priorities, which made the Party look more revolutionary than it actually was. The Congress Socialist Party proclaimed itself to be Marxist (but not Marxist-Leninist). Manifestly opposed to going along with the international communist movement, it did not join the Socialist International either. Only Marxism can bring anti-imperialist forces over to their ultimate goals. The party members must, therefore, be quite familiar with the technique of the revolution and the theory and practice of the class struggle, and must know the nature of the state and the processes leading to socialist society. The Congress Socialists aimed their efforts at

achieving full independence and creating a socialist state. Initially, they wanted to impose their platform on all the INC, but, under fire, notably, from Indian Communists and the group of M. N. Roy,⁸³ they moderated their demands to the INC and proposed to transform it into an anti-imperialist front uniting various classes on Indian society.

Supporters of S. C. Bose,⁸⁴ a radical Bengali nationalist, formed an independent faction among the left forces in the INC. He was convinced of the necessity of overcoming the reformist illusions of the "old guard" of the INC and getting the mass of the people to be politically active and revolutionized. Yet another thing Bose did not like about the INC policy was its treatment of compromise as a point of principle, the Gandhian idealization of the old times, and the Gandhian passion for constructive work which, in Bose's opinion, impeded the task of mobilizing workers, peasants and youth whom he regarded as the backbone of the liberation struggle. Bose warned against making a fetish of national unity and called for distancing themselves from the exploiter sections bent on a compact with Britain. He believed that the aggravation of social conflicts would only contribute to winning independence and that national and social struggle had to be waged simultaneously.

Like all left-wing leaders, Bose used socialist slogans. He considered Gandhian tactics of civil disobedience to be insufficient and called for it to be supplemented by creating parallel governments based on local INC committees and by training workers, peasants and youth for direct action to win their demands. However, Bose had his revolutionism and radicalism combined with negative tendencies. A researcher from the German Democratic Republic, Bianca Schorr, writes that he did not rule out the possibility of using terrorist methods, that he was an ambitious, self-conceited and authoritarian man, and that he counted on the elitist group of fighters following a strong leader and made no secret of his sympathy for fascism.⁸⁵

Such were the motley forces in the INC which could have formed a kind of left bloc with the Communist Party of India in the 1930s if the objective coincidence of their interests had not been hampered by subjective mutual mistrust and misunderstanding. Disunity, inability to work out a common action plan and to make a sober assessment of their possibilities with due regard for

the interests of the anti-imperialist struggle, waverings and improvisation bordering on adventurism peculiar to petty-bourgeois revolutionaries were the main weaknesses of the left wing of Congress. Those weaknesses, coupled with the able tactics of Mahatma Gandhi and right-wing leaders of the INC, led to the left wing sustaining a serious political defeat in the late 1930s.

In Indonesia the most influential revolutionary democratic trend in the course of the anti-imperialist struggle since the 1930s and in the opening years of independence was associated with the name of Sukarno. He was known to take his bearings from the working masses—peasants, workers, artisans and small tradesmen, and democratic intellectuals. Sukarno made concern for their lot the major principle of his political platform. Hence the name of the ideology worked out by Sukarno—Marhaenism (derived from a widespread name Umar Haen or Marhaen, figuratively meaning an ordinary man). Marhaenism was not confined to asserting national sovereignty because Sukarno proclaimed his intention to resolve social contradictions to the benefit of working people. But he thought that could be done on the basis of national unity, by common consent, using the ancient traditions of unanimous concord and compromise arrived at through discussion and mutual concessions. Sukarno did not believe that class conflicts shaped the life of colonial society. He thought that the foremost contradictions in it were those between representatives of the East and the West, between the colonizers and the colonized.⁸⁶ That was right in its own way. But this proposition could be interpreted not only on the basis of scientific concepts of classes and class struggle but also on the basis of an idealistic concept of national unity. Sukarno avoided full clarity on these issues but, as a matter of fact, tended to favour the latter solution. That did not prevent him expressing his sympathy not only for socialism, but for Marxism as well. As early as the 1930s, Sukarno wrote that “nationalism in the Eastern world has been wed to Marxism; it has become a new nationalism”,⁸⁷ without realizing that the prophetic sense of that phrase was a prevision of attempts by radical nationalists to adapt scientific socialism to their own needs.

In 1945 Sukarno formulated his programme in the shape of “five principles” (“Panchasila”): nationalism (sovereign and

unitary nation-state), humanism or internationalism (equality and co-operation of all nations), democracy (popular representation, political freedom), general welfare (economic equality) and faith in god (religious tolerance).⁸⁸ All of Indonesia's patriotic forces rallied behind those slogans in the closing stages of the struggle for independence.

In Burma the revolutionary democratic trend in the national liberation movement took shape under the impact of spontaneous peasant risings, above all, the great peasant rebellion of 1930-1932. The Dobama Asiayone political society, created in 1930, came to be dominated by left trends in the mid-1930s, which transformed the Dobama Asiayone into a revolutionary democratic organization by the end of the decade. In search for support from the masses, the revolutionary democrats, led by Aung San, created an All-Burma Trade Union Organization and an All-Burma Peasant Association in 1939. The latter's demand for the abolition of landed estates was included by the Dobama Asiayone into its programme as early as 1940 along with demands for full independence, democratic freedoms, nationalization of the land and major industries, and establishment of a democratic dictatorship of the working class and the peasantry. Social, above all, agrarian issues figured prominently in the platform of Burma's revolutionary democracy. So did its provision for co-operation with Communists. The leadership of the Communist Party of Burma, created in 1939, comprised the leaders of the left wing of the Dobama Asiayone, including Aung San. Dobama Asiayone documents stressed that this organization was not communist but it was not afraid of the "spectre of communism" and had its doors open to all fighters against imperialism.⁸⁹ The socialist tendencies of Aung San and his followers were not free from subjectivism and utopianism, but that did not prevent them being revolutionary and democratic.⁹⁰ As a matter of fact, that was an ideological and political trend of a new type which later on came to be called a non-capitalist option or socialist orientation. The fruitful impact that scientific socialism had on it was beyond question. Unfortunately, the split in the Communist Party of Burma in the 1940s, the switchover of some of its leaders to adventurist ultra-left positions and the assassination of Aung San by right-wing extremists weakened Burmese revolutionary democracy and held up for years the actual efforts to carry

through the programme of non-capitalist development which, given a favourable set of circumstances, could have begun right after independence.

There is no space and no need to mention here all the revolutionary democratic trends which emerged in what was once a colonial world. Admittedly, there is an endless variety of more or less developed, stable and durable revolutionary democratic trends that arise in any liberation movement.

The foregoing sketchy account of the development of revolutionary democracy in Eastern countries in the period of the "awakening of Asia" right to the end of the Second World War prompts a number of conclusions. With an essentially convergent mass base, assured by the common stand against imperialism, this revolutionary democracy can be seen to consist of two trends—bourgeois and petty-bourgeois (proletarian revolutionary democracy, i.e., the communist movement, is not considered here). The attitude to the "socialist increments" serves as a fairly clear divide between them. Bourgeois democrats (radical nationalists) did without them. The social programme of petty-bourgeois democrats was based on subjective socialism.

The revolutionary democracy of the period under review produced two models of socialist conceptions. On the one hand, it was subjective socialism painted in nationalist colours with petty-bourgeois illusions about class reconciliation based on the national traditions of mutual assistance. Clear examples of that brand of socialism were offered by Sun Yatsen and Sukarno. On the other hand, there was an obvious gravitation towards scientific socialism, which suggested a transition from nationalism to socialism, and preparation of the prerequisites of socialism in the nationalist stage of the struggle. Such trends showed themselves in various ways and to various degrees in the philosophies of Kuchik Khan, Aung San, and (in the 1920-1930s) Jawaharlal Nehru and a number of Indian Socialists, followers of M. N. Roy. They did not deny that the ideas of scientific socialism were applicable to their countries in principle and recognized the inevitability of the class struggle. Some of them even declared themselves committed to scientific socialism.

After the victory of the October Socialist Revolution in Russia and the rise of the communist movement in the East, revolution-

ary democrats had to determine their attitude to the world's first socialist state and to the Communists in their own countries. On the first point they were practically unanimous: both Kemal and Sun Yatsen appreciated the need for an alliance with the Soviets in the drive for national sovereignty and against imperialism. But the attitude to the Communists of their own countries betrayed two diametrically opposite modes of approach. Bourgeois revolutionary democrats as represented by the Kemalists hounded the Communist Party of Turkey and drove it underground. Petty-bourgeois revolutionary democrats strove for co-operation with Communists. That was the position of Sun Yatsen, Kuchik Khan, Jawaharlal Nehru and Aung San.

So even within the period under review, revolutionary democracy begot embryonic trends which took shape in the socialist-oriented countries by the mid-1970s in full measure and in different forms, at a different level of historical development and with a different degree of maturity. The distinctions between the revolutionary democracy of these two historical epochs are easy to explain: in the 1920s-1930s the people of the colonial countries were only beginning their battle for freedom, while the 70s saw the outcome of that battle practically decided, old colonialism almost totally wiped off the face of the earth and a world system of socialism operating as the determining factor of societal development.

The nature of the period largely determined the weakness of the pioneers of petty-bourgeois revolutionary democracy in Eastern countries. They did not yet represent, as a rule, a completely self-determined and independent political force which had broken entirely with national reformism. Although many revolutionary democrats of those times sought to strengthen their social base in the mass organizations of working people, they failed to do so. The counter-measures of local capitalists, the low level of political understanding of the masses and the surviving anti-imperialist potential of some sections of the bourgeoisie of the Eastern countries did not allow revolutionary democracy to make itself a sure leader of the popular movement. It was the national bourgeoisie that remained the leading class in the anti-imperialist movement in most countries. Very often revolutionary democrats even did not set themselves the aim of leading the anti-imperialist movement. Theirs was a more modest concern—

to use in full the anti-imperialist possibilities of bourgeois leaders and organizations and to make them develop revolutionary qualities.

The objective weakness of revolutionary democracy, which had not yet completely emerged from the womb of the liberation movement led by the national bourgeoisie, found expression in its ideological guidelines, too. In some instances, those were the illusions of a "class peace" after independence, while in other cases, even if the fundamental principles of scientific socialism were accepted, they were applied selectively, rather than comprehensively, which left the door open to idealism and, along with it, reformism as part of the otherwise revolutionary social and political platform. Hence a trend for compromise and for association with all political currents retaining at least a semblance of anti-imperialism, faith in good intentions, i.e., the qualities which Lenin found to be peculiar to the Russian populists as they moved from revolutionary democracy to liberalism.

The weakness of the social, organizational and ideological base of revolutionary democracy made itself felt also in that its influence was largely determined by the performance of outstanding leaders who had won widespread national recognition. The death of Sun Yatsen heralded the decline of revolutionary democracy in the Guomindang, the assassination of Aung San seriously damaged the positions of revolutionary democrats in the Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League in Burma, and in India the left were considerably stronger as long as Jawaharlal Nehru was with them.

The general weakness of revolutionary democrats deprived them of an opportunity to perform well while in power. They wielded power only for a short space of time (Sun Yatsen in China or Kuchik Khan in Iran's Gilan Province) in time of war which absorbed all of their efforts. Stable power was gained only by bourgeois revolutionary democrats (the Young Turks, Kemal Ataturk) who, having taken up the reins, quickly set themselves up against working people and used up their revolutionism or converted it into a pursuit of modernization, leaving the foundations of the established social order intact.

Of course, it is easy to criticize the Eastern petty-bourgeois revolutionary democracy of bygone times from the vantage-point of the 1980s. Yet one must not forget that it comprised quite a

few really outstanding and self-sacrificing revolutionary political leaders who were for the first time in the world resolving the trickiest problem of combining the anti-imperialist struggle with socialist aspirations in domestic and international circumstances favouring a capitalist, rather than socialist, option. It is not by chance that those were the individuals who started off the large-scale propagation of the ideas of socialism in Eastern countries.

Socialist Orientation and Revolutionary Democracy

Revolutionary democracy in Asia and Africa reached a major peak and developed new qualities in the late 1950s and in the 1960s, as the general crisis of imperialism entered a new stage marked by the collapse of the world colonial system. The international and domestic situations had been generally revolutionized so much that it was no longer the bourgeoisie but petty-bourgeois elements, otherwise known as intermediate elements, that emerged at the top of the national movement in a number of countries. In some cases (the Arab world), the bourgeoisie discredited itself as a national force capable of leading the struggle against imperialism and had to yield leadership to intellectuals of all stripes. In other cases (Tropical Africa) the national movement was taking shape and scoring its first victories against the background of extremely insignificant development of local capitalism, the total absence or weakness of elements of the national bourgeoisie. And that, naturally, brought petty-bourgeois revolutionary democracy forward into commanding positions. The period that followed the Second World War was generally one of rising political activity and influence of petty-bourgeois groups, their radicalization and their conversion to the ideals of socialism. Petty-bourgeois radicals were coming to power. Now it was no longer they who had to seek alliance with the bourgeoisie but the bourgeois elements, which had lost or never gained a monopoly of supreme leadership, had to fall in step with the new national leadership in the hope of influencing it and retaining their own positions. That shift brought about a new version of non-capitalist development carried on under the leadership of revolutionary democratic political groups, rather than Marxist-

Leninist parties, in contrast with how it happened in the former outlying ethnic minority regions of tsarist Russia and a number of Asian countries where socialist revolutions had taken place. They expressed the interests of a large bloc of national anti-imperialist forces comprising not only workers, peasants and the petty bourgeoisie, but representatives of the national business community as well. The watershed passed between patriots and compradors, not between working people and exploiters. Moreover, working people were by no means the recognized leaders of the national front. In it all the social forces operated on equal terms and balanced each other out to a certain extent. Control was in the hands of the radical petty-bourgeois elements who considered themselves to be above the classes and did enjoy a good measure of independence from them because of the weakness of the bourgeoisie and the proletariat and the concentration of great political and economic power.

African national or revolutionary democracy has arisen from anti-imperialist nationalism. There was too little room for it there and it aspired to socialism. But it did not break with nationalism, having only extended its bounds, imparted a democratic, progressive and consistently anti-imperialist character to it, and created prerequisites for a closer approach to scientific socialism. It is indicative that the revolutionary democracy of the late 1950s and the early 1960s arose, as a rule, in a setting where political independence had been won. Hence its strong gravitation towards social problems, although anti-imperialism remained its main thrust and substance.

The conversion to the ideals of socialism was not a privilege of revolutionary democracy in the 1950s and 1960s. It was a broader trend which gave rise to so-called "national socialism". But distinctions between the reformist and revolutionary trends within the framework of this ideological and political movement were rather essential. The national reformists rejected Marxism-Leninism while national democrats accepted a good number of its precepts as their guide to action. National reformists disregarded the boundary between socialism and modern capitalism, the so-called "welfare state", while national democrats laid open the social ulcers of capitalism of the latter half of the 20th century. National reformists comforted themselves with illusions about the coming of a new era of co-operation with former metropolitan

countries, while national democrats called for a stout battle against imperialism and for a vigilant attitude to neocolonialist methods. National reformists feared a "communist penetration" of Africa while national democrats opted for co-operation with the USSR and the other countries of the socialist community, regarding them as bulwarks of resistance to colonialism and neocolonialism. National reformists interpreted national unity as a rejection of class struggle, while national democrats recognized the universal character of the class struggle and marked the basic contradiction between the forces of reaction and those of progress in their countries.

These properties of the policy and ideology of revolutionary democracy enabled it to advance the revolutionary process in the countries concerned. But it did not go the whole hog in dissociating itself from the reformist trends of "national socialism". There still remained a certain measure of ideological and political convergence which was determined not only by the anti-imperialist potential the national reformists had not yet used up and the objective contradictions between imperialism and the former colonial world. National democrats were to a certain extent unanimous with national reformists in their concepts of the unique "African personality" and of the inborn inclination of the peoples of Africa towards socialism, and in their assumption that capitalism could be imported into Africa only from without and did not strike root in it, and that contradictions among the patriotic forces were not antagonistic and could be overcome in the process of co-operation and so on.

The conflicting nature of national democracy showed itself in the waverings now to the right, now to the left in the area of economic policy, in the gap between word and deed, in the rise of bureaucratic elements lining their pockets at the expense of the state and the people, and in the loss of the prospect for deeper social change. In a number of cases, this led to the fall of national democratic regimes in the latter half of the 1960s and in the early 1970s or to their conversion to national reformism. The main cause behind those reverses was, evidently, by no means the slow pace of social change, but the inability to dig in on the lines achieved without dissipating the revolutionary potential. The blame for it lies with the weakness of the political vanguard which was socially heterogeneous and ideologically

loose and became the battlefield of a pitched class struggle between the component elements of the national front whose antagonistic character was short-sightedly denied. The absence of clear class leadership made itself felt. It is not for nothing that it should have become typical of the ideological and political platform of national democracy in the latter half of the 1960s to call for peasants and workers to play the leading role in the patriotic front and for the bourgeois elements to be barred from political leadership. But this kind of change was quite often made from above, betraying mistrust of an independent class organization of working people, as it happened in Egypt under Nasser when attempts were made to reform the Arab Socialist Union and create a vanguard party.

In the African revolutionary democracy of the latter half of the 1960s and the early 1970s there were both a progressive trend (which consisted in recognizing the need for a further restriction of the influence of the bourgeoisie on political power and for an enhancement of the role of working people) and a reverse trend (that is, a return to national reformism as a result of either a coup d'état against national democratic regimes or a degeneration of national democracy in power).

By the late 1960s and the early 1970s the ruling groups of national democracy lost some of their following because of the difficulties each had to live through. There was a certain observable crisis of that movement, which sceptics exploited to question the very possibility of a new version of non-capitalist development, worked out by communist and workers' parties.

However, in the latter half of the 1970s, the movement of revolutionary democracy in Africa took a new lease of life as it received a powerful reinforcement in the shape of vanguard forces in the former Portuguese colonies, revolutionary Ethiopia and other countries where they had come to power. These forces relied on the experience of their predecessors and strove to draw conclusions from their setbacks and difficulties. One typical feature of the new contingent of African revolutionary democracy was its greater determination and consistency in approaching scientific socialism which they unequivocally identified with Marxism-Leninism. Irrespective of whether these parties declare scientific socialism to be their ideological and theoretical base (MPLA-Party of Labour, FRELIMO are among those which

do, while the PAIGC, PAICV, and MLSTP among those which do not), they share the basic precepts of Marxism-Leninism about the class structure of society and socialist revolution. Yet they do not proclaim socialism to be their immediate priority and do recognize the transitional stages of a national democratic or popular democratic kind.

Along with this fresh reinforcement of revolutionary democracy, there has been a continued evolution of the veterans of this trend—the ruling parties of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria, Tanzania and some other countries. It has been typical of them to be deliberately distancing themselves from Marxism-Leninism in the theoretical field on the grounds of loyalty to religious principles, national traditions and things like that. Such an approach in itself is not an obstacle to a further consolidation of the class character of revolutionary democracy, which has taken place in a number of cases.

There has been a hitch in the process of social change in some countries of the first generation of socialist orientation (especially in the Arab world). Socialist trends have shown no appreciable advance there. Bourgeois elements have been adapting themselves to the new conditions and finding ways to enrich themselves, notably through the public sector. In such circumstances, mistrust of working people and an ambition to hamper their class-based self-determination have been particularly harmful. So the subjective socialist spirit of revolutionary democracy peters out, finding no support in actual accomplishments, but its militant anti-imperialism endures.

The political trend geared to non-capitalist development was originally called “national democracy” in the documents of the international communist movement. When, at a later stage, the same phenomenon began to be defined as “revolutionary democracy” in scientific and political publications, that created the problem of relationship between these two concepts. It is difficult to find the right solution to this problem without first establishing how revolutionary democracy was understood.

In pre-war and particularly in post-war times, Lenin's broad concept of revolutionary democracy, including that in Russia, was consigned to oblivion by many. Lenin is known to have given a dialectical assessment of the complex evolution of this con-

tradictory phenomenon in the course of 60 years—from the predecessors of populism (Narodism) to the final defection of the leadership of the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries to the fold of counter-revolution. In the 1930s and 1940s and in the early 1950s the problem was oversimplified and the history of revolutionary democracy in Russia shortened. Traces of such an approach were quite evident in the article on "Revolutionary Democrats in Russia" in Volume 36 of the second edition of the Great Soviet Encyclopaedia which appeared in 1955. It recounted the great historic services of revolutionary democrats of the 1850s-1860s in the movement for emancipation and in advancing philosophical and social thought. However, it did not underline the specifically peasant, rather than proletarian, character of their socialism. It was implied that only the level of Russia's historical development, and by no means their own subjective persuasions, prevented the revolutionaries of the 1860s from embracing scientific socialism. Publications of those times laid much stress on the indisputable fact that the great Russian revolutionary democrats of the 1850s and 1860s had been the forerunners of Russian social-democracy but passed over another fact that they were not only forerunners but pioneers of populism, which set itself up against Marxism when it struck root in Russian soil.

The revolutionary populists (Narodniks) of the 1870s were still acknowledged in the encyclopaedia as "revolutionary democrats" in spite of the fact that they had backed down in ideology and turned to terrorist methods. The later record of revolutionary democracy was described as follows: "The subsequent evolution of populist ideology led to the liberal Narodniks of the 1880s losing their revolutionary democratic features and giving up the revolutionary struggle against the autocracy, and to their views becoming the principal obstacle in the way of Marxism and the social-democratic movement in Russia". There was a significant note: "Look up the list of literature on the subject in the articles on V. G. Belinsky, A. I. Herzen, N. P. Ogarev, N. G. Chernyshevsky and N. A. Dobrolyubov".

So revolutionary democracy in Russia, to judge by that article, ceased to exist by the early 1880s. Its classic exponents were Herzen and Chernyshevsky, and with the coming of the revolutionary populists it fell into decay. The encyclopaedia failed to

mention that Lenin attached paramount importance to non-party revolutionary democracy in 1905 and 1917 and believed that it had a tremendous revolutionary potential and that there had to be an alliance with it and with petty-bourgeois parties in the course of the democratic revolution. The encyclopaedia also ignored that even in October 1917 Lenin saw the left-wing Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks as live forces of petty-bourgeois democracy. The approach displayed by the encyclopaedia did tremendous damage to the investigation of the problem. The chronologically nearest developments extremely important for an understanding of revolutionary processes in petty-bourgeois countries which were yet to go through a bourgeois revolution in the 20th century were not studied. They were dismissed as reactionary and revolutionary democracy was antiquated, oversimplified and idealized.

With the exploration of the problem of non-capitalist development emerging into the forefront of Soviet Oriental and African studies in the early 1960s, Lenin's ideas of revolutionary democracy were emphatically recalled as applied to Russia. But many students of socialist orientation in Asian and African countries stuck to the restricted interpretation of revolutionary democracy as principally the brain-child of Herzen and Chernyshevsky, which they had learned while still at school or at college.

The early attempts at commenting on the policy principle of non-capitalist development often underestimated the complexity of this process. Movement along that road was often represented as the development of a bourgeois-democratic revolution into a socialist one under the dominant control of the proletariat and the leadership of a Marxist party, while the deep-going class contradictions between the political forces leading it were ignored. With such a notion as the guideline, an oversimplified and narrow-minded understanding of revolutionary democracy served as a convenient model. The leaders of radical nationalism were viewed as revolutionary democrats of the kind that was peculiar to the 1860s. But while the latter were prevented from measuring up to Marxism by objective conditions, the Afro-Asian revolutionary democrats were induced by objective conditions to embrace Marxism and it was only their inadequate information, which could easily have been made up for by a study and expla-

nation work of Marxists, that appeared to be in the way of them learning scientific socialism thoroughly.

The partisans of such a viewpoint assumed that the term "national democracy" did not correspond to the level of the revolutionary potential of the forces working for a non-capitalist way of development, that "revolutionary democracy" was superior to national and, therefore, it was this term that should be used.

That kind of outlook arose from a failure to understand two major things: the objective predetermination of the class base of the petty-bourgeois concepts of socialism (both in Russia in the middle of last century and in the East 100 years later) and the fundamental distinctions in the social base of Russian revolutionary democracy and ideologues of non-capitalist development in Africa and Asia in the early 1960s. As has been noted, revolutionary democracy in Russia expressed the interests of working people, while in the East it expressed those of a broad front of national forces, including the patriotic elements of exploiter classes. It is beyond doubt that these are different things in their class essence and the theorists who objected to a restricted concept of revolutionary democracy being applied to the leaders of non-capitalist development insisted on sticking to the term "national democracy" as one faithfully denoting the specific quality of the thing in question, namely, laying emphasis on the national priorities and the national-colonial question and on rallying a nation's progressive forces for its revolutionary solution.

Two groups came to the fore within the framework of national democracy by the mid-70s. Their general evaluation has been offered earlier on. This development found its reflection in scholarly publications in a new understanding of the correlation of national and revolutionary democracy, which has gained much currency. National democracy is understood as the first, primary stage of non-capitalist development distinguished by a broad front of anti-imperialist forces comprising bourgeois elements, with no dominant control by the working class. Revolutionary democracy speaks for the interests of workers, peasants and other working people, recognizing scientific socialism as the ideological foundation of the movement. In other words, revolutionary democracy is a new generation of supporters of socialist orientation.

Putting the matter this way carries more conviction. It is quite realistic as to the class-based assessment of the opening stage of non-capitalist development. It accurately represents the salient features in the ideological platforms and strategic guidelines of the partisans of a new generation of socialist orientation. Perhaps, there is a certain mixing up of ideological precepts and reality. But the main drawback of this construction is an arbitrary or conditional use of terms.

Its authors, just as those in the former case, proceed from a restricted understanding of revolutionary democracy. They imagine it to be a quite definite political trend with a clear class content. They identify it with new forms of socialist orientation. But that is no more than a particular case of revolutionary democracy and there is no ground for constructing it as a general notion.

And, finally, there is the third approach that arose in the early 1960s — that of using the terms “revolutionary democracy” and “national democracy” as synonymous and occasionally as a joint concept—“revolutionary national democracy”. It could seem at first that this was a compromise solution, indeed, one without any principles behind it, and that those who suggested it simply avoided being clear on the subject and committing themselves to either side. However, it is enough to look at it historically to see that this was the right solution. If you proceed from Lenin’s broad interpretation of revolutionary democracy and from the existence of the revolutionary democracy of the capitalists, the petty bourgeoisie and the proletariat, you will find it to be perfectly obvious that the interests of working people, workers and peasants alone can be expressed only by a particular kind of revolutionary democracy, not by any kind. So it comes out that it is not revolutionary democracy that appears as a particular case of national democracy, as something that has grown out of it by narrowing down its social base, but it is national democracy that appears as a particular case of the broad concept of “revolutionary democracy”, which has to be filled with a specific class and political substance in each particular case. Hence the legitimacy of the term “revolutionary national democracy”, indicating the specific nature of revolutionary democracy in the context of non-capitalist development of African and Asian countries. It is worth recalling how often Lenin refer-

red to "revolutionary peasant democracy" or "revolutionary bourgeois democracy".

Lenin's broad interpretation of revolutionary democracy makes all arguments about the correlation of revolutionary and national democracy pointless. All the twenty-odd years of successful or unsuccessful experience of development in a non-capitalist way can be considered within the concepts of the struggle of the classes inside revolutionary democracy and around it. One should not see present-day revolutionary democracy in Eastern countries as being identical with socialist orientation. It is appreciably broader. The struggle against neocolonialism and the feudal foundations creates conditions for the emergence of revolutionary democratic trends which have not progressed enough to recognize the class struggle, or embrace the ideas of scientific socialism, or even trust the socialist world and clearly understand its role in the anti-imperialist movement. Suffice it to recall the militant anti-imperialism of Muammar Qaddafi or the first gestures of the Iranian revolution. New forms of revolutionary democracy will undoubtedly arise in the future.

At the turn of the century, Lenin spoke of the transition from populism to Marxism. It was a different case when he examined the transition accomplished by Plekhanov and his fellow-thinkers and, in the 1920s, by a number of Left Socialist-Revolutionaries who retained their faith in the revolutionary ideals and rejected the treacherous policy of their Party's leadership. Lenin was preoccupied with Marxism's influence on petty-bourgeois ideologists, and their reaction to individual Marxist precepts under the influence of Marxist criticism and their own experience, and sometimes as a disguise or just for the sake of fine-sounding speech-making. That process was embryonic at the time. The sprouts of internationalist and scientific socialist tendencies, which Lenin optimistically found some of the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks to develop, were quickly withering away.

Russia had witnessed instances of a break with a petty-bourgeois platform and a change-over to consistently socialist positions, but she had never experienced a gradual transition through the full deployment of all the positive potentialities of petty-bourgeois revolutionism, objectively and subjectively bringing it closer to Marxism. That had been predetermined by the sweeping revo-

lutionary process and by the way the Russian proletariat was prepared for a socialist revolution. The political development of the working class went ahead of that of the petty-bourgeois elements brought up to a dead-end by liberal populism (Narodism). Marxism did not arise in Russia just as a school of thought. Its spread and transformation into the decisive political force had been assured in the social-economic and political sense by the level of the development of big capitalism, the existence of a large industrial working class, and its political organization which proved to be effective. This is what made the transitional ideological and political forms between populism and Marxism unpromising and unviable.

But the process Lenin noted as one that had not occurred or succeeded in Russia was legitimate in principle and, therefore, it did emerge in colonial countries where the relation of petty-bourgeois and proletarian revolutionism was different because of a different level of historical development and where the proletariat was well behind the petty-bourgeois elements in political maturity.

The process of transition from militant anti-imperialist nationalism (as has been noted, the revolutionary democracy of the East, although it often developed populist features as well, was painted most in nationalist colours) to Marxism has been passing through several stages and taking on a wide variety of forms. It has more than once suffered from a dialectical contradiction between scientific fallibility and naive theories, on the one hand, and political persuasiveness, progressive quality and effectiveness which Lenin spoke about in referring to populism. There have been opposite trends, too, when even theoretically correct and realistic platforms turned out to be ineffective because they had not been prepared politically and organizationally. Such was the fate of Jawaharlal Nehru's revolutionary democratism of the late 1920s and the early half of the 1930s, which essentially remained a good intention. The unity of theory and practice is an indispensable condition of the revolutionary movement. Without such unity, it is bound to degenerate both in the philosophical and in the political sense.

Coming closer to Marxism-Leninism is the major route for revolutionary democracy to follow. But it is very tortuous and thorny, and one demanding great political caution. The forms to

follow as you go forward are diverse and the main thing required is for them to correspond to actual conditions.

The approval of the principles of Marxism-Leninism by a political movement is not only a gnoseological problem but a political one as well, and both of these aspects are shaped in a new way by the actual conditions of the former colonial countries.

In the gnoseological respect, the priority to meet cannot be confined to applying the general precepts of scientific communism. That would be too simple and scholastic a solution, whereas it is a creative one that is required for the revolutionary process to develop successfully. And that means adapting Marxism-Leninism to each country's particular conditions. One can do so only through a careful study of local societies by all means available in modern science. Historical dialectics is no more than a method, and only its application to factual material can produce tangible results. However, many revolutionary democrats gravitating towards scientific socialism have been showing themselves clearly inclined to embrace general, basically correct schemes of development and manifestly underestimate the necessity of a thorough and detailed investigation of the specific conditions, which alone can produce a genuinely scientific strategy.

The political side of the problem is no less complex. The task before the political vanguard is not just to learn to apply Marxism itself. It must make it an effective force and a means whereby to rally the masses. That does not always work out like that and, moreover, it is impossible to make it work at once, as a rule, in the context of social and economic backwardness. There have to be intermediate stages, transitional ideological and political platforms and programmes which, without being definitely Marxist in the philosophical sense, would not contradict Marxism, but would be understandable to the mass of the people acceptable to them, would induce them to act in a socialist spirit and bring them round very gradually and carefully to appreciating Marxism-Leninism as perfectly consistent with their interests.

The danger of neglecting the traditions and the established mentality of the mass of the people was realized by a number of revolutionary democrats of Eastern countries who called for passing over from the national movement to a socialist movement

back in the 1920s and 1930s. As early as the 1920s, some Marxist scholars (M. P. Pavlovich, Irandust) noted that peasants in Iran had not only refused to take the land away from the landed classes, as Communists urged them to do, but sometimes even reacted to such calls with extreme hostility.⁹¹ Something like that happened in Afghanistan 60 years later.

The problem of the language in which to address the working people of the former colonial countries is still one of great relevance for revolutionary democracy and it must, beyond dispute, be taken into account when working out its ideological and political platform. Otherwise there would be a gap between the levels of the political consciousness of the vanguard and the masses, and the programme of the vanguard would not be carried out. However, mass consciousness is evidently not prepared as yet for perceiving the basic propositions of Marxist sociology. That applies notably to countries which are essentially in the pre-capitalist phase of development. The anti-imperialist struggle was clear to the colonial peoples and they were actively involved in it. But the struggle within national society in many of the socialist-oriented countries was in an embryonic state and its class character was not obvious to the population, so that it was rather associated with tribal or religious differences and rivalries. Hence the extreme complexity of the process whereby the masses can grasp the scientific ideas about socialism, classes and the alignment of class forces in a socialist revolution. The propositions about the leading role of the working class, rather than the peasantry making up the overwhelming majority of the population, are seen as abstract notions difficult to digest.

These difficulties are due both to subjective factors (like a low level of education or inadequacy of public relations campaigns) and by objective conditions, that is, when historical development has not achieved a level high enough for class consciousness to be dictated by the intensity and irreconcilability of social conflicts within the local community. Yet the masses learn the science of the revolution from their own historical experience, and not from handbooks or at party schools alone. It is not by chance that socialist orientation, although it was and is accompanied by what is undoubtedly a class-based political differentiation, should have arisen from anti-imperialism rather than internal class conflicts in most of the countries in question. Now, in those rare cases

where the non-capitalist pattern of development was based on a clear class polarization (as in Ethiopia or Afghanistan), it was of a feudal, rather than capitalist, type. It has been generally recognized that rushing ahead in the process of social change is dangerous, and so is the forcing of socialist trends into ideological platforms. Finding them to lack the food they can easily digest, the masses turn to other, more accessible and understandable sources. In ideology, just as in politics, it is necessary to reckon with reality, e.g. the dominant middle-class mentality of the masses in backward peasant countries. It is conditioned by the level of their social, economic and political life and can be overcome only in the course of a long evolution.

There are two misconceptions, rather widespread, if in different quarters, that deserve attention in this context.

One of them is an underestimation of the influence of petty-bourgeois ideology. The authors of a well-known monograph, *Developing Nations: Underlying Principles, Trends, Prospects*, proceed from the assumption that "the petty-bourgeoisie is a stratum of bourgeois society" and so argue that it is not right to "identify any small-scale producer with a petty bourgeois".⁹² That lays the economic base for the following judgement: "There appears to be a rather current trend to exaggerate the spread and influence of 'petty-bourgeois ideology', when this definition is said to apply to the mass ideology of non-proletarian and socially non-differentiated sections of working people many of whom are not seen as forming part of 'normal' bourgeois society. . . In any case this definition of all ideologies of the Third World, except proletarian and liberal bourgeois, as 'petty-bourgeois', which becomes a kind of master-key for all involved ideological (indeed, not only ideological) problems of the developing countries, is totally unjustified".⁹³ This high-sounding sentence condemning generalities can appeal to the reader and prevent him from noting that the whole construction is a conflicting one. Of course, you cannot open any lock with such a "master-key" as "petty-bourgeois" philosophy. For to call any trend petty-bourgeois is just about the same as to call it revolutionary democratic. That means to say nothing or too little. For petty-bourgeois ideology can be revolutionary or reformist, traditionalist or modern, religious or atheistic, anti-communist or gravitating towards scientific socialism, etc. That, of course, is a bad master-key. But

wouldn't it be more correct to say that this definition is insufficient, rather than unjustified?

The way Lenin judged the standards of reference by which to rank the small-scale producer among the petty bourgeoisie was different from that of the authors of the monograph. "Small production actually exists in an environment of *commodity production* . . .," he wrote. "Actually, the small producer, whom the romanticists and the Narodniks place on a pedestal, is therefore a *petty bourgeois* who exists in the same antagonistic relations as every other member of capitalist society, and who also defends his interests by means of a struggle which, on the one hand, is constantly creating a small minority of big bourgeois, and on the other, pushes the majority into the ranks of the proletariat. . . The more commodity economy develops, the more strongly and sharply do these qualities stand out. . ." ⁸⁴ But still Lenin never saw direct trade in products as an imprescriptible attribute of a petty bourgeois. The populists (Narodniks) were also ready to rank a trading peasant among the petty bourgeoisie. Rejecting their concepts as narrow-minded, Lenin exclaimed: "But is there any difference in principle between the position of this kind of commercial farmer and that of any small farmer in a society of a developing commodity economy?" ⁸⁵

So the petty bourgeoisie is a stratum not of bourgeois society, nor that of "normal" capitalist society, but of "a society of a developing commodity economy". Now, we shall hardly find anywhere in African or Asian countries a society that would not be a "developing commodity economy" and in which capitalism would not be the leading trend of spontaneous economic growth.

In November 1918, Lenin described the "small-peasant class" in Russia as "the source of the broad diversity of political trends among the petty bourgeois democrats". ⁸⁶ That was a political and ideological superstructure over a peasant economy. Equally, the small-scale producer in the East breeds a wide range of petty-bourgeois trends, as he cannot breed anything else by himself without any outside influence. Of course, there are the scales of values of the primitive tribes still surviving in the conditions of autarky. But drawing such tribes into national life and into the process of commodity exchange leads to their primitive mentality turning into petty-bourgeois mentality. There is no basic contradiction between them. Petty-bourgeois ideals hail from the

past. It is economic conservative romanticism.

The trend towards underestimating the spread of petty-bourgeois ideology still often implies equating it with the mentality of a small shopkeeper, commercialism, swindle and profit-hunting. That is a mundane, rather than scientific, notion. Lenin saw petty-bourgeois ideology as being distinguished by idealizing small-scale production, representing one of the forms of a commodity economy, and failing to understand that, if allowed to take its own course, it is bound to lead to another form of a commodity economy—large-scale industrial capital which petty-bourgeois ideologues denounce.⁹⁷

Petty-bourgeois ideology is quite often imbued with humanistic principles, an earnest wish of good to the working people and subjective socialism. "One must not form the narrow-minded notion," Lenin said, quoting Marx's "The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte", "that the petty bourgeoisie, on principle, wishes to enforce an egoistic class interest. Rather, it believes that the *special* conditions of its emancipation are the *general* conditions within the frame of which alone modern society can be saved and the class struggle avoided".⁹⁸

Such an understanding of petty-bourgeois ideology explains the reason behind its wide currency, going beyond the limits of the social environment of small proprietors and small-scale producers drawn into commodity production. Petty-bourgeois ideology is not uniform by itself, it can possess a great revolutionary potential and even serve as a stepping-stone to Marxism, but at the same time, in certain stages of the revolutionary process, it can be an obstacle to the propagation of the concepts of scientific socialism. Attempts to narrow down the area of the influence of petty-bourgeois ideology in Eastern countries prompt the illusion that in the context of hardly developed capitalism non-proletarian working masses can produce some other and better ideology and that they are more receptive to genuinely socialist ideology. This is wrong, for social and economic backwardness precludes the economic and political formation of a developed class of the national bourgeoisie and makes it easier for radical elements to come to power but, unfortunately, does not make working people politically wiser.

Another misconception regarding the petty bourgeoisie and petty-bourgeois ideology is that it supposedly represents a mani-

festly reactionary force hostile to the proletariat and socialist revolution. Moreover, such an assessment is put forward at a time when one can speak of nothing beyond laying the ground for socialist change. Such an ultra-leftist, pseudo-proletarian stand has more than once arisen in the anti-imperialist movement in the ranks of revolutionary democracy, including in recent years. Kwame Nkrumah wrote in 1970 that "the petty bourgeoisie will always, when it comes to the pinch, side with the bourgeoisie to preserve capitalism."⁹⁹ In 1977, the MPLA-Party of Labour exposed the breakaway group of Nito Alves and Ze Van Dunem, who considered themselves to be true Marxists as opposed to the MPLA's hard core behind Agostinho Neto, whom they accused of following a petty-bourgeois course. The statement of July 12, 1977 by the MPLA Central Committee rejected Alves's misconception of the class struggle as leading to an isolation of the working class from its allies—the peasants and patriotically-minded petty bourgeoisie and revolutionary intellectuals—and pointed out that the breakaway group was petty bourgeois by its class origin and found some support only from the pauper proletariat of Luanda.¹⁰⁰

In early April 1979, a plenary session of the National Council of the PAIGC for the Republic of Cape Verde Islands resolved to expel the leaders of a faction who had indulged in extremist and adventurist tub-thumping and who qualified the PAIGC ideology and politics based on the teachings of Amílcar Cabral as petty-bourgeois and outdated. The faction was denounced as Trotskyist and having foreign connections. The Alves-Van Dunem group in Angola had also been under the influence of the ultra-left elements in Portugal and Brazil. The pressure of "ultra-left" trends in the West on the revolutionary democracy of developing countries continues. In 1979 Claude Gabriel published a book, *Angola: a Turning Point in Africa*, in Paris, expressing his disappointment with the progress of social change in that country and maintaining that the MPLA-Party of Labour, which had originally been a "nationalist revolutionary movement", had fallen into the hands of the petty bourgeoisie increasingly slipping into nationalism and departing from revolutionism.¹⁰¹ Such ultra-left ostentatious contempt for the petty bourgeoisie is still reminiscent of Lenin's assessment of similar declarations of Socialist-Revolutionaries who, he said, were eager

to come out with a "noisier" declaration and to "cry out most loudly against those vices they themselves feel guilty of".¹⁰²

Such an attitude to petty bourgeois ideology and politics has nothing to do with Marxism. Marxism does not offer any universally applicable guidelines. It provides an assessment of a particular phenomenon in particular circumstances, which are extremely diverse. Hence the widest imaginable range of petty bourgeois movements—from consistently revolutionary to manifestly counter-revolutionary. But the necessity of an alliance with petty bourgeois revolutionaries, particularly in the context of underdeveloped capitalism and an underdeveloped working-class movement, has always been taken into account by the founding fathers of scientific socialism. In connection with Marx's comments on the agrarian programme which was advanced in America by his former associate Hermann Kriege in the middle of last century, Lenin wrote: "Marx recognises the petty-bourgeois movement as a peculiar initial form of the proletarian, communist movement. . . Marx. . . does not condemn, but fully approves communist support of the movement."¹⁰³

Such is one of the particular cases of basic interest in respect of the problem of revolutionary democracy in the developing countries. The petty bourgeoisie can be neither abolished nor condemned. The revolutionary process will die if it is kept out. That is the real base on which to build and the social force that has to be brought to socialism. This can be done only through painstaking, patient and gradual work. The period of transition embraces all aspects of public life, not only the economy, but politics and ideology as well. The transitional ideology from revolutionary nationalism and petty bourgeois socialism to Marxism becomes a natural means of initiating the working masses of the developing countries into socialist revolution. There must be enough ground, both in the ideological field and in that of politics, for the existence of a long-term and a short-term programme. The problem is to combine the revolutionary perspective properly with the requirements of the current stage. It is dangerous not only to be unable to look ahead but also to try and live by the considerations of yesterday, instead of today. With a common ideological base in the countries which have not yet discarded the burden of backwardness, there can naturally be different levels, different ways of expression and different "languages"

in the ideological and political training of the vanguard and in mass education. That is no opportunism, nor any compromise with principles, nor any departure from scientific socialism, but a means of bringing it home to millions of people who have not passed through a school of class warfare under capitalism.

The history of the national liberation movements of African and Asian countries can be seen to have incorporated the wide spectrum of revolutionary democracy which Lenin spoke about. Its initial specimens were bourgeois revolutionary democracy which did not even raise the problem of abolishing social exploitation. It was supplanted by petty-bourgeois revolutionary democracy which proclaimed socialist ideals but set itself up unequivocally against Marxism. In the early 1960s revolutionary national democracy made important moves towards scientific socialism, while preserving fundamental philosophical and political differences with it. Somewhere in the mid-70s, the second echelon of proponents of socialist orientation declared Marxism-Leninism to be their credo.

From the standpoint of the theoretical fundamental principles of the movement, the new generation of national democracy demonstrated a quantum leap, a spurt ahead, and its veterans—an ambition to entrench themselves in the positions they had reached. There is yet another variation of national revolutionary democracy represented by the PAIGC and PAICV, heirs to the single party founded by Amílcar Cabral. By the ideological base as laid in Cabral's theoretical works, they undoubtedly belong to the second generation of socialist-oriented parties, without, however, proclaiming any devotion to scientific socialism, while in the strategic respect both parties still want a united anti-imperialist front without bringing the working class forward as the leading force, which was typical of the opening stage of non-capitalist development. Distinctions in the actual political course do not always and faithfully correspond to ideological distinctions. In this case, all national democracy retains more common features than in theory. And still the emergence of several forms and several trends within the limits of non-capitalist development is beyond doubt.

The revolutionary democracy of Asian and African countries has proved to be the main political force in winning national in-

dependence and making the struggle for social progress and justice a current priority. Its record is one of many glorious victories but also of quite a few setbacks, retreats and defeats. How many revolutionary movements and initiatives have faded out, died down or seemed to have passed without a trace! But one persistent feature discernible in the conglomerate of successive trends of all kinds, roughly denoted as "revolutionary democracy", is a steady growth of socialist tendencies. A vast distance has been travelled from bourgeois revolutionary democracy through various forms of petty-bourgeois revolutionary democracy to the direct, practical and considered change-over to consistently socialist revolutionary democracy.

- ¹ V. I. Lenin, "The Impending Catastrophe and How to Combat it", Vol. 25, p. 337.
- ² V. I. Lenin, "How to Guarantee the Success of the Constituent Assembly", Vol. 25, p. 379.
- ³ V. I. Lenin, "Cadets and Democrats", Vol. 18, p. 230.
- ⁴ V. I. Lenin, "First All-Russia Congress of Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies", Vol. 25, p. 20.
- ⁵ See V. I. Lenin, "The Petty-Bourgeois Stand on the Question of Economic Disorganisation", Vol. 25, p. 563.
- ⁶ V. I. Lenin, "The Third Congress of the R.S.D.L.P.", Vol. 8, pp. 379, 380.
- ⁷ See V. I. Lenin, "Report on the Unity Congress of the R.S.D.L.P.", Vol. 10, p. 374.
- ⁸ See V. I. Lenin, "Cadets, Trudoviks and the Workers' Party", Vol. 10, pp. 455, 456.
- ⁹ Ibid., p. 456.
- ¹⁰ V. I. Lenin, "Two Tactics of Social-Democracy in the Democratic Revolution", Vol. 9, p. 47.
- ¹¹ V. I. Lenin, "How Comrade Plekhanov Argues About Social-Democratic Tactics", Vol. 10, p. 464.
- ¹² V. I. Lenin, "The Unity Congress of the R.S.D.L.P.", Vol. 10, p. 297.
- ¹³ V. I. Lenin, "Cadets, Trudoviks and the Workers' Party", Vol. 10, p. 456.
- ¹⁴ V. I. Lenin, "The Campaign for the Elections to the Fourth Duma", Vol. 17, 1974, p. 380.
- ¹⁵ V. I. Lenin, "Political Parties in Russia", Vol. 18, p. 52.
- ¹⁶ V. I. Lenin, "Cadets and Democrats", Vol. 18, p. 230.
- ¹⁷ V. I. Lenin, "How Comrade Plekhanov Argues About Social-Democratic Tactics", Vol. 10, p. 462.
- ¹⁸ V. I. Lenin, "The Victory of the Cadets and the Tasks of the Workers' Party", Vol. 10, p. 265.
- ¹⁹ V. I. Lenin, "What the 'Friends of the People' Are and How They Fight the Social-Democrats", Vol. 1, p. 279.

- ²⁰ V. I. Lenin, "Two Tactics of Social-Democracy in the Democratic Revolution", Vol. 9, p. 98.
- ²¹ V. I. Lenin, "The Impending Catastrophe and How to Combat it", Vol. 25, p. 368.
- ²² V. I. Lenin, "From Narodism to Marxism", Vol. 8, p. 86.
- ²³ V. I. Lenin, "The Narodniks on N. K. Mikhailovsky", Vol. 20, p. 118.
- ²⁴ V. I. Lenin, "What Goes On Among the Narodniks and What Goes On in the Countryside", Vol. 18, p. 558.
- ²⁵ V. I. Lenin, "Liberalism and Democracy", Vol. 17, p. 578.
- ²⁶ V. I. Lenin, "The Peasant, or 'Trudovik' Group and the R.S.D.L.P.", Vol. 10, p. 412.
- ²⁷ V. I. Lenin, "What the 'Friends of the People' Are and How They Fight the Social-Democrats", Vol. I, p. 280.
- ²⁸ P. N. Tkachev, *Selected Works*, Vol. III, Moscow, 1933, pp. 91-92 (in Russian).
- ²⁹ V. I. Lenin, "What the 'Friends of the People' Are and How They Fight the Social-Democrats", Vol. I, p. 264.
- ³⁰ Ibid., pp. 285-286.
- ³¹ Ibid., p. 264.
- ³² Ibid., p. 275.
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REVOLUTIONARY-DEMOCRATIC CONCEPTS OF NON-CAPITALIST DEVELOPMENT. CULTURAL AND HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

(Premises, Peculiarities and Significance)

By A. U. Gordon

One of the global problems of modern times is the destiny of the peoples of the Third World, which is being resolved in the context of their self-determination in relation to the two world social systems—socialism and capitalism. Mikhail Gorbachev, General Secretary of the CC CPSU, has stressed: "The greatness and novelty of our times consist in that the peoples are ever more clearly and openly present in the forefront of history. They now have such positions as to enable them to make themselves reckoned with directly, not just in the final count. That brings out yet another truth: taking options is becoming more characteristic of the movement of history at the close of the 20th century." One thing that is assuming very great importance for Marxists in this connection is providing the rationale for the socialist option which requires the general truth of socialism to be combined with the historical experience and cultural identity of the peoples of different countries and continents.

"All nations will arrive at socialism—this is inevitable, but all will do so in not exactly the same way, each will contribute something of its own to some form of democracy, to some variety of the dictatorship of the proletariat, to the varying rate of socialist transformations in the different aspects of social life".¹ These lines were written by Lenin before the victory of the Socialist Revolution in Russia and before any nation had yet arrived at socialism.

After 1917, Lenin, with the experience of the October Revolution and of the opening stages of socialist development in Russia to rely on, was even more emphatic in speaking out against stereotyped thinking in the revolutionary movement, against treating national or regional historical experience as something ab-

solute and mechanically transplanting it to other countries and continents. Joining issues with the leaders and theorists of the Second International, who interpreted the historical experience of West-European countries as a kind of standard of world-wide development and challenged, on that ground, the validity of the Socialist Revolution in Russia, Lenin argued that individual countries, while following the general line of world development already indicated by that of other countries, inevitably displayed their own particular features and blazed their own trail, which joined this common line. Speaking of the diversity of the historical process connected with the internal peculiarities of various countries and their uneven development, Lenin showed how it had manifested itself in the Russian Revolution, and, proceeding from its experience, predicted the inevitability of the historical distinctions of revolutions in the Orient and pointed out that the revolutionary process there was bound to have its own peculiarities.

"While the development of world history as a whole follows general laws", Lenin said, "it is by no means precluded, but, on the contrary, presumed, that certain periods of development may display peculiarities in either the form or the sequence of this development. . . Russia stands on the border-line between the civilised countries and the countries which this war [World War I] has for the first time definitely brought into the orbit of civilisation—all the Eastern, non-European countries—she could and was, indeed, bound to reveal certain distinguishing features; although these, of course, are in keeping with the general line of world development, they distinguish her revolution from those which took place in the West-European countries and introduce certain partial innovations as the revolution moves on to the countries of the East. . . Our European philistines never even dream that the subsequent revolutions in Oriental countries, which possess much vaster populations and a much vaster diversity of social conditions, will undoubtedly display even greater distinctions from the Russian revolution."²

Having shown that Social Democratic theorists failed to understand the decisive element of Marxism—its revolutionary dialectics, Lenin produced what was a really dialectical mode of approach by his analysis of the course of the revolutionary movement in the East and of the development of national liberation and

anti-imperialist revolutions. He constantly underlined the importance of taking into account the specific conditions of the colonial and dependent nations and the historical peculiarities of Oriental countries. All of Lenin's pronouncements on the national and the national-colonial question after 1917 comprised the idea of the necessity of "applying", "adapting", and "using" the principles of the "general Communist theory and practice", "the fundamentals of the Soviet system", socialist ideas and institutions to "pre-capitalist conditions", when "there can be no question of a purely proletarian movement", when "the principal mass is the peasantry, when it is necessary to resolve the problem of fighting against medieval vestiges, rather than capital."³

Lenin's teaching about a non-capitalist option for nations and peoples which had not passed through the stage of full-fledged bourgeois society was a summing-up of these propositions and an example of a creative elaboration of Marxist theory. That teaching was worked up and specified to suit the modern historical period in the records of the congresses of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, documents of the meetings and conferences of Communist and Workers' parties and works of leaders of the international Communist movement.

The elaboration of the theoretical rationale for and the investigation of the actual experience of non-capitalist development are central to present-day Soviet Oriental and African studies. The amount of literature on these problems has been growing considerably since the mid-1960s, and at the present time there are scores of monographs, abstracts, pamphlets, dissertations and hundreds of articles in the periodical press on the subject. In short, there is a whole library of political, economic, and philosophical literature on the problem of non-capitalist development⁴ (not to speak of the historical publications analysing the record of Mongolia or the achievement of socialism by the peoples of Central Asia, the Trans-Caucasus, Siberia and the Far East).

However, life does not stand still. The modern dynamic pace of non-capitalist development and the practice of socialist-oriented countries are generating more and more questions and compelling a yet more searching examination of the problems which have already been dealt with in literature. It is worth noting, in particular, the influence that the cultural traditions and peculiar-

ities of the historical experience of the peoples of African and Asian countries have on the moulding of the views of their revolutionary democrats. These problems of cultural history are a major element of the complex and diverse set of problems of the internal prerequisites of non-capitalist development, while research on this group of problems has for a long time been conducted by Marxist scholars with certain indecision because their direct predecessors were the Narodniks (or Populists).

The Russian revolutionary democrats, A. I. Herzen and N. G. Chernyshevsky, and the revolutionary Narodniks who subsequently took up their conclusions raised the actual possibility of "skipping" or "bypassing" capitalism for the first time in the world's social thought over a century ago. In making out their case, they proceeded, first and foremost, from Russia's national peculiarities, that is, her national "identity", and, first of all, from the fact of the peasant commune surviving as the form of the social existence of the vast majority of Russia's population and from the fact of communal collectivism being identical with, and akin to the principles of socialism. The historical reality of post-reform Russia* disproved the calculations of the Populists': capitalism overpowered and corrupted the peasant commune, and its development was interrupted by what was already a proletarian type of revolution. However, it is this revolution that created the prerequisites for a Marxist-Leninist science of the non-capitalist option to be formed. The very idea of the possibility of "skipping" or "bypassing" capitalism was not discarded by history. It owed its second birth to Marxism.

Furthermore, the idea of non-capitalist development underwent radical transformation and fused with the governing laws of the world-wide historical process discovered by Marx and with the formative theory of the development of human society and with historical materialism. While the Narodniks' idea of non-capitalist way implied setting the destinies of Russia against the historical course of the West, including its working-class movement and proletarian socialism, Marxism treats the working-class movement of the developed capitalist countries and proletarian socialism as indispensable material and mental prerequisites for open-

* After the abolition of serfdom and other reforms of the 1860s, Russia started rapidly developing the capitalist way.

ing up the way to socialism for societies with pre-capitalist economic and social relations. The Marxist-Leninist science regarding the non-capitalist option has come to centre on the understanding of the historical process as a natural triumph of socialism world-wide. Socialism becomes a historical inevitability with the rise of capitalism because the latter begets its own force of rejection—the proletariat. So the science of the non-capitalist option has also proved to be connected with the concept of the history-making mission of the proletariat.

An important complement to this concept was the definition of imperialism as the capitalist system embracing the whole world and Lenin's formulation of the law of the uneven historical development of various countries in the age of imperialism which predetermines the possibility of them moving towards socialism, even in the context of underdeveloped capitalism and with pre-capitalist structures still dominant. Finally, all the pronouncements of Marx, Engels and Lenin on the possibility of advancing towards socialism from the pre-capitalist mode of life are distinguished by a dialectical understanding of the historical process, incompatible with fatalism, automatic succession of social systems, and the "hard-and-fast laws" of progress. Marxian dialectics led to the idea of *choosing* the course of development, implying express action by human beings and the operation of a historical subject—revolutionary parties, classes and peoples—with a view to making natural laws work.

The founders of Marxism are known to have very closely followed the development of the revolutionary movement in Russia and the debate on the possibility of skipping capitalism attracted their attention. Marx expressed himself in no uncertain terms on the cardinal issue of that debate: in principle, the peasant community could be "the fulcrum of Russia's social revival".⁵ And he warned: "If Russia continues to pursue the path she has followed since 1861, she will lose the finest chance ever offered by history to a people and undergo all the fatal vicissitudes of the capitalist regime".⁶ In those times (just as later on, in the period of the Second International) it was believed in certain quarters of the international working-class and socialist movement that the way the countries of Western Europe were bound to follow in their historical development was through feudalism, capitalism and, in the long run, socialist revolution. It is this

sequence that was thoroughly and convincingly outlined in *Capital*. But Marx himself, and that is a point to stress, by no means treated the historical path of the West as something absolute. Therefore, he did not decry the efforts "of Russians to find a path of development for their country different from that which Western Europe pursued and still pursues".⁷

While noting that the specific historical setting of *Capital* was limited to Western Europe, Marx wrote: "In considering the origin of capitalist production, I said that it was based on a 'complete separation of the producer from the means of production' [Marx quotes from *Capital*] and that 'the whole of that process is based on the *expropriation of land tillers*'. . . I have *precisely* limited the 'historical inevitability' of this process to the *countries of Western Europe*. And why?" Because, Marx replied, regarding the genesis of capitalism "we are dealing here with the *transformation of one form of private property into another form of private property*. The land tilled by the Russian peasants never having been their *private property*, how is this theory to be applied in their case?"⁸ That is to say that Marx left the issue of the destinies of the peasantry and prospects for the capitalist development of Russia, and, indeed, of other non-Western countries, open both to a theoretical analysis and to revolutionary practice.

The letters to Russian revolutionary leaders effectively characterise Marx both as a man (for he joined a well-wishing discussion of a concept which was fiercely advocated by his political opponents and personal enemies who did not stop short of foul charges and even slander), as a researcher (he pointed to a certain limitation of the work that had taken an incredible effort and years of life to produce), and as a leader of the international revolutionary movement. Marx joined in considering the problem of the non-capitalist development of Russia, although it had been posed under the ideologically alien flag of "distinctive national identity". Once he saw behind that "distinctive national identity" the real peculiarities of this country in the appropriate stage of its development⁹ and properly took them into account, Marx admitted the possibility of Russia following a special, non-capitalist path of development, different from that of Western Europe. He found two circumstances that conditioned that possibility: (1) non-capitalist development was seen as a way of rev-

olutionary change ("in order to save the Russian commune there must be a Russian revolution"¹⁰—that is how Marx succinctly formulated this idea); (2) a democratic revolution in Russia must be resolutely supported by the West-European proletariat.¹¹

It would, naturally, be an oversimplification to assert that, while admitting the theoretical possibility of Russia's non-capitalist development, Marx proceeded from the purely domestic national peculiarities and distinctive identity of Russia alone. On the contrary, as one can clearly see from his remarks, the very question of the non-capitalist development of a single country could arise in connection with a certain level of the development of capitalism achieved in other countries and in connection with the maturity of capitalism as an order of society from the global historical standpoint. The non-capitalist transformation of the Russian commune, he considered, was possible because it became contemporaneous with the capitalist mode of production and could "assimilate its positive achievements without passing through its horrible vicissitudes". "Another factor which favours the preservation of the Russian commune (by means of its development) is that. . . the Russian commune finds the capitalist system in a state of crisis which must end in its elimination, in the return of modern societies to the 'archaic' type of communal property".¹²

So it is the dialectical unity of national and international factors that formed the basis of the Marxian idea of non-capitalist development. You can trace the same kind of dialectics in Lenin's works. He, as has been noted elsewhere, invariably emphasized the necessity of taking into account the peculiarities of Oriental countries, which predetermined the particular pattern of development of the revolutionary process. At the same time, "Lenin's theory of non-capitalist development deduces its possibility from the natural laws of the world's capitalist development in the stage when it has led to a socialist revolution and the establishment of real socialism".¹³ The all-round exposition of the national peculiarities and internal prerequisites combined with international factors is likewise a methodological guidepost for a Marxist investigating the problem of non-capitalist development in modern times.

In considering the internal prerequisites of non-capitalist development, one can schematically single out the factors of a socioeconomic and socio-cultural order. They play their determining

role also in certain unity and, consequently, they must be explored with an equal measure of intensity. However, a certain disproportion is still observable here. Whenever it comes to speaking of the prerequisites for the choice of socialist orientation in a particular developing country, some often point to its backward economy and "multisectoral" social structure, with undeveloped classes of bourgeois society, and to the peculiarities of social existence. But on that ground, and along and in common with them, there are the peculiarities of social consciousness, those that are normally called a "subjective factor", that play an important part. Now, bearing in view Marx's well-known finding about the ideas becoming a material force when they grip the minds of the masses, let us look at what ideas have been and are still opposed to capitalism in the national liberation movement.

The Spread of Bourgeois Civilisation to the East and Protest Against It

The "transplanting" of bourgeois ideology was part of the process which Lenin described as consisting essentially in transplanting capitalist production from the metropolitan countries to the colonies.¹⁴ The ideas of Enlightenment, born by the best brains of France, England and other West European countries in the early bourgeois times, reached all parts of the world and began to be intensively propagated in the territories which had become the colonies of European Powers. But there they underwent certain transformation suggesting the particular colonial character of Enlightenment as a whole.

The main instrument of the colonial enlightenment was colonial enlightenment in the narrow and literal sense of the term, in other words, the system of education introduced by colonisers. The importance of that innovation can hardly be overestimated. For the youth, the colonial school was a source of knowledge which opened up the way not only for personal advancement but also for reshaping the life of their native people in general. There was a rush for knowledge. Describing the "first urge to learn which swept across India", one of the contemporaries wrote: "The youth of India studied with tremendous zeal, doing what seemed to be beyond human ability"¹⁵. Those were the times

when, according to an ideologue of the national liberation movement in another continent, the colonial intellectuals "avidly plunged themselves into Western culture", and like a stepchild, strove not just to get familiar with the new family but to become part of it¹⁶.

However, it was not long before the mother country demanded full obedience, without giving either the full value of life or even the full value and integrity of world outlook in return. For scores of thousands of Asians and Africans colonial enlightenment turned out to be "a negative education". "We have only learnt that we are nobodies",¹⁷ Swami Vivekananda stated with bitterness. Colonial teachers cultivated a feeling of contempt for the past, for the faith of fathers and for the customs of the people in the minds of their pupils. That produced an inferiority complex, disbelief in one's forces, suppression of one's sense of personal dignity, etc.

Besides, colonial intellectuals started to learn from the Enlightenment when its European homeland had already passed through its crisis. The enlighteners' ideals of fraternity, equality and liberty turned out to be disproved by the realities of bourgeois society with its most dramatic class antagonisms, glaring inequality, competition, alienation of the human being, etc. Setting out for London, Paris or New York as a new Mecca, colonial intellectuals quite often found themselves to be deceived as soon as they arrived there. It is in the metropolitan countries that many of them got infected with anti-bourgeois sentiments and profound scepticism about Western civilisation and European culture.

But it is in their own homelands that Asians and Africans, educated in Europe, were in for the bitterest disappointment when they realised that colonial enlightenment served as a rationale and excuse for colonial domination ("colonial duty", "the civilising mission" of Europeans, "the burden of the white man") and the spread of European culture was the ideological weapon of the colonizers.¹⁸ The chauvinism of bourgeois ideology sanctifying colonial oppression and the essentially forcible character of the establishment of bourgeois (European) culture had the most unfavourable consequences for the destinies of Enlightenment in the East.

Apparently, it would be inaccurate to speak of the historical limitation of the Enlightenment in its colonial version. Strictly

speaking, in Europe, too, it was historically conditioned and, consequently, limited in the bourgeois sense, at its inception. In this particular case, it will be more appropriate to speak of it being "truncated" and "crisis-ridden" because what we mean is (bourgeois) ideology in time of crisis and (bourgeois) culture in time of decay, with all potentialities for progressive development used up. And those European thinkers and cultural personalities whose works African and Asian intellectuals drew upon to assimilate the ideas of Renaissance and Enlightenment were now more often the ideologues of the crisis and decline of bourgeois culture. For example, the idea of Reason was learned, as evidenced by the Moroccan philosopher Abdallah Laroui, not from Leonardo da Vinci or Erasmus, but from Ernest Renan, and the principles of democracy—not from John Locke or Montesquieu, but from John Stuart Mill, the concept of scientific and technological progress—not from Saint-Simon, but from "pragmatic vulgarizers who degrade the Promethean vision of science to a sordid search for petty-bourgeois comfort".¹⁰

This striking manifestation of the decline of bourgeois culture in the sense of its falling general level was only one side of the whole process, and not the major one at that, by its impact on the colonial world. The crisis of the ideology and culture of the bourgeois civilisation of the West by the time it had spread to the East found itself most profoundly and dramatically expressed in the differentiation of the ideas and principles advanced by the epoch of its genesis. What had once represented a single whole²⁰ became a split nucleus in the social and historical respect. There arose a whole spectrum of ideas which turned out to be variously bourgeois. At one end of the spectrum we see specifically bourgeois ideas, such as the freedom of property. In the centre there are the ideas of the nation and national sovereignty, constitutional government and civil rights. They acquired particular importance in the struggle against colonial rule, personifying the bourgeois democratic character of the ideology of the national liberation movement, normally for researchers. But it is worth noting that these ideas are relatively bourgeois and conditioned by the general (bourgeois) character of the epoch and the general (bourgeois) content of national culture. Outside that context, such ideas become general democratic principles. Still more relatively bourgeois are such ideas of the Enlightenment as the principle

of progress and of the advance of human society, including scientific and technological progress.

Finally, at the other end of the spectrum there were ideas "leading", to quote the founding fathers of Marxism, "beyond the *ideas* of the old world order".²¹ Such ideas, expressed, notably, by the slogans of the Great French Revolution "equality, fraternity" were stultified in bourgeois culture and interpreted in the spirit of formal legal equality and abstract humanism—the foundations of bourgeois ideology. But they were essentially not bourgeois for they dated from the principles of the peasant and even clan and tribal commune and, potentially, even antibourgeois, which transpired while bourgeois ways were still being established.²²

All that came to light in full measure in the new historical epoch ushered in by the Socialist Revolution in Russia, when an alternative to the bourgeois evolution of national liberation movements took shape in historic world-wide dimensions. However, even at the point of assessing the influence of the ideas of the Enlightenment on the ideology of the national liberation struggles in the European colonies in the period immediately preceding the October Revolution, we should take into account their diversity. Such consideration makes it possible to understand why these ideas could become a double-edged weapon in the course of the struggle for national independence. By and large, since the ideology of the national liberation movement was absorbing the ideas of the Enlightenment, the centre of their spectrum shifted towards general democratic and rationalistic principles and values "far beyond the bounds of a limited, properly bourgeois world order, and within the mental world of Socialism".²³

On the whole, colonial enlightenment played a great part in shaping the ideology of the national liberation movement and such a new socio-cultural entity as colonial intellectuals.²⁴ But neither it, nor the Christian missionaries, the colonial legal order or capitalist enterprises ever succeeded in making the culture of subject nations decisively bourgeois, nor did they have "bourgeois ideology, as a *system* of notions and standards well established [Emphasis added—A.G.]"²⁵ Individual elements of bourgeois ideology formed a kind of superstructure over what was still pre-bourgeois culture and non-bourgeois social consciousness. Such multiformity accounts, in particular, for the difficulties in iden-

tifying the class character of the ideology of the national liberation movement. It did, in a way, embody bourgeois nationalism (suffice it to compare the views of Ram Mohan Roy* or Mohammad Abduh** with what was represented by the ideology of anti-colonial protest in the form of the "old Chinese rebellion"²⁶) but it would be an oversimplification to see it confined to this nationalism.

This is what has prompted more and more clarifications in Soviet scientific publications. "Researchers", one of the authors stated, "point out that Afro-Asian nationalism is fundamentally different from classical bourgeois nationalism. This nationalism appeared, as a rule, before the process of consolidation of nations was over. Its origin was connected not with the formation of the national bourgeoisie as a product of capitalist development in the countries concerned but with the anti-colonial movement of oppressed peoples".²⁷ Bourgeois nationalism proper ("classical" nationalism) was not so much produced by nation-building as "induced" by a clash with bourgeois culture (and ideology) of colonialists. And the very idea of the nation was applied to a pre-bourgeois nation or, to be exact, to a pre-bourgeois ethnos.

Non-bourgeois (pre-bourgeois) world outlook, standards and values enveloped the bourgeois nucleus of new ideas and transformed them by imparting a traditionalist hue to them. Anti-bourgeois ideas naturally turned out to have the same hue. But in the latter case, the effect of traditionalisation was magnified several times over by the fact that the missionaries of bourgeois culture were foreign rulers, conquerors and oppressors. The criticism of the bourgeois civilisation of the West mounted along with the national liberation movement and the anti-bourgeois and traditionalist motives intensified each other and closely interlaced in that criticism. The peculiarities of the capitalist order of society, the features distinguishing it from pre-bourgeois societies were seen as the basic flaws of Western civilisation and became an object of criticism in social thought and the growing national

* Ram Mohan Roy (1772 or 1774-1833), an Indian enlightener who fought against the most odious Hindu customs like the self-burning of widows.

** Mohammad Abduh (1849-1905), an Arab enlightener who tried to adapt Islam to bourgeois relations.

consciousness of colonial countries. The thrust was, above all, against those bourgeois principles which were seen as the greatest threat to the integrity of social existence and the intellectual life of their peoples—individualism, utilitarianism, secularization, etc. Moreover, as the decisive moment in the struggle for independence drew nearer, there was an appreciable reappraisal: what could first be welcomed as the emancipation of the individual was then branded as the consecration of the "*Homo homini lupus est*" principle, the worship of reason was found to conceal the "worship of profit-hunting" and "mental freedom" to stand for "mental sterility", etc.

The increasingly critical attitude to Western civilisation in the nascent national consciousness of oppressed peoples was, by and large, a dominant tendency, and, with certain nuances, that must, evidently, have been a general rule for colonial and dependent countries. Tracing the development of Arab social thought from the early 19th to the early 20th centuries, Z. I. Levin stated that it had passed "from an awakened interest in European success in technology through idealizing West European social and political structures and the education system to anti-colonialism and criticism of some features of European bourgeois civilisation".²⁸

About as much can be said regarding colonial India. In considering the course of the reformation movement in that country, R.B. Rybakov wrote about an "intensification of anti-colonial, anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist tendencies".²⁹ While the greatest mind of India in the late 18th and the early 19th centuries, Ram Mohan Roy was still sharing "historically conditioned illusions" concerning the British mission in India and admired the bourgeois order in the metropolitan country,³⁰ by the early 20th century such illusions came to be regarded as verging on defeatism and national betrayal. An aspiration for transforming traditional institutions by emulating Western models was replaced, as a dominant trend, by the rejection or, to be exact, by an injunction to reject those models and by the idea of national regeneration, that is, the country's reconstruction, based, above all, on its own traditions. "If India is destined to be reborn and to become great," said Aurobindo Ghosh, one of the leaders of the national liberation movement of the early 20th century, "that will be achieved not by imitating the methods of

English policy and trade and metropolitan institutions, but by elevating its own civilisation, cleaned of the ills that afflicted it, to yet higher and more significant accomplishments than those ever recorded".³¹

Calling for India to go her own way, instead of following in the footsteps of the West, suggesting a variety of ways and, consequently, looking for, or at least, stressing the need for a national alternative to the Western ways were characteristic of the most outstanding exponents of Indian social thought who laid down the cornerstone principles of the ideology of the liberation movement in that country. In fact, Mahatma Gandhi, leader of the Indian national liberation movement, is known to have gone as far as to reject the bourgeois civilisation of the West altogether, including such attributes as cars and large cities.

The denunciation of the Western ways, institutions and values provided a source of inspiration in the struggle against the foreign conquerors who relied on them; conversely, preaching imitation turned out to be a demoralizing factor in this struggle. The idea of reviving traditional values and treading its own path was the idea of national self-assertion and as such it was, first of all, basically anti-colonial. But inasmuch as the denounced Western ways, institutions and values were the historical form of existence of the capitalist socio-economic system, anti-colonial criticism struck at it, too, thereby making the idea of "one's own path" sound anti-capitalist more or less, enough, in fact, to lay the ground, if in broad outline, for the concepts of non-capitalist development to be formed within the national liberation movement.

Now, here is a point to clear up. One should not think that the ideas and, subsequently, the concepts of non-capitalist development were based only on the refusal to borrow Western models or that such a refusal was exclusively traditionalist. Contrary to the die-hard notions about the unilineality of the historical process, in this case the refusal to borrow appeared as the reverse side of the borrowing and it was growing as the latter gained ground. The "transplanting" of the capitalist mode of production, of the Western way of life and of bourgeois ideology was followed up by an assimilation of some of their forms and elements. Looking at it from the standpoint of cultural history, one must say that the greatest contradiction of the national libera-

tion movement was in combining a determined, and sometimes ruthless anti-colonial struggle against representatives of Western civilisation with learning and emulating its achievements and "Western ideals". The great liberation movement of oppressed peoples and their national regeneration simultaneously signified an extension of the world-wide history-making process with the West in the vanguard. It is not by chance that Lenin, while assessing the "awakening of Asia", should have written about the peoples of the East being drawn into "the struggle for the ideals which the West has already worked out for itself".³² The concepts of non-capitalist development, born of the national liberation movement, faithfully reflected and expressed this dramatic contradiction.

Non-Capitalist Development and Fusion of Cultures. The Problem of "Translating" the Ideas of Socialism into the Language of African and Asian National Cultures

Outstanding fighters for the independence of Eastern countries were by no means in favour of a total rejection of Western culture, nor were they traditionalists in the full sense of the term. Although at the height of the anti-colonial struggle, their criticism of the traditional ways and attitudes was normally muted, they never gave it up. Mahatma Gandhi's unflagging struggle against such a basic attribute of traditional Indian society as the untouchables is a clear case in point. It is not a return to the traditional ways and attitudes but development using the traditional heritage that underlay the ideas of the non-capitalist option. The advocates of those ideas strove to be equidistant both from westernization and from traditionalism or, as outstanding Indian enlightener and reformer Vivekananda aphoristically put it, to avoid the "Scylla of the old orthodoxy" and the "Charybdis of modern European civilisation".³³

But you cannot create a new culture out of nothing. While rejecting both extremes, the leaders of the national liberation movement were forced to draw upon both sources and to borrow from the one and the other cultural fund available in colonial society. The ideas of non-capitalist development arose from the conflicting position of rejection and borrowing, which was peculiar to the national liberation movement as a whole. The con-

cepts of non-capitalist development were taking shape at a crossing of two streams of cultural history: one was the intensified penetration of Western institutions and values into Eastern countries and the other—the galvanization and rebirth of the traditional heritage. Behind the platforms of “national identity” and “one’s own way” was a revision of the traditional heritage in the light of the borrowed philosophical principles. The concepts of skipping capitalism became a clear expression of the fusion of cultures that was beginning in Eastern countries.

Ideologues of non-capitalist development have quite often spoken up in no uncertain terms for this fusion, supporting and advancing the ideas of cultural interchange. While denouncing the caste and religious prejudices, the worship of self-denial and the other-worldly orientation in Indian civilisation, Vivekananda found it to contain some positive features which he set against the vices of the West. Simultaneously, while castigating the oligarchy of the rich, the worship of things and other flaws of Western civilisation, he found it to have some merits which he set against the vices of Indian civilisation. Such double ambivalence predetermined or, rather, justified the principle of selection and intercomplementing of the positive features of Western and Eastern (Indian) civilisation. Vivekananda wrote that the admirable achievements in terms of spirit (East!) should be shared in exchange for amazing achievements in the material field (West!)... The receptive Western mind would stand to gain from an admixture of introspection and the habits of meditation typical of the East, while the Eastern mind would gain by learning how to be more active and vigorous.³⁴

A fusion of cultural histories was championed by China’s outstanding personalities who were going over to the positions of revolutionary democracy. Li Dazhao, Chen Duxiu and Sun Yatsen opposed the adoration of all things Western and took great care of national culture, although criticising it at the same time. Li Dazhao’s arguments were particularly characteristic regarding the fusion of cultures. By comparing contemplatively identified hallmarks of Eastern and Western civilisations, he obtained two rows of definitions, neither looking immaculate and self-sufficient. That pattern prompted intercomplementing individual pairs of attributes of civilisation, as Intuition, Art and Spirit in the East and, accordingly, Reason, Science and Matter

in the West. Li Dazhao considered both civilisations as two indispensable driving forces of world progress. Bringing the cultures of the East and the West closer together and having them complement each other would, as he saw it, make up an integrated world culture.³⁵

The socialist perspective or socialist orientation is, from the Marxist point of view, the criterion for the concepts of the non-capitalist way, that which distinguishes them from the reformist theories of "advanced capitalism" or traditionalist doctrines of modernized theocracy and "Oriental despotism". However, clarifying and specifying the socialist perspective is a historical process which, as far as the African and Asian countries are concerned, involves a very distinctive pattern of formation of socialist ideas.

The propagation of socialist ideas was connected, in particular, with their perception in the sense of a cultural fusion and, above all, as "anti-Western westernization".³⁶ Conforming to the direction of the quest formulated in Vivekananda's aphorism, socialism was neither traditionalism nor Westernization identified with bourgeois ideology. Socialist ideas, Western by the place of their origin and by their appearance as a stage in the development of European social thought, could be perceived both as non-Western and even anti-Western, challenging and negating European civilisation in its bourgeois clothing. It is not by chance that even fairly moderate religious reformers should have followed the development of the working-class and socialist movement in Europe not only with a feeling of sympathy but also somewhat gloatingly, taking its growth as evidence of the depravity of European civilisation and regarding it both as a sign of the approaching collapse of Western domination and a refutation of the Western claims to the role of a world-wide historic standard of civilisation.

Interpreted in that way, the Western origin of socialism could not prevent it spreading in the East. On the contrary, just because of the properties arising from such origin, it corresponded to the cultural vision and requirements of colonial intellectuals educated in Europe. Socialist doctrines and, above all, scientific socialism (Marxism), made it possible to reject bourgeois civilisation that was imposed by colonizers, without pleading for pre-bourgeois patriarchalism. It is rationalist scientific principles

that formed the supreme standards of reference to justify this two-fold rejection. The idea of progress, that of the consistent advance of human society and the concept of the natural laws behind the world-wide historical process indicating the inevitability of capitalism being eventually replaced by a more consummate social order were of paramount importance. It is not for nothing, for example, that such outstanding representatives of that intellectual contingent as Nehru and Fanon, while expressing their attitude to Marxism, should have particularly noted the historical optimism of Marx's teachings.

But scientific and theoretical arguments in favour of socialism and evidence cited to prove its superiority over capitalism as a social and economic system and the natural requirement for capitalism to be replaced by socialism—arguments in the categories of Western social thought and Western cultural values—were not enough for the ideas of socialism to grip the minds of the masses whose mode of living and way of thinking remained essentially traditional and pre-bourgeois. It is precisely the "Westernization" of socialism that underwent the greatest transformation in the mentality of the masses. Just like anything that has been borrowed, it was reborn to live a second life in the national traditions of the oppressed peoples.

One thing that was common for the ideological trends of African and Asian countries was the "discovery" of the ideas of socialism in the Scriptures, monuments of social thought and oral traditions of national cultures; particular thinkers of ancient and medieval times were (and still are) declared to have been the forerunners of scientific socialism. In consequence, on the one hand, the national tradition was "pulled up" to socialism and, on the other, the modernization of the respective religious and philosophical teachings made for creating an archaic image of socialism. Interpreted in the light of the ideas of social justice and equality, humanity and plain common sense, which were current still in pre-bourgeois societies, socialism was largely replaced by them. That created a "synthetic" base of national and religious socialisms wide-spread in the ideology of the national liberation movement after the winning of independence by colonial countries and peoples.

Soviet researchers were at one time predominantly critical and uncompromisingly negative in respect of national socialisms.

It was presumed that the ideology of the liberation movement in Asia and Africa would be evolving from anti-colonial and anti-imperialist nationalism to socialism under what was expected to be a non-stop schedule and national socialisms were seen as a retreat and a departure from that course. Such an approach, by oversimplifying the problem of combining socialism with the national liberation movement, led to a one-sided assessment of this ideological phenomenon. However, as Soviet scholar K. N. Brutents has emphasized, national socialisms should be viewed not only as a departure from scientific socialism and "transformation and more or less significant—depending on the political positions of the proponents of these concepts—distortion" of its provisions. This is, at the same time, a "manifestation . . . of a certain 'retreat' of nationalism which . . . acts not quite independently, but . . . under the umbrella of 'socialist' theories. The ideas borrowed from the nationalist arsenal obey . . . the requirements of these theories to a greater or lesser extent".³⁷

In their recent works Soviet scholars have been making the point that the emergence of national socialisms is "one of the most striking manifestations of the deepening social content of nationalism"³⁸ and of the deepening social character of the national liberation movement, and that this is a certain stage of the evolution of its ideology under the influence of the ideas of socialism. A more precise evaluation of so distinct an ideological entity as national socialisms comes from a closer insight into the complexity of the entire process of combining scientific socialism with the national liberation movement. Analysing the experience of the revolutionary democratic parties of emergent nations, Soviet scholar Yu. N. Gavrilov has pointed out: "Even the leading hard core of a party takes long to learn and apply Marxism-Leninism. Scientific socialist ideology takes still longer to strike root in uncultivated social and economic soil".³⁹ It should be added that the problem of transformation of the cultural and historical "soil", i.e., the interaction of socialism with the historical experience and cultural traditions of the peoples of African and Asian countries, is no less complex.

This problem has already been posed in Soviet Oriental and African studies and some of its aspects (the role of religion or patriarchal-archaic world outlook or overlapping national and

class elements in the social consciousness of colonial and post-colonial societies) have been expressly examined by various authors.⁴⁰ It is related not only to national and religious socialisms providing the best evidence by which to judge its influence. Soviet science has developed various points of view regarding the relationship between the revolutionary democratic concepts of the non-capitalist option and national socialisms. In the opinion of some authors, revolutionary democratic concepts form something like a left flank of this involved and contradictory ideological complex; others presume that revolutionary democrats have already surmounted or are surmounting national socialist positions in their concepts. There is another thing that is important for us to stress at this point. The problem of the interaction of socialism with the cultural history of the emergent countries, which has been subjectively expressed through the national-socialist outlook of certain ideologues, is an objective one and, as such, it has faced and will face all social forces and ideological trends in the emergent countries, including, of course, the revolutionary democrats.

Although the national and national-colonial questions figured prominently in the theory of scientific socialism, due, above all, to Lenin's works, it has been typical of Western science and propaganda to claim that Marxism underestimates the importance of ethnic problems, that its founding fathers showed contempt for them, and that Marx, Engels, and Lenin exhibited "national nihilism". Such views have been expressed in political quarters of some of the emergent nations. Refuting them and characterizing Lenin's contribution towards the elaboration of the ethnic issue, Ulyanovsky has noted that "Lenin always saw the national quality as a reality in which the class quality shows itself in one form or another" and that the founder of the Soviet multi-nation state considered the "national quality as something historically created and objective".⁴¹

These conclusions apply in full measure to the area of social consciousness and national self-awareness. Yuri Andropov, qualifying the peculiarities of this area in the speech on the Sixtieth Anniversary of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics said: "Everything counts—the attitude to the language, to monuments of the past, the interpretation of historical events".⁴² Each nation's historical record is the path which it has traversed,

which nobody can ever take away from it, and it finds expression in its historical consciousness, cultural heritage and, finally, its language. It is, perhaps, a nation's most elementary component—its language, that provides the first bit of its "historical existence" and its objective national quality. And the problem of propagation and perception of new ideas, including socialist ideas, in social thought and social consciousness of African and Asian peoples, also started with the complexities of translation in the most literal sense of the term.

But while political requirements stimulate an appeal to national traditions and the "translation" of socialist ideas into their "language", the "language" of these traditions also has a serious impact on politics, conditioning the specific features of the world outlook and mentality of political leaders at all levels: from the direct representatives of the masses to the leaders and ideologues. The reference to the "middleway" doctrine in the platform of the Burma Socialist Programme Party can be taken as a clear case in point. Burmese authors insist on it being identical with dialectics. But, obviously, that Buddhist dialectics is greatly different from Hegelian and Marxian dialectics. One thing that attracts attention is that the accent in the treatment of the principle of the unity and struggle of opposites is on unity, that the notion of "contradiction" is not accepted, or perceived, etc. Social and political "correlations" of such a world outlook or mode of thinking are quite definite.

So, the problem of "translation" of socialist ideas which we come across in the concepts of national and revolutionary democrats is not so much that of language as that of cultural history, for it is a problem of having these ideas expressed in the "language" of the national tradition. And the peculiarities of the tradition find their most tangible embodiment in corresponding concepts. Unfortunately, we often find the impact of such peculiarities misunderstood or underestimated. Take, for example, the case when the concepts of African revolutionary democracy are considered in opposition to the revolutionary democratic concepts of Arab countries on the grounds of their widespread commitment to religious and philosophical traditions, piety towards the Prophet, references to the Koran, etc.

The distinction here is obvious, but in evaluating it, one should take into account the fact that the revolutionary demo-

crats of Arab countries stand by an advanced religious and philosophical tradition created in their native language and entrenched in national culture, while the heritage of national culture in Africa south of the Sahara is the thinking based on myths and poetry and a rich storehouse of mythology and folklore.⁴³ The philosophical tradition formed there is either the processing of this heritage which has begun this century (particularly since independence) or European philosophy (in larger measure) in European—English and French—languages. The latter circumstance has, beyond question, contributed and still contributes towards the dissemination of socialist ideas in a form close to their primary source, although the problem of “translation” into the “language” of national traditions exists also in Africa south of the Sahara, while the task of “adjusting” the traditions of African societies to socialism seems easy only at first glance. So it would hardly be right to have revolutionary democrats ranged politically by their greater or lesser adherence to traditions. There has to be an analysis of these traditions to consider their actual impact on respective societies.

This is what the founders of Marxism called for. Engels, who made a point of studying the history of philosophy, while summing up, as it were, his studies in the closing period of his life, formulated his conclusion about the importance of the historical fund existing in the ideological areas as objective ground making their development relatively self-sustained. “The precondition of the philosophy of each epoch regarded as a distinct sphere in the division of labour,” he wrote, “is a definite body of thought which is handed down to it by its predecessors, and which is also its starting point. And that is why economically backward countries can still play first fiddle in philosophy: France in the eighteenth century as compared with England, . . . and later Germany as compared with both”.⁴⁴ A few years later Engels reverted to this conclusion. He wrote that a thinker “possesses in every sphere of science material which has arisen independently out of the thought of previous generations and has gone through its own independent course of development in the brains of these successive generations” and that if “we deny an independent historical development to the various ideological spheres which play a part in history, we also deny them any *effect upon history*”.⁴⁵

The Role of Revolutionary Democracy in Making the Emergent Countries a Subject of World History

In the light of these comments made by Engels, it is obvious that criticism of the revolutionary democrats of the emergent countries for using that body of thought which exists in national culture in the shape of a vocabulary, stock of notions, logical constructions, value categories, etc., is tantamount to urging disregard for objective realities. Behind the allusions to the specific national circumstances and the ideologically accentuated "distinctive identity", one should, in this case, distinguish the really independent existence of stable elements of culture (I say it is relatively independent because cases of total seclusion in world culture are very few and far between).

However, what we do come across more often in the theories of the ideologues of the national liberation movement in general and in the concepts of non-capitalist development in particular is not the objectively independent existence of a national culture, but claims or guidelines for national "distinctive identity". Yet a nihilistic approach would be out of place in this case, too. It is worth recalling that Marx by no means denounced the "efforts of Russians to find a path of development for their country different from that which Western Europe pursued and still pursues", although they were made under the umbrella of Russia's "distinctive identity". It is common for "distinctive identity" to be associated with notions of some self-dependent and unchanged substance equal to itself. However, they do not contain the very idea of development and, consequently, neither do they have anything to do with the concepts of non-capitalist development. One thing directly related to the latter in Russian social thought is a tendency to perceive "distinctive identity" as Russia's historical calling and her ability to make her contribution to world history and occupy a fitting place in world civilisation due to the peculiarities of her development. This is the approach that was characteristic of Russian revolutionary democrats. One of them, A. I. Herzen, wondered all through his life: "So what idea, what thought does the Russian people bring into history?"⁴⁶ Now, earlier on, another one, V. G. Belinsky, proclaimed as a kind of programme: "Yes, we have some national life over here, and we are destined to say our word and our thought to the world".

This idea of a national calling rests on a sound determination, intrinsic to each national culture in the making, to assert and to establish itself among others in the realm of world civilisation. It is all the more characteristic of the peoples whose culture and civilisation were dismissed and suppressed for years — “on behalf of world civilisation”.⁴⁷ Explaining the importunity with which intellectuals of colonial countries sometimes proclaimed the distinctive identity of national culture, Fanon wrote: “...Those who condemn this excessive passion strangely forget that their psyche and their ego shelter themselves comfortably behind French or German culture which has proved its worth beyond dispute”.⁴⁸ The writings of that ideologue of the national liberation movement have thrown in full relief, one may say, the sophisticated dialectics of the general and the particular, inherent in the struggle of the peoples oppressed by European colonialism for their national liberation. Therefore, his judgments on the subject deserve particular attention.

In the national consciousness of the oppressed, Fanon pointed out, decolonization is “not discourse on something universal but zealous affirmation of originality meant as absolute”⁴⁹ and at the same time an embodiment of their “will to participate in the edification of civilisation in the rest of the world”.⁵⁰ So why do the oppressed peoples have to affirm their national originality first before building up world civilisation? Obviously because, above all, the first thing to do to achieve national liberation is to prove a nation's existence and that means, according to the Marxist definition of the nation, that each particular historical human community, apart from having a common language, common territory and a common economic set-up, has appropriate psychological and other peculiarities “fixed in the specific features of a given people's culture which distinguish their culture from that of other peoples”.⁵¹ Now, the only way for national culture to make its contribution to the storehouse of world civilisation is by preserving its distinctions and complementing the cultural achievements of other peoples with its own discoveries preserved by its cultural tradition. Indeed, it is only the people who have preserved the continuity of their own cultural tradition that would not lose their capacity for new discoveries and for a creative cultural endeavour.

However obvious that may be for a Marxist, there is another

thing that is just as obvious: it is normal for the preservation of a cultural heritage to become a problem at a time of revolutionary movements. It is just because a revolution means a break in continuity in the development of society as a whole, it is just because a revolutionary nation is obsessed with a desire to dismantle the old world altogether for the sake of building a new one, there is a trend for the revolutionary contingent to settle accounts with the cultural heritage as well and to set about creating culture anew, from scratch. The greatest example of a revolutionary's historical maturity is, therefore, still that of Lenin who opposed such a trend when it appeared, notably, in the activities of what was known as *Proletkult*.^{*} The same problem arises in modern national liberation revolutionary movements and revolutionary democrats of emergent countries have to combat such *proletkult* passions, so to speak.

"Some Ethiopians", said a representative of revolutionary Ethiopia, "consider it necessary to destroy all the institutions of traditional culture just because they come from the past and outdated social order".⁵² By contrast with such ambitions, the Declaration of the Commission for Organising the Party of Working People of Ethiopia imperatively underlined the necessity of studying, promoting and enriching country's traditional culture. Resolutions of FRELIMO (Mozambique) provided for a national commission to be set up to collect and study the people's traditions and customs. There were the first national festival of traditional music and dancing in that country in 1980, and an international symposium on the protection of cultural heritage, with UNESCO involvement, in January 1981. Nihilistic tendencies have been opposed in some other socialist-oriented countries, too.⁵³

Naturally, a simple "stocktaking" of traditional notions, customs and values and keeping them like museum exhibits cannot be a real alternative to nihilism. Cultural tradition is not a warehouse of finished products with appropriate tags by which each ideological and political trend would find the thing it needs. There is no place for tags in this case, nor could one go by them

^{*} *Proletkult* (proletarian culture) was a cultural-educational, literary and art organization (1917-1932) seeking to form a new socialist culture without using historical heritage.

because, as Soviet researchers have been pointing out, "the same traditions may turn out to be of different significance depending on the kind of ideological interpretation they are given" and on "the context of the social and political struggle in which the myths and images of the past, historical evidences and ethical values become part of the programmes of different social movements".⁵⁴ So this is no place for museum-type stocktaking because one cannot identify culture with objectified things it represents. Such "objectifying" in politics, just as in art, proves to be something like "styling", imitating a tradition, assimilating its external attributes, i.e., in the long run, superficially using a cultural tradition to further self-seeking interests. And all that is a far cry from real cultural creativity.

The nihilistic feeling in the revolutionary democratic circles was, to a certain extent, a reaction to the said "styling" of national culture. Such a phenomenon was widespread in post-colonial times. The bourgeois elements or those turning bourgeois (represented, in particular, by the bureaucratic and military-bureaucratic regimes), which came to power in many emergent countries, usurped individual slogans and exaggerated some features of cultural rebirth in a bid to create a mass base for themselves. Disguising their more or less obvious cosmopolitanism and their adoration of "modernism" and the Western way of life, such rulers are not averse to "swearing by yesterday". They readily appeal to local gods and the heroic record of their peoples, swear allegiance to the Scriptures and wear traditional apparel. The betrayal of cultural heritage is sometimes covered up with sweeping campaigns to exorcize the "European spirit", a genuine cultural revolution is replaced by the "Africanization", "Arabization" or other "nationalization" of isolated aspects of everyday life, by fighting against the outward attributes of European culture, borrowings of scientific terms, geographic names, etc.

This way of upholding the distinctive national identity incenses progressive forces, but that does not mean that the defence of the distinctive cultural identity and national patrimony has lost its progressive character altogether for the emergent nations. True, some Soviet authors argue that the defence of the national originality of African and Asian peoples was justified only in the colonial period and that there was no more objective need for such defence after the winning of national independence.

That is only half-right. While acknowledging the anti-colonial origin of the concepts of distinctive cultural identity, one cannot fail to notice that the problems of defending national culture are not resolved by the mere hoisting of a national flag. First, it is still important to work to overcome the colonial legacy, the humiliation of the masses—the carriers of traditional culture, the depression of national consciousness consequent upon cultural colonization in an attempt to depersonalize the subject nations. Second, colonialism has been replaced, and that is well known, by a new form of the denial of freedom—through economic and cultural dependence of the emergent nations.

The economic, social and cultural weakness of post-colonial societies undermines the international position of the emergent nations and damages their growing national consciousness. In these circumstances, the struggle for national culture is no less fierce than the struggle for a national economy. Because of enhanced social mobility and the advancement of the mass media, the "demonstration effect" of the Western way of life, clearly described in various works by Soviet Orientalists and Africanists, has greatly increased. The export of Western capitalist mass culture has reached the countryside which ideologues of the national liberation movement thought was the last unassailable bulwark of original national culture.

There has been a growing recognition on the part of revolutionary democrats that cultural dependence is not only a sequel to economic underdevelopment, but also a prerequisite for the continued economic dependence of the emergent countries on imperialism as it condemns them to following the Western models of development, emulating Western values and living by Western standards. Since revolutionary democrats are the most devoted and the most determined champions of national liberation and of the defence of the gains of the national liberation revolutions, a commitment to revive national culture is bound to be integral to revolutionary democratic programmes. As consistent anti-imperialists, revolutionary democrats cannot fail to be in the forefront of the struggle against Western dictatorial practices in the cultural field, that is, against "cultural imperialism". It is not enough to end the physical presence of an enemy, Samora Machel, President of the People's Republic of Mozambique, said shortly after his country had won its inde-

pendence. There should be an unflagging fight against the bourgeois way of life, habits and morals, for these negative factors in the life of the Mozambican people contribute towards keeping up imperialist domination. Only in a stout battle, the President emphasized, could one oppose the cultural "infiltration of the enemy".⁵⁵

Imperialist domination and neocolonial expansionism in every shape or form have the common effect of making post-colonial societies increasingly bourgeois. The modernization of developing countries after Western patterns and westernization of their culture lead to their turning into bourgeois nations. At the present time, the process of "transplanting capitalist production", as mentioned at the beginning of this article, has reached a critical point. As one can see from some research studies by Soviet economists, what is being made bourgeois under the direct impact of the world capitalist system, still keeping most of the developing countries in submission, is so important an element of social reproduction as the system of needs.⁵⁶ The assimilation of a new system of needs in emergent countries leads to large sections of their population developing such wants as cannot be supplied within the framework of traditional production. In the concrete economic sense, this is the demand for a growing amount of marketable goods and services, a hunt for the "prestigious" commodities of Western manufacture, the moulding of a consumer fashion and "life-style"—naturally by Western standards. In the social-economic sense, this is a sharp differentiation not only of consumption levels but, more particularly, of the degree to which the requirements of different sections of the population are satisfied. A new type of individual, aspiring to the quickest possible social promotion and to the achievement of material well-being, is taking shape. Such principles of activity as hoarding, calculation and self-seeking are striking root, as are those of utilitarian, pragmatic and individualistic morality. Bourgeois alienation, formalization of social relations and erosion of the personal character of social connections are developing.

In the meantime, there is a rising tide of spontaneous protest by the masses, which quite often find expression in a reinvigoration of the traditional forms of social organisation, social connections and types of social consciousness. It is the duty of

revolutionary democrats to articulate this social protest and direct it towards creating a new type of society of a non-capitalist kind. Just because it is not bourgeois, the cultural heritage of the emergent nations is an ally and a base of support for revolutionary democrats, not their enemy. But it is only if combined with progressive world culture that the anti-bourgeois potential of this national heritage can be made work. Socialism, anti-imperialist forces and anti-bourgeois tendencies in capitalist countries are a gage of success of the non-capitalist option of the emergent countries not only in the material and economic sense, but also in the intellectual and cultural respect. The revolutionary democrats have yet to accomplish the history-making fusion of everything sound, viable and advanced in the national cultures of the developing countries with socialist culture. They have yet to inject a concrete and positive substance into the formula of the fusion of cultural histories, which was advanced back in the times of the "awakening of Asia" by the most farsighted ideologues of the national liberation movement who strove to steer clear both of the Scylla of traditionalism and Charybdis of Westernization.

Early this century, Lenin conjectured a change of the pattern of world history as the peoples of colonial and semicolonial countries, that is, the oppressed majority of humanity, turned from passive objects of history into its subjects. He wrote about "the beginning of the end of 'Oriental' quiescence"⁵⁷ and the coming age of "great world storms opened up in Asia and there 'repercussions' in Europe",⁵⁸ that "the times when the cause of democracy and Socialism was associated only with Europe alone have gone for ever".⁵⁹ In its Theses for the centenary of Lenin's birth, the CPSU Central Committee emphasized that Lenin's prevision of subject nations turning into active parties to world politics and winning the right to decide "the issue of the destiny of all humanity" is coming true nowadays.⁶⁰

These propositions and conclusions are increasingly confirmed and elaborated on in the works by Soviet Orientalists and Africanists dealing with the problems of the national liberation movement. It has been noted in these works that the concept of a subject of history implies that the peoples of emergent nations become masters of their destinies, gain an opportunity to choose the way to follow in their own national development and at the

same time exercise a growing influence on the worldwide historical process.

The problem of the evolution of a new historical subject has many aspects. It comprises the consolidation of national sovereignty, an independent foreign policy, social reforms, economic progress, and advancing the material and cultural standards of the people. Changes in international affairs and a reshaping of international economic relations, which, as they are, make the developing countries depend on the economic system of the capitalist world, are an indispensable condition and a major element of this problem. Finally, it is the aspiration of the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America to "state their projects, affirm their values, and define their relations with the world",⁶¹ and to contribute towards the development of world civilisation.

While characterizing the world-wide history-making importance of the teachings of Marx, Lenin underlined, in particular, that Marxism had arisen "*away from the high road of the development of world civilisation*", and as "*the direct and immediate continuation of the teachings of the greatest representatives of philosophy, political economy and socialism*", and as "*the legitimate successor to the best that man produced in the nineteenth century*".⁶² Later on he pointed out that Marxism "*has ... assimilated and refashioned everything of value in the more than two thousand years of the development of human thought and culture*".⁶³ At the same time, bringing out the direct sources of Marxism, Lenin referred to classical German philosophy, classical English political economy and French Socialism ("*combined with French revolutionary doctrines in general*"), and emphasized that Marx "*was the genius who continued and consummated the three main ideological currents of the nineteenth century, as represented by the three most advanced countries of mankind [Emphasis added—A.G.]*".⁶⁴ It is not by accident that there is no reference in that list of Lenin's, just as in his other comments on the ideological and theoretical prerequisites of Marxism, either to Arab or Indian philosophy, or the social thought of China, or the spiritual tradition of other Eastern nations and peoples. The reason for it is that by the time Marxism came into existence, Eastern peoples found themselves away from "*the high road of the development of world civilisation*" (which was passing through a capitalist stage), stood, as Lenin

put it, "beyond the pale of history",⁶⁵ representing its object—an object of the activities of the European nations, which were of worldwide history-making importance.

The awakening of the oppressed peoples of non-European countries, Nguyen Nghe of Socialist Vietnam has noted, began with the recognition that "Europe was in the vanguard of history for three centuries" [i.e. from the 17th century on] and that "Europe has at least launched two values on to the historical arena . . . renewal of productive forces and democracy".⁶⁶ The awakening of the Orient, as Lenin stressed, was beginning with the struggle for "the ideals which the West has already worked out for itself".⁶⁷ But while joining this struggle, African and Asian peoples are making their own contribution, advancing their own values and specifying "Western ideals" in accordance with their own cultural heritage. It is up to a researcher to appraise this contribution.

Marxist theory, being as it is a live and constantly developing science, Lenin pointed out, "*grows out of the sum total of the revolutionary experience and the revolutionary thinking of all the countries of the world*".⁶⁸ This precept of Lenin's has been followed through in the documents of the CPSU and the international Communist movement. Soviet scholars take it as their guide in analysing the processes unfolding in the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America at the present time. "The Marxist-Leninist teachings", B. S. Yerasov writes, "in considering the interrelationship of scientific socialism with the cultural traditions of African and Asian peoples, present themselves not as a break with age-old traditions and gains, but as a science carrying forward the great historical trend of fighting against oppression. The processes now going on [in the emergent countries] provide the ground for various transformed elements of cultural heritage to be included not only in nationalist ideology and 'national socialism'. At a higher level of development, these elements can flow into the ideology of scientific socialism which recognizes every people's contribution to the development of the world-wide revolutionary process".⁶⁹

By fusing cultural histories, revolutionary democrats in Asia, Africa and Latin America contribute towards linking up the cultural traditions of their peoples with scientific socialism. The revolutionary democratic concepts of the non-capitalist option of

African, Asian and Latin American states are being shaped and developed in the context of the growing influence of scientific socialism on the social thought and consciousness of the peoples of emergent nations. At the same time, they are influencing scientific socialism, enriching it with their own historical experience.

"The universality of Marxism-Leninism," Yu. A. Krasin notes, "consists in its thorough theoretical assimilation of the entire wealth of social practice and, hence, in a critical reassessment of the content of progressive non-Marxist social theories and notions from scientific positions. This is one of the channels of Leninism's digestion of the diversified and contradictory historical experience of the modern epoch".⁷⁰

¹ V. I. Lenin, "A Caricature of Marxism" pp. 69-70.

² V. I. Lenin, "Our Revolution", pp. 477-480.

³ V. I. Lenin, "The Second Congress of the Communist International", pp. 242-243.

⁴ Here are only the general monograph-type studies of the contemporary revolutionary democracy of African and Asian countries published in the latter half of the 1970s and in the early 1980s: *Africa: Problems of Socialist Orientation*, Moscow, 1976 (in Russian); G. B. Starushenko, *Socialist Orientation in Developing Countries*, Moscow, 1977 (in Russian); A. V. Kiva, *Socialist-Oriented Countries: Major Development Trends*, Moscow, 1978 (in Russian); N. D. Kosukhin, *The Formation of Ideological and Political Strategy in Socialist-Oriented African Countries*, Moscow, 1980 (in Russian); O. V. Martyshin, *African Revolutionary Democracy*, Moscow, 1981 (in Russian); *The Ideology of Africa's Revolutionary Democrats*, Moscow, 1981 (in Russian); *The Socialist Orientation of Emergent Nations. Some Questions of Theory and Practice*, Moscow, 1982 (in Russian); A. S. Grigoriev, *Scientific Socialism and Modern Revolutionary Democracy*, Lvov, 1982 (in Russian).

⁵ Marx to Vera Ivanovna Zasulich in Geneva, in: Marx, Engels, *Selected Correspondence*, 1982, p. 320.

⁶ Marx to the Editorial Board of the *Otechestvenniye Zapiski*, in: Marx, Engels, *Selected Correspondence*, p. 292.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Karl Marx, "First Draft of the Reply to V. I. Zasulich's Letter", Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. 3, 1973, p. 152.

⁹ That was, it should be noted, an instructive example of a Marxist interpretation of the problem of "distinctive identity", to which we shall yet have to revert.

¹⁰ Karl Marx, "First Draft of the Reply to V. I. Zasulich's Letter", Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. 3, p. 161.

- ¹¹ An elaborated argument about the interaction of two revolutions was presented in the 1882 Preface to the Russian Edition of *The Manifesto of the Communist Party*. The idea about the need for support from the Western proletariat was most forcefully expressed by Engels in his dispute with P. N. Tkachev. "If anything can still save Russian communal ownership and give it a chance of growing into a new, really viable form", Engels wrote in 1875, "it is a proletarian revolution in Western Europe" (Frederick Engels, "On Social Relations in Russia", in Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. 2, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1973, p. 395.)
- ¹² Karl Marx, "First Draft of the Reply to V. I. Zasulich's Letter", Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. 3, 1973, p. 153.
- ¹³ R. A. Ulyanovsky, *Modern Problems of Asia and Africa*, Moscow, 1978, p. 40 (in Russian).
- ¹⁴ See V. I. Lenin, "The Discussion on Self-Determination Summed Up", Vol. 22, 1977, p. 337.
- ¹⁵ Quoted in: N. I. Prigarina, *A Handful of Ashes, a Live Heart*.—M. Ikbāl, *Selected Writings*, Moscow, 1981, p. 10 (in Russian).
- ¹⁶ Frantz Fanon, *Les damnés de la terre*, Paris, François Maspero, 1961, p. 164.
- ¹⁷ See: Swami Vivekananda, *Centenary Memorial Volume*, Calcutta, Swami Vivekananda Centenary, 1963, p. 488.
- ¹⁸ See A. V. Gordon, *Problems of National Liberation Struggle in the Writings of Frantz Fanon*, Moscow, 1977, pp. 55-59 (in Russian).
- ¹⁹ Abdallah Laroui, *L'idéologie arabe contemporaine*, Paris, François Maspero, 1982, pp. 33-36.
- ²⁰ As a matter of fact, historically, too, Enlightenment consisted of different elements. It was intrinsically contradictory, as witnessed by the hectic controversy between Voltaire, apostle of bourgeois progress, and Rousseau with his social criticism, or the struggle between the Girondists—predecessors of liberalism, and the Jacobins—revolutionary democrats, and then between the Jacobins and egalitarians—the "madmen", for a particular interpretation of Rousseau and so on. But the times that saw capitalist relations established compressed them so much that isolated non-bourgeois and even antibourgeois elements "worked" for the bourgeois system as a whole.
- ²¹ Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, "The Holy Family", *Collected Works*, Vol. 4, 1975, p. 119.
- ²² See, for example: Y. M. Sakher. The "Madmen's" Movement, Moscow, 1961 (in Russian).
- ²³ R. A. Ulyanovsky, *Modern Problems of Asia and Africa*, p. 162 (in Russian).
- ²⁴ See *Intellectuals and Social Progress in the Developing Countries of Asia and Africa*, Moscow, 1981, Chapter II (in Russian).
- ²⁵ R. A. Ulyanovsky, *Modern Problems of Asia and Africa*, p. 163 (in Russian).
- ²⁶ By this term, Lenin meant the spontaneous destructive force of tra-

- ditional peasant risings of which there were so many in the history of China. Methodologically, the important thing in such a collation is Lenin's idea that "modern national movements should be distinguished from 'movements' (so-called *movements*) of a medieval nature" (V. I. Lenin, "Notes for the Committee on the National and Colonial Question", *Collected Works*, Vol. 42, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1969, p. 203).
- ²⁷ A. G. Akhmetov, "Assessing the Ideology of Modern Nationalism in Newly Free Countries", in: *Current Problems of Historical Materialism*. Alma-Ata, 1982, p. 202 (in Russian).
- ²⁸ Z. I. Levin, *The Development of Arab Social Thought 1917-1945*, Moscow, 1979, p. 8 (in Russian).
- ²⁹ R. B. Rybakov, *Bourgeois Reformation of Hinduism*, Moscow, 1981, p. 123 (in Russian).
- ³⁰ Ibid., p. 26.
- ³¹ Ibid., p. 112.
- ³² V. I. Lenin, "Democracy and Narodism in China", Vol. 18, p. 165.
- ³³ Quoted from V. S. Kostyuchenko, *Vivekananda*, p. 162.
- ³⁴ Ibid., p. 161.
- ³⁵ See L. P. Delyusin, *A Dispute on Socialism. From the History of the Social-Political Thought of China in the Early 1920s*, Moscow, 1980, pp. 23-24 (in Russian).
- ³⁶ Harry J. Benda. "Non-Western Intelligentsias as Political Elites".—*Development and Society. The Dynamics of Economic Change*, Ed. by D. E. Novack and R. Lekachman, New York, St. Martin's Press, 1964, p. 413.
- ³⁷ *The Battle of Ideas in the Modern World*, Vol. 3, Moscow, 1978, pp. 40-41 (in Russian).
- ³⁸ O. V. Martyshin, *The Destinies of Oriental Nationalism. —The Revolutionary Process in the East. History and Modernity*, Moscow, 1982, p. 216 (in Russian).
- ³⁹ Y. N. Gavrilov, *The Ideological and Political Evolution of Contemporary Revolutionary Democracy.—Problems of the World Revolutionary Process*, First Issue, Moscow, 1981, p. 138 (in Russian).
- ⁴⁰ Thus, K. N. Brutents wrote that in the course of the national liberation movement, socialism joined "with another fundamental idea—the idea of the nation" and began to be put forward "in the first place, as an essential means of realizing the national liberation objectives and those of rapid independent development and national regeneration" (*The Battle of Ideas in the Modern World*, Vol. 3, pp. 37, 39). R. A. Ulyanovsky has pointed out the absence of "dramatic philosophical conflicts between the internal forces of reaction and progress" in colonial countries and "incompatible things combined" in the outlook of national leaders (R. A. Ulyanovsky, *Modern Problems of Asia and Africa*, pp. 160-161). O. V. Martyshin, while drawing attention to the specific features of the political experience of national revolutionaries, noted that their Marxism was superficial and that they had not learned it "the hard way". (O. V. Mar-

- tyshin, *The Destinies of Oriental Nationalism*, p. 226). Various authors have referred to the immaturity of the class consciousness of the newborn working class, the patriarchy of peasant mentality, the complexity of the "socialism—religion" problem, etc. (See R. A. Ulyanovsky, *Socialism and Newly-Free Countries*, pp. 523-556); K. N. Brutents, *Contemporary National Liberation Revolutions*, Moscow, 1974, pp. 373-393); *The Battle of Ideas in the Modern World*, Vol. 3, pp. 222-243; 259-280; *Contemporary Nationalism and Social Development of the Foreign East*, etc. (all in Russian)).
- " R. A. Ulyanovsky, "Lenin on the National Liberation of Oriental Peoples", *The Revolutionary Process in the Orient*, p. 35 (in Russian).
- " Y. V. Andropov, *Sixtieth Anniversary of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics*, Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, Moscow, 1982, p. 14.
- " This is very clearly evident in the attempts of African thinkers to elaborate a "national philosophy" by imparting to it some features of ethnophilosophy or philosophizing ethnography (see A. V. Sagadeyev, "Between Logos and Myth: Problems of "African Philosophy", *Philosophical Heritage of Eastern Nations and Modernity*, Moscow, 1983 (in Russian); by the same author: "The Philosophy and Ideology of Nationalism in the Developing Countries of Asia and Africa", *Philosophical and Social Thought of the Nations of Asia and Africa*, Moscow, 1981, pp. 43-51 (in Russian); P. K. Grechko, "Methodological Problems of Philosophical Thought in Africa".—*Ibid.*, pp. 89-105.
- " "Engels to Conrad Schmidt in Berlin", in Marx, Engels, *Selected Correspondence*, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1982, p. 401.
- " "Engels to Franz Mehring in Berlin", in: Marx, Engels, *Selected Correspondence*, 1982, pp. 434, 435.
- " A. I. Herzen, "On Socialism", *Selected Works*, Moscow, 1974, p. 258 (in Russian).
- " "As for us, we have been colonized", Leopold Senghor pointed out, "to be sure, as undeveloped, defenceless individuals, but also as Negroes or Arab-Berbers—in other words, as people of a different race and different culture. This was the basic argument of the colonizer. We were 'primitive' and ugly to boot; it was necessary to expose us to progress, to 'the light of civilization.—Naturally, progress and civilization could only be European". (L. S. Senghor, *On African Socialism*, London, Pall Mall Press, 1964, p. 68). "The African has no language", the colonizers claimed, "but vernaculars or dialects at the most; no history. . . , no art, but only folklore, no law, but he mechanically obeys customs, no religion. . . His only knowledge is magic or empirical; he has no morality since he obeys impulses. . . The school . . . will fill these gaps. . . It will bring the Black a culture that has proved its worth. . . It will make him a human being in the full sense of the term" (Louis-Vincent Thomas, "Acculturation et nouveaux milieux socio-culturels en Afrique noire", *Bulletin de l'Institut Fon-*

damental d'Afrique Noire, Serie B. Dakar, tome 36, Janvier 1974, No. 1, p. 172).

- ⁴⁸ Frantz Fanon, *Les Damnés de la terre*, p. 157.
- ⁴⁹ Ibid., p. 33.
- ⁵⁰ Frantz Fanon, *Pour la révolution africaine*. (Ecrits politiques), Paris, François Maspero, 1964, p. 169.
- ⁵¹ *Fundamentals of Marxist-Leninist Philosophy*, Sixth edition, Moscow, 1982, p. 260 (in Russian).
- ⁵² Quoted in: V. I. Vorona, "The Role of Traditions in the Cultural and Ideological Life of Socialist-Oriented African Countries", *Philosophical and Social Thought of the Nations of Asia and Africa*, p. 83 (in Russian).
- ⁵³ See *ibid.*, pp. 84-87.
- ⁵⁴ *The Battle of Ideas in the Modern World*, Vol. 3, p. 191 (in Russian).
- ⁵⁵ Quoted in: *Philosophical and Social Thought of the Nations of Asia and Africa*, p. 88 (in Russian).
- ⁵⁶ See *Developing Countries: Underlying Principles, Trends and Prospects*, Moscow, 1974 (in Russian); V. V. Krylov, "Particular Aspects of the Development of Productive Forces and of the Reproductive Process in the Developing Countries", *Developing Economies: Theories and Research Methods*, Moscow, 1979, pp. 152-185 (in Russian).
- ⁵⁷ See V. I. Lenin, "Lev Tolstoi and His Epoch", Vol. 17, p. 51.
- ⁵⁸ V. I. Lenin, "Historical Destiny of the Doctrine of Karl Marx", Vol. 18, p. 584.
- ⁵⁹ V. I. Lenin, "On the Slogan for a United States of Europe", Vol. 21, p. 342.
- ⁶⁰ See *The Centenary of the Birth of Vladimir Ilyich Lenin. Selected Documents and Materials*, Moscow, 1970, pp. 70-71 (in Russian).
- ⁶¹ Frantz Fanon, *Pour la révolution africaine*. (Ecrits politiques), p. 146.
- ⁶² V. I. Lenin, "The Three Sources and Three Component Parts of Marxism" Vol. 19, p. 23.
- ⁶³ V. I. Lenin, "On Proletarian Culture", Vol. 31, p. 317.
- ⁶⁴ V. I. Lenin, "Karl Marx", Vol. 21, p. 50.
- ⁶⁵ See V. I. Lenin, "The Second Congress of the Communist International", Vol. 31, p. 232.
- ⁶⁶ Nguyen Nghe. "Frantz Fanon et les problèmes de l'indépendance—*La Pensée*, Paris, No. 107 (janvier-février 1963; pp. 34-35).
- ⁶⁷ See V. I. Lenin, "Democracy and Narodism in China", *Collected Works*, Vol. 18, pp. 163-169.
- ⁶⁸ V. I. Lenin, "The Voice of an Honest French Socialist", Vol. 21, p. 354.
- ⁶⁹ B. S. Yerasov, *Social and Cultural Traditions and Social Consciousness in the Developing Countries of Asia and Africa*, Moscow, 1982, p. 261 (in Russian).
- ⁷⁰ Y. A. Krasin, "Leninism and the Modern World". —*Problems of the World Revolutionary Process*, First Issue, pp. 51-52 (in Russian).

NON-CAPITALIST DEVELOPMENT: THEORY AND PRACTICE

By U. G. Khoros

The problem of non-capitalist development was posed by Marx and Engels over a hundred years ago. In an unmailed letter to the Editorial Board of the *Otechestvenniye Zapiski*, Marx, speaking of the efforts of Populist leaders "to find a path of development for their country different from that which Western Europe pursued and still pursues", granted the possibility, in principle, of Russia skipping the phase of capitalism. He believed that to be the "best case" for this country.¹ Moreover, the founders of scientific socialism presumed that various elements or remnants of traditional communal collectivism which survived in backward societies, when capitalism had already passed its peak in developed countries and was beginning to be eroded by internal contradictions and crises, could become a kind of support for the transition to socialist forms of living.

One factor to enable such a transition, Marx and Engels believed, was for the revolutionary process to develop simultaneously in advanced and backward societies. "If the Russian Revolution," they wrote in the preface to the 1882 Russian edition of the *Manifesto of the Communist Party*, "becomes the signal for a proletarian revolution in the West, so that both complement each other, the present Russian common ownership of land may serve as the starting-point for Communist development."² Only with the help of a victorious proletariat, which would have demonstrated "how it is done", Engels emphasized in the closing years of his life, could the socially and economically underdeveloped nations "appreciably shorten the process of their development towards socialist society and avoid much of the suffering and fighting through which we are having to pave our way in Western Europe".³

Of course, one could speak no more than theoretically about non-capitalist development in the times of Marx and Engels. Not only a European proletarian revolution but anything like a mass peasant uprising in Russia were problematic in the last quarter of the 19th century. Nevertheless, the general sociological formulation of the problem by Marx and Engels was a matter of tremendous theoretical value.

Lenin looked at the possibility of non-capitalist development against a different historical background, that of the age of imperialism and proletarian revolutions and of the incipient great national "awakening of Asia". In that anti-colonial movement Lenin discovered some ideological trends of a Populist type,⁴ which could gain ground, he presumed, "in a number of Asiatic countries".⁵ And although Lenin evaluated Sunyatsenism and similar trends, above all, from the standpoint of the major significance of their radical democratic core clothed in a utopian socialist mantle, he did not rule out the possibility that the said trends could, in certain circumstances, go beyond bourgeois democratic slogans. Radically-minded petty-bourgeois elements, he explained, "are not by any means necessarily hostile to socialism under all conditions, or in all countries"⁶.

After the victory of the October Revolution in Russia which powerfully stimulated the revolutionary process in colonial and dependent countries Lenin, speaking before the Second Congress of the Communist International, called on it to advance "the proposition, with the appropriate theoretical grounding, that with the aid of the proletariat of the advanced countries, backward countries can go over to the Soviet system and, through certain stages of development, to communism, without having to pass through the capitalist stage".⁷ He expressed his conviction that direct borrowing of the "Russian form" of proletarian socialism was likewise possible, in principle, in the zone of the national liberation movement: "The idea of Soviet organisation is a simple one, and is applicable, not only to proletarian, but also to peasant feudal and semi-feudal relations".⁸ In the report to the Eighth All-Russia Congress of Soviets, Lenin, referring to the formation and development of Soviet republics in Central Asia and in the Trans-Caucasus, pointed out: "These republics are proof and corroboration of the fact that the ideas and principles of Soviet government are understood and immediately

applicable, not only in the industrially developed countries, not only in those which have a social basis like the proletariat, but also in those which have the peasantry as their basis".⁹

Today one can say with certainty that the basic ideas and presumptions of the pioneers of scientific socialism regarding the problem of non-capitalist development have become a reality. A number of countries in Asia and Africa, once free from colonial dependence, have opted for a non-capitalist path of development and for socialist orientation*. This choice has been overwhelmingly stimulated by the existence and the aid of the world community of socialist nations as well as of the international communist and working-class movement. That means translating into reality the idea suggested by Marx, Engels, and Lenin about an alliance of the socialist movement of developed countries and the national democratic movement of former colonies and semi-colonies. The non-capitalist path of development has assumed tangible outlines, and in many countries national democrats link it up with surviving communal collectivist institutions. Finally, in those emergent countries where vanguard parties of working people have appeared, the socialist orientation of domestic and foreign policies is established by the application of the principles of Marxism-Leninism.

Naturally, experience does not only bear out the earlier theoretical constructions, but lends new dimensions to them. The record of non-capitalist development of emergent nations (if we exclude the Mongolian People's Republic) is about a score of years, which is not too long by historical standards but quite sufficient for initial generalizations and conclusions. While still studying the problem of non-capitalist development, modern Marxist-Leninist thought already has some actual historical evidence to go by.

It is, certainly, impossible to consider all aspects of this wide-ranging subject within the scope of a single article. So I'd better set the limits for this particular probe straight away. First, I am going to deal mainly with countries whose ruling regimes follow ideological trends of a Populist type, non-Marxist social-

* In this article the concepts "non-capitalist path of development" and "socialist orientation" are equivalent.

ism. Now, to explain, in brief, the way I am using the notion of "Populism" in this article,¹⁰ let me just say that I see Populism, when applied to the modern developing nations, as an ideology centring on non-capitalist development through the use and transformation of communal collectivist institutions and the principles of traditional solidarity. However, it can be variously translated into political practice—either in a revolutionary democratic or in a petty-bourgeois reformist way.

Second, the performance of the said regimes will be reviewed from three positions: (1) social-economic strategy; (2) relationship between the leadership and the masses; (3) non-capitalist development and traditional collectivist structures.

Third, I take two countries: Algeria and Tanzania as the main samples to study. I have chosen them as characteristic varieties of the group of socialist-oriented countries under consideration both because of their ideological programme (the "least" and the "most" Populist) and its practical embodiment (one committed to accelerated and pronounced industrialization and the other, to rural development, first and foremost; the former begin predominantly on course for "modernism", and the latter, expressly focussing on traditional collectivist values, etc.). Naturally, whenever necessary, I will be referring to other countries engaged in non-capitalist development.

Marxist researchers see non-capitalist development as a stage "in which the necessary political, social and material prerequisites for the subsequent transition to socialism are created by non-capitalist methods in the context of a state of national democracy"¹¹⁻¹² That implies setting up a "non-capitalist structure" which comprises a public sector in industry and some in farming, co-operatives in the making and private producers' businesses. The development of the public sector comes, first of all, together with industrial progress and the weakening of economic dependence on the world capitalist market.

By these standards, Algeria's achievements can be considered rather impressive. Of all the socialist-oriented countries it is one that has done most in carrying through a programme of accelerated industrialization and reshaping the national economy. This has proved possible, to some extent, because of the favourable objective prerequisites (availability of considerable

natural resources, the necessary manpower reserves, and a relatively high level of development since colonial times). At the same time, the Algerian economy suffered tremendous damage during eight years of war for national liberation, which brought in its wake not only the destruction or shutdown of many enterprises and the unemployment of nearly half the able-bodied population, but also the flight of about a million French, as a rule, skilled specialists who accounted for the lion's share of production in the modern sector in industry and agriculture. There was, besides, a considerable outflow of capital. In such conditions, further economic growth could be secured only through a consistent development strategy.

This strategy began to be followed from the mid-1960s when Houari Boumediène came to power. As French authors Marc Raffinot and Pierre Jacquemot have pointed out, it set course for "economism", i.e., for the country's accelerated industrialization, which was ideologically balanced in a way by "Populism"—an appeal to the "peasant roots" of the Algerian revolution, the declaration of Islamic moral values, and so on.¹³ In the opinion of other French researchers, B. Étienne and J. Leca, the object of Boumediène and his entourage was to create an "industrial society with full employment and a modern level of development. . . Cemented by a solid moral framework and the austerity of morals attributed to Islam".¹⁴

The Algerian leadership opened with a full-scale drive to decolonize the national economy. Nationalization was carried out in the latter half of the 1960s in many industries, finances and trade, undermining the positions of foreign capital. The "battle for oil", which was particularly strenuous, led to the Algerian government establishing full control over all "oil" sectors in 1971. The export of oil and gas became one of the main hard currency earners.

At the same time, there was a comprehensive reorganization of industry with some principles of management planning introduced. Scores of public companies were set up in basic sectors of the economy—industry, banking and finance, and in the services. Investment for them was provided by the state (there were some mixed companies as well) which also formed the boards of directors and management bodies at individual enterprises, but they operated within the framework of private law

and on commercial terms. State control over the operation of companies was designed, above all, to assure strict financial discipline.

While proclaiming the priority of the state both in the implementation of investment projects and in the vital sectors of the national economy,¹⁵ the Algerian leadership strove to make the private sector active as well. The 1966 Investment Code, establishing certain benefits and guarantees for private capital (exemption of private enterprises in a number of sectors from the turnover tax, a reduction of the business tax and so on), generally stimulated private enterprise. And although the volume of private investment in industry in 1967-1973 was about 1/29th of government investment,¹⁶ some of the money for the development process was still drawn from the coffers of the Algerian bourgeois. Private capital, concentrated mostly in light and food industries, contributed towards providing the population with staple commodities, assuming many functions of the service industries.

However, it was the state that was the major driving force behind industrial growth. Investment in industry, above all, in the group "A" sector, sharply increased. The major source of investment was the revenue derived from the export of oil and gas (32% of exchange earnings), immigrant remittances by Algerians working abroad (20%) and foreign aid (24%).¹⁷ In the latter half of the 1960s the accumulation fund was growing by 17% a year,¹⁸ and Algerian industry, having regained its pre-war level by 1969, was fast on the upgrade. Whereas in 1965-1970 the average annual GDP growth rate was 4.2%, in 1970-1977 it was 6.8%, the rise having been principally achieved by industry, above all, by the "A" group sector.

Due to a consistent economic policy, the Algerian state controlled 90-95% of the imports and up to 90% of the exports by 1975, while the public sector's share of the GDP was no less than 85%.¹⁹ It was not the numbers alone that mattered. A national industrial complex began to take shape, assuring to a certain extent many elements of the reproduction process in heavy industry, engineering and metal-working, oil production and petrochemical industry, production of building materials, etc. Specialized industrial centres sprang up in Annaba, Skikda and Arzew and elsewhere.

Such an accelerated build-up of the industrial potential (even with the export of petroleum products earning hard currency, and some other attendant factors) could not but impose a considerable burden on society. Because of the small initial capacities and the high cost of infrastructure and designing, investment in industrialization, for instance, in the Annaba Steel Plant project had to be between two and three times what it was in developed countries.²⁰ Capital investment in the "A" group, in principle, always takes long to pay off; but in this case a low output-input ratio was still more manifest because of a shortage of skilled manpower (although the government spent much on the training of engineering and technical staffs), inexperience or inability of local engineers and business executives. For these reasons, over one-third of the state enterprises were loss-making (according to the statistics of the mid-1970s), and in 1976 deductions from the profit of the public sector for the national budget were abolished altogether.²¹ Therefore, while carrying through the industrialization programme mostly by importing capital-intensive technology, the Algerian leadership had to apply for rather considerable foreign credits and loans. Hence the sweeping growth of the foreign debt which amounted to 22 billion dinars in 1975 (in 1975 one Algerian dinar was equal to \$0.24) and in 1978 it was already as high as 45 billion dinars, or over half the GDP cost. By 1985 the country's foreign debt was estimated at about 55 billion dinars.²²

Accelerated industrialization in an underdeveloped country, which still heavily depends economically on the world capitalist market, is an extremely costly and uneasy enterprise and to prevent it producing excessive social strain, it is worth while, apparently, sticking to tolerable proportions within the system of social production and distribution—between expenditure on development needs and the public income, between industry and agriculture, between production and welfare expenditure, etc. There was a different picture in Algeria in this sense: the aspiration of the leadership for an early achievement of industrial standards of developed countries became an obsession, and so entailed a number of negative consequences, both economic and social.

This aspect of the matter has more than once been noted by Soviet researchers, especially L. A. Fridman. He has noted an

incomparably higher growth rate of accumulation than in many developing countries. It was 15% of the GDP in 1967, 33% in 1970, 37% in 1972, 45% in 1975, and up to 49% in 1978.²³ But if just about half the GDP goes for capital investment, most of which is concentrated in industry, this is bound to be at the expense of other sectors—agriculture, social welfare, etc. For instance, in 1967-1978 the investment in industry was nearly seven times that in the agrarian sphere (60.3% and 8.8% accordingly).²⁴

Let me note, in passing, that some Western researchers, basing themselves on the afore-mentioned structure of capital investment, have found some similarity between the Algerian social-economic strategy and the Soviet model of industrialization in the late 1920s and in the 1930s.²⁵ However, in the USSR, even under the first Five-Year Plan, farming accounted for 15.5% of all investment, and an average of 20% (appreciably more than in Algeria) in subsequent decades.²⁶

Naturally, an imbalance appeared and kept on growing between the development of industry and farming, between town and countryside. Productivity in agriculture was increasingly falling behind industrial productivity (1:27 in the mid-1970s compared with 1:5 in the late 1950s). Suffice it to say that the wheat yield in the most developed self-governing sector of the Algerian countryside, which occupies 27% of cultivated land and accounts for 45% of the aggregate agricultural produce, was below 700 kg per hectare, on average, in the last decade. In consequence, the volume of agricultural production, far from expanding, was down to 90% in the late 1970s compared with what it had been twenty years before, with grain production having fallen by one-fifth (which has to be seen against the background of an extremely high population growth rate of 3.3% a year). It is not surprising that Algeria, once a grain exporter, should have become its stable importer. In 1969 national production supplied 70% of the country's food demand, while in the early 1980s, it supplied a little over 30%.

Such a lag materially reduced the effect of industrialization. For example, one-third of the foreign currency earned through oil sales was used to pay for imported food in the late 1970s.²⁷ The Algerian leadership tried to redress the balance by starting an "agrarian revolution" in the 1970s, which was expected to

abolish feudal vestiges in the countryside, provide landless and land-poor peasantry with land, organize a solid co-operative sector and thereby stimulate expanding agricultural production. However, throughout the time it was under way, the "agrarian revolution" brought any benefit to no more than one-fifth of the landless and land-poor peasants. It did not give the majority of Algerian peasants (6 million out of the total of 8.2 million in 1980) what they had hoped for: land, permanent employment and higher incomes.²⁸

The serious economic imbalance between industrial and agricultural production had just as serious social consequences. The persistent annual growth of consumer prices and inflationary tendencies brought about stagnation and even a decline of the incomes of large groups of the population and stopped the rise of real wages. Per capita consumption in the 1970s practically did not increase compared with the 1960s, and even with the 1950s.²⁹ Yet the standard of living in cities was 2.5 times as high in 1973 as it was in the countryside,³⁰ and since then the gap continued to widen. At the same time the condition of the urban population was not easy either not only because of rising prices but also because of a drastic aggravation of the housing problem. Consequent upon industrialization, the urban population appreciably increased while investment in housing construction as in farming was slashed. In consequence, there were more than 9 persons for every housing unit in Algerian cities in 1977, with 6 in 1966, and the rent for a small apartment was nearly 3.5 times the official minimum wage of 600 dinars.³¹

Finally, the emphasis on modern imported technology prevented the process of industrialization from appreciably reducing the contingent of reserve manpower. In the opening years of independent development there was an exceptionally hard situation in the labour market. As recently as 1970 about 40% of the economically active population were practically jobless. Although, as industrialization progressed the share of people employed in industry (out of the total number of employed) increased from 8.2% in 1966 to 17.2% in 1977, the demand for employment in industrial sectors was met only by 20.1% in 1970-1973 and 32.4% in 1973-1977. In the countryside, 26.5% of the able-bodied male population were unemployed and large numbers were employed partially by the late 1970s.³²

All these negative developments can be regarded as the extremely high social "price" which has to be paid for the intensive process of industrialization swallowing up nearly half the GDP. L. A. Fridman, considering the growth rates and level of capital investment in Algeria and other developing countries, finds that not 45-49% but 30-35% is the optimal rate of accumulation in the industrial sectors, which is enough to realize the objectives of industrialization and secure a continuous, if modest, increase of per capita consumption.³³ With the rate of industrial investment rising still further, as one can see, notably, from the Algerian example, not only does the effect fall, but a serious social imbalance arise.

It is not, of course, that Algerian leaders ignored consumer welfare. For example, over 30% of Algeria's national budget and nearly 11% of the GDP are spent on education (which is one of the factors conducive to industrialization). In 1978, Algeria had 3 million schoolchildren as against 750,000 in 1962.³⁴ The state has been striving to maintain fixed prices of certain foodstuffs—bread, sugar, vegetable oil and other items (although it cannot arrest the rapid increase of the prices of other products and consumer goods). The tax on the monthly wages of up to 500 dinars has been abolished.

Finally, the 1980 Congress of the ruling National Liberation Front party revised the social and economic development strategy with a view to progressively reducing capital investment in industry (down to 37%), increasing investment in construction and agriculture accordingly, and assuring the growth of working people's incomes and consumption. The measures taken have been bearing fruit. There has been a certain growth of agricultural production in recent years.³⁵

It may take some time yet to redress the balance in the national economy. However, there is every reason to believe that given a proper line of leadership, capital investment in industry, made generally in the national interest and for the sake of social and economic progress, will pay off in the long run. Algeria's growing economic co-operation with the socialist world has been and will be playing an important role in this respect.

Let us now have a look at Tanzania. The social-economic strategy of that country's government, headed by President Julius Nyerere, is opposite, in a way, to the Algerian because it

seeks, first and foremost, to promote the agrarian sector. The economic course of the Tanzanian leadership, proclaimed in the Arusha Declaration in 1967, comprised three basic aspects: (1) creation of a new rural structure by organizing ujamaa villages—co-operatives where traditional communal collectivism combined with production modernization measures ought to have gradually brought about socialist change in the countryside; (2) “tailoring” industry to the needs of agricultural development, that is, gearing it principally to providing services essential to farm work, processing of agricultural products and provision of essential commodities for the countryside so as to create a balanced national economic cycle and secure the country’s economic independence—“self-reliance”; (3) a certain redistribution of incomes and respective “social investments” for reducing (and eventually ending) the inequality between well-to-do and poor sections, between town and countryside, and also between individual districts of the country. The “Tanzanian experiment” has become, perhaps, the most Populist model of development of emergent nations and, as such, has attracted great attention of specialists on the problems of the developing countries.

The major principle of “Tanzanian socialism” has been in proclaiming the primacy of the “human” factors of development over purely economic ones. While criticizing the social-economic policy which had been followed by the government of Tanzania before the adoption of the Arusha Declaration, Julius Nyerere pointed out: “What we were doing, in fact, was thinking of development in terms of things, and not of people. . . . The people were secondary; the first priority was the output. As a result, there have been very many cases where heavy capital investment has resulted in no increase in output”.³⁶ Conversely, supreme care for the needs of working people, more favourable conditions for labour, encouragement of mass initiative and a fairer incomes policy ought, in the opinion of the Tanzanian leaders, to have ensured the necessary economic upsurge. Only that kind of socialist-oriented strategy was recognized as effective from the stand-point of resolving the biggest problems of social and national development in an undeveloped country dependent on the world market. “Our present poverty and national weakness make socialism the only rational choice for us”, Julius Nyerere said.³⁷

So how was that social-economic course followed through? Its nucleus was "social investment" directed, above all, towards improving the living conditions of the rural population and thereby stimulating its productive activity. A comparison of the first (1964-1969) and the second (1969-1973) five-year plans is very indicative. While under the former one, adopted before the new course was announced, only 9% of the development budget for education was spent in the countryside, the latter had as much as 29% allotted for the same purpose. The means for extending the system of rural health services were increased by more than half as much again, while those for the supply of drinking water to the countryside were nearly trebled.³⁸ Now, if we look at the distribution of Second Five-Year Plan investment (state investment constituted over two-thirds of the total investment and 76% of monetary investment), we will see that 37% of the resources involved were channelled into farming directly and about as much indirectly, because the larger proportion of the 40% allotted for construction and 15% for the social infrastructure, were intended for the countryside.³⁹ In other words, most of the state capital investment was "rural". The policy of substantial "social investment" continued to be pursued as time went on. For example, in 1975, the government of Tanzania decided to have 25 district health centres and 100 village drugstores opened every year,⁴⁰ and by the late 1970s education—from primary to higher—became free.

The policy of "social investment" brought with it some measures for income redistribution. The tax burden was shifted on to well-to-do groups, in particular, a luxury commodity tax was introduced; while the peasantry were exempted from local taxes. The government controlled the price scissors between industrial and agricultural goods to a certain extent, which, though widening, did so at a little over two-thirds of the rate in neighbouring capitalist-oriented Kenya.⁴¹ With a view to balancing the incomes of the urban and rural population, the government decided on a wage freeze in the late 1960s for relatively high-pay groups of workers, while putting up the wages of low- and middle-pay categories.⁴² In consequence, the income gap between the higher and lower brackets was gradually narrowed. In 1970 it was 70:1, in 1974—9:1, and in 1980—6:1.⁴³ Perhaps, the latter two ratios may seem exaggerated, but the very tendency for

levelling out the incomes through an express government policy is beyond doubt.

Naturally, the aim that the Tanzanian leaders pursued was not just levelling. They realized that the point was not so much to have incomes redistributed as to bring about an expansion of productive forces as the basic prerequisite for overcoming underdevelopment.⁴⁴ Such an expansion, as Tanzanian leaders believed, could be ensured by a total structural reshaping of agriculture and by setting up co-operative socialist villages, *ujamaa*, which were to replace Tanzania's typical small community-family type settlements principally engaged in subsistence farming. A standard *ujamaa* village had both a collective field reserved for joint tillage by members of the co-operative and individual family plots, as well as the necessary infrastructure rising, with roads built, water supply improved, health centres, schools and other facilities opened. The staff of such a co-operative (250 families, on average) was to have produced, as Tanzanian leaders estimated, a considerable production and social effect for, on the one hand, it would mean realizing the benefits of co-operation of various kinds (supply, marketing, consumer, productive), and the possibilities of capital investment in these enterprises, and, on the other hand, socialist relations of production were created, their formation being facilitated by the surviving traditional institutions of communal mutual assistance (*ujamaa*).

In the first few years after the adoption of the Arusha Declaration, the organization of *ujamaa* villages was proceeding basically by the principle of voluntary association, at a slow pace. 650 "socialist villages" had been set up by 1969, inhabited by 2.5% of the country's population.⁴⁵ Afterwards, the "*ujamaaization*" went on faster, and in 1973 14% of the population dwelt in the new settlements.⁴⁶ These growth rates, however, were also found to be insufficient, and the authorities stimulated a further spurt in organizing co-operative villages. By 1980, 77% of the Tanzanians—14 million out of the 18 million—lived in 8,000 new settlements.⁴⁷ True, what was going on in the closing stages was no longer "*ujamaaization*" but "*villagization*", i.e., the creation of such villages in which the emphasis was not on collective production but on "community living"—lower types of co-operation (supply and marketing) and individual farming.

Apart from "social investments", the co-operative villages were given quite substantial resources which were used both for resettlement and housing construction and for production purposes—the provision of machinery, seeding stock and fertilizer for the new farms, specialist training, etc. For instance, the tractor fleet nearly doubled in 1967-1974, to reach a total of around 7,000.⁴⁸ In 1975, capital investment in agriculture was nearly triple the annual average for 1966-1972.⁴⁹

It was presumed that in ten years the new collective farms would start paying off and producing the bulk of marketable agricultural output which would enable the problem of food supply to the cities to be resolved, thereby creating a solid base for subsequent industrialization. These plans had an industrial development programme tied to it. The emphasis was on sectors attending to the needs of the farming community—processing of agricultural products and provision of essential consumer goods. Following the adoption of the Arusha Declaration, there was a total or partial nationalization of a number of foreign firms which were replaced by parastatals (autonomous public corporations). There were 330 of them by the mid-1970s. They included small and larger ones, such as the National Development Corporation which was in charge of 22 companies and in control of between 25% and 50% of the joint-stock capital of six more mixed companies.

The public sectors thus organized (comprising also the nationalized network of financial institutions, communications, transport, power plants, health services, tourism, wholesale trade, export, import, etc.) accounted for over 80% of industrial production.⁵⁰ Its major share was in food, textile and woodworking industries, production of building materials, chemical industry (mostly fertilizer production) and other sectors in one way or another concerned with meeting the needs of the countryside. For example, a National Small Industry Corporation (SIDO) was established late in 1973. It set up centres in a number of districts for small-lot production and specialist manpower training. They made some essential items for the rural population, such as building materials, agricultural implements and spare parts for bicycles, and also granted loans and rendered assistance to village artisans. "Rural industrialization" was an important element of government plans.⁵¹

At first, national economic growth was more or less effective. Industry made steady headway (with a growth rate of over 10% a year) and its share in the GDP reached 10.2% in 1972. Moreover, due to a policy of import substitution, the relation of local and foreign-made goods in the domestic market changed from 1:4 to 6:4.⁵² On the whole, in the first decade of independence, Tanzania's annual economic growth was 5.4% which, considering the population growth rate of 2.7%, enabled an annual per capita income increase of 2.7%, while the average rate for all Africa was 1.7%.⁵³

But then came some serious setbacks. These were caused in part by exterior factors: severe droughts of 1973-1974 and 1979-1980, which compelled a considerable import of foodstuffs and, accordingly, an outflow of hard currency earnings; increased world prices of oil and petroleum products after 1972, which ate up half the nation's revenue by the late 1970s; falling prices of exported agricultural primary products (cotton, coffee, sisal and other items) which also reduced the national stockpile; rising world prices of technological equipment; expensive military aid to neighbouring Uganda in overthrowing the anti-people Idi Amin regime; and finally, the high-cost construction of the new capital, Dodoma.

There were factors of a different kind at work as well. As President Julius Nyerere pointed out, the winning of independence led to a "revolution of growing expectations" among the Tanzanian population, a considerable growth of the needs and increased consumption while production was manifestly lagging behind.⁵⁴ Largely under the impact of this factor there were "social investments" in such sectors which, while they were vital could not immediately "pay off"—the education system, health services, transport, infrastructure, construction of the new capital, Dodoma, etc. There were also some other reasons to explain why instead of the country's accelerated development by the principle "we must run while they walk", proclaimed by the Tanzanian leadership, there was, as a matter of fact, what researchers described as "running to stay in place".

To begin with, the agricultural sector did not become a solid base for further economic growth. Although there were occasional increased harvests of staple food crops, sometimes even considerable,⁵⁵ on the whole food production was growing since

1968 by a mere 1.4% a year, i.e., at a rate which was just a little over half that of population growth.⁵⁶ Hence, the unending want of food imports which in critical periods were worth 1,000 million shillings and more a year.⁵⁷

The ujamaa (and other types of co-operative settlements) did not develop into productive collective farms. They produced as little as 5% of the total marketable agricultural output.⁵⁸ Researchers (and quite often even Tanzanian officials themselves) have been referring to peasant conservatism and sluggish traditional agricultural production. Beyond dispute, these factors exist and do lead to the countryside sometimes having no interest in expanding production and in getting higher earnings and ineffectively using machinery. For instance, 15,000 tons of fertilizer made available to the peasants were left unused in 1976-1977.⁵⁹ But it would hardly be right to see that as the main reason. Managerial miscalculations appear to be far more responsible.

First, the co-operativization of the Tanzanian countryside was unjustifiably pushed, particularly since 1974. Local government bodies, anxious to "show off" in reporting their performance to the central authorities, quite often resorted to forcible resettlement, threats and reprisals against rural dwellers. The ambition to "score points" led to many villages being set up in a hurry or just renamed ujamaa, involving a waste of resources.⁶⁰ Second, the new settlements had a dire shortage of specialists and quite often were not up to the mark in organizing production, supply and marketing. For instance, the marketing functions were exercised by middlemen very much like those of colonial times, with the result that the peasants had up to 50% of the purchasing price taken away from them. Instead of the optimal number of 250 families, collective villages quite often grouped a thousand households and even more and it became a problem for peasants to reach the common field to work on because of a great distance they had to travel. No wonder that in their overwhelming majority the new collective villages turned out to be loss-making, and peasants, in reply to pressure from local or central organisations, withdrew into their habitual forms of subsistence farming or plain "self-feeding".

The trend for ujamaa villages to fall apart has been implicitly recognized recently even by the authorities who have more

and more often been redistributing the collectively owned farmland to individual households.

Things in industry were no better. Enterprises of the public sector were chronically unprofitable due to a variety of reasons, mostly of a subjective kind. One may point, for instance, to unjustifiably inflated staff and higher pay rates for managerial personnel than those of private firms. Despite the public sector's lower labour productivity, the average hourly rate was 27% higher than it was at similar enterprises of the private sector.⁶¹ Furthermore, the plans for the construction of new enterprises were quite often unrelated to the possibilities for them to market their products, which caused such enterprises to operate sometimes 40-60% below capacity.⁶² There was also bureaucratic mismanagement of the public sector combined with peremptory orders as well as incompetence of individual officials and business executives.

But, perhaps, the most essential thing was that the policy of import substitution was inconsistent. Although a number of goods did begin to be produced at home, there still remained the country's general technological dependence on transnational corporations and a preference for capital-intensive technology which was too expensive (particularly because of the ever rising prices of machinery and equipment imported from developed countries). Technological dependence developed into direct financial dependence: from about the mid-1970s, over 60% of the monetary resources came from foreign sources—loans and credits from the West, as shown by the Tanzanian economist, H. Moshi.⁶³ As early as 1976, Tanzania's foreign debt amounted to nearly 8 billion shillings (34.3% of the annual national income)⁶⁴ and has since been growing all the time.

The rapid growth of the foreign debt has been caused, notably, by the fact that while the Second Five-Year Plan was still under way, the Tanzanian leadership began gradually backing down from the strategy of "self-reliance" and "rural" orientation of social and economic development, which was launched in 1967. Whereas until the mid-1970s, capital investment in farming was still superior to investment in industry, subsequently the latter began fast catching up with the former and then surpassed it.⁶⁵ Under the Third Five-Year Plan (1977-1981) industry got nearly 30% of all appropriations while farming had 15.2%⁶⁶

So without having completed what they had declared to be the top priority job of creating the necessary agricultural base for industrial development, the authorities switched over to an ill-prepared industrialization programme, which was fraught with further setbacks in the particular external and domestic circumstances.

All those imbalances and "bottlenecks" in the national economy finally led to a serious impasse in the early 1980s. The performance in that period was alarming, indeed: in 1981 agricultural production was considerably lower than it had been a year before (the maize harvest was down by more than one-third, that of rice—by 20%); the share of industrial output in the GDP was down to 7.1% as against 10.2% before; the GDP growth rate dropped from 3.7% in 1979 to 0.6%.⁶⁷ That moved President Nyerere to admit that Tanzania's "problems are very serious, and very real". Speaking before the Second Congress of the ruling Chama Cha Mapinduzi party (CCM) in October 1982, he said: "The basic problem is that our earnings and our consumption are out of balance; we are consuming more than we are earning."⁶⁸

The situation that had thus developed was analyzed both by Tanzanian leaders and outside observers. Here is a noteworthy fact: few of those who commented on Tanzania's economic performance (including Western researchers, newspaper observers and former Tanzanian statesmen) consider that the root of the evil is in the very idea of ujamaaization, socialist orientation and the policy of "self-sufficiency". Most of the commentators concur in the view that the difficulties which have arisen are attributable to the action of those who were supposed to carry out the programmes adopted, and not to the programmes themselves. Thus, the American researcher, Francis Hill, while giving their due to Nyerere's ideas, still considers that his activity "has been much less successful at controlling the subsequent course of the policies and organizations that he initiated".⁶⁹ The British economist, Edmund Clark, is even more specific: between a narrow circle of sincere socialist leaders led by Nyerere and the working masses there is a stratum of bureaucracy "immune from the pressures of the people and the poverty in which they live".⁷⁰ Assessments of this kind are, perhaps, most widespread.

It appears that the social-economic strategy set out in the

Arusha Declaration has, indeed, conformed to the objective conditions of Tanzania. Difficulties arose while it was being put into effect and were largely caused by departures from it. That is just how the matter has been put in recent resolutions of the national leadership. At the second National CCM Conference, President Nyerere called for agriculture to regain priority in planning and in the structure of the national economy as the overriding condition for an effective implementation of the strategy of self-sufficiency. A "programme of national survival" has been launched, aimed basically at expanding production (agricultural, first and foremost), reducing inflation, increasing hard currency earnings, raising the productivity of labour in the public sector and carrying on the policy of "social investments". On the basis of these recommendations, the Ministry of Agriculture worked out long-term and short-term programmes of agrarian development with emphasis on the modernization of individual peasant farming along with promoting the progress of state farms and revitalizing the private sector.⁷¹

Comparing the experience of the development of Algeria and Tanzania, we can state their polarity to certain extent: in one case certain economic achievements have been paid for by a high "social" price, and in the other, on the contrary, "social investments" have been rather substantial, but economic performance was clearly lagging behind. At the same time, the experience of both countries (in spite of their different levels of development, different economic potentials and different scale of industrialization) has some common features connected with the established forms of the public sector and co-operativization as well as technocratic methods which are the driving motor of development.

Some foreign writers explain disproportions and negative trends in the development process in Algeria and Tanzania by the preponderance of the state capitalist structure of the type just mentioned and on these grounds do not even rank them among socialist-oriented countries. For instance, there is the contention that Algeria is just a "capitalist society without capitalists".⁷² According to the Canadian author, John Nellis, "in Algeria the administrative control of the labour force is analogous with the ownership of the means of production".⁷³ Such assessments appear to be wrong in principle. First, we have no

reason to question the non-capitalist orientation of such reforms carried out in Algeria and Tanzania as those which undermined the positions of foreign capital, created the public sector and the co-operative system, introduced some elements of self-management, raised the living standards of the worse-off sections of the population, etc., or the sincerity of their aspiration for socialism as recorded in the Algerian National Charter or the Arusha Declaration. Second, the forms of the public sector just considered and co-operatives as well as state capitalism (mixed economy) as such may, under certain conditions, be steps to building socialism in the future. One may well recall the way Lenin posed the problem of state capitalism in the early 1920s. State capitalism, Lenin said, "is the capitalism that we can and must permit, that we can and must confine within certain bounds; for this capitalism is essential for the broad masses of the peasantry and for private capital, which must trade in such a way as to satisfy the needs of the peasantry".⁷⁴

From the standpoint of social orientation, the Algerian economy generally differs, say, from Tunisian just as the Tanzanian version of development from Kenyan. It is indicative that Algerian Communists in principle consider it necessary to use this "state form of capital accumulation for development".⁷⁵ The problem is different: it is in mastering public, co-operative and mixed sectors of the economy and in the revolutionary authorities supervising the operation of the economic machinery and management implementing state capitalist policy. The actual record of development both of Algeria and Tanzania shows that this is an uneasy task.

Supervision implies not only restraining the acquisitive bourgeois ambitions of the bureaucratic élite, but, what is far more important, an ability to assure the operation of the entire economic machinery and the interaction of the public and mixed sectors with the co-operative, small commodity and private sectors. The latter aspect deserves special mention. Algeria and Tanzania have, by and large, avoided the leftist tendency of underestimating the importance of the private sector, which was typical of Guinea in the mid-1960s and, later on, of Mali in the 1960s, Burma in the 1960s and the early 1970s—the tendency which had perforce to be corrected in the said countries. But in Tanzania in the latter half of the 1970s, the authorities

had to return the nationalized butcher's shops and filling stations to their former owners. As far as Algeria is concerned, although its leadership under Houari Boumedienne made a good effort after coming to power to bring the Algerian business community into the process of development, the latter established itself primarily in the service industries. Beyond question, a politically care-free attitude to the private sector and to the bureaucratic bourgeoisie is fraught with great danger. Egypt is a clear case in point. But no less serious is another danger that of mismanagement and denial of the historical utility of some elements of "capitalist training", strict cost-accounting, initiative, and responsibility which can be acquired in the context of socialist orientation. The private sector can make a certain contribution to the socially vital services, small-scale and medium-level production, the provision of essential commodities; it is indispensable, in a way, also for the "instruction" of public and co-operative enterprises and for the improvement of the economic machinery in the period of transition.

Analysis of the relationship of the leaders and the masses is, perhaps, the main thing in studying Populist-type trends or respective political regimes, since the issue of such relationship and the political activity of working people is central to the ideological and political theories of a Populist kind. It is not by chance that the American author, Entelis, should have pointed out that the "Populist orientation" of the Algerian political leadership is connected with the accent it makes on the fundamental social role of the "poor masses".⁷⁶ American political scientists Huntington and Nelson have even made a point of indicating the "Populist model of political participation" which proceeds from the assumption that the higher level of the political activity of the masses must make for social-economic egalitarianism and for social progress in general.⁷⁷

Indeed, prominent Populist leaders and ideologues have been invariably calling for the establishment of "people's rule" or "direct" popular democracy. It was first Frantz Fanon who formulated a classic argument for Populist political thought in favour of fostering mass political initiative at grass-roots level: the inevitable teething troubles of the large-scale political participation of the masses will unfailingly pay off as the masses

find themselves to be the masters of their own destinies and respond to the confidence reposed in them by taking real interest in the management of all social affairs.⁷⁸ Julius Nyerere held a similar view. Suppose, he reasoned, an ujamaa is managed by a good specialist whose projects (as long-term investment in a prospective farm) the peasants cannot properly appreciate. "Peasants can therefore replace the manager who, in their opinion, does nothing to bring about rapid economic growth. They will have made a mistake, but that is *no trouble* [Emphasis added—*V.Kh.*]. The main thing is that the peasants will still be using the right and the opportunity to choose their leaders. For people who do not trust their leaders will not share in carrying out the plans of agricultural development, and that will rule out all progress whether now or in the years ahead."⁷⁹

The political activity of working people and the political participation of the masses are regarded by modern Populists as primary and quite often as a more important indication of social progress than, say, economic growth. "Any action that gives them [the people—*V.Kh.*] more control of their own affairs," the 1971 guidelines of the Tanzanian ruling party said, "is an action for development, even if it does not offer them better health or more bread. Any action that reduces their say in determining their own affairs or running their own lives is not development and retards them even if the action brings them a little better health and a little more bread."⁸⁰ Boumediène has also pointed out that "working people must transform themselves into managerial staffs" and take an active part in the running of social production and in the management of social property.⁸¹

How far does the actual political practice in the countries under consideration correspond to the given policy-programme guidelines? In the years since independence they have set up various organizations intended to direct the activities and promote the enterprising initiative of large sections of working people. These are, for one thing, mass organizations grouping around the ruling parties—trade union, peasant, youth and women's organizations. Second, these are local government bodies: people's assemblies of communes and departments in Algeria, general assemblies of villages and village councils in Tanzania. Finally, these are representative economic bodies: committees of

self-governing farms and industrial workers' assemblies in Algeria and corresponding commissions of village councils and workers' councils at enterprises in Tanzania.

All these mass organizations are expected to act as the closest assistants of the party and government machinery. At the same time, as many observers indicate, they are quite often set in motion by a one-way ("from top to bottom") impulse while the "feedback" is far less pronounced. For instance, in the opinion of the French political scientist, Jean Leca, who has spent years investigating political life in Algeria, "centralism" takes precedence of "democracy" in the principle of democratic centralism officially professed by the Algerian leadership after 1965. Considering various forms of the large-scale participation of the masses in national affairs (workers' assemblies, trade union movement, mobilization of students for work in the countryside, and so on), Jean Leca arrives at the conclusion that, first, this is always managed participation; second, it shows itself in isolated sectors of society and does not seriously invade the area of management; third, the groups invited from above are told what programme of action they are supposed to carry out; fourth, the political participation of the masses proceeds by way of isolated campaigns; it is not institutionalized, but connected simply with the concrete problems and needs of the regime.⁸²

There have been similar assessments as regards Tanzania. As Francis Hill observed, even when CCM leaders or government agencies called on the masses to be active, that was the leaders' sporadic initiative. For many major political moves the authorities were said to "require only lack of opposition".⁸³ Such paternalistic methods of work with the masses have been described by a Dar es Salaam economist, Rweikiza Baguma.⁸⁴

The mass meeting is just about the main form of the political mobilization of the masses in Tanzania and a number of other countries of Tropical Africa. A typical case has been described in a book by a US Africanist, Fred Hayward. The organizers go out days in advance to set up a meeting for a political leader. Bands are hired and dancers and drummers are obtained. The day arrives, the leader comes, the people gather—in most cases not to hear the speeches, but out of curiosity and for the enjoyment of a "festive occasion". For most of them this aspect of national politics is recreation, not political participation. The band

plays, speeches are made and the people dance. The meeting is over, and everybody is happy. The leader goes back, thinking he has a strong following. However, if you asked the people—you might get quite a different story.⁸⁵ As a rule, such activities are designed just to “mark” support for the regime and are not followed up by any constructive activity “from below”. Similar conclusions can be made in studying the situation in Mali in the 1960s and Burma in the 1960s-1970s. Considering numerous forms of the political mobilization of the masses in Guinea under Sekou Touré—meetings, parades, demonstrations, seminars, and so on, the French author, Claude Rivière, writes that they were all designed to express nothing beyond a general approval of what the authorities offered to the population at each particular moment. But that “overpoliticization” of the masses, Rivière called it, signified, on the contrary, their own extreme passivity⁸⁶.

So there is a certain contradiction. On the one hand, the revolutionary leaders of the Populist type in their political practice officially proceed from the ideas of “people’s rule”, the utmost involvement of the masses in government, and the encouragement of grass-roots political activity. Their devotion to the interests of working people finds expression in the social-economic and political reforms to meet the needs of the general public. On the other hand, the Left-Populist leaders have a feature common to many exponents of national democracy who, as has been noted in Soviet publications, “suffer . . . from mas-sophobia”,⁸⁷ which finds expression in the “regulation” of all political activity of the masses and a substantial restriction of their initiative.

It would be one-sided to put this contradiction down only to circumstances and miscalculations of a subjective kind. The enhanced role of regulatory functions in emergent countries is due, above all, to objective factors—the masses are unprepared for full-scale social activity, their standards of literacy and political development are inadequate, they have no established democratic practices, yet they do have their traditionalist prejudices.

The self-managed farms in Algeria can be taken as a case in point. When French owners of agricultural plantations deserted them to flee to France, the working masses (former hired workers and farm labourers on those plantations) spontaneously

occupied the abandoned estates and decided to manage production on their own. That was a tremendous achievement of the people. The Algerian authorities, still in the times of Ahmed Ben Bella, approved that initiative by the March Decrees of 1963 and granted the self-managed farms the necessary powers. There was even the view that socialism in Algeria ought to take shape as "socialism of self-management". However the self-managed sector fairly quickly ran into difficulties: production fell nearly by half compared with the colonial period and most of the farms turned out to be loss-making. And although the state tried to mend matters by taking the self-managed farms under its control and thereby considerably reducing their autonomy, the profitability of the entire self-managed sector has never been achieved.

Similar difficulties arose in the process of organization of workers' assemblies which were expected to exercise control over the managerial personnel, share in running all production affairs and uphold the workers' interests. Replying to the reproach that workers' self-management had limited opportunities and could not stand up against the new "technocratic" élite, Boumediène said during a meeting with trade union leaders in the mid-1970s: "If socialist self-management of enterprises were introduced in actual practice, the authority of the governing establishment would be very limited. It is the fault of the working people themselves, too, that this has not happened as yet. They have not appreciated the weapon they have in their hands [i.e., self-management bodies.—*V. Kh.*] That is problem No. 1 in Algeria".⁸⁸

Just in the same way the co-operative plans of the Tanzanian leadership, as the Swedish Africanist, Goran Hyden stated, have run up against the inaction of the patriarchal peasantry, their social and psychological sloth and their gravitation towards economic primitivism, which the author has somewhat loosely denoted as "the peasant mode of production".⁸⁹

All that accounts, to a certain extent, for the characteristic tendency discovered in the operation of progressive regimes by Soviet Orientalists: revolutionary democracy, "inadequately stimulates the development of political democracy, but strives to promote social democracy"⁹⁰—to ensure working people's right to work, recreation, education, etc., that is to make the very

"social investments" that were mentioned earlier on. It is this area that most distinctly reveals the advantages of socialist orientation over the capitalist way from the standpoint of meeting the vital needs of working people. On the other hand, for all of its positive aspects, "social democracy" does not replace, nor can it replace, political democracy. Moreover, operating at times in the form of the blessings bestowed upon working people, "social democracy" can, to a certain extent, even contribute towards keeping them socially and politically passive, fostering dependent inclinations, presupposing that since any initiative comes from above, the authorities themselves must arrange everything. This peculiar social and psychological phenomenon has been more than once noted in scientific publications dealing with the relationship of the leaders and the masses in the emergent states.⁹¹

Whenever a socialist-oriented regime goes in for a well-considered and consistent encouragement of a mass, grass-roots initiative, it pays off immediately. This has been admitted even by some bourgeois authors. In particular, the American sociologist, Professor Marina Ottaway of Zambia University has explained the success of the land reform in Ethiopia in 1974-1977, above all, by the fact that the state had succeeded in arousing the political initiative of the peasantry by organizing self-defence squads, which could defend peasant interests in the struggle for land against feudal landowners and their flunkys. It is for this reason, she found, that Ethiopia must have achieved more than other African countries in carrying out the land reform.⁹²

It would be wrong to presume that the leadership in the countries under consideration are not conscious of the situation as it has developed, nor take steps to stimulate the political activity of the masses. The peculiar electoral system of Tanzania can be cited as an example of such stimulation. Under the 1965 election regulations, each citizen of that country, outside the category of private employers, landlords and other individuals in receipt of unearned incomes, can, with 25 votes to support him, put forward his candidacy to the National Assembly from his local constituency. Of all the candidacies thus registered, the CCM bodies select two candidates who are allowed to contest an election campaign given their general basic acceptance of the Party programme. In consequence, there are between 800 and

1300 candidates emerging at the opening of each election campaign in Tanzania. And although the actual polling involves only a quarter or even one-seventh of the total number of candidates, election results quite often turn out to be "other than planned"—quite a few party and government officials are voted out, including up to 20-25% ministers and other high-ranking officials involved in the election campaign.⁹³

Less than half of the entire contingent of the National Assembly is elected in this way. Nevertheless, scientific publications on Tanzania have generally recognized that the system of alternative candidates has rather significant advantages as a factor for the political mobilization of the masses. First, this procedure makes the voters well informed about their own rights and about the obligations of "their" deputy. Second, they draw the attention of the candidates, local authorities and central government to their needs. Third, most voters—even a higher proportion than that in developed countries—know their candidate and seek to reach him. Fourth, this election procedure imposes a certain measure of discipline on the ruling top leadership since many of its representatives can no longer be a hundred per cent sure that they are going to be elected. The main thing is, however, that the alternative system of elections contributes towards the political enlightenment and democratic education of the masses, above all, the peasantry, who cease to be a politically inert mass. Besides, the significance of parliament rises in the nation's political life, especially in influencing local development.

Political decentralization is yet another method of revitalizing the political activity of the masses, typical of many trends of a Populist kind in the developing countries. A detailed rationale for political decentralization was set out, notably, in Algeria's 1976 National Charter. Algerian leaders have been striving towards implementing political decentralization. For example, Boumedienne and his associates gradually transformed the preceding political structure after 1965, enhancing the role of local self-government. The basic political unit was a community which acquired a sizable measure of independence in local affairs—as regards the problems of economy, education, etc. The community has its own representative body—a local council elected by universal suffrage.

In Tanzania, the course towards decentralization began to be pursued in 1972. It was launched, in the opinion of the African researcher, Uma Lele, as the Tanzanian leadership's reaction to the inefficiency of the organization of ujamaa settlements in 1967-1971, which they sought to explain by the excessive centralization of managerial structures and bureaucratic methods in organizing settlements. Plans were afoot not only to reduce the prerogatives of the central authorities but also to strengthen the functions of the local public as well as the party's role in provinces. Accent was shifted to party commissars in regions and districts.⁹⁴

At the same time, the basic instruments of government remained in the hands of central departments. Moreover, the financing has from now on been done mostly from above so as to avoid imbalances in the development of different regions and districts, as official agencies explained. So the policy of centralization has been self-contradictory from the very outset. For instance, there was too little local involvement in planning. District and regional party commissars were appointed by the central authorities. The village councils and general assemblies of villages—the local self-government bodies—were relegated to positions of secondary importance, economically and politically, within the framework of decentralization measures by the mid-1970s.

As the Swedish author, Frank Holmquist, has shown, political decentralization in Tanzania degenerated into what looked rather like "administrative deconcentration", that is the transfer of official staff from the centre to the provinces, and did not enhance the role of local leaders and encourage more independent activity by the masses. According to the findings of specialists from Dar es Salaam University, the proportion of self-help projects* involving a high degree of local activity dropped from 64% in 1971-1972 to a mere 29% in 1974-1975. At the same time the incomes of regional top officials rose by 37% from 1971-1972 to 1974-1975 due to a reduction of the local personnel and the arrival of officials from the centre.⁹⁵

I think that one of the most serious impediments to the suc-

* Construction of roads, bridges, wells, schools, etc. chiefly by local authorities receiving but small donation from the state.

cess of what were fundamentally rightly conceived measures for the decentralization of management was the ambition of the officialdom to preserve and strengthen their positions and to oppose everything conducive to enhancing the political activity and enterprise of working masses. Here we once again face the problem of bureaucracy which has been assuming great importance in the developing countries because of the tremendous backwardness and anti-democratic stereotypes left over by colonialism, and traditionalist habits of veneration of the "elders", "big-wigs", "bosses", etc. It is not for nothing that the remarkable African revolutionary, Amílcar Cabral, warned: "After the liberation there will be people controlling the police, the prisons, the army and so on, and a great deal depends on who they are and what they try to do with these instruments."⁹⁶

As a rule, the administrative staff in Tanzania and Algeria was formed of members of the social and class élite. In Tanzania, for example, most of the civil servants came from the families of prosperous farmers living in the more developed regions growing valuable export crops.⁹⁷ It is worth noting that over 88% of the administrators of the late 1960s and the early 1970s were in the civil service before independence.⁹⁸ The process of democratization of the bureaucratic establishment (in Tanzania in this context, but that trend has been peculiar to some other countries as well) has been generally extremely slow. According to the American researchers, McGowan and Wacirah, Tanzania's civil service had the same few hundred people in high offices in the 1960s and in the early 1970s, with 80% of them having only changed some jobs for others—occasionally up to three times.⁹⁹ There has been no marked change in the subsequent years either.

Officials in the countries under the regimes we are considering here (just as, incidentally, in many developing countries) have a good measure of autonomy and a considerable potential—in terms of their economic and political position, prestige and status. True, in the countries which have declared themselves committed to a non-capitalist way of development and introduced certain restrictions on private economic activity, and which pursue a more egalitarian policy of income bourgeois the officialdom is deprived of an opportunity to "turn bourgeois" so openly and publicly as in the countries treading the capitalist

path. Nevertheless, its economic and social positions there are strong, too. For in the countries under national democratic regimes, the state is the main owner and manager of production, and it predominantly controls the system of distribution as well. This circumstance turns the officialdom into a great force influencing all social groups. Claude Rivière considers, for instance, that the type of society that was created in Guinea in the 1960s and 1970s was one in which access to the system of distribution of material values played a paramount role.¹⁰⁰ Besides, as studies on Tanzania have shown, a kind of "informal alliance" of bureaucracy with the top-level rural petty-bourgeoisie, actually laying hold on government subsidies and development funds, can well take shape in the countries under consideration.¹⁰¹

The national leaders both of Algeria and Tanzania have more than once pointed to the negative aspects of the activities of the officialdom and called for action to check them. To oppose bureaucracy and corruption, Boumediène stressed, there has to be control. For it to be effective, it must be exercised by the people.¹⁰² Speaking about the measures to restrict abuses by the officialdom in Tanzania, one can note the adoption of a special "Leadership Creed" which imposes certain moral obligations on a leader and restricts the participation of officials in private enterprise. A five-percent tax "for development" was introduced there as early as the mid-1960s for those who received a monthly income of over 200 shillings, and pay rates for party officials and civil servants were reduced.¹⁰³ There are occasional purges of staff, check-ups of official incomes, and suggestions to deliver surplus land to the government stock, etc. But, as a rule, these measures produce no major changes.

Bureaucracy is causing damage to the community not only because of the ambition common to a majority of officials for personal enrichment, which finds expression both in outright corruption and, indirectly, in the trend for the staff of the civil service to be inflated. No lesser is the damage arising from the political and economic ambitions of the bureaucratic contingent. For the latter strives for a monopoly position in the field of management and, therefore, has no interest in stimulating the political activity of working people. At the same time, as has been shown earlier on by the example of a campaign to promote

peasant co-operativization in Tanzania, the logic of bureaucratic "service" quite often leads to management by injunction, and excessive official zeal for "plan fulfilment", which also has a negative effect on the display of grass-roots initiative and often only discredits the measures conceived for the sake of the masses.¹⁰¹

A substantial counterweight to the sway of the bureaucratic contingent in such circumstances can be and must be provided by the ruling party, all the more so since the countries under consideration have officially proclaimed the party's primacy over the state. Stressing this point, Boumediène once stated that the party's principal mission was to "mobilize the masses and assure the people's effective participation in the implementation of national tasks".¹⁰⁵ However, the ruling parties do not yet have the necessary political and organizational possibilities realizing these objectives. The Algerian National Liberation Front, for example, remained a central set-up, with no primary units to work with, right until late 1970. With such an unchallengeable centre of authority, as the Revolutionary Council in Algeria, the functions of any particular institutions of the NLF were largely nominal. As far as the higher party bodies were concerned, their creation was completed as late as 1979 at the Fourth NLF Congress.

As to the CCM, although it appears to be well formed organizationally, for a number of reasons this party has failed to bring off a consistent anti-bureaucratic drive in the area of management and get large masses involved. The principal reason is the lack of democracy within the party itself. Even the secretaries of the primary organizations are appointed, not elected. Besides, the majority of party organizations are formed by the territorial, rather than workplace principle, which reduces their influence on the masses. Finally, in Tanzania the party staff are in many ways merged with the civil service and influenced by it.

It will not be an exaggeration to draw the conclusion from the foregoing that better relations between managerial institutions and large sections of working people in many ways offer additional potentialities for carrying forward progressive changes in Tanzania and Algeria. The objective of effectively involving working people in social affairs and in the task of resolving

the pressing problems of non-capitalist development remains as relevant as ever.

The problem of using various forms of pre-capitalist collectivism (above all, communal institutions) in the process of non-capitalist development of the countries which have fallen behind, as noted earlier on, attracted the attention of Marx and Engels. It was long before the 1880s, when Vera Zasulich asked Marx whether the community in Russia could become a stepping-stone for socialist change, the author of *Capital* began pondering over various aspects of that problem (for example, in his works "Forms Preceding the Capitalist Mode of Production" and "British Rule in India").

Marx gave an essentially positive reply to the question of Vera Zasulich. "It is clear straight away," he pointed out, "that one of its [the community's—*V.Kh.*] basic features, the common ownership of land, constitutes the natural basis for collective production and appropriation." Therefore, the fact that "the Russian peasant is accustomed to *artel* conditions of work makes it easier for him to effect the change from a parcelled system of economy to a collective one which he is already practising to a certain extent and in meadow-lands which are not divided up in drainage work and other undertakings of general interest".¹⁰⁶

Similarly, Engels considered it possible for the mark* in Germany to be revived "but not in its old form which has outlived itself but in a rejuvenated form; by so updating communal landownership as to have the latter not only assure the peasant small holders all the advantages of large-scale farming . . . and offer them the means wherewith to organize large-scale industry along with agriculture, using the power of the steam and water, but also organize it without capitalists, by the effects of the association itself."¹⁰⁷ The countries which have fallen behind can well use "the remnants of communal ownership and corresponding folk customs", Engels wrote, "as a potent means for substantially shortening the process of their development towards socialist society".¹⁰⁸

Lenin did not have any direct comments of this kind. He lived at a time when communal ownership in Russia had already been

* A form of neighbourhood community.

substantially shaken by the development of capitalism. Besides, there was the close ideological confrontation of revolutionary Marxism with Populism and Neopopulism which insisted on the "socialist instincts" of the peasantry. However, while rejecting the Populist theories of "agrarian" and "communal socialism", Lenin emphasized that Marxists had never supported those "foolish projects for forcibly abolishing the community and forcibly introducing some other, similar system of landownership, such as are usually concocted by the present-day opponents of the village community, who favour gross interferences in the peasants' life and attack the village community from anything but the standpoint of the peasants' interests".¹⁰⁹

The problem of the community institution in Russia took on new qualities after 1917 when the peasantry spoke up for communal landownership to be preserved, while the Soviet authorities had to get down to the actual business of setting up a system of co-operative farming. If "'we' are successfully to resolve the problem of our immediate transition to socialism", Lenin pointed out at the time, "we must understand what *intermediary* paths, methods, means and instruments are required for the transition from *precapitalist* relations to socialism. That is the whole point."¹¹⁰ A product of pre-capitalist relations, the community is, one of the forms of production co-operation, while co-operation, as Lenin stressed, makes it possible for socialist change in the countryside to be brought about "by means that are the *simplest, easiest and most acceptable to the peasant*".¹¹¹

The flexibility of Lenin's approach to the peasantry and the pre-capitalist forms of landownership proved to be perfectly justified in the subsequent period. It may be recalled that the Soviet authorities did not treat the institution of the community negatively, considering the "aspiration of the absolute majority of the peasantry, particularly its medium-level contingent for egalitarian and communal landownership which it fought for with as much passion and determination as it had fought for the land and the abolition of large-scale private landownership".¹¹² Many communities, which had been abolished under the Stolypin Reform*, were restored after the victorious

* The agrarian reform carried through by the then Prime-Minister, D.A. Stolypin. Its aim was to replace community relations by a household-based system of agriculture.

October Revolution. In the mid-1920s, there was a preponderant proportion of peasant farmsteads in the communal sector of the country's midland regions.¹¹³ With Lenin's co-operation plan on its way to being fulfilled, the existence of peasant communities (or "land associations", as they were then called), was one of the prerequisites for passing over to machine-hiring and credit-granting associations, associations of individuals who joined forces for collective land cultivation and other primary forms of co-operation. In any event, there was a "shorter distance" from a peasant community to collective farms in some respects than it was from individual farms. That was shown by the practice of co-operation not only in the midland regions of the USSR, but in the outlying regions and republics as well¹¹⁴.

All that conclusively refutes the assertions of a number of Western students and exponents of "neo-Marxism" that it was typical of classical Marxism to underestimate the peasantry, to misunderstand their institutions or to show contempt for them.¹¹⁵ Moreover, the approach of Marx, Engels, and Lenin to the problem of non-capitalist development of the peasantry has now become one of great relevance because a number of democratic trends in Asia and Africa seek to fall back on the institutions of traditional collectivism in the very practice of socialist orientation.

From the standpoint of the latter criterion, Algeria and Tanzania are, just as in some other respects, the "least" and the "most" Populist. In Algeria, an appeal to pre-capitalist communal collectivism was principally ideological. As early as the second half of 1960s, the then NLF leaders tried to prove that collectivism was a fundamental feature of the medieval community in the Maghreb countries since they were dominated by clan, tribal and communal forms of ownership. For this reason some authors referred to the need to turn to truly Algerian sources, such as community (Jemâa). In the subsequent period, this argument was supplemented with considerations about the affinity of the ideas of Islamic egalitarianism and social justice to socialism, democratic traditions of the Algerian past, etc. Yet none of that went beyond the limits of general propositions and slogans. The utilization of the traditional heritage of "communality" was restricted basically to the social and cultural levels, education and morality.

In Tanzania things were different. There the requirement for traditional communal solidarity and mutual assistance to be used in the process of building "Tanzanian socialism" became decisive from the very outset. The ujamaa villages, Julius Nyerere said, had to become an "enlarged variation of the traditional African family".¹¹⁶ The attempts at using traditional institutions within the framework of socialist change proclaimed by Tanzania's leadership affected not only the economic sector. The Tanzanian state, for example, has legally formalized certain forms of common law (the family code, rules of inheritance, procedure of compensation for damage, terms of mutual assistance, etc.). There has been an "improved traditional style" implanted in architecture both for the sake of economy and out of ideological considerations. There are some other areas, such as political structures, where the traditional forms of relationship are partly maintained.¹¹⁷

I am going to limit myself to considering Tanzanian experience only in the agrarian and co-operative field. What does this experience attest to? What has the campaign of many years for creating co-operative villages, ujamaa, shown? Above all, it has revealed objective difficulties of "grafting" the community on the socialist system of relations. This has found a peculiar kind of reflection in the reassessment by Tanzanian leaders of the degree of affinity between traditional solidarity and socialist production collectivism.

As the Swedish scholar, Goran Hyden has pointed out, although the ujamaa principles as the system of collective production and distribution did actually exist in traditional village practice, they existed only within the enlarged family. There was another principle, ujima, that operated in relations between families. It admitted of working co-operation and mutual assistance only in isolated cases (at harvest time, upon completion of home-building by a family, etc.) in relatively small proportions. In this sense, the ujamaa theory, applying intra-family co-operation to inter-family relations, interpreted the traditional communal collectivism too loosely and could not be unconditionally accepted by the peasants¹¹⁸.

Hyden has cited the example of Bukoba province where institutions of traditional collectivism—"byama"—functioned actively in the 1970s, just as before. Those were special organizations,

something like brigades (both male and female)—some for cattle grazing, others for home-building, still others for the organization of village festivals, provision of aid to the sick, etc. At the same time, the inhabitants of those regions showed no particular interest in the ujamaa—traditional collectivism there had concrete objectives, and larger purposes remained foreign to it.¹¹⁹

By the same token, Francis Hill has noted, the peasants of a village in the Dodoma district who were used to the customs of neighbourly mutual assistance, had no habit of working on a common field, still less so since the reward for that help had not earlier included any portion of the harvest, while the rules of the co-operative provided for grain to be turned over to the state.¹²⁰ Besides, in Tanzania, lying as it does in Eastern Africa distinguished by a succession of rainy and arid seasons demanding intensive work within a limited space of time, it was difficult for the peasants in the ujamaa villages to combine work on their individual plots and on the common field.¹²¹

Does that mean that traditional and socialist collectivism are incompatible? Such a conclusion would be too emphatic, in my view. The point is, first and foremost, that, paradoxical though it might sound, it is the traditional communal institutions that did not stand the “real” test in the course of the Tanzanian experiment. For, while ideologically raising traditional “communality” very high, the organizers of the ujamaa movement at local level were breaking it, as a matter of fact. The very resettlement and amalgamation of former villages (which were becoming, as stated earlier on, too big and inconvenient for peasants) was in substance a serious “recasting” of the former traditional connections of rural dwellers. But the main thing was the replacement of the principle of communal self-management (if only of its elements!) by all-round management and by outside “prompting” (and quite often compulsion). The result was to make a clean sweep of the cornerstone of communal solidarity—the relative independence of co-villagers in the management of their own affairs (land division, forms of mutual assistance and co-operation in work, construction of public premises, roads, etc.).

Of course, in the context of socialist orientation one cannot directly use the form of the traditional peasant community for

the purposes of non-capitalist development. Beyond doubt, there has to be a selective approach, pruning of traditional collectivism from the elements of archaism, patient and skillful work for progressively changing peasant habits and guidelines. But, on the other hand, the actual breaking of the very springs of the communal mechanism, without which it just cannot be used, depreciates attempts at utilizing the communal work habits and community living in the process of the non-capitalist reshaping of the countryside.

On the whole, the experience so far available in drawing communal institutions into non-capitalist structures (not only in Tanzania, but also in some other countries of Africa, Asia and Latin America) does not, it seems, offer any good ground for anything like a black-and-white judgement about the expediency of attempts of this kind. There are some "pros" and "cons". On the one hand, traditional communal collectivism (leaving aside the distinctions between the particular types of communities in all the developing countries and even within the limits of one, African, continent) possesses a series of features which make it rather difficult for it to be grafted on the fabric of modern non-capitalist or socialist-type production. According to some credible observations by ethnographers, "communalism" in pre-capitalist society was not a result of a moral choice or some acquired virtues, but a consequence of an implacable necessity in the struggle with Nature. Therefore, a person with traditional mentality will lack a sense of alternative, initiative and aspiration for change.¹²² Just like the great Russian democrat, Alexander Herzen pointed out in the 19th century that the peasant community levelled the human person,¹²³ so in our days, for instance, a Malagasy researcher, Georges Serre-Ratsimandisa, writes that in the Malagasy rural community ("fokonolona") "within the limits of a group, the individual does not exist; there are only the persons inseparable from the collective".¹²⁴ Now, socialism is inconceivable without raising an independent and resourceful personality.

The secluded character of life and work (preventing intra-communal solidarity from precluding intercommunal estrangement and strife), lack of interest in novelties, the traditional "ceiling" of production and consumption—all that creates serious barriers in the way of amalgamating patriarchal peasantry into

co-operative collectives of a modern type. The American authors, Helen Desfosses and Dirck Stryker, having analyzed some attempts at creating a co-operative Mali village under Modibo Keita, established, in particular, that an enlarged African family which the then Mali leaders tried to use, unchanged, as the basis for a "socialist village" turned out to be unsuitable as a unit of co-operation. The traditional forms of "co-operation in consumption" did not prompt the members of such a co-operative to develop a "sense of responsibility" with the result that considerable resources were spent on village festivities, escaping the area of production; the organization of collective work was hampered by the age and sex differentiation of the African community; finally, the pre-capitalist scale of values did not inspire them to seek greater production beyond the established targets.¹²⁵ The latter factor was also noted by the French author, H. de Decker, who investigated the earlier forms of village co-operation in Guinea during the 1960s. Work on collective fields, he wrote, was of a formal kind there, as it was looked upon as no more than a "demonstration of solidarity with the party" without having anything to do with expanding production and raising the living standard in the countryside.¹²⁶

The American researcher, N. Hopkins, who studied the same co-operative changes in Mali in the 1960s, made a fairly grounded conclusion that traditional co-operation with its patrilinear housekeeping was based on a division of labour between unequals while socialist co-operation was based on the implied contract between equals; each principle presupposing different organizations of the basic economically productive unit of society.¹²⁷ Indeed, theorists of "communal socialism" quite often demonstrably exaggerate the traditional communal egalitarianism while at the same time failing to note the elements of social differentiation and exploitation within the African community which have been noted, for instance, by such a sober-minded thinker and prominent African revolutionary as Amílcar Cabral.¹²⁸ These elements have tended to build up since independence.

At the same time, as some researchers have pointed out, the traditional communal and the socialist way of life have quite a few features in common. According to the prominent ethnographer, Ronald Cohen, the dominant feature of pre-colonial

structures in Africa is "emphasis on social [group, collectivist—*V.Kh.*] relations as a primary value, regardless of the particular form of organization in the society itself".¹²⁹ One may note in this context a telling observation by the American author, Gavin Alderson-Smith, that Peruvian peasants identify the community not with the particular physical location of their land which they hold in common ownership, but with the spirit of collectivism and comradeship, mutual confidence and so on and so forth.¹³⁰

Communal collectivism can turn into an effective incentive for work. Researchers have more than once noted that in traditional African collectives people who work together can work longer, more diligently and productively than if they worked all alone.¹³¹ An individual's involvement in this kind of common work is dictated not by an expected reward but by a "domineering concern for the preservation of the commune" when the common recognition by co-villagers is the main incentive. In such conditions, African author T. Kabweguere underlines, collective work becomes a "source of satisfaction and social guarantees as well as an object of competition".¹³²

Peasant conservatism at the point of production is not certain either. Professor G. Benneh of Ghana University considers the working relationship in a community to be sufficiently dynamic and representing no serious obstacle to village modernization.¹³³ This opinion appears to be not without foundation, considering that the community has more than once in world history demonstrated an ability to adapt itself to various formative structures (slavery, feudalism, capitalism). A remarkable book by the founder of the Peruvian Communist Party, José Carlos Mariátegui *Seven Essays of Interpretation of Peruvian Reality* contains an interesting story by Peruvian administrator Castro Pozo about an Indian community in the Muquiyauyo township combining the characteristics of consumer, credit and producer co-operatives. The community owned an electric power station and purchased machinery for use in collective work. It conducted a joint construction of public premises, involving everybody, women and children included.¹³⁴

Finally, it is essential to note that the traditional institutions of the community, the closest to the masses and the easiest for them to understand, constitute something like ready-made forms of the social-political organization of the peasantry. The revival

of the traditions and customs of the peasant community can become a kind of indication and symbol of social self-organization of the peasantry. For example, in Peru, during the so-called revolution of 1940, peasants on a number of occasions secured a renewal of the system of communal land redistribution and in the course of that campaign banded together against the well-off top crust of the village as well as against neighbouring big landowners.¹³⁵ It was not a matter of chance for the peasant population to use the communal form in such a way as evidenced by similar facts of more recent times—those of the agrarian reform of 1969. In that period, the renewal of communal customs, such as village rallies, became a means of the peasants' class confrontation with big landowners. The American researcher, E. B. Keatinge, who has made a field investigation of one of such communities, arrived at the conclusion that corporate structures provide a natural basis for the political or economic consolidation of the peasantry because the institution of the community, operating through its self-management agencies—general meetings of villagers—stimulates the collective association of the mass of the people and the creation of a form of social organization.¹³⁶

So the facts just cited from real practice (far more of them could be given) point to a possibility—in principle—of using traditional corporate relations in the process of the non-capitalist development of the village in the emergent countries. True, the following theoretical consideration is sometimes advanced by way of objecting to such a possibility. Corporate collectivism, the Polish sociologist, Leszek Dzięgiel, reasons for instance, is a derivative of a certain structure of relationship. This collectivism will simply not work under a different structure of relationship and a different scheme of management directed towards extended reproduction, etc. Corporate solidarity will disappear once its basis is removed.¹³⁷

What one can say to this fairly widespread argument? While its first part, the premise, appears to be quite justified (traditional collectivism is an element of a certain system of social connections), the second part, that is, the conclusion, only outwardly looks convincing. The record of history has abundantly demonstrated that traditions, including corporate traditions, are die-hard indeed; even when some particular institutions and

forms of organization have practically disappeared, they are reproduced for a long time yet at the point of production and, above all, at social and psychological level. Now, what socialism needs are not the corporate institutions by themselves (as such, they are, indeed, unsuitable today), but precisely a habit of collectivism, mutual aid, etc. This is just the case when historical momentum turns out (or at least can turn out) to be useful.

There is a continuing debate in Soviet and foreign publications about the destiny of traditional institutions and a possibility of their being "grafted" onto the fabric of society developing in a non-capitalist way. Various, sometimes opposite points of view have been expressed. In the long run, this dispute can be resolved only by the very course of life and by the actual social development of emergent nations. There is enough ground, however, for the assumption that in the event of successful agrarian experiments, socialist collectivism can use the viable elements of corporate relations which will help create the new type of society more painlessly than by dismantling these relations. If traditional institutions and values could be "built into" capitalism, as shown, for example, by the historical record of Japan, why could not they (naturally, given appropriate progressive transformation) serve the cause of socialism?

The reader may have noticed that considerable attention in this article has been given to the problems and difficulties of the process of non-capitalist development. It is by no means my desire to make accent on difficulties alone that accounts for this line of reasoning. The achievements of socialist-oriented countries, including those I have mentioned—whether in the economic or social fields, or in education, or in the process of anti-imperialist reforms—are commonly known and beyond dispute. It is far more important to study the "bottlenecks" and consider problems and factors holding up social progress in emergent nations.

One must not underestimate these problems and difficulties arising in the way of progressive regimes in emergent nations. However, it would be just as wrong to overestimate and overdramatize them as some Western, including left, researchers do sometimes. One may take a recent, generally interesting work on Tanzania by the American scholar, Idrian Resnick, as a case

in point. He considers that the contradictions of non-capitalist development in that country are due to the "class struggle" going on between working people, led by progressive CCM leaders with Julius Nyerere at their head, and the privileged political-managerial class, and this struggle has so far worked out not to the advantage of working people subjected to "exploitation" by the officialdom.¹³⁸

This line of reasoning is fairly widespread. It is typical of it to make rather loose use of the terms "class", "class struggle", and "exploitation". In Marxism-Leninism, the notion "class struggle" is used to denote the relationships of classes in antagonistic societies. Resnick's argument is that practically any social conflicts and outbreaks of discontent (friction within the managerial class, the refusal of villagers to accept a particular decision of the local chiefs, etc.) can be considered "class struggle".

As much can be said about the concept "exploitation". To a Marxist, it is by no means identical to inequality in terms of property relations or social status, which Resnick makes accent on in his book. As to the various examples of abuses cited in his work (like the disguised employment of wage labour by civil servants, corruption, etc.), one may, of course, rank them as extra economic exploitation. But one has to bear in mind that all this is, so to speak, "illegal" exploitation in circumvention of the social-political system existing in that country, which can be called an exception rather than the rule (although there can be quite a few of such exceptions, too). In other words, in my view, there is a substantial difference between that kind of things (distortions and leftovers) and exploitation within the system of a class antagonistic (say, capitalist) society, that is, "legal" exploitation protected by government institutions.

There is another problem—and it is presented, in part, in the above-mentioned book by Resnick. Very backward countries, former colonies, opt for non capitalist development which inevitably involves tremendous objective and subjective difficulties and problems of reshaping both the basis and the superstructure. Their economic and socio-political progress is hindered by a variety of circumstances: a long and devastating war against the metropolitan country for national liberation (Algeria), development virtually "from scratch" (Tanzania). These countries, just as the overwhelming majority of other socialist-oriented

nations, are relatively small in area and it is not simple at all for them to "tap" their national resources, particularly against the background of neocolonialism and their dependence on the world capitalist economy.

The national economic set-up has yet to be formed. There is a dire shortage of skilled manpower, competent managers and specialists. The working masses do not have a sufficient level of culture and democratic consciousness. There are most die-hard elitist prejudices and stereotypes of behaviour inherited from colonial times and traditionalist leftovers.

All kinds of negative developments, contradictions and social conflicts are inevitable in such conditions just as sheer mistakes and miscalculations connected, besides, with the novelty of the social experiment. The degree of these social and political contradictions can be different in each particular case. But to believe that they can be completely avoided through a "proper" strategy, given the best of intentions on the part of the leaders, means to oversimplify the matter. The root of the problem is in the political and cultural underdevelopment of the masses, which makes it still difficult for them to become actively involved in the administration of all social affairs and in effective control over the official élite. Hence an objective opportunity for the appearance of bureaucracy and of all of its negative consequences—economic, political and cultural. Bureaucracy in such conditions is a kind of "price" for backwardness.

All these complexities and intricacies are well realized by the national leaders themselves in the countries under consideration. "With few specialists," President Julius Nyerere stated, "we are trying to build socialism; with few people conscious of the basic requirements of democracy we are trying to achieve change by democratic means; with few technicians we are trying to effect a fundamental transformation of our economy. And with an educational élite whose whole teaching encouraged motives of individualistic advancement, we are trying to create an egalitarian society!"¹³⁹

It does not follow at all from the foregoing that socialist orientation for emergent nations is a premature or unfounded slogan. On the contrary, the idea of non-capitalist development nowadays has received additional impulses as a result of the irreversible internal crisis of world capitalism in modern times,

an objective impossibility of assuring the social progress of the emergent nations within the framework of backward, dependent and "peripheral" capitalism, finally, a powerful positive influence of the world socialist system and the international working-class and Communist movement on the developing world. Of course, the choice of the non-capitalist path of development by no means guarantees subsequent progress. Moreover, it is, in a way, more difficult to follow socialist orientation than to follow the capitalist road of development, because the latter road has been historically fairly "well-trodden" and demands nothing beyond ordinary pragmatism and reliance on the proprietary instincts of the economically "advanced" population groups (which will, in the long run, inevitably lead and is already leading to serious social upheavals in the developing world), while the former option represents an uneasy historical experiment in which not even the experience of the socialist countries can always be used because of the different starting levels and development opportunities.

The historical experiment of the non-capitalist development of emergent African and Asian countries continues. One cannot quarrel with the view expressed by the Bulgarian researcher, I. Khlebarova: even when the development of a particular socialist-oriented country "loses its progressive direction", when "some regimes fall victim to reactionary upheavals [or, let me add, social-political degeneration—*V.Kh.*], the results of preceding progressive measures turn out to be irreversible".¹⁴⁰ Just as, let me note, the experience of the development of those states, which becomes a kind of lesson for others to learn.

The miscalculations of a subjective kind consist, above all, in "straightening out" the involved objective dialectics of different processes and trends of national development (economic and social progress; managerial centralism and political independence of the masses; a fusion of traditional and modern elements in social life). The "straightening out" in this case implies a tilt towards one of the aspects of the said social contradictions (economic progress at the expense of social advance or, on the contrary, the prevalence of "centralism" over "democracy", and so on) instead of resolving the given social contradictions by finding out the necessary measure between the opposing and, at the same time, quite objective vital imperatives of

reality and discovering their optimal combination. Speaking of the ideological and theoretical prerequisites for these miscalculations, one must say that they are evidently due to the very type of non-Marxist Populist Socialism shorn of its dialectical materialist foundation. It is not by chance that the African author, Olisa Awogu, while considering the trend for the vanguard parties of working people in Asia and Africa to turn to Marxism-Leninism, should have expressed his assumption that there can be a turn towards scientific socialism one day in the future by what will initially be far from Marxist national democratic forces if "traditional African socialism fails in the end to achieve social justice".¹⁴¹

But such a prospect, however historically logical, is not the only one. Revolutionary democratic trends following the non-capitalist way are still only beginning to use their possibilities; they are still an integral part of the national democratic forces in the developing world. If they succeed in "recovering" from etatism, "economism" (or, on the contrary, the tendency towards egalitarianism) and other extremes of the policy of development, they will find themselves in a position to show consistency and to bring their ideological policy programme of "Populism" into more or less definite accord with the practical forms of the relationship of the leaders and the masses, if organizationally effective advanced political parties are created and if, finally, they attract the largest masses of the people and organize their work, satisfy their vital interests and take their countries forward towards a secure alliance with the socialist community countries, then they will be able to ensure the successful non-capitalist development of their peoples and thereby make a great contribution towards the cause of social progress in the emergent nations of Asia, Africa and Latin America.

¹ "Marx to the Editorial Board of the *Otechestvenniye Zapiski*, in: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Selected Correspondence*, 1982, p. 292.

² Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, "Manifesto of the Communist Party", in: *Selected Works*, Vol. I, 1976, pp. 100-101.

³ Friedrich Engels, "Nachwort (1894)" [zu "Soziales aus Rußland"]; in Marx/Engels, *Werke*, Bd. 22, Dietz Verlag, Berlin, 1974, pp. 428-29.

⁴ See V. I. Lenin, "Democracy and Narodism in China", Vol. 18, pp. 163-169.

- ⁵ V. I. Lenin, "Two Utopias", Vol. 18, p. 358.
- ⁶ V. I. Lenin, "Eighth Congress of the R.C.P.(B.)", Vol. 29, p. 148.
- ⁷ V. I. Lenin, "The Second Congress of the Communist International", Vol. 31, p. 244.
- ⁸ Ibid., p. 243.
- ⁹ V. I. Lenin, "The Eighth All-Russia Congress of Soviets", Vol. 31, p. 490.
- ¹⁰ For details, see V. Khoros, *Populism: Its Past, Present and Future*, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1984, L. Weidenfeld, A. Nicolson, *Populism. Its Meanings and National Characteristics*, 1969; M. Canovan, *Populism*, Harcourt Brace Vovanovitch, N.Y., L., 1981.
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- ¹³ Marc Raffinot, Pierre Jacquemot, *Le capitalisme d'état algérien*, Paris, François Maspero, 1977, pp. 155-156.
- ¹⁴ B. Etienne et J. Leca, "La politique culturelle de l'Algérie", *Annuaire de l'Afrique du Nord*, 1973 (XII), Paris, Editions du Centre Nationale de la Recherche Scientifique, 1974, p. 75.
- ¹⁵ *Plan quadriennal 1970-1973, Rapport général*, Alger, 1970, Ministère des Finances, p. 147.
- ¹⁶ See Y. V. Potemkin, *Algeria: Problems of Development*, Moscow, 1978, p. 88 (in Russian).
- ¹⁷ Marc Raffinot, Pierre Jacquemot, *Le capitalisme d'état algérien*, Paris, François Maspero, 1977, pp. 155-156.
- ¹⁸ A. G. Virabov, *Outlines of the Economic and Social Development of Algeria*, Moscow, 1981, p. 125 (in Russian).
- ¹⁹ *Révolution Africaine*, Numéro spécial, Alger, 26.06.1975, No. 591, pp. 29, 30.
- ²⁰ Y. V. Potemkin, *Algeria: Problems of Development*, Moscow, 1978, pp. 103-104 (in Russian).
- ²¹ Ibid., pp. 83-84.
- ²² A. G. Virabov, *Outlines of the Economic and Social Development of Algeria*, Moscow, 1981, pp. 81-84 (in Russian).
- ²³ *L'Algérie en quelque chiffres*, 1979, Alger, 1980, p. 30. These and some other figures quoted hereinafter are to be found in Fridman's article "Problems and Contradictions of the Economic Development of Socialist-Oriented Countries", in: *Parties and the Revolutionary Process, in the Countries of Asia and Africa* (Moscow, 1983), whose analysis we have been using.
- ²⁴ *Révolution Africaine*, Alger, No. 851, 13-19 juin 1980, p. 11.
- ²⁵ Hammid Temmar, *Structure et modèle de développement de l'économie de l'Algérie*, SNED, Alger, 1974, pp. 213-214.
- ²⁶ *The National Economy of the U.S.S.R. in 1972*, Moscow, 1973, p. 478; *The National Economy of the U.S.S.R. in 1979*, Moscow, 1980, pp. 366-367 (both in Russian).
- ²⁷ A. G. Virabov, *Outlines of the Economic and Social Development of*

- Algeria, Moscow, 1981, pp. 87, 180 (in Russian); Georges Mutin, *Agriculture et dépendance alimentaire en Algérie*.—"Maghreb—Machrek", Paris, No. 90, 1980, pp. 47, 51.
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- ³⁰ A. G. Virabov, *Outlines of the Economic and Social Development of Algeria*, Moscow, 1981, p. 164 (in Russian).
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- ³² See *Recensement générale de la population et de l'habitat. Population active*. Vol. III, e. "B", Alger, 1979, pp. 31, 42. See also E. G. Pozdorovkina, *Labour Resources of the APDR. (The Problem of Formation and Employment)*, Moscow, 1982 (in Russian).
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- ³⁵ *FAO Production Year-Book*, Rome, 1981, pp. 77-78.
- ³⁶ Julius K. Nyerere, *Man and Development*, Dar es Salaam, e.a. Oxford University Press, 1974, p. 36.
- ³⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 114.
- ³⁸ Edmund Clark, "Socialist Development in an Underdeveloped Country: the Case of Tanzania", *World Development*, Ox., Vol. 3, No. 4, April 1975, p. 224.
- ³⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 225; V. V. Pavlova, *Tanzania: the Government's Economic Policy*, Moscow, 1973, p. 156 (in Russian).
- ⁴⁰ *Daily News*, Dar es Salaam, September 24, 1975.
- ⁴¹ Goran Hyden, *Beyond Ujamaa in Tanzania. Underdevelopment and Uncaptured Peasantry*, Berkley and Los Angeles, 1980, University of California Press, p. 123.
- ⁴² Julius K. Nyerere, *Ujamaa. Essays on Socialism*, Nairobi, London, New York, Oxford University Press, 1968, p. 162; Ukandi G. Damachi, *Leadership Ideology in Africa. Attitudes Toward Socio-Economic Development*, New York et al., Praeger Publishers, 1976, p. 65.
- ⁴³ *Brief on Tanzanian Economic and Social Development Plans*. By N.N.P. Shimwela, Acting Commissioner for Macroeconomic Planning Ministry of Planning and Economic Affairs, Dar es Salaam, 1980, p. 10.
- ⁴⁴ If all the available material values were to be equally distributed to the population, Julius Nyerere said in 1967, each Tanzanian would receive merely 525 shillings' (i.e., some 65 dollars') worth of goods a year, which is an equivalent of poverty. Therefore the only way out is "increased production" (Julius K. Nyerere, *Essays on Socialism*, pp. 161, 165).
- ⁴⁵ H. Häncel, "The Rural Development Strategy of Ujamaa Villages

- in Tanzania".—*Zeitschrift für Ausländische Landwirtschaft*, Frankfurt a/Main, Jg. 15, Heft 2, April-Juni 1976, S. 183.
- ⁴⁶ *Daily News*, September 26, 1973.
- ⁴⁷ Tanzania. Miaka 10 ya azimio la Arusha, Dar es Salaam, Printpak Tanzania Ltd., 1977; B. Fonarev, Tanzania: Overcoming the Difficulties of Development, *Asia and Africa Today*, No. 4, 1980.
- ⁴⁸ *The United Republic of Tanzania. Year-Book*, Moscow, 1980, p. 82 (in Russian).
- ⁴⁹ *Daily News*, September 24, 1975.
- ⁵⁰ M. K. Goryachev, "Chama Cha Mapinduzi—the Leading Force in Building the New Type of Society", *Narody Azii i Afriki*, No. 1, 1981, pp. 88-89 (in Russian).
- ⁵¹ *Daily News*, July 21, 1975.
- ⁵² V. Y. Katsman, *Modern Tanzania*, Moscow, 1977, p. 136 (in Russian).
- ⁵³ L. Stein, "Transforming the Tanzanian Economy: a Review Covering the First Decade of Independence", *African Social Research*, Lusaka, June 1979, No. 27, p. 563.
- ⁵⁴ Julius K. Nyerere, *Miaka mitaon ja serikali ja CCM*, Dar es Salaam, 1982, pp. 17-18.
- ⁵⁵ For example, the production of wheat in 1978 was up by 80% as compared with 1975, that of maize—20% up, and sorghum (millet)—90% up (*The United Republic of Tanzania. Year-Book*, p. 75) (in Russian).
- ⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 81.
- ⁵⁷ *Tanzania. Facts and Figures. 1979*, Ministry of Planning and Economic Affairs, Dar es Salaam, 1980, pp. 4-5.
- ⁵⁸ *The United Republic of Tanzania. Year-Book*, p. 89.
- ⁵⁹ Goran Hyden, *Beyond Ujamaa in Tanzania*, p. 150.
- ⁶⁰ American researcher Francis Hill, for instance, described how an amalgamated "model" village of Chamwino had been established. Upwards of 300 tractors were brought in to resettle the local residents. A hospital was built for them within a couple of weeks, although there was one just two miles away, etc. The whole enterprise cost nearly \$7 million to the authorities. (Francis Hill, "Ujamaa: African Socialist Productionism in Tanzania", *Socialism in the Third World*, Ed. by H. Desfosses, Levesque, New York, Praeger, 1975, p. 245.
- ⁶¹ Kwam S. Kim, "Enterprise Performances in the Public and Private Sectors: Tanzanian Experience, 1970-1975", *Journal of Developing Areas*, Macomb (III), Vol. 15; No. 3, April 1981, p. 478.
- ⁶² *Yearly Country Report on the United Republic of Tanzania*, Presented by Sand K. Henien, UN Document, URT(S), 820 V. N.Y., January 1982, p. 7.
- ⁶³ H.P.B. Moshi, "Industrialisation and Techological Policy in Tanzania: An Overview," *Africa Development*, Dakar, 1981, Vol. VI, No. 1, p. 89.
- ⁶⁴ *The United Republic of Tanzania. Year-Book*, p. 123.

- ⁶⁶ See *The Economic Survey, 1977-1978*, Dar es Salaam, 1979 p. 36; *Hali ya uchumi wa taifa katika mwaka*, Dar es Salaam, 1981, p. 33.
- ⁶⁷ *The United Republic of Tanzania. Year-Book*, p. 141.
- ⁶⁸ *Yearly Country Report on the United Republic of Tanzania*, pp. 6-7.
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- ⁷⁰ Francis Hill, „Ujamaa: African Socialist Productionism in Tanzania”, *Socialism in the Third World*, Ed. by H. Desfosses, Levesque, New York, Praeger, 1975, p. 227.
- ⁷¹ Edmund Clark, “Socialist Development in an Underdeveloped Country: the Case of Tanzania”, *World Development*, Ox., Vol. 3, No. 4, April 1975, p. 223.
- ⁷² See *The Agricultural Policy in Tanzania*. Dar es Salaam, Government Printer, 1983.
- ⁷³ M. Raffinot, P. Jacquemot, *Le capitalisme d'état algérien*, pp. 109, 125.
- ⁷⁴ John R. Nellis, “Algerian Socialism and Its Critics”, *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, Toronto, No. 3, September 1980, p. 495.
- ⁷⁵ V. I. Lenin, “Eleventh Congress of the R.C.P.(B.)”, *Collected Works*, Vol. 33, p. 279.
- ⁷⁶ *Révolution Socialiste*, No. 11, 1977, p. 16.
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- ⁷⁹ See Frantz Fanon, *Les damnés de la terre*, *op. cit.*, p. 135; A. V. Gordon, *Problems of the National Liberation Struggle in the Writings of Frantz Fanon*, Moscow, 1977, pp. 161-162 (in Russian).
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- ⁸³ See Jean Leca, *Algerian Socialism: Nationalism, Industrialization, and State-Building. Socialism in the Third World*, pp. 143-144.
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- ⁹⁹ See Goran Hyden, *Beyond Ujamaa in Tanzania...*, pp. 108, 124, 180, 209.
- ¹⁰⁰ *Developing Countries: Underlying Principles, Trends and Prospects*, p. 339 (in Russian).
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- ¹⁰⁸ See Raymond F. Hopkins, *Political Roles in a New State. Tanzania's First Decade*, New Haven and London, Yale University Press, 1971, p. 78.
- ¹⁰⁹ See P. J. McGowan, H.K.M. Wacirah, "The Evolution of Tanzanian Political Leadership", *African Studies Review*, East Lansing, 1974, Vol. 17, No. 1, pp. 76-92.
- ¹¹⁰ See Claude Rivière, *Dynamique de la stratification sociale en Guinée*, Lille, Univ. Lille, Paris, Librairie Honoré Champion, 1975, p. 619.
- ¹¹¹ See Richard E. Stren, "Ujamaa Vijijimi and Bureaucracy in Tanzania", *Canadian Journal of African Studies*, Montreal, Vol. 15, No.3, 1981, pp. 596-597.
- ¹¹² *Révolution Africaine*, No. 644, du 25 juin au 1er juillet 1976, p. 15.
- ¹¹³ *Tropical Africa: Problems of Development*, Moscow, 1970, p. 59 (in Russian).
- ¹¹⁴ In addition to Tanzania, we may just as well refer to Zambia whose leadership followed rather characteristic left-populist ideological and political options in the 1960s and early 1970s. In the latter half of the 1960s, President Kenneth Kaunda put forward a programme of "Zambian humanism", with mass co-operativization of the countryside declared to be its part and parcel. It was to be carried out under the direction of the Department of Co-Operative Societies headed by a prominent leader of the ruling UNIP party, who, however, was little familiar with the problems of the countryside. In a climate of heightened expectations regarding the co-operativization programme, he decided that his department must urgently "report" some

performances for all to see: first, the number of co-operatives created, and, second, the amount of money spent (for credits, subsidies and grants for the new farms). So the campaign boiled down to hastily registering the co-operatives attracted by the promises of money resources and actually distributing these resources, which were occasionally quite sizable (suffice it to say that the state provided some \$1500 of free subsidy for a single co-operative and \$3000 for long-term and short-term crediting). It is not surprising that because of such a straightforward "high-attainment" approach, the co-operativization campaign ended in failure, a lot of resources were just wasted and the very idea of co-operativization was called in question in the countryside (See Stephen A. Quick, 'The Paradox of Popularity: "Ideological" Program Implementation in Zambia'.—*Politics and Policy Implementation in the Third World*, Ed. by M. S. Grindle, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1980, pp. 42-63.

¹⁰⁵ *Citations du Président Boumediène*, Société Nationale d'Édition et de Diffusion, pp. 102-103.

¹⁰⁶ Karl Marx, "First Draft of the Reply to V. I. Zasulich's Letter", in: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. 3, 1973, p. 158.

¹⁰⁷ Friedrich Engels, *Die Mark*, in Marx/Engels, *Werke*, Bd. 19, Dietz Verlag, Berlin, 1962, p. 330.

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 428.

¹⁰⁹ V. I. Lenin, "The Heritage We Renounce", Vol. 2, 1960, p. 501.

¹¹⁰ V. I. Lenin, "The Tax in Kind", Vol. 32, 1977, p. 349.

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¹¹² S. P. Trapeznikov, *Leninism and the Agrarian-Peasant Question*, Vol. I, Moscow, 1967, p. 372 (in Russian).

¹¹³ *The Peasants' Agricultural Encyclopaedia*, Vol. 2-3, Moscow-Leningrad, 1925, pp. 324, 236 (in Russian).

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¹²⁰ Francis Hill, *Ujamaa: African Socialist Productionism in Tanzania*, p. 238.

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THE FORMATION OF THE COMMUNIST MOVEMENT IN ASIA AND REVOLUTIONARY DEMOCRACY IN THE EAST

By M. A. Persits

The communist movement in the Eastern countries near to the Soviet state is known to have originated in 1918-1921. Didn't it arise too early? That is a justified question, considering the social and economic backwardness of the East.

Most of the bourgeois scholars concerned with the subject of "communism in Asia" have been quite of the same mind in replying to this question, arguing that there was no ground in the East at the time as yet for a communist movement to arise naturally and that it was artificially implanted there by the "missionaries of Bolshevism" and "Moscow's agents". That is the contention of American historians, such as David N. Druhe¹ and John P. Haithcox.² They are echoed by the Indian historian, V. B. Karnik, who writes that the communist movement in his country "was nurtured abroad and transplanted into the Indian soil".³ A theory that communist ideology was inapplicable to the conditions of Iran was advanced by S. Ravasani. In his opinion, "the Iranian Communist Party was a foreign body in Iranian society".⁴ Most bourgeois Sinologists have also been trying to convince their readers that there was no possibility of a communist party appearing in China. And if it did appear there after all, they hold, that was just because it was imposed on that country by the Comintern.⁵ Even such a prominent British historian as Arnold Toynbee saw the origin of the communist movement in the East as expansionism of Soviet Russia which was carried out by its special agents.⁶ However, the facts, which many bourgeois authors rather unanimously ignore in this case, prove them wrong.

The Proletariat in the East

Eastern countries, even after the First World War during

which their national industrial development made notable headway, remained agrarian adjuncts of, and sources of raw materials for, big capitalist powers and were still lagging behind them by at least an entire historical epoch in the social and economic respects.

The proletariat doubled and even trebled in some countries of Asia during the war years and in China it even quadrupled,⁷ while still constituting under one per cent of the entire population of the Eastern countries. Jawaharlal Nehru wrote that India's industrial workers "were a bucketful in a sea of peasants and workers on the land".⁸ They constituted no more than 0.8% of the country's population.⁹ Most of the workers were closely connected with the countryside, and they did not detach themselves from it either geographically or economically, let alone psychologically and politically. During the war years, the former contingents of workers who had some record of factory service dissolved within a mass of newcomers from villages. That had the effect of depressing what was already a low level of the class consciousness of the Eastern proletariat, because the workers, who had just come from villages, stood, like the 18th century workers amply described by Engels, "upon the moral and intellectual plane of the yeomen with whom they were usually immediately connected. . ."¹⁰

The ruination of the peasantry everywhere, which knocked millions of dispossessed people out of agricultural production, as well as the demolition of handicrafts in competition with the industry of foreign and local capital (the latter had expanded in the war years), created large groups of paupers and beggars in cities who usually joined the ranks of coolies, rickshaws and similar trades. All those semi-proletarian elements closely adjoined the proletariat, making for the erosion of the social boundaries of the emergent working class. One of the first Chinese Communists, Qu Qiubo, wrote in 1927 that in China "a large proportion of the proletarians pass through a long 'school of rag-tags' before becoming workers".¹¹ It is not for nothing that many Eastern intellectuals, including revolutionary democrats, often saw no difference between the proletariat and other sections of the poor and dispossessed population. Nehru said that "few people in India . . . even thought in terms of the workers or peasants"¹² and when in the early 1920s "the voice of industri-

al labour began to be heard . . . it might have been ignored but for the fact that the Russian revolution had forced people to attach importance to the industrial proletariat".¹³ Not even the first Communists of the East, yesterday's revolutionary democrats, could always tell the working class from other groups of the poor teeming in the cities of colonial countries.

Eastern workers were almost totally illiterate and profoundly ignorant, and they never made up a cohesive group even within the framework of a single factory. They were divided into religious-caste and community groups which often feuded among themselves.

The Indian national revolutionary, Abdur Rabb Barq, said in 1920, speaking about his country's workers: "The proletarians are split into numerous castes and creeds existing in India. . . The Indian proletariat is so far only caste-, not class-conscious. . . It is in the grip of utter ignorance and the greatest of prejudices. Religion dominates it in full. The proletariat wants no social revolution, but it will accept a revolution that the bourgeoisie may force upon it. The proletariat has not become a conscious class, it has not even become a class at all. It is helpless. Political revolutionaries are organizing and subsidizing it, directing and exploiting it in the interest of their political revolution." Much of this is true. Eastern workers did not come to understand their political interests as yet. The rising strike action by workers, although it became increasingly tenacious and widespread, still remained basically a spontaneous battle for the most elementary economic demands. In the course of the strikes, the workers developed a desire to organize and create their own associations. But most often those were community associations. In China and India, for example, they were formed with a view to lending mutual aid in the event of illness or death and often also in order to oppose other community associations in fighting for factory jobs.

The national bourgeoisie tried to exploit the workers' desire for unity just as the growing movement of the proletariat in general to further its own interests. In search of mass support for the struggle it led for national independence and a limitation of the undivided sway of feudal rulers, its representatives often took the initiative in forming trade unions or similar organizations. They strove to get workers to develop elements of bour-

geois national consciousness, bring them into the national movement and stamp out the sprouts of proletarian outlook.

In China, at the time of the sweeping anti-imperialist May 4 Movement, spokesmen for the national business community more than once urged intellectuals and students active in the patriotic struggle to help the enlightenment and nationally-oriented education of workers. That, in their opinion, was to contribute towards raising the productivity of labour at Chinese enterprises and encourage greater workers' participation in the national liberation struggle.¹⁴ One of the organizers of the Communist Party of China, Zhang Tailei, in a report prepared for the Third Congress of the Communist International, offered the following classification of trade unions created on a bourgeois initiative. First, those were associations formed by bourgeois democratic leaders back at the time of the Xinghai Revolution of 1911 as their "political weapon"; second, the trade unions organized by revolutionary students in the wake of the May 4 Movement in 1919 to gain workers' support in the struggle against imperialists; third, "labour unions organized by parliamentary dealers" as a means of their "parliamentary game"; fourth, trade unions created by capitalists themselves at their enterprises to prevent workers from organizing in purely class national associations.¹⁵

It is indicative that the major Chinese national bourgeois party, the Guomindang, did much to influence the workers, drawing them in and quite often supporting their strike action. All Comintern representatives who worked in China in the early 1920s noted the connection of the contemporary labour movement with the Guomindang. Maring reported in July 1922 that Sun Yatsen had long been in contact with workers. His party's leaders backed up the organization of trade unions in Canton and always sided with workers on strike. All strikes were led by that organization. The strikers took part in nationalist demonstrations staged by the Guomindang and that organization provided material assistance for them. The connection between the Guomindang and the strikers was so close that about 12,000 sailors in Canton, Hong Kong and Swatow joined the organization.

In India, the creation of most trade unions was initiated by prominent radical left leaders of the Indian National Congress.

These were, above all, Bal Gangadhar Tilak, the leader of the democratic wing of the liberation movement, and then Lala Lajpat Rai and their supporters active in the anti-imperialist struggle. Back in 1897, Tilak called on nationally-minded "rich people" to bring the "lower classes" into the political movement. Then, at the time of the national upsurge of 1906-1908 and the consequent wave of strikes he was already openly urging workers to organize trade unions.¹⁶ It was clear to Tilak and his supporters that national independence could never be gained without workers' support and without their involvement in the liberation struggle. The victory of the socialist revolution in Russia strengthened the Congress left wing in their intention to bring proletarian contingents into action against foreign oppressors. In 1918-1920 they formed dozens of trade union federations, and an All-India Trade Union Congress was established in 1920 under the leadership of Lala Lajpat Rai and on Tilak's initiative. It comprised 60 recently created trade union federations and at least 40 more declared themselves sympathetic towards it.¹⁷

A member of the leadership of the Communist Party of India, S. G. Sardesai, wrote: "It was the leftists (then called extremists) in the national movement that first took an intelligent interest in the working-class movement and came forward to organize it. Besides, there were others in the Indian National Congress who realized both the power of the working-class movement as an anti-imperialist force and the 'danger' of its passing out of the control of the national leaders".¹⁸

The history of the liberation struggle of the Turkish people in 1918-1923 abounds in examples of the activities of various parties and organizations calling themselves workers' or socialist parties. They were created either by revolutionary democrats sincerely striving for national liberation and for easing the lot of working people, or by political dealers who wanted just to curb the mounting working-class movement in the country. In the former category there was the so-called Green Army which existed for several months in 1920,¹⁹ and some labour union-type associations: the International Working Men's Union which was formed in Istanbul in December 1920, and several unions affiliated to it—those of seamen, woodworkers, and construction workers, as well as the Association of the Anatolian Railway

Workers, the Society of Tramway Company Workers, etc.

The latter category comprised some bourgeois-reformist organizations and parties which were in the service of the national vested interests and even foreign occupationists. To begin with, there was the so-called Socialist Party. It was nominally a continuation of the Ottoman Socialist Party created in 1913 and then disbanded by the Young Turks' Cabinet during the world war. But to all intents and purposes, it was a new Socialist Party that appeared in Istanbul in February 1919. Its leadership was largely in the pay of British colonizers. Besides, there were the Independent Socialist Party which had broken away from the latter, and then the Workers' and Peasants' Party and also the Labour Party created by the Sultan's regime itself. The interests of French concessioners in Istanbul were represented by the Society for the Defence of Workers. Nearly all of the said organizations were insignificant numerically and had no particular influence on workers. Only two of them succeeded in attracting an appreciable following for a time. The Socialist Party had a membership of between 5,000 and 7,000, while the Independent Socialist Party had just about 1,000 members. The rest were small, short-lived groups.²⁰

So by the 1920s, the Eastern proletariat had not yet established itself as an independent class in its own right, and was still under the influence of the national bourgeoisie ideologically, politically and organizationally. Naturally, it had not yet become a social base for the communist movement because only a small fraction of the proletariat (just a few members, in fact) was receptive to the ideas of scientific socialism. At the same time the strike action of workers of Eastern countries assumed very large proportions in the immediate post-war years and acquired substantial political significance. There had been no such action by various contingents of the proletariat in Asia before in terms of scale, intensity and solidarity. Properly speaking, that was the first upsurge of the working-class movement in the East.

The most remarkable new feature of that strike movement was that the workers, led by national revolutionary leaders, sometimes left aside their traditional economic demands and came forward under general national slogans. There were quite a few instances of workers of many industrial enterprises simultaneously calling and staging strikes in support of purely political anti-

colonialist demands advanced by progressive intellectuals. Indeed, even the strikes of workers in support of their normal economic demands, staged at foreign-owned enterprises, acquired an anti-colonialist complexion in the general upsurge of the anti-imperialist struggle.

All that showed workers coming nearer to accepting the ideas of anti-imperialist nationalism and the patriotic bourgeoisie establishing a certain measure of leadership over them. So it was natural for the strike movement of the Eastern workers to mount just along with the national liberation struggle. In Korea that came parallel with the March 1919 nation-wide popular uprising and subsequent months of intensive struggle against Japanese imperialism. In China that was a period of vigorous anti-imperialist action started by the student rising on May 4, 1919. In India, there were massive non-violent campaigns under Mahatma Gandhi's leadership to resist the colonizers in 1920-1922. In Turkey those were the years of a nation-wide armed struggle against the Entente powers which occupied the country in 1920-1923. And in all of the national movements just mentioned the workers' strikes figured prominently.

It was stated in the theses of a report to the Sixth Congress of the Comintern delivered by Otto Kuusinen that "the first period of the growth of the labour movement in the colonial and semi-colonial countries (approximately 1919-1923) is organically bound up with the general growth of the national-revolutionary movement which followed the world war, and which was characterized by the subordination of the class interests of the working class to the interests of the anti-imperialist struggle headed by the native bourgeoisie".²¹ That was how Eastern workers entered the primary school of political movements. And although that was a school of anti-imperialist nationalism, it did train workers for a struggle under their own standard.

But their own standard was yet to come. For the time being, late in the second and just at the opening of the third decade of the 20th century, the Eastern proletariat was still in the making and could not yet see itself as an independent class in its own right. Only a few of its members were, perhaps, coming to see it. The Baku-based Council of Propaganda and Action, in noting the great difficulties of the development of the revolutionary struggle in the East, laid particular stress on "the absence

of a powerful and consolidated proletarian class" and the extreme "backwardness, ignorance and hidebound conservatism of the working masses".²²

Although the role of the proletariat in the political life of colonial society rose in the years of the First World War and even became notable at the time of the sharpening national struggle, it was still generally small. In 1921, K. Kharnsky wrote in a dispatch from China about "the small political weight of the Chinese proletariat" and regretfully noted that "even in Shanghai workers are looking at many things through the eyes of bourgeois nationalists".²³ The class contradictions between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie in the East had not yet become antagonistic and, besides, they were blunted in the general struggle of different classes against foreign oppressors. In other words, the differentiation of classes in the East was drastically slowed down by the community of their anti-imperialist interests and struggle. Lenin, speaking at the Second Congress of the Communist International, pointed out that "the main determining feature" of the oppressed countries of the East was "the preponderance of precapitalist relationships . . . so that there can be no question of a purely proletarian movement in them. There is *practically* no industrial proletariat in these countries [Emphasis added—M.P.]".²⁴ As I said, Eastern workers began to grasp the ideas of anti-imperialist nationalism but were still far from accepting the principles of scientific socialism which, incidentally, nobody had yet tried to impress on them.

So doesn't the foregoing corroborate the opinion of bourgeois scholars about the absence of any ground in the East for the communist movement to arise and, by the same token, about that movement having been artificially implanted there? No, it does not, if you see the state of things as it was, i.e., if you take into account the true distinctive pattern of the revolutionary process in the East, which consisted in that the socialist movement, which had emerged in pre-capitalist conditions, just as the communist movement, had come before the workers became a "class-for-itself" and preceded the development of an organized political struggle of the proletariat. That distinctive feature was noted as early as 1927 by the November plenary session of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China. Analyzing the Party's record by the time, the session stated that "the CPC began

to develop as a political trend and as a party when the Chinese proletariat had not yet established itself as a class and when the class movement of workers and peasants was still in the bud".²⁵

Early in the 20th century, i.e., long before the Great October Socialist Revolution and the appearance of the Comintern, the revolutionary intellectuals of the East began to study and spread the ideas of socialism coming from the West.²⁶ That process, which was developing quite independently from the working class and its struggle, went into a particularly high gear after and under the influence of the Russian Revolution of 1905-1907 when even so-called socialist parties were formed in the course of bourgeois revolutions in Iran, Turkey and China. The sprouts of a socialist movement which had thus cropped up became an important element of the revolutionary process of the "awakening of Asia". That incipient movement was stopped for a time by official reprisals in the years of the First World War. However, they could not suppress what was already a keen interest of revolutionary intellectuals in socialist teachings.

No sooner had Eastern revolutionaries started to study various socialist theories of the West than they naturally came into contact with Marxism. But Marxian theory by no means attracted their major attention. They did not yet see its fundamental difference from other socialist theories. It was the Great October Socialist Revolution that changed things radically.

The Great October Revolution and Anti-Imperialist Upsurge in the East

The influence of the October Revolution on the oppressed East was tremendous, indeed, but it did not show itself at once. The revolution had yet to defend itself and to uphold its gains. A certain amount of time was required for the national revolutionaries and revolutionary democrats of the East, i.e., those who watched its development with particular interest and absorbed its impact before anybody else, to get convinced of the stability and expediency of the order it had established. In 1919-1920, the influence of the Great October Revolution on the revolutionary forces of the East had already attained a very high degree. The Soviet system of state power was successfully proving

its viability and, consequently, the validity of the ideas of Marxism-Leninism for the whole world to see.

However, the influence of the socialist revolution in Russia on oppressed Asia and, more particularly, on its revolutionary intellectuals, was growing not just as the Soviet system consolidated itself. One factor of tremendous importance was an open confrontation of two political courses in the East, two programmes for building the post-war world. One course, one programme was pursued by the Entente powers. Having won the war, they set about constructing what came to be known as the Versailles system, which left the colonial and dependent countries open to further partition and repartition, endless plunder and still greater subjugation. The other course was that of Soviet Russia. While speaking up for the right of the subject nations to self-determination and independence and expressing her readiness to give them effective support in the struggle for freedom, she called for the fraternity and co-operation of peoples and pressed for an immediate ending of the war and for a just and democratic peace without annexations and indemnities.

Right after the victory of the October Revolution, the Soviet Government made public its foreign policy principles in its famous documents: the Decree on Peace (November 8, 1917), the Declaration of the Rights of the Toiling and Exploited People (November 15, 1917) and the Message to All the Working Moslems of Russia and the East (December 3, 1917).²⁷ It annulled all the secret treaties of tsarism and the bourgeois Provisional Government with imperialist powers, treaties which meant subjugating Eastern countries and peoples, capturing and carving up their lands.

Aware of the Soviet policy in Asia, the peoples of the East felt particularly bitter about their oppressed condition and were more intransigent than ever in reacting to further instances of land-grabbing and enslavement by the Entente powers which set about building up the post-war world to their liking. There was a rising tide of national liberation movements everywhere in the East in 1919-1921, directed in no small measure against the Treaty of Versailles. The heroic struggle of the working people of Russia was a source of inspiration for determined anti-imperialist action not only to the revolutionary democratic intellectuals of the East, but also to still larger sections of the advanced con-

tingent of the proletariat still in the making and even of the peasantry. Lenin said that the example of Soviet Russia had "proved to be catching for many nations. . ."²⁸

On October 30, 1918, Britain, acting on behalf of her allies, imposed a predatory armistice of Mudros on the vanquished Turkey. Thereupon, the forces of the Entente powers occupied the country's strategically most important and fertile regions, such as Izmir, Bursa, Eskisehir and the lands beyond as far as the Sakarya River, captured Adana and the entire surrounding district, Thrace and Istanbul.²⁹ In that way the Entente powers were laying the ground for the country's dismemberment and for the total destruction of its political independence. That action sparked off a spontaneous guerrilla movement against the invaders in many regions of Anatolia. It soon became an essential element of the nation-wide struggle against them. Mustafa Kemal wrote in June 1919: "I never imagined, while in Istanbul, that misfortunes could arouse the people so much within so short a time."³⁰

In calling on the Turkish people to carry on and step up the struggle against the colonizers, Kemal often referred to the selfless anti-imperialist struggle of the working people of Russia as a source of inspiration.

The people of Korea grew determined, under the impact of the Great October Revolution in Russia, to rise against the Japanese colonizers in an uphill battle. The effect that the events in Russia had on the revolutionary democratic elements of Korea was conclusively demonstrated by an important document of those times—the Declaration of Korean Revolutionary Students in Tokyo. In February 1919, the Youth Organization for the Independence of Korea, which they had created, forwarded that Declaration, on behalf of their people, to the Japanese Government. It said: "Our nation wants to gain freedom through justice. But if we do not achieve success in this way, we . . . will wage a life-and-death struggle, one and all . . . for ever." Further on they declared that only now, with Russia as "a new state which is the first progressive democratic state built on the principles of justice and freedom" did the Korean people "come to hope" for the victorious consummation of their struggle.

The Declaration informed the world about two student representatives being sent to the Versailles Conference to call on it to

grant Korea the right to self-determination.³¹ The powers concerned, however, did not so much as let the Korean delegates into the conference room (neither those sent by revolutionary students, nor those subsequently sent by the Shanghai-based Korean government in exile) and refused to consider the issue of Korea. The Korean people and their revolutionary democratic representatives saw the true colonial image of the Entente and the illusion that their hope for the peaceful achievement of independence was. It was then that the Korean people rose to fight.

The movement for independence, started by a huge peaceful demonstration in Seoul on March 1, 1919, soon escalated into a nation-wide popular uprising. It spread throughout the country, even though it had no common directing centre. The uprising reached its peak in March but went on in lesser proportions in April, too, and even in the subsequent months of 1919. Altogether there were 3,200 demonstrations, rebellions and armed uprisings, involving over 2,000,000 people, in the country from March to December.

The masses displayed heroism and courage in numerous pitched battles with Japanese troops and police. The insurgents lost 7,909 people killed and nearly 16,000 wounded.

By ruthless repression, the Japanese government managed to put down the uprising. About 53,000 active fighters were arrested.³² Korea remained a colony of imperialist Japan. The people, however, did not resign themselves to it and kept on fighting for independence. And the revolutionary democratic elements, learning the lessons of the battles they had lost, were looking hard for new ways to rid the country of colonialism.

Following Korea, a massive anti-imperialist struggle unfolded in China. It became known there in April 1919 that the Versailles Conference had granted Japan's claim to the Shandong Province she had already seized, with former German concessions—the port of Qingdao, the Jiaozhou-Jinan Railway, coal mines and other industrial enterprises. Furthermore, the Beijing government had enjoined its representatives in Versailles not to press for the return of Shandong to China. This touched off protest everywhere against the flouting of China's sovereign rights and indignation over the treachery of the Beijing rulers. The first to declare its protest was the population of Jinan—the main city of Shandong Province. There was a huge rally there on April 20

expressing the unbending will of the masses to fight for China's sovereignty.³³

However, the anti-imperialist (mostly anti-Japanese) movement in China is dated not from April 20, but from May 4 when about 5,000 students with white flags of mourning and slogans like "Let Us Defend Our National Sovereignty!", "Restore Rights in Shandong!" and "Punish National Traitors", marched into Beijing's central Tiananmen Square. The demonstrators were not only speaking out in support of their demands but tried to dispose of hated pro-Japanese leaders of the Beijing administration. There was a clash with police, 32 students were arrested and many were wounded and crippled.

The reprisals had a diametrically opposite effect from what the government had counted on. The movement was snowballing, and it was joined, following the students and intellectuals, by considerable numbers of tradesmen, national industrialists and, what is particularly important, workers. "The wave of the student movement," Sun Yatsen wrote, "engulfed the country, with everybody showing a sense of responsibility and people swearing to give their lives for the patriotic movement".³⁴

The intensity of the struggle did not subside for two months. Workers' strikes at foreign-owned enterprises in support of their anti-Versailles and anti-government demands were complemented with strikes of tradesmen, a boycott of Japanese goods and more mass demonstrations and rallies, as well as hundreds of telegrams to Versailles against the signing of the terms of a fettering peace. The patriotic movement gained in strength and scope, involving more and more areas. Anti-imperialist action got under way in Tanjin, Shanghai, Hangzhou, Nanchang, Anqing, Changsha, Taiyuan and many other cities.³⁵

Never before had there been such a tidal wave of anti-imperialist struggle on a mass scale by the people of China as the May 4 Movement. It reflected the new spirit and the change of mentality that the Great October Revolution brought to the peoples of China and other Eastern countries. That was so sagaciously remarked by Li Dazhao, the later-to-be organizer of the Communist Party of China and a prominent leader of the May 4 Movement, when he welcomed the two Russian revolutions of 1917, being the first man to do so in his country, and highly appreciated their significance for the Chinese people. Writing

about the victory of the February Revolution, he said that it did not only wash away "all the rubbish that has built up in the political life of Russia for many years" but "irrigates the seeds of freedom germinating in our country". Following the Great October Revolution, he said that the Chinese "must proudly hail the Russian Revolution as the light of a new world civilization" and that "the Russian Revolution heralds a change in the mentality not only of the Russians but of all humanity in the 20th century".³⁶

The immediate ends which the Chinese people had been struggling for in the course of two months were achieved. The Chinese delegation refused to sign the Versailles Peace Treaty and the Chinese ministers and officials who had tarnished themselves most by their pro-Japanese treacherous activities were dismissed. However, China had by no means freed herself from her semi-colonial status and domination by the militarist cliques. "There has to be yet another great revolution to revive a true Chinese Republic,"³⁷ Sun Yatsen said on May 16, 1920. That was the goal of revolutionary elements of the Chinese nation inspired by the October Revolution in Russia.

The national liberation movement in India also reached a point of fresh sweeping upsurge in 1918-1922 and, under the influence of the October Revolution, acquired some features which it had never had before. The struggle against British rule became a really nation-wide struggle of the masses. One of its forms was strike action by workers, which turned into a permanent major factor of the liberation movement. Strikes often became general within the limits of a city or an industry; they were lasting and persistent. Peasant risings which swept across many provinces were of a militant anti-feudal and anti-imperialist kind. The government managed to cope with them only by using sizable armed strength. Anti-imperialist meetings and demonstrations in cities, involving intellectuals, professional people, students, tradesmen, industrialists and artisans, also often escalated into full-scale risings and ended in fierce clashes with police and troops. The whole nation was astir with a non-violent resistance campaign, led by Mahatma Gandhi, which comprised a boycott of British goods and mass *hartals*—a closing of shops and educational institutions and stoppages at offices and industrial enterprises.

There were two important circumstances that contributed towards the mounting strength and expanding scale of the liberation struggle of the peoples of India. First, there was an organizational and political restructuring of the Indian National Congress and the Indian Muslim League, which turned these two upper-crust national bourgeois associations into real mass parties and true centres of the national liberation movement. Second, they established unity of action which led to anti-imperialist efforts being pooled by two major groups of the country's population, the Hindus and the Muslims, who had often feuded among themselves before. The unity found expression, notably, in the fact that the Khilafat movement became an important element of the general Indian struggle against the British colonizers. It sprang up in 1918 among the Indian Muslims as a protest against the action of Britain and other Entente powers aimed at dismembering Turkey, whose Sultan was a Caliph—the chief of all the faithful. The Khilafat movement went into higher gear after the official occupation of Istanbul by the Entente forces in March 1920, with the Turkish Sultan actually taken prisoner. It gave rise to a *hijrat* campaign—the flight of thousands of civilians (not only Muslims but Hindus as well) from India into neighbouring Muslim countries to organize an armed struggle against Britain. Quite a few revolutionary-minded Indians took advantage of that campaign to go to the Land of Soviets through Afghanistan to see for themselves the reality of a workers' and peasants' state and to enlist its support in their struggle against British rule in India. That was a very striking example of the impact of the Great October Revolution on the mass of the people of India.

The most radical trend in the all-India struggle for national liberation was represented by revolutionary organizations operating in India and outside. Among them there were a number of illegal units which applied the tactics of individual terrorism and conspiracies in the hope of laying the scene for a popular uprising to end British domination.

To sum up, "there was a militant spirit in the country," as Jawaharlal Nehru wrote. India hankered for a "way out of the intolerable conditions of a degrading servitude", "freedom was . . . necessary", and the people rose demonstrating "true national unity".³⁸

The British administration in India realized that the unprecedented sweeping surge of anti-colonial protest was inspired by the example of the Russian workers and peasants. However, while denying the moral impact of the October Revolution, it cooked up stories about the "Red agents" in India and the "threat of Bolshevism" they had brought with them. The British authorities denounced every anti-colonial act as the work of Moscow and then also of the Comintern and declared just about every radically-minded national activist, not to speak of a national revolutionary, to be a "Bolshevik". An organization to fight Bolshevism was established in Peshawar in November 1920. The British government funded it with £9,000 a year.

The "Bolshevist threat" story was convenient to the British authorities in India for it allowed them, by alluding to foreign intervention, to justify themselves in London, which expressed displeasure over their inability to bring the colony to heel. In reality, there was no "threat of Bolshevism" in India, or in other Eastern countries with national liberation movements on the upswing, nor could there have been any. The working class, not to speak of the peasantry, was, as stated above, still far from grasping the ideas of communism. The initial effect of the Russian Revolution on India and other Asian countries was predominantly to radicalize the national liberation struggle, making it a mass struggle, with workers, and also peasants—in India and Korea—being involved in it on such a wide scale for the first time. The idea expressed in Lenin's slogan about the "right of nations to self-determination" (up to and including national secession), which the Bolsheviks had declared for the whole world to hear and were putting into practice in their own country, fell on long since prepared ground in the East and fetched, as we have seen, an immediate response in the shape of sweeping anti-Versailles and, generally, anti-colonial and anti-imperialist action of the peoples.

But that was not all. The Great October Revolution helped Eastern revolutionary democrats draw the right lessons from the post-war anti-imperialist activities in their own countries and realize that only mass movements could topple the colonial system and its mainstay—internal reaction. The significance of that fresh understanding is impossible to overestimate, for major battles for freedom were yet to be fought and there was, consequently, an

opportunity to use the lesson of history in the subsequent struggle.

Months and years of the post-war upsurge of the anti-imperialist struggle in the East could not make any fundamental change in the lot of the subject nations. India remained Britain's colony and Korea Japan's prey. The Turkish people kept on waging a hard and steadfast war against the Entente powers, relying on extensive Soviet material and political support. "Now," Mustafa Kemal said, "we know both the fondest desire in the hearts of the Turkish nation and the deepest conviction of its conscience: liberation! The cry for liberation resounded everywhere in the Turkish homeland".³⁹ China's semi-colonial status did not change in the wake of the May 4 Movement. The nation was torn apart by internecine wars of militarist cliques with imperialist powers behind them. Sun Yatsen wrote that "the arbitrary action of militarists and the great powers is intensifying from day to day, plunging China deeper and deeper into the horrible semi-colonial hell. . . This is extremely worrying the nation, and thinking people are racking their brains day and night over how to find salvation".⁴⁰

The so-called Versailles system, built by the Entente powers, demonstrated the utter futility of all hopes about imperialists ever desisting from their policy of colonialism at their own free will. At the same time, the sweeping scale of the anti-imperialist upsurge in the East revealed immense opportunities for the struggle of subject nations and their ability to prevail over the colonizers, given proper organization and co-operation with the Soviets.

In those conditions, the Great October Revolution, the Eastern policy of the Soviet Government and the Red Army's success in winning the civil war and defeating the foreign invasion proved to be a particularly effective force of attraction for the revolutionary intellectuals of the East who were seeking a way out of colonial and feudal slavery, and encouraged them to try and learn Marxism which the Bolsheviks had as their guide in bringing their people to a victory not only over their domestic bourgeoisie but over foreign imperialism as well. It was only after the Great October Revolution in Russia and under its influence that people in the East showed real interest in Marxism. The first Chinese Marxist, Li Dazhao, wrote late in 1919: "With

the Russian Revolution, *Marxism* proved to be a force capable of shaking the world. The subsequent social revolutions in Germany, Austria and Hungary had Marxism to guide them as well. Those major world upheavals drew attention to the teachings of Marx".⁴¹ This idea was even more explicitly expressed by Zhang Tailei. In a report to the Third Congress of the Communist International, he pointed out that "only after the Russian proletarian revolution did Chinese students get down to learning Marxism in earnest".⁴²

It was only natural and logical that the interest in various socialist theories, which had long been common to progressive and, particularly, revolutionary intellectuals of the East, should have developed, under the impact of the Great October Revolution, into a full-scale effort to study and disseminate scientific socialism and the revolutionary experience of the Soviets. In fact, that was the starting point in launching the communist movement in the East.

Just as the spread of socialist ideas was an important element of the historical process of the "awakening of Asia", the most essential feature of the post-war anti-imperialist upsurge in the East and its major upshot was the movement of revolutionary democratic intellectuals for a study of Marxism-Leninism and of the experience of the Russian Revolution, which led to the creation of communist groups and circles. Most prominent in that movement, and quite often those who set it going, were revolutionary elements among the Eastern emigres who got involved in this process earlier and developed it faster than it happened in Asian countries themselves.

Eastern Emigres in Soviet Russia and Other Countries

The Eastern emigres were, indeed, a vast and rather motley force. Nationals from Eastern countries lived in many countries of Europe and America as well as Japan in the early 1920s. Many of the emigres came into contact with local Socialists and joined the labour movement in the host countries.

For example, a large number of Indian national revolutionaries who fought for their country's independence had to emigrate because of ruthless persecution by the authorities even before World War I. They set up their own militant revolutionary cen-

tres in the US, Germany, France, Sweden and other countries, and continued their anti-imperialist struggle for liberation. Some of them, residing in France, joined the French Socialist Party.⁴³

Around 4,000 Turkish workers and students were sent to Germany and Austria-Hungary during World War I, some for skill upgrading and others for college training. In Germany, a good number of Turkish students and workers entered the revolutionary Spartacus movement and participated in the November 1918 Revolution side by side with them, and many even died while fighting for a Soviet system in Germany. The Turks who found themselves in Hungary also passed through a school of socialist revolution in March-July 1919.⁴⁴

A large number of Chinese students were studying in Japan and France both in pre- and post-war years. Chinese revolutionary intellectuals in Paris established a close relationship with French Communists in 1919-1920 and, with their active help, diligently studied the ideas of Marx, Engels and Lenin, the history of the October Revolution, the progress of socialist development in Russia and, of course, the experience of the labour movement in France. As early as February 1921, Zhou Enlai and Cai Hesen grouped young Chinese supporters of Marxism in Paris into a Society for the Study of Communism.⁴⁵ This Paris group subsequently produced some prominent leaders of the Chinese communist movement.

In capitalist countries, Asian revolutionaries had far greater opportunities for a thorough study of Marxism-Leninism and for learning extensive information about the October Revolution than they had at home, where, besides, the colonizers and local reactionaries sought to suppress the slightest of communist activities. Therefore it was natural for communist groups to arise among Asian emigres somewhat earlier than they did in Asian countries themselves.

It was, naturally, Soviet Russia that had a special part to play in the process of revolutionizing Eastern emigres, getting them to learn Marxism and start the communist movement. And it was in Soviet Russia that a particularly large number of Eastern emigres found themselves at the time. At least a million nationals of adjacent Asian countries, a rather motley contingent, had been living and working on its territory even since before the revolution.

The overwhelming majority of Eastern emigres in Russia were migrant workers who came from Iran and Korea in search of a living as well as unskilled workers from China recruited in time of war for earth-digging and other jobs in areas near the Russian Army's front-line. Iranians settled mostly in the Caucasus (especially in Baku) and in Central Asia, Koreans in the Russian Far East, and Chinese, in large numbers, in southern Russia, apart from Siberia and the Russian Far East. Those were peasants and artisans, ruined at home, and still more often poor urban classes and paupers. The workers in the modern sense of the term were few and far between. In their mass, those were illiterate, utterly ignorant and uneducated people. The only exception was a very small number of intellectuals from among tradesmen and other well-to-do groups from some neighbouring Oriental countries. They normally lived in Russia for years; their children often studied at schools of university rank in the Caucasus and the Russian Far East. There were also some semi-intellectuals and self-taught people coming from working-class, mostly impoverished strata who had learned to read and write through self-instruction and obtained a limited amount of knowledge about their own national history.

The second substantial group of emigres was the Turks—former prisoners of war (63,000) and interned civilians (2,000). Peasants predominated among them, although there were artisans and workers, too. There was an appreciable sprinkling of civilian and military intellectuals, comprising those who had been earlier involved in the socialist movement in the Ottoman Empire. In particular, among the interneers was Mustafa Subhi, an active revolutionary democrat who had first begun to learn the ideas of socialism in France and was subsequently one of the founders of the Communist Party of Turkey.

The third group began to be formed after and in consequence of the October Revolution, mostly in 1920-1921. That was a group of revolutionary emigres consisting of national revolutionaries and revolutionary democrats, active and radical leaders of the liberation movement of the subject nations of Asia. Some of them had already taken or were about to take their first steps towards embracing Marxism-Leninism. For all of those people it was a conscious and, in effect, heroic act of the anti-imperialist struggle to go to Soviet Russia and for some it was a breakthrough

towards joining the communist movement. The group of revolutionary emigres was growing all the time, as it was reinforced by more fighters coming to the Soviet state and also by more revolutionary elements arising amongst the old working-class emigres from Iran, Korea and China and former Turkish prisoners of war.

Indian fighters for their country's liberation were prominent in the group of revolutionary emigres. At least 200 Indians arrived in Tashkent and some other cities of Soviet Central Asia in 1919-1920 and settled there. Among them were people united by certain organizational and political connections and (from the end of 1920 on) groups of individual *muhajirins*, participants in the Khilafat movement for exodus from India, who, as stated earlier on, used that form of mass anti-British protest to reach Soviet Russia. The desire of Indian revolutionaries to visit the birthplace of the October Revolution was so great that they could not be stopped either by the difficulties involved in crossing the summits of Hindu Kush or by the dangers they had to face when travelling across the Turkmen steppes where counterrevolutionary bands were prowling around.

It was the so-called Provisional Government of India, established in Kabul in 1915, that was the first politically organized group of Indian national revolutionaries to establish contact with the RSFSR and to send its representatives over. The President of that government, Mahendra Pratap, and Prime Minister Maulvi Barakatullah visited Tashkent and then Moscow in 1918 and 1919 (the latter stayed on in Soviet Russia for the next few years); Mohammad Shafiq and Mohammad Ali, representing the same Indian revolutionary centre, arrived in Tashkent in March 1920, and more of its envoys came there later on.⁴⁶ A group of 28 Indians headed by Abdur Rabb Barq and Prativadi Acharya, representing another organization of national revolutionaries—the so-called Indian Revolutionary Association—arrived in Tashkent from Kabul in July 1920.

Both organized groups of Indian emigres had similar revolutionary democratic programmes with a clearly expressed socialist tendency which was understood, however, in the spirit of utopian egalitarianism and a return to the communal and clan system of ancient India. They held their main priority to be that of achieving India's full national independence and making it a

federal republic. They had enthusiastically welcomed the October Revolution, regarding it, first and foremost, as a way to exercise the right of nations to self-determination. Such a limited interpretation of the revolution was quite natural for people who had spent years fighting for their country's liberation from British rule and who saw the entire programme of the Great October Revolution, including its socialist substance, in the light of their own national priorities. The members of both organizations were firmly convinced that the Indian national liberation movement could win out only in a close alliance with Soviet Russia. It was to forge such an alliance that they had arrived in the Land of Soviets. Moreover, they believed that Soviet Russia ought to play the major part with her armed forces in the liberation of India and help the Indian revolutionaries create their own revolutionary army which they were prepared to form initially even of mercenaries. The Indian national revolutionaries were still far from the mass of the people, feared the possibility of them staging a revolutionary uprising, refused to work with the masses and, for that reason, attached paramount importance to military methods of the liberation of India, including armed intervention by the Red Army.

The most salient feature of the social complexion of the Indians who had gathered in Soviet Russia—both those who were organized and those who did not belong to any particular political organization—was that they were predominantly owner- or tenant-peasants by origin, and urban middle-class elements—clerks, tradesmen, students and servicemen—by status. They were all distinguished by a high level of national consciousness, yet most of them knew nothing about scientific socialism. At the same time there was a small group of intellectuals among them who were already taking interest in this doctrine and were on their way to embracing it. In Soviet Russia they hoped to learn that new theory in full so as to use it for realizing their objectives of liberating India. Some of them already considered themselves Communists and were anxious to learn the experience of the Russian revolution and the ways of making the same kind of revolution at home.

A large proportion of the Eastern revolutionary emigres in Soviet Russia were the Chinese revolutionary democrats, most of them already committed to the theory of Marx. They started

coming in 1920, sent by their respective communist groups and societies for the study of Marxism, and other revolutionary organizations. Yao Zuobing, representative of the League of Primary, Secondary and Higher School Students' Unions, arrived in Vladivostok in May 1920, as stated in a report to the Executive Committee of the Communist International on the organization and activities of the Eastern Nationalities Section of the Siberian Bureau of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks).^{*} Some were reaching Moscow by dint of their own initiative. One of them must have been Wang Weizhou (probably, a member of the Guomindang). He worked and studied in Soviet Russia and returned to Beijing as early as August 1920.⁴⁷

The first prominent Chinese supporter of Marxism to arrive in Moscow in 1920 was Qu Qiubo. In his "Travel Notes on New Russia", which he finished in 1921, he aptly gauged the state of minds of China's revolutionary youth who were looking to socialism as a way to national regeneration. "Our notions about socialist trends and the essence of socialism were rather confused and vague. . . . There was not a single real 'socialist' among us". It was to find answers, once and for all, to the philosophical questions that agitated the minds of revolutionary youth that Qu Qiubo had decided to go to Soviet Russia. "It was my firm resolve," he writes, "to travel to Russia, and I just did not care at all how I was going to do it: if I had not been able to go there as a correspondent, I would have kept on trying to do it in any other way, whatever the difficulties." Qu Qiubo was lucky in the end. He joined a group of correspondents of the Beijing newspaper, *Chen bao*, and Shanghai's *Shishi xinbao*, Yu Sunghua and Li Zhungwu, who went to Soviet Russia. "My purpose, as I set it for myself," Qu went on to say, "was to devote myself wholly and entirely to a systematic study of theory

^{*} The Siberian Bureau of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) existed from December 1918 to May 1924. Besides the Siberian Bureau, the Central Committee set up many provisional regional offices to resolve particularly complex domestic and external political problems and economic objectives in various regions, ethnic areas and republics, taking into account their distinctive specifics and the stage of development they were in.

and real facts I decided to learn communism, the history of the Russian Communist Party and Russian culture".⁴⁸

A representative of the Chongqing Communist Circle, who signed his report with the letter A, left a very expressive account of the reasons behind the fervent desire of many revolutionary-minded young people to go to the Soviet Republic. In that report, presented to a congress of revolutionary organizations in the Far East (1921-1922), he said that four members of his circle "went to Russia to study the methods by which Russian Communists had built their society and procure precious books of which there were none in China because they found it quite necessary to learn everything about communism either from books written by Russian Communists or from conversations with knowledgeable comrades in Russia". One had to spare neither time nor effort to achieve those objectives. The author continues: "Although the trip from Sichuan to Russia is very long and tiring, it is still worth the risk, for we have learned much from talking with Russian comrades and can now set about realizing our objectives. When we come back to Sichuan, we will do our best to apply the knowledge we gained in Russia to our organization; it will become far better and, beyond question, its work will be crowned with success."⁴⁹

It is noteworthy that the organization of regular trips of revolutionary youth representatives to Moscow to study became one of the first and most important preoccupations of the Chinese communist circles. It was the Shanghai Circle that was to the fore in this effort. As early as 1920 Chen Duxiu established a school of foreign languages which, under the direction of Yang Mingzhai, who had come from Russia where he had become a Communist, trained students selected for further education in Soviet Russia. One of the founders of the CPC, Zhang Guotao, writes that the first group of eight members of the Socialist Youth League was sent to Moscow in the winter of 1920-1921.⁵⁰ They were Liu Shaoqi, Peng Shuzhi, Luo Jue, Ren Bishi, Pu Shiji, Yuan Dashi, Bao Pu and Liao Huangping.

The urge to learn from the Russian Bolsheviks was so widespread as to attract even Guomindang men, including Sun Yatsen who, although he considered himself a Socialist, but by no means shared the principles of Marxism-Leninism. On August 28, 1920, Sun Yatsen asked the Government of the RSFSR for

an opportunity to study the experience of Soviet Russia.⁵¹ Such an opportunity was granted and the Guomindang used it. No less remarkable was an episode connected with the arrival of Soviet Russia's official envoy A. A. Ioffe in Beijing on August 12, 1922. Acclaimed by the capital's progressive community, he was given a particularly rousing welcome at an overflow meeting of students and professors at Beijing University. As the Comintern's representative in China, Maring, stated in his report to the Executive Committee of the Communist International, the meeting was addressed by the rector of the University, Professor Cai Yuanpei, "one of the well-known men of present-day China" who "made a speech in which . . . he declared that his attitude to Ioffe was that of a pupil to a teacher". He, naturally, saw the Soviet envoy as a representative of the Bolsheviks of Russia from whom not only revolutionary youth but the older generation of progressive intellectuals of China and the East in general were eager to learn.

A Soviet Sinologist, Y. Kostin, has found that 587 young people from China had arrived in Moscow by January 1, 1922.⁵² Forty-two students are known to have been studying in the Chinese Department of the Communist University of the Toilers of the East⁵³ in 1922. Evidently, many enrolled at other colleges in the Soviet capital and other Soviet cities.

That was how a revolutionary emigre community from Eastern countries formed ideologically and grew numerically in Soviet Russia.

The Bolsheviks' International Work with Emigres from Eastern Countries

The one million nationals from Eastern countries who found themselves in Soviet Russia naturally came under a great revolutionizing influence of the October Revolution and the process of Soviet development. And that objective process was appreciably intensified by the Bolsheviks' political and organizing work which contributed towards the formation of vanguard revolutionary forces in the East and led to them turning communist and creating communist groups. Lenin pointed out in the Report of the Central Committee to the Eighth Party Congress that the

work with foreign working people in the period under review was "one of the most significant features in the activities of the Russian Communist Party. . ." ⁵⁴ As proletarian internationalists, the Bolsheviks considered such work to be their duty and, at the same time, a matter of their own interest because it contributed towards weakening imperialism and strengthening the Soviet state. For example, long before the creation of the Comintern, Soviet Communists had launched full-scale educational work among the foreign nationals in Russia. Speaking at the First Congress of the Comintern in March 1919, Otto Kuusinen said that since it emerged, "revolutionary Russia had actually represented the new International for over a year". ⁵⁵

A Federation of Foreign Communists was set up under the auspices of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) as early as May 1918. It brought together numerous communist groups which had arisen among the former prisoners of war from the countries of Western and Eastern Europe. Communist work—both educational and organizational—among Asian working people in Soviet Russia was directed by the Central Bureau of the Communist Organizations of the Peoples of the East. It was first named the Central Bureau of the Muslim Organizations of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks). Technically, the Bureau was constituted in December 1918, but its steering committee started operating back in January. Apart from central organizations, political work with Eastern nationals in places where they were concentrated most—in the Caucasus, southern Russia, Soviet Central Asia, Siberia and the Soviet Far East—was carried on by district and provincial Party bodies as well as by the territorial offices of the Central Committee of the RCP(B).

In January 1920, the Siberian Bureau of the Central Committee of the RCP(B) created a Siberian Mission for Foreign Affairs in Eastern Siberia and in Neighbouring Countries, which was headed by V. D. Villensky-Sibiryakov. The mission assumed also the job of conducting revolutionary political work among Chinese, Korean, Mongolian and Buryat nationalities in Russia. The extension of that kind of activity required a special agency to be established: it was the Eastern Bureau which was created under the Siberian Mission's auspices on April 24, 1920. Soon afterwards, the functions of the Eastern Bureau devolved upon

a new special agency, an Eastern Nationalities Section, which was established under the auspices of the Siberian Bureau of the Central Committee of the RCP(B) in Irkutsk on July 15, 1920.⁵⁶ Finally, in January 1921 the section was reorganized into the Far Eastern Secretariat of the Comintern.⁵⁷

In August 1920, the Eastern Nationalities Section under the Siberian Bureau of the Central Committee of the RCP(B) resolved to organize a Party school for the Koreans. It was to provide a five-week course of training to instruct the students on such problems as subsistence, commodity and monetary economies, the theory of labour, exchange and surplus value; capitalist society and its contradictions; class struggle and its forms; imperialism and colonial conquests; dictatorship of the proletariat and the construction of communism; the Soviet Constitution; and the history and the programme of the RCP(B). The courses must have started operating in March 1921, and on April 17 "there was an official ceremony to mark the graduation of the first group of Korean communist students."⁵⁸

A Party school for the Chinese was opened in Irkutsk in the middle of 1921. The Far Eastern Secretariat of the Comintern reported to ECCI representatives in Shanghai that the school admitted Chinese participants in the Russian civil war and that "nearly all of them are workers and peasants who have been in Russia for years". The Far Eastern Secretariat expressed the hope that "after finishing the Party school, they will be valuable workers" at home. The school was open to comrades from China, but only those "who, upon their return home, will devote themselves to political or trade union work".

A large amount of work among the Chinese and Koreans was carried on by Communists of the Far Eastern Republic. The Far Eastern Bureau of the Central Committee of the RCP(B) established special Korean educational sections attached to the Party's provincial and district committees in places where there were many Koreans, and Chinese sections in those with large numbers of Chinese.

There was an educational centre under the auspices of the Tashkent Territorial Committee of the RCP(B) early in 1919 for the political training of Iranians, Turks, Afghans, Chinese and Uigurs as well as Indians. Later on, the Turkestan Commis-

sion of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee* set up a special political education department for that purpose, and on December 23 of the same year it resolved to establish an International Propaganda Council.⁵⁹ The leader of the first Turkish Communists, Mustafa Subhi, was elected Chairman of the International Propaganda Council on February 6, 1920. In a report on its performance from December 1919 to July 1920, the Council said its task was "to unite all the existing revolutionary organizations of adjacent countries, operating in and outside Turkestan..., directly guide the work of national sections and central bodies of the revolutionary parties of Eastern peoples existing in Soviet Turkestan, and get down to organizing communist groups⁶⁰ and revolutionary elements in countries bordering on Turkestan. The Council strove "to set up links between the Russian Revolution and the movement of oppressed working masses of the East", and to make the slogans proclaimed by the Russian proletariat clear and understandable to the working masses of Persia, India, Bukhara, etc."⁶¹

The Council carried on effective oral and written education work in Turkestan, organized meetings, talks and lectures. It put out Marxist-Leninist publications in five languages—Farsi, Turkish, Uzbek, Urdu and English. The Council did its best "to train competent agitators and organizers in the East".⁶² It represented an international organization for its leadership comprised representatives not only of local RCP(B) organizations but also of national communist groups emerging in Turkestan.

Similar work was carried on by the Baku-based Propaganda and Action Council created in September 1920 by decision of the First Congress of the Peoples of the East, which was a Comintern body. On November 2, 1920, the Council opened short-term Crash Courses to train Eastern nationals as agitators and communicators. These had a student body of over forty, including 20 Turks and 14 Iranians. The Baku newspaper *Kommunist* wrote at the time that the courses would be "the first nur-

* The All-Russia Central Executive Committee was the Supreme legislative, executive and supervisory body of the RSFSR in 1917-1937. It was elected by the all-Russia congresses of Soviets to operate between congresses. Until the formation of the USSR, it included members from the Ukrainian and Byelorussian Republics, elected at their respective congresses of Soviets.

sery of revolutionary and communist ideas in the East".⁶³ The Council even planned to create a university of social sciences for Eastern revolutionaries. Similar courses and schools were also launched in Tashkent and other cities.

That is to say that Soviet Communists carried on political work with Eastern nationals wherever it was possible and necessary in the hope that, once back home, they would tell their compatriots about the Soviet state and the socialist ideals of its peoples and would become consistently involved in the communist and national liberation movements.

It was the Communist University of the Toilers of the East, which opened in Moscow in April 1921, that rose to prominence in training Eastern revolutionaries. It produced the leading core for the working-class and communist movement in many Asian countries.⁶⁴

Eastern revolutionaries highly appreciated the significance of the Marxist-Leninist training which they received in Soviet Russia and which enabled them quite often to overcome their national limitations and to become Communists by commitment, rather than intuition.

At the first graduation assembly at the Korean Party School in Irkutsk on April 17, 1921, one of the students, Li Dia Chong, said: "When we crossed the doorstep of the Party school, we, although we were members of the Communist Party, still had our minds infected with a bit of nationalist ideology. But now we can boldly declare that we have developed from nationalists into internationalists. That is a great merit of our educators. From now on we devote ourselves, wholly and entirely, to the struggle against world oppressors".⁶⁵

The opinion of Eastern revolutionaries about the role of the Communist University in the process of their development as Marxists is no less interesting. On November 20, 1921, the first group of 8 Indians, having completed their course of training, addressed heartfelt messages to the ECCI and the RCP(B). In their letter to the Comintern, they said: "We, the Indian section of the Communist University of the Toilers of the East, on the occasion of having completed a course of instruction in social sciences, are sending our greetings to the ECCI, . . . and want to express our allegiance to communist ideas which we have learned due to our contact with the Communist International . . .

which has stretched out a hand of brotherhood to the oppressed nations of the East." In their second letter, the Indians thanked the RCP(B) "for hospitality and propitious conditions" which had been created for their "instruction and advanced training". They expressed their confidence that "inspired by the Russian Revolution", they would be "active in the revolution now going on in India".⁶⁶ Shaukat Usmani, Rafiq Ahmed, Rahmat Ali Khan (Zakaria) and many other Indians,⁶⁷ as well as quite a few representatives of other Asian countries became Communists in the process of instruction and contact with Soviet and Comintern leaders in Moscow.

The Origin of the Communist Movement Among Soviet-Based Eastern Emigres

The Great October Socialist Revolution and the construction of the world's first workers' and peasants' state, which had a tremendous far-reaching effect on Eastern emigres in Soviet Russia, led to some of their revolutionary democrats setting up a communist movement.

The revolutionaries from among the Turkish prisoners of war were among the first to start that movement. Mustafa Subhi, who had by then passed over from revolutionary democracy to Marxism,⁶⁸ was the most outstanding among them. A conference of Turkish Socialists was called in Kazan, on his initiative, as early as June 1918. A month later, a more representative conference was held in Moscow. It was attended by 20 delegates, of whom 17 were Socialists (apparently, former members of the Ottoman Socialist Party). It is indicative that only four of those seventeen were listed as workers, the remaining thirteen were, in all probability, intellectuals.⁶⁹

The first Turkish Communists realized that the working class must be the backbone of the communist movement, and Mustafa Subhi noted with satisfaction that at the Moscow Conference "there are not only revolutionary intellectuals, as before, but also representatives of oppressed classes—soldiers and workers".⁷⁰ They saw that such representation of workers was insufficient and, as Subhi described it, set themselves the task of creating a "Socialist Party among Turkish workers and poor peasants so

as to have an opportunity to withstand the onslaught of capital".⁷¹ In the resolutions the Moscow Conference adopted on Subhi's report "On the Fundamentals and Programme of the Turkish Party of Socialist Communists", it declared itself "to be in agreement and solidarity, in principle, with the programme of the Communists",⁷² meaning the Programme of the RCP(B). The drafting of its own programme was postponed until a subsequent conference attended by Communists from inside Turkey.

So the Kazan and Moscow conferences, having united the Turkish Socialists in Russia, gave rise to the Turkish communist movement. The Moscow conference elected the Central Committee of the Turkish Party of Socialist Communists and formed an agitation and propaganda committee. A large role as a communicator was played by the weekly *Yeni Dünya* (New World) newspaper, which was organized by Mustafa Subhi in 1918. Its first 49 issues appeared in Moscow, and further publication was transferred to the Crimea where there were many former Turkish prisoners of war and then to Tashkent and, from June 1920 onwards, to Baku.⁷³ A large proportion of the print-run was smuggled into Turkey.

The Turkish Communists decided to start preparations for creating a national communist party and launch a build-up at home to this end so as to ensure the calling of a representative congress with most of the delegates coming from Turkey. That was the right course which implied avoiding haste in so difficult an undertaking and considering the necessity of promoting a communist movement in Turkey proper. Yet the political views of the first Turkish Communists, who thought that since Turkey was a capitalist country, the task was to make a socialist, rather than a bourgeois democratic, revolution in it, should be appraised differently. At the Moscow Conference Mustafa Subhi declared: "Our conviction and our programme call for destroying capital and liberating people. All the land and all the means of production and transport . . . must be nationalized by the people and in that way the poor classes of society must be delivered from bourgeois tyranny. That is the base for socialism."⁷⁴ This idea was even more emphatically formulated in the conference resolution on Nazmi's report "The Political Situation in Turkey and the Eastern Question". The document adopted by the con-

ference declared that the only way to save Turkey was to establish a socialist system.⁷⁵ Those precepts, which did not take into account the country's actual social and economic condition, precluded the Communists' co-operation with the anti-imperialist-minded national bourgeoisie. However, such co-operation would have been in the interest of the proletariat because it could have intensified the struggle against the colonizers who threatened the very existence of the Turkish nation-state.

The issue of the attitude to Soviet Russia was the major one at the socialist conferences both in Kazan and in Moscow. The Turkish revolutionaries declared that they considered it to be their duty to defend it, arms in hand, for it had given "humanity light and happiness" and became "a refuge and a defending homeland for the revolutionaries of all nations" and a fighter "for the rights of all the poor and oppressed people against the powers-that-be".⁷⁶ And, indeed, the Turkish internationalists fought outside Kazan, went into action against the counter-revolutionary rising of Czechoslovak troops and joined battle on the Turkestan, Crimean and other fronts.

Iranian working people who were in Russia (to be exact, a small proportion of them, mostly from among those who worked with the Baku proletariat) began to join the social-democratic movement while still under the direct impact of the Russian revolution of 1905-1907 and the activities of the Trans-Caucasian Bolsheviks. That important process was initiated and organized not only by individual representatives of the Iranian revolutionary intellectuals but sometimes workers themselves who had passed through the Baku school of proletarianizing. It was the Iranian oil workers, Asadullah Gafar-Zade and Bahram Agayev, that formed the Iranian Social-Democratic Party, *Adalet* (Justice), in Baku in 1916.

Under the influence of the Great October Revolution, the *Adaletists* began to call their organization the *Adalet Communist Party*, and later on, at the first (constituent) congress, they gave it the official name of the Communist Party of Iran. That example was a clear indication that the Eastern communist movement, which gained ground under the impact of the October Revolution, was a natural sequel to, and development of, the pre-socialist movement which had emerged in Asian countries

long before November 7, 1917, and the formation of the Comintern.

As a result of the October Revolution, the Adalet obtained a certain base of support in the foremost group of the Iranian migrant workers not only in Azerbaijan but also in Daghestan and Turkestan. Particularly notable headway was made in creating Adalet communist groups in Soviet Central Asia where there were at least 100,000 Iranian nationals in 1920.⁷⁷ Geidar-Khan Amu-Ogly, Sultan-Zade, Alikhanov, A. Khanukayev, to mention just a few, were prominent organizers of that movement in Turkestan and later on inside Iran. The first circles of Adaletists were formed under the auspices of RCP(B) organizations of Kokand and later on Tashkent as early as 1918.⁷⁸ Afterwards such groups began to operate independently. They appeared and functioned also in Samarkand, Chardzhou, Bukhara, Merva and Poltoratsk with support from the International Propaganda Council (IPC). According to an IPC report for December 1919-July 1920, there were 35 Adalet groups in Turkestan with a total membership of around 6,000.⁷⁹ Weekly communist newspapers in Farsi were published in Samarkand and Poltoratsk.⁸⁰

The first regional conference of Iranian Communists was called in Tashkent in April 1920. It proclaimed the amalgamation of isolated groups into a Persian Adalet Communist Party in Turkestan and thereby took an important step forward towards laying the ground for the constituent congress of the Iranian Communist Party. In Daghestan, Adalet groups numbered up to 500 by the middle of 1920.⁸¹

The figures just cited are very approximate and, most likely, overstate the actual number of the first Iranian Communists in Turkestan and Daghestan. In those times, communist groups among the migrant workers from Iran (largely paupers and rag-tags) were quite often formed nominally of people who were often completely unprepared for it and just yielded to the persistent urging of agitators who, incidentally, also knew rather little about Marxism-Leninism. So the first Communists from Iran in Soviet Russia had to deal with a mass of politically backward people who were in the grip of Muslim religion and largely reflected the social and economic backwardness of Iranian society in general. However, what they guided themselves by in their

honest revolutionism was not a proper regard for the historically concrete situation of Iran which had no proletariat, as a matter of fact, at the time, but a burning desire to lose no time in repeating the Russian experience of socialist revolution at home.

The first Iranian Communists held extreme left political views. That was because of their theoretical immaturity and inadequate Marxist training. The then leader of Iranian Communists, Sultan-Zade, produced his arguments, in an outline of the prospects for social revolution in the East, first published in Tashkent in March 1920,⁸² to prove that the conditions of tsarist Russia before the October Revolution and those of Iran in the early 1920s were nearly identical and for that reason Iran could wait no longer in carrying out a socialist revolution of its own. He wrote: "All of Russia's large-scale industry belonged to foreign capital and, on that account, all the surplus value was siphoned out of Russia. It is these conditions that created a revolutionary mood among the working class. Persia's position does not differ from Russia's in this respect". Unaware of the Marxist-Leninist method of definition of social classes and, notably, of the proletariat, Sultan-Zade asserted in an article that Persia was "one of the Eastern countries to have an extremely well-tempered working class" and therefore "it must be and will be the first Eastern nation to hoist the Red Banner of social revolution over the ruins of the Shah's throne".⁸³

In his other pronouncements Sultan-Zade had to admit the absence of a proletariat in Iran but never dismissed the idea of an immediate socialist revolution on that ground. He believed that the revolutionary function of the proletariat must be fulfilled by a revolutionary army. That was what he saw as the basic force of the revolution.

On March 11, 1920, Mustafa Subhi, who was then in charge of the International Propaganda Council in the East (Tashkent), and Sultan-Zade addressed a letter to the Revolutionary Military Council of the Turkestan Front. They asked for "permission to form Persian military units in Turkestan" out of Persian migrant workers. The reason behind the request was that "because of the colonial policies of Britain and tsarist Russia, which had turned Persia into a market for their goods and had not allowed any development of her national industry, *there was no proletariat in the country*"; while at the same time the coloni-

zers had set up "a whole army of rag-tag proletarians" in various Persian cities. In such conditions, they went on to say, "relying only on the peasant and semi-proletarian masses in Persia, we Communists will not be able to field sufficient forces against the landowning oligarchy supported by England. It will be a different thing if Iranian Communists have their own armed forces... Our Party hopes that with the help of these army units... the working people of Persia will not only be freed from the British imperialists, but *will also be for ever liberated from their own exploiters—capitalists and landlords*—and will join the fraternal commonwealth of the Soviet Republics [Emphasis added—*M.P.*]"⁸⁴ In the subsequent months of 1920, Sultan-Zade and his group held on to the sectarian views at variance with the decisions of the Second Congress of the Comintern which, as a matter of fact, urged the Communists of the East to co-operate with the anti-imperialist sections of the national bourgeoisie.

Quite a few Chinese, as I stated, were actively involved in the communist movement which was gaining ground among foreign nationals in revolutionary Russia. It was in Soviet Russia that the first Chinese Communists—members of the RCP(B)—appeared for the first time. Communist groups began to be set up in 1918 within the framework of the associations of Chinese workers which existed in 12 cities of the RSFSR by late 1920. The Irkutsk Association of Chinese Workers laid it down, for example, in its Short-Term Programme, that "work among the mass of the membership of the association is aimed, first and foremost, at creating a solid and stable core of Chinese Communists, the prospective... vanguard of the Chinese revolution for which it is necessary... to form communist groups..." Communist groups were also created in all kinds of military units. For example, the international Korean-Chinese regiment of the 3rd Siberian Infantry Division had 30 full members and 129 probation members of the RCP(B) in August 1920. There were also territorial federations of Chinese Communists. In Blagoveshchensk, for instance, there was a Chinese communist group which called itself the Chinese Communist Party of Amur Region.⁸⁵

The growing Chinese membership within the RCP(B) and the specifics and complexity of work with them led to a Central

Organizing Bureau of Chinese Communists being established under the auspices of the Central Committee of the RCP(B) on July 21, 1920.⁸⁶ It was to direct all ideological, educational and organizational work among them, although it had very limited opportunities for it because of a nearly total absence of Marxist-trained workers among the Chinese. In fact, one should not overstate the proportion of Communists among the Chinese nationals in Russia. It was small, which was due, above all, to the prevalence of rag-tag-pauper element among the Chinese immigrants who were still very far from sharing the ideas of scientific socialism. It is indicative, for example, that there were as few as 50 Party members and 30 sympathizers within the Chinese associations in Irkutsk, Cheremkhov, Verkhneudinsk and Bodaibo.

It is worth noting that those Chinese immigrant workers who had resided in Russia since before the revolution and became Communists there, did not, as a rule, take any appreciable part, on their return home, in building the Communist Party of China. This circumstance was noted by K.V. Shevelev,⁸⁷ and I should evidently agree with him,⁸⁸ considering the opening years of Party-building with most of its activities conducted through study groups, or circles, when the first small communist groups were of a restricted kind and consisted almost entirely of intellectuals.

Could Chinese immigrant workers, going back home from Soviet Russia, join those communist circles and do some active work there? Theoretically, they could, but in reality that was practically impossible for them to do. First of all, there were as few as seven or eight underground communist groups in large industrial and administrative centres of China late in 1920 and early in 1921. Those who were coming back from Soviet Russia, predominantly peasants, went to their respective villages where there were no communist groups as yet. The immigrant townspeople were mostly elements that had been thrown out of the realm of production in China. Once back home, they were, apparently, to settle again in the bottom rungs of the social ladder where the situation was hardly conducive to their acceptance of the ideas of communism.

It is clear from the foregoing that the Chinese immigrant community which had emerged in Soviet Russia before the revolu-

tion comprised the most backward elements of Chinese society. There were practically no factory workers among them, and intellectuals were few and far between. The bulk of the immigrants were far from sharing the ideas of Marxism-Leninism and just on their way to acquiring their national awareness. Evidently, the organizers of Chinese workers' associations in Russia did not so much as count on the bulk of the Chinese who went home becoming actively involved in the struggle for a socialist revolution. They thought the masses to be fit only for a far more modest role. The Short-Term Programme of the Irkutsk Executive Committee of the Chinese Workers' Association had this passage, for example: "4. Taking full account of the Chinese workers' definite desire to return home, the Association must strive to make them accept a certain outlook so that, on their return home, they should be displeased with the order existing there and, consequently, do their bit to create a climate of discontent conducive to a prospective revolution, if not get actively involved [in the revolutionary struggle]." Even those of the Chinese who joined the Red Army and fought, arms-in-hand, to defend the power of the Soviets, were most likely exhibiting only their own national awareness and an understanding, acquired in Soviet Russia, that their country's destiny directly depended on the victory of the Soviet Republic in the civil war.

A weekly communist newspaper in Chinese, *The Awakening of Nations*, began to appear in Irkutsk early in 1920, which was subsequently replaced by the *Eastern Commune*. And, of course, Chinese immigrant workers, who had been in Russia for three to six years, on their return home played quite an important role in revolutionizing their fellow-countrymen and getting them to develop the right kind of knowledge about Soviet Russia and its anti-imperialist policy and struggle for the emancipation of the subject nations of the East. Yet they were still far from sharing communist aspirations.

As to the Chinese in the immigrant working community, who joined the RCP(B) under the influence of the revolutionary situation in Russia or became members of their own national communist units, they most likely merely expressed their desire to become Communists in that way, but never did in reality. It took some time and appropriate conditions for them to become real Marxists. There were no such conditions as yet in China in

those sections of the community in which the emigres coming back from Soviet Russia were supposed to mingle. These conditions appeared later on, as the revolution gained ground and the large mass of the Chinese people joined the struggle. It was then that, one must presume, the ABC of communism learned in Soviet Russia made itself felt far more strongly than it ever did as long as the CPC had existed in the form of study groups, or circles.

But yet another group of immigrants from China, consisting of revolutionary democrats who had for the most part already declared themselves to be the followers of Marxism, was growing up in Soviet Russia in 1920-1921, as we have already seen. Those Chinese revolutionaries were studying the history of the October Revolution, learning the theory of scientific communism and watching the actual process of building socialism. Many of them became Communists and played an important part in the formation of the CPC on their return home.

It is most interesting that the early Chinese Communists from among the pre-revolution immigrant community, just as among post-revolution immigrants, in the early stages of their initiation into Marxism adhered to what were generally similar ultra-left views on the character of the prospective Chinese revolution, on the military factor in it, etc. For example, the Charter of the Central Organizing Bureau of Chinese Communists, headed by An Longhe,⁸⁹ said that "the Chinese Communists consider carrying out a social revolution in China and organizing the working class of China to be their direct duty to the proletariat of all lands." Specifying that proposition, An Longhe argued in a written report to the Second Congress of the Comintern (June 25, 1920) that in China there were "all the conditions for a communist order to be established" and that, generally, "the countries of the East have greater chances than those of the West for going Soviet" and, consequently, "abolishing both the foreign and their own bourgeoisie".

So what were the conditions that, in An Longhe's opinion, favoured so much an immediate socialist revolution in China? He pointed, first, to the existence of three "active revolutionary forces", on which all hopes were pinned, among the "400-million-strong Chinese working mass" or among the "general mass of the Chinese proletariat". Those were, princi-

pally, the *hunghus* (members of armed bands in Manchuria) and then the emigrants (probably, above all, the Chinese residing in Russia) and, finally, farm labourers (he spoke of "the overwhelming preponderance of farm labourers"); second, the "absence in the nation of religious prejudices"; third, the "weakness of the national bourgeoisie"; and fourth, "the offences caused to the people by the foreign invasion".

What claims attention is a total failure to understand what the proletariat is, for it was said to include almost the entire population, a "400-million-strong working mass", certainly such social groups (the *hunghus* and rag-tags) as could least of all be called a working class. But that was in tune with An Longhe's concept of socialism, which fit in perfectly with the idea of primitive egalitarianism, although it was garnished with arguments haphazardly borrowed from Marxists. Regarding the *hunghus* as a "political party identical by its programme with the party of the Russian Communists", the author of the report presented an idealized picture of the way their bands were formed and described them as ideal structural elements of a prospective socialist society. He wrote that the *hunghus* "normally call themselves Ta-huochi (fellowship); Ta-huochi members must live together, die together, fight together, eat together, always stay together, and their property must be common—that is the *ideal commune* [Emphasis added—M.P.]".

In another document, an address of the Central Organizing Bureau to the Chinese Communists of Irkutsk, An Longhe, referring to the "*early teachers of communism*", called on his people to unite so as "to rise in arms against both *our own and foreign* bourgeois, and chase them out of our beloved homeland [Emphasis added—M.P.]".

In An Longhe's opinion, a socialist revolution in China can be made only by revolutionary armies. These should be formed of *hunghus*, all the more so since they were predominantly hanging about the Sino-Russian border and also of Uigurs displeased with the Beijing government and living in exile in Soviet Turkestan. "All *hunghu* guerrillas," he wrote, "are ready to act at first signal. . . Comrades on the Russo-Chinese border are imperatively demanding the earliest possible opening of revolutionary action under *the standard of social revolution*. . . There are 270,000 Muslims, our Chinese subjects, in the Tashkent district.

They all are ready to die for a social revolution [Emphasis added—*M.P.*].” As much was said at the First Congress of the Peoples of the East in Baku by Wang Wunguo, who represented the Chinese residents of Soviet Turkestan. He declared that “all the Chinese living in Soviet Russia are looking forward to the moment when they, together with... the Red Army, will move into China in order to liberate their enslaved brothers, workers and peasants, from the yoke of Britain, Japan and *our own bourgeois*... There is a process of class stratification going on in China at the present time and the ground is well laid for the establishment of the power of workers and peasants [Emphasis added—*M.P.*].”⁹⁰

Upon the completion of such a military variation of socialist revolution, An Longhe proposed what was a remarkable plan of action, marked by naive sincerity and fervent love for freedom: “We shall take all the land, the forests, the mountains and the waters, and the plants and the factories of foreigners⁹¹ into our own hands, cancel the debts, and we shall be ready to take all power into our hands and to learn to govern as bid by our persuasions and conscience. We shall build up a new kind of economy, a new type of world, and a new pattern of administration for our homeland. Let everybody sacrifice at least a rouble to the altar of the homeland, that will mean 400 million roubles in a single day. With that money we shall build our economy, industry, schools and advance our national culture; we shall work and we shall study.” So there would arise a society in which everybody “will eat from a common pot and make clothes with a common needle”. Those utopian plans were imbued with intransigent anti-imperialism and a spirited preaching of love for the homeland. In order to love the homeland “not only in word... but also in deed”, it was necessary to carry out the plan thus drawn up, for “only in this way”, said the address of the Central Organizing Bureau of Chinese Communists, “will [we prove that] we earnestly love our homeland”.

An Longhe did not confine himself to the “narrowly Chinese” limits. He was planning a world revolution and the creation, in consequence, of a World Republic of Soviets. In the report “On the Plan of the Chinese Communist Section Attached to the RCP for a Revolution and Cultural Education Work”, addressed to the Second Congress of the Comintern, he proposed cal-

ling, as the first step, a world congress of Chinese workers which he thought could be opened in a year, on June 15, 1921. His next point was to bring about a progressive unification of the oppressed 400-million-strong people of China "with the forces of the still more oppressed 300-million-strong Indian people". An Longhe pointed out that "united by oppression and exploitation, the human masses of China and India represent, between them, over half the world's population" and, if set in motion, they "will be unvanquishable in their spontaneous victorious march which can only end in the establishment of a World Socialist Federative Soviet Republic, to be organised by January 1, 1927, at the latest. So, there must be 6 years 3 months and 3 weeks of intense campaigning, instruction and cultural education . . . to achieve the goal of our great revolution. . ."⁹²

How all that is interesting and how typical it is of the ideological, theoretical and political level of the first Communists of the East! An Longhe and those he represented had a rather naive idea of Marx's theory. They saw Marxism as no more than a science of egalitarianism, humanism and common human justice, and, above all, of course, as an effective means of anti-imperialist struggle. But even that was not so little for it served as a bridge by which to pass over to genuine Marxism-Leninism.

An idea of the views of Chinese revolutionary intellectuals who had arrived in Soviet Russia in 1920-1921 can be gained from Zhang Tailei's report of June 1921 for the Third Congress of the Comintern.⁹³ It was an interesting and rather successful attempt to examine Chinese society, its semi-colonial status, class make-up, the forms of exploitation of urban and rural working people, questions of the history and contemporary state of the socialist, working-class and women's movements. The document was a substantial achievement of China's budding Marxist thought. Yet the report was not free of ultra-left sectarian precepts. In particular, Zhang Tailei asserted that "the only way to the nation's economic rebirth and the Chinese people's salvation from foreign exploitation is by establishing a communist system".⁹⁴ That meant, as a matter of fact, dismissing the stage of a bourgeois democratic revolution, although it was indispensable and, indeed, the only possible stage to achieve first because of the weakness of the proletariat, undeveloped labour movement and virtual absence of a communist party.

Realizing the backwardness of the Chinese factory proletariat and considering that its "class awareness . . . is still rather low",⁹⁵ the early Chinese Marxists were looking for an outside force that could, in spite of that, accomplish a socialist revolution and thereby bring workers into it. Many of them, like An Longhe, then turned their eyes to numerous *hunghu* bands consisting of the rag-tag and paupers. Zhang Tailei also saw them as quite "revolutionary, if raw, material" which could be used by Communists for carrying out an early socialist revolution, provided only they could "make them class-conscious".⁹⁶

The reason for such a conclusion was that Zhang Tailei and many of those he represented considered that proletarians were not only "machine production workers" but also "manual production workers" and "numerous coolies".⁹⁷ However, the latter category of workers must be ranked among medieval-type artisans for, in the author's opinion, it consisted of workshop owners, foremen and apprentices. As to the coolies, they were, unquestionably, part of the urban rag-tag and paupers who provided manpower for the Manchurian *hunghus* and *tufei* armed bands in other districts of China.

Zhang Tailei offered his own self-styled solution to the issue of the national bourgeoisie as well. Believing China to be a hair-breadth away from a socialist revolution, he naturally gave a purely negative assessment of the national bourgeoisie, viewing it as an agent of imperialism, a class wholly and entirely "in the service of world grabbers",⁹⁸ and therefore rejecting the prospect of more or less long-term co-operation with it.

The numerous and motley group of Chinese revolutionary immigrants in Soviet Russia, apart from the supporters of Marxism whose views were essentially expressed by Zhang Tailei, included those who believed pre-Marxian utopian socialism to be the supreme achievement of socialist thought. A journalist from Nanking, Yang Xun, explained his arrival in Soviet Russia in the following way: "Russia is not a capitalist state, but a state organized by the principle 'he who does not work, neither shall he eat' . . . she has not yet achieved the state of Thomas Moore's 'utopia' or Plato's 'Republic' [Emphasis added—M.P.], still, among contemporary's states . . . , her order can be considered the most equitable and rational. That is why we are so eager . . . to see what she is building."⁹⁹

The formation of socialist and, subsequently, communist groups among the Koreans who lived in the Soviet Far East began as early as 1918. There were over 16 Korean party organizations comprising 2,305 full and probation members of the RCP(B) in Soviet Russia at the close of 1920.¹⁰⁰ Right from the outset, the early Korean partisans of Marxism from among revolutionary intellectuals tried to create their own national socialist party. In April 1918, Li Dong Hwi called a conference of national revolutionaries in Khabarovsk, which ended in establishing a Korean League of Socialists.¹⁰¹ A year later, in May 1919, a conference of Korean Socialists, meeting in Vladivostok on the League's initiative, declared the formation of a Korean Socialist Party. Its first act was to join the Comintern.¹⁰²

Next came a congress of Korean Communist Organizations of Soviet Russia and Siberia in July 1920. It elected the Central Committee of the Korean Communist Organizations, including Li Seng, Chairman, Pak Syng Mang, Vice-Chairman, Alexander Cai, Secretary, and others.¹⁰³ As far as Li Dong Hwi was concerned, he had gone to Shanghai with his supporters at the close of 1919 where he headed a small group of Korean revolutionary emigres who declared themselves a Communist Party of Korea in May 1920. Besides, a small communist group, led by Pak Din Shung, established itself in Beijing. Korean revolutionary intellectuals in Japan started their communist activity shortly afterwards. There was continuous infighting between those groups, hampering party-building.

An attempt to unite the centres of the Korean communist movement, which was gaining ground outside national frontiers, and to strengthen and extend its links with Communists inside Korea was made on the initiative of the Far Eastern Secretariat of the Comintern early in 1921. A Congress of Representatives of All Korean Communist Organizations of Korea, China, Manchuria, the Far East, Siberia and Russia met in Irkutsk from May 4 to 15, 1921.¹⁰⁴ That was the official name of the conference. The actual state of things, however, was different.

The congress was attended by 83 delegates who mostly represented the Korean communist groups of various cities of the Soviet Far East as well as Red Army and guerrilla units which operated against the White Guards in that region. Only two delegates arrived from Korea,¹⁰⁵ although nine had been sent

to Irkutsk (via Beijing and Harbin). In a message of July 7, 1921 from Irkutsk, the deputy plenipotentiary delegate of the Comintern, Minsker, communicated to the ECCI, and to Kobetsky, Pyatnitsky and others that five out of the nine men refused, under Pak Ding Shung's influence, to participate in the congress and remained in Beijing, one returned to Korea to inform his organization about the obtaining situation, and yet another stayed on in Harbin for unknown reasons. Finally, six persons arrived to represent the Korean Communists residing in various regions of China.¹⁰⁶

Although the Congress declared the formation of the Korean Communist Party, it did not succeed either in actually creating the party or in uniting all Korean Communists. That was because of the bitter factional struggle among the Korean revolutionary democrats, which must have been provoked by the fact that very many of them, while declaring themselves Communists, actually stuck to the positions of nationalism and anarchism.

That came to light in the course of the Congress itself. Its eighth session on May 11 adopted some theses noting, in particular, that Korean "national and religious political organizations, to be exact [their] leaders, having found it possible to get help from Soviet Russia and proceeding from the assumption that the end justified the means, began to paint themselves in communist colours, while, in real fact, most of them remained nationalists".¹⁰⁷ In all probability, those words also applied to a considerable proportion of the delegates to the Congress. In an early session, the Congress had to acknowledge the "presence of rebel anarchist elements" and voted to "purge itself of them". Five men were expelled from the Congress, yet ten more of those who had openly expressed their disagreement with the leading role of the Comintern stayed on.¹⁰⁸ Of course, it was not by chance that one of the delegates, whose speech was signed with an X, declared: "Honestly speaking, we must say that even after purging the Congress we are not sure of the good quality of its composition".¹⁰⁹

Addressing the Congress on May 7, B. Shumyatsky, who was in charge of the Far Eastern Secretariat of the Comintern, pointed out that "among the Korean Communists, even those who have come for the Congress, there are many petty-bourgeois re-

bel elements who are not accustomed to discipline, infected with the mentality of individualism and are intrinsically unable to recognize any organizing principle." He ended his report with a highly meaningful question: "Is it the right time to create a single Korean Communist Party in the presence of such rebellious, petty-bourgeois, anarchist and by no means communist elements?"¹¹⁰ Although the majority of the audience replied to that question in the affirmative, it was B. Shumyatsky who was right in rather clearly pointing out to the delegates that their intention to form a party immediately was premature. He acted in accordance with Lenin's guidelines questioning the possibility of creating proletarian parties in the obtaining conditions of the peasant countries of the colonial East.¹¹¹

The resolutions of the Congress recorded earnest revolutionism and a thorough understanding that after the October Revolution the liberation struggle in the East could effectively develop only in alliance with Soviet Russia and the international movement of the proletariat.¹¹² Moreover, some of the numerous theses approved at the Congress correctly referred to the bourgeois character of the liberation movement in Korea, its historical inevitability and the imperative need for the Communists to support the national liberation struggle by "coming into contact and even into interim accords with genuinely national revolutionary organizations". It was noted, at the same time, that the Communist Party "retains the independence of its class proletarian movement".¹¹³ These propositions were perfectly in tune with the Leninist guidelines of the Second Congress of the Comintern. However, along with them, the Congress voiced quite a few ideas of a left sectarian kind. A number of decisions on major issues of the communist movement revealed the political immaturity of the first Korean Communists and their incomplete Marxist training.

The theses adopted at the ninth session asserted that "if the Korean worker and peasant want complete political and economic emancipation, if they do not want to fall out of the arms of Japanese capitalists into those of American capitalists and their own bourgeoisie, they must renounce bourgeois-democratic slogans and get down to creating a system of power by working people . . . excluding all exploitation".¹¹⁴ The theses approved at the eleventh session said that the Communists set as "their im-

mediate objective not only that of defeating Japanese imperialism with the aid of the world proletariat but also that of ending exploitation in general".¹¹⁵ With such guidelines adopted, it was quite natural to hear the Chairman of the Central Committee of the Korean Communist Organizations in Russia, Li Xieng, declare at the twelfth session that "a united national front has no sense for us, Communists, adhering to the platform of the dictatorship of the proletariat".¹¹⁶

Once on course for a socialist revolution, but with no proper conditions for it in Korea, the first Korean Communists took up the idea of creating their own army. Apparently, they wanted to form it of guerrilla units fighting against Japanese colonizers and also of Koreans residing in Soviet Russia. A report by the Korean Communists to the Third Congress of the Comintern stated that "the Congress has resolved one more . . . and very important question—the military question. A single Korean Communist Party, no sooner born, has resolved to assume its combat mission by creating a revolutionary Korean Red Army. . . . That is to say, having at once become a party of active struggle, it cannot hesitate to enter the Third Communist International as a full-fledged member."¹¹⁷ All that clearly indicates how far the early Korean Communists were from understanding the actual tasks before the communist movement in their own country.

The Indian immigrant community in Soviet Russia consisted principally, as stated earlier on, of people who regarded the objectives of national liberation as more understandable and more important than social problems. Therefore, it was not a simple, if natural, act for their advanced section to accept Marxism.

In Tashkent, the immigrant community forming the Indian section of the International Propaganda Council was making fairly rapid headway in the communist direction. It grouped between four and eight men, primarily of the Provisional Government of India established in Kabul. As early as April 1920, some members of that section declared themselves Communists (Mohammad Shafiq, Mohammad Ali and Abdul Majid)¹¹⁸ and at the same time made an attempt at creating an Indian Communist organization.¹¹⁹ However, the first such organization was formed as late as October 1920 when the Indians who had attended the Second Congress of the Comintern arrived in Tash-

kent. On the initiative of M.N. Roy and A. Mukherjee, a group of seven men declared themselves to be the Communist Party of India on October 17,¹²⁰ which perfectly expressed the left revolutionary impatience of its organizers and was, unquestionably, a premature act.

The membership of the communist group increased slowly and by the end of December it had as few as 13 people in it. M.N. Roy's left sectarian stand was in the way. Having started what was essentially a necessary campaign among the Indian emigres for the creation of a communist organization, M.N. Roy and his supporters, however, directed it against the national liberation aspirations of revolutionaries, trying to convince them that a national revolution was not a revolution in the proper sense of the term because it could not set working people free from the local exploiters, who were no better than the British. M.N. Roy explained to the Indians that a real revolution must be a communist revolution to be worthy of the efforts it would take to carry out. That propaganda evoked the protest of most emigres for they were told, as a matter of fact, that the cause they had been fighting for and would be prepared to rise in arms to uphold, and one for the sake of which they had exposed themselves to the privation of a long and hard journey, turned out to be senseless and, at any rate, unnecessary to the Indian people. In short, it was not right, either strategically or tactically, for M.N. Roy to play down the ideas of the struggle for national independence and to oppose the principles of communism to them in his discussions with national revolutionaries. So it was clear that the efforts to form a communist party proved to be far less effective than M.N. Roy had expected.

Nevertheless, the first Indian communist group was set up, and after the work with Indians had been transferred to Moscow (April 1921), it more than doubled its membership. That was how Indian national revolutionary intellectuals, passing over to the positions of Marxism-Leninism, started their own country's communist movement while being outside its national frontiers, in Soviet Russia. Very soon communist groups began to appear also inside India due, of course, in no small measure, to the efforts of the first Indian Communists in exile.

So, a communist movement among the Eastern immigrant community in Soviet Russia emerged in 1918-1921. Along with

revolutionary intellectuals who led it, the movement included a few progressively-minded immigrant workers. Normally, those were people who succeeded in assimilating the influence of seasoned Russian workers with whom they had worked together at factories or fought together on the civil war fronts.

The early Eastern Communists were committed to the defence of Soviet Russia from invaders and uncompromising struggle in alliance with her against foreign colonizers and at the same time against their "own" national bourgeoisie. It was typical of them, however, to fail to understand the important distinctions that existed between the social-economic conditions of independent states of developed and medium-developed capitalism and the pre-capitalist environment of most of the subject nations of Asia. They held sectarian views on the major issues of the strategy and tactics of the communist movement in the East. Their political constructions can readily be seen to contain the ideas of universal equality and human justice as well as an over-exaggeration of the role of the military factor in the coming revolutions, prompted by the weakness or even absence of the proletariat in Eastern countries.

Nevertheless, the appearance and activities of communist groups and organizations formed by revolutionary emigres from Eastern countries near the borders of Soviet Russia became an important element of the communist movement in those countries themselves.

The Communist Movement in the East: External and Internal Trends. The Formation of Communist Parties

The first communist groups formed by Eastern immigrants in Soviet Russia lost no time in launching extensive agitation and organizing activities among their compatriots. A considerable role in these activities was played by newspapers, mostly weeklies, published in Oriental languages—Turkish, Persian, Chinese and Korean—in places of the greatest concentration of Oriental nationals: in Tashkent, Poltoratsk, Samarkand, in the Crimea, in Baku and even in Moscow. Those publications as well as numerous leaflets propagated the Marxist-Leninist ideas of the national and social emancipation of oppressed peoples and classes,

reported difficulties and achievements in the process of building a socialist society in Russia and political developments in Oriental countries. Most important works by Marx and Lenin and other materials were translated into Oriental languages.

The said publications were not only distributed among the Eastern emigres in Soviet Russia but in large numbers reached the East due to close ties between the communist groups in exile and their fellow-thinkers in their home countries as well as other revolutionary anti-imperialist forces operating in Asia. They were enhancing the influence of the Great October Revolution on Eastern countries and speeding the progress of the communist movement there. That is what the first Eastern Communists who were in Soviet Russia saw as their priority. The campaign for the repatriation of Oriental nationals started by the Soviet authorities in 1918 contributed towards translating their intentions into practice.¹²¹ That led to the links and interaction between the external and internal trends in the communist movement in Asian countries being extended and strengthened.

The massive repatriation of Oriental working people from revolutionary Russia scared the colonizers and the reactionary rulers in their service and even the national bourgeoisie of Asian countries. Late in 1919, the US State Department communicated to a British representative that "the Government of the United States seriously questions the advisability of assisting at this time the return to China of Chinese workmen and coolies who have been under the influence of Bolshevik rule in Russia".¹²² A few months earlier on, in March 1919, the State Council of the Chinese Republic enjoined all the regional rulers and police stations to "establish strict surveillance over the workers returning home [from Russia] and take immediate measures for their dispersion [Emphasis added—*M.P.*]" and also to bar them from entering educational institutions, the army, police and factories "so as to give them no opportunity to spread lies and confuse people."¹²³ The semi-official *Yeni Dünya* newspaper in Ankara was quite eloquent in expressing uneasiness over the spread of the ideas of Marxism and the growth of communist elements in Turkey. Late in 1921, it wrote: "Our unfortunate country, confronting all kinds of troubles and hardships, is now facing a terrible storm coming from the North—Bolshevism."¹²⁴

That kind of uneasiness of the colonizers and conservative ele-

ments in Asian countries themselves may be attributed to the fact that the communist movement, just as was to be expected, did not confine itself to acting within the emigre groups. It began almost simultaneously spreading in the subject countries and, naturally, that was due, in no small measure, to the effort of Asian revolutionaries who were coming back from Soviet Russia by way of repatriation or on a mission from emigre communist groups or the Comintern.

The communist movement in Turkey was rising in 1918-1920 as a result of the activities of revolutionaries who had left petty-bourgeois national revolutionary organizations operating under the flag of Islamic socialism and also bourgeois-reformist parties like the Socialist, Social-Democratic and other parties. The most revolutionary-minded members of those organizations accepted Marxism and joined the communist movement under the influence of the Great October Revolution. The revolutionary emigres who were returning to their homelands after having passed through a school of proletarian revolution in Russia, or in Germany or Hungary, were a no less important source for the reinforcement of the communist groups.

Istanbul and Ankara were the main centres of the communist movement that was arising in Turkey. The first communist group appeared in Istanbul late in 1918, though it existed only until February 1919.¹²⁵ However, a new group of Communists appeared in that city in the spring of that year. It subsequently operated underground for two years and succeeded in exercising considerable influence on workers. Members of that group, active in factories and workshops, created communist groups, circulated leaflets, pamphlets and magazines to propagate their views, and carried on verbal agitation. The Istanbul Communists considered it to be their main task to mobilize the masses for an armed struggle against the imperialists who had subjugated their homeland.¹²⁶ There were other small communist groups, quite often international, in Istanbul. It was common for them to overstate their actual political status as organizations and call themselves communist parties, although they had no reason, except their revolutionary impatience, to do so. One of such groups, led by S. Ginsberg, S. Maximos and K. Vanli, among others, even established direct contact with the Comintern.¹²⁷ A new communist group, consisting of workers who had been members of the

Bulgarian, Romanian, Hungarian, Serbian and Russian communist parties before returning to Istanbul, was formed in May 1920.¹²⁸

An essential role in promoting the communist movement was played by the Socialist Workers' and Peasants' Party of Turkey (SWPPT). Turkish revolutionary-minded students and workers, coming back home from Germany, brought that Party, which they had created abroad, over to Istanbul in July 1919. The Party pressed for the country's liberation from imperialist domination, demanded the formation of a democratic government, spoke up for the economic interests of workers and peasants, and propagated the ideas of socialism in its monthly magazine *Kurtulus*. However, the Party was not united. From the beginning of 1920, its leadership fell into the hands of bourgeois elements while its revolutionary forces started changing over to the country's communist movement.¹²⁹ For example, prominent SWPPT leader Ethem Nejat was subsequently elected Secretary of the Communist Party of Turkey and became the closest associate of Mustafa Subhi, the leader of the first Turkish Communists.

Communist groups began arising in Anatolia at about the same time, in 1919-1920. Ismail Hakii Bay, one of the top leaders of the Turkish communist movement in Soviet Russia, reported to the Central Committee of the RCP(B) in mid-January 1921 that communist groups had already been organized in Bursa, Trebizond (Trabzon), Samsun, Kastamonu, Konya, Sivas, Adana and some other points of Anatolia.¹³⁰ He also mentioned the capital of Turkey, Ankara, where the efforts towards creating communist groups were particularly intensive.

In mid-July 1920, a group of Ankara revolutionaries, led by Saleh Hajioglu, declared themselves the Communist Party of Turkey and announced that they were joining the Comintern. Those were mostly supporters of Marxism who had left the anti-imperialist national revolutionary organization known as the Green Army.¹³¹ The programme of the Green Army, which combined elements of egalitarian socialism and Islam, did not suit them, and they left that organization on the grounds that its leaders had yielded to the Kemalists' demand for self-dissolution.¹³² It is noteworthy that another leader of the Ankara communist group, working side by side with Saleh Hajioglu, was Za-

inetullah Navshirvan. An ex-officer of the Turkish army, he had been taken prisoner in Russia and, on his return to Constantinople, joined the Social-Democratic Party, placing himself on its left wing. Later on he changed over to the Socialist Workers' and Peasants' Party and, finally, to escape persecution by British police, moved to Ankara where he showed himself to be active in the emergent communist movement.¹³³ Revolutionary elements of the Socialist Party of Turkey (SPT) also went over to the Communists. For example, it was the left of the local SPT branch that formed a communist group in Eskisehir in co-operation with SWPPT members who had come from Istanbul.¹³⁴

All Soviet researchers writing about the beginnings of the communist movement in Turkey note its early connection with the country's working class and even the active participation of workers themselves in the formation of communist groups and circles. Some evidence to bear out this point is provided by the proceedings of the trial of the pioneers of the Turkish communist movement, which was organized by the Ankara authorities in April 1921. They were charged with attempts to "overthrow the M. Kemal government and prevent him from strengthening Soviet-Turkish friendship."¹³⁵ The 45 persons who faced that false charge comprised 16 civil servants, two employers, an MP, 14 workers (compositors, hammers, carpenters and factory workers), three servicemen, four teachers and five persons whose occupation was not disclosed.¹³⁶

To judge by these facts, workers constituted an appreciable group among the first Communists of Turkey. That was not a common occurrence in other Eastern countries and, in fact, was not probably widespread in Turkey proper, being principally confined to Istanbul. That city was outstanding in a way. It had close on 60% of the country's workers, many of them being of other than Turkish nationality, that is, workers from Bulgaria, Greece, Yugoslavia and some other countries of Europe, who had long been in the proletarian movement. As to Turkish workers, many of them had spent long years in Soviet Russia, Germany, or Hungary where they had been directly involved in the struggle of the proletariat and in the communist and socialist movements. Generally speaking, the interaction of internal and external communist trends in Turkey was particularly effective and

led to the formation of a Communist Party at a rather early stage.

The Central Bureau of the Turkish Communist Organizations, created by Mustafa Subhi in Baku in May 1920, carried on regular organizing work among Turkish Communists in Soviet Russia and inside Turkey through the agency of its rather numerous envoys and agitators. That was a way to establish contact between separately operating communist groups at home and abroad and create the conditions for them to unite within a single party.

The Party's constituent congress was indeed called, following a great amount of coordinating and political work done by Turkish Communists. Because of the ban the Kemalists had imposed on it, the congress met outside Turkey, in Baku, where it sat from September 10 to 16, 1920. Of the 74 delegates, 51 represented 13 communist groups inside Turkey proper and, apparently, 23 delegates had come from the communist groups in Soviet Russia. There were 32 delegates with voting powers.¹³⁷ The congress declared the formation of the Communist Party of Turkey, bringing together communist groups which had existed disunited in Istanbul, in a number of cities of Anatolia and in exile. The congress adopted a number of important documents and elected the Party's Central Committee and auditing commission. Mustafa Subhi was elected Chairman of the CPT and Ethem Nejat, Secretary.

The resolution which the congress approved upon a review of the current situation said (§3): "The Turkish Communists declare that the instructions issued by the Second Congress of the Third International are consistent with the requirements of life and accord with the basic ideas of the Turkish social movement".¹³⁸ In other words, the congress declared its consent with the Leninist guidelines of the Second Congress of the Comintern which called on the Communists to preserve the independence of their movement and, in doing so, unflinchingly supported the national liberation struggle of the people, although it was led by the local bourgeoisie. In accordance with this point the resolution stated (§4) that the Communist Party of Turkey would assist in "promoting" the national revolutionary movement in Anatolia "directed against imperialism", and at the same time "will work towards laying the ground for securing dom-

ination by the working classes, which is the present goal and the ultimate wish of the working people."¹³⁹

Unfortunately, the significance of these fair precepts was seriously weakened by some of the clauses of the CPT Programme¹⁴⁰ which was also adopted by the congress of the Turkish Communists.

It was a thoroughly revolutionary document, by its character and spirit, for it declared an unbending determination to set the people of Turkey free not only from foreign but also from national oppressors. The CPT proclaimed itself to be part and parcel of the international communist movement and declared that "it, together with other communist parties of the world, [belonged] to the Third International" and was actively fighting within its ranks against the international bourgeoisie. The Programme underlined the CPT's unbreakable natural link with the people whom it owed everything "it has of sublime and ideal" (Chapter 1, §10).

One cannot say that the Programme took no account at all of the actual social and economic situation of Turkey as the first Communists had done before when they presumed the country to be capitalist. Paragraph 9 of the first general political chapter of the Programme said that although "Turkey . . . has made notable progress compared with other Eastern countries," nevertheless "factory business" in her lands "has not yet developed as it should". There were isolated factories in various parts of the country, but "no real proletariat . . . has yet been formed" [Emphasis added—*M.P.*].

The reference to other sections of working people and the dispossessed is still more succinct: peasants "work from morning till night, . . . being deprived of the means whereby to satisfy their most elementary vital needs", soldiers die to please the great powers; "in towns and villages there is a class of poor people deprived of all means of production" and also the jobless who had lost "all hope for salvation".

The Programme went on to assert that Turkey "with all of her present way and form of government . . . is a country which has entered the phase of bourgeois democracy". Next came an important reservation to the effect that Turkey had not yet got rid of her status of a "semi-colony" and that "the class struggle [in it] is [only] in its opening stages".

The Programme further stated that what was happening in Turkey was "a rebellion against the rapacious victor powers" which "involves the nation's poor classes as well" and that, consequently, "the Turkish worker in alliance with his enemy, . . . the local bourgeoisie exploiting and robbing him, is fighting against world capitalism oppressing and robbing Turkey. . .".

So the first chapter of the Programme contained two points:

1. Turkey is a backward, semi-colonial country with no working class formed as yet, and
2. Turkey is waging an armed national liberation war in which the working classes are united with the patriotic sections of the bourgeoisie.

From these correct premises the Programme drew, however, an utterly unjustified conclusion that "the class awareness" of the working people was not blunted in the course of the national liberation struggle but, on the contrary, under the strongest impact of the Great October Revolution, it was sharpening and coming "to perfection" with the result that "the national movement in Turkey [assumed] a social (i.e. socialist) character and [prepared] favourable conditions for peasants, and workers' councils to be set up on the basis of socialism".

So the Programme sought to prove that the new situation created in the world by the October Revolution enabled the peoples, irrespective of the level of social and economic development they had attained, to set themselves socialist aims and strive to achieve them immediately. The Programme proceeded from an uncompromising commitment to carbon copy the Russian socialist experience in Turkey and formulated the Party's tasks, counting on the earliest, supposedly assured victory of a socialist revolution on Turkish soil. In fact, most of the fifty-seven paragraphs of the Programme, except three or four, basically described above, were a near-synopsis of the Programme of the RCP(B). Moreover, that was a synopsis not of the first programme which the Bolsheviks had followed before the October Revolution, but of the second one, adopted by the Eighth Congress of the Russian Communist Party in 1919 and, consequently, formulating the priorities of the Russian Communists after the proletariat had won political power.

It did not so much as put forward any objectives of the bourgeois-democratic stage of the revolution, which was the only

possible one for Turkey at the time and one that was actually developing during the national liberation war against the Entente powers.

One can understand the logic of the first Turkish Communists. For it was those short-term objectives that they had unequivocally proclaimed in the congress resolution on the current situation. There was no need, in their opinion, for the programme urging a socialist revolution and the establishment of a socialist state to speak of supporting the national liberation struggle and the bourgeoisie that was leading it, because the projected revolution was to be made not only against foreign but against national oppressors as well.

The Programme detailed a wide-ranging plan for the establishment of republican and workers' councils to exercise the power of oppressed classes, which it saw as a stepping stone from capitalism to communism (Chapter II, §§2 and 3). Accordingly, it declared the need to "put all sources and implements of production into the common ownership of the class of producers living off their own work alone, and to abolish once and for all the estates of parasites who live without working..." It called for the nationalization of big enterprises (Chapter IV, §§8 and 9), and also of all banks (to be merged in a single "People's Bank") (Chapter VII, §27), big houses and palaces belonging to capitalists, drug-stores, hospitals and sanatoria (Chapter IX, §32; Chapter XI, §37). It proclaimed the need to "eliminate the colonial and capitulationist order" and thereby ensure an "up-surge of the nation's productive forces" (Chapter IV, §13).

The Programme called for agrarian problems to be resolved by declaring the nationalization of the land; by granting plots of land to peasants "working with their own hands", giving land to landless and land-poor peasants by sharing out uncultivated private arable and "ordinary estates"; turning over large private farms to the state, and by giving every encouragement to the voluntary association of peasants in agricultural communes. In conclusion, the Programme stated that in the countryside the CPT relied on the "proletarians and semi-proletarians", i.e., on the farm labourers as well as on the peasants deprived of the means to till the land they had.

It is hardly worth describing the other chapters and paragraphs of the Programme. They are all good and fair, but the

aims they set could be achieved only as a result of a socialist revolution for which Turkey had neither the objective nor the subjective conditions as yet. All that was happening in the country at the time was a national liberation revolution which was led by the Anatolian bourgeoisie holding anti-communist positions, to boot. In those conditions, the Communists ought to have thought of the ways and means of securing co-operation with the country's other anti-imperialist elements and pressed the immediate demands of the working people, who constituted the decisive force of the national liberation movement. The newly-elected Central Committee of the CPT abided, however, by a different point of view which it expressed quite definitely soon afterwards. On October 2, 1920, the CPT Central Committee forwarded a report "On the State of Affairs in Turkey" to the Propaganda and Action Council of the Peoples of the East where it unequivocally determined the starting point of its Programme. "Unquestionably," the report stated, "we are on the eve of the triumph and victory of a social revolution in Anatolia". The CPT Central Committee said further on that "the RSFSR and the Third International must *endorse the Programme of the Turkish Communist Party and acknowledge it as the sole true communist programme in Turkey* [Emphasis added—M.P.] and declare all those adopting different programmes to be no Bolsheviks".¹⁴¹

But the Propaganda and Action Council of the Peoples of the East rightfully criticized the left sectarian Programme of the CPT. A member of the Presidium of the Council, A.Y. Skachko, described the document as follows: "This is a declaration of what the CPT will do when it is in power in Soviet Turkey. But one cannot see at all from this programme what, after all, the Party will be pressing for now, before winning power".¹⁴²

The Propaganda and Action Council, a Comintern body, seconded Skachko's criticism, but did not limit itself to it. The Turkish Communists were given practical assistance in correcting the mistakes they had made and redrafting their policy document. It was Skachko again who, on behalf of the Council, drew up special "Theses on the Economic and Political Conditions in Turkey and the Tactics of the Turkish Communist Party",¹⁴³ which were carefully studied by the Turkish Communists. The CPT Central Committee accepted the criticism whereupon it got down

to drafting a new programme and completed it in the first half of December 1920, having extensively drawn on Skachko's theses. This conclusion has to be made, first, because the text of the redrafted programme coincided with Skachko's theses in some places and, second, because it was stated in clear handwriting in brackets following the title on the first page of the theses: "(drawn up by Comrade Skachko, member of the [Propaganda and Action] Council of the Peoples of the East. *Adopted by the CPT Central Committee*"¹⁴⁴ [Emphasis added—M.P.] Although the document which was prepared on the basis of those theses had no name, it was, unquestionably, a redrafted programme of the CPT, to judge by its content. Besides, it was actually called a *programme* at the end of the eight-page text. The Party will be able to raise, the document said, "...large numbers of staunch and dedicated members for achieving the objectives proclaimed by the *present programme* and resolving the tasks it set" [Emphasis added—M.P.] It is also most significant that this unnamed document bears the signatures of the Chairman of the CPT Central Committee, Mustafa Subhi, and Secretary Ethem Nejat.

Fundamentally different as it was from the programme considered earlier on, the new draft represented a serious attempt at analyzing the current social and economic position of Turkey and proceeded from it, if not always successfully, in determining the specific tasks before the Party. Having worked out the draft with the help of the Propaganda and Action Council, the first Turkish Communists certainly took an important step bringing them nearer to learning and applying Marxist-Leninist theory and understanding Lenin's demand for a Party's priorities to be set and for its activities to be based not on the fluid ground of self-willed revolutionism but on an investigation of the socio-economic and political conditions the people have to live under. However, the redrafted programme, being as it was largely a well-founded and well-argued document, nevertheless smacked of "ultra-leftism" and sectarianism. It turned out to be a slow and hard job for the first Communists of the East to cure themselves of that "infantile disorder", as Lenin aptly called it.

The redrafted programme declared three times that the Communist Party would "by all means" support the "bourgeois government (of the Kemalists) since it is leading the struggle of

the Turkish insurgents against Western imperialists" and that, simultaneously, "it will defend the interests of the working masses and press, if possible, for an immediate improvement of their lot". The importance of these guidelines was reduced, however, by the trends of "ultraleftism" and sectarianism. While calling for a united anti-imperialist front, the draft programme went on to state that the achievement of national independence and the establishment of the national bourgeoisie as the governing force "*will bring no relief*" to workers and peasants. On the contrary, "*the misfortunes experienced by the working masses of Turkey, far from ceasing, will increase still further* [Emphasis added—M.P.]." Further on, it said that political independence "will not free Turkey from economic oppression by European capitalism, nor safeguard her from the penetration of foreign financial and industrial capital, nor save the peasants and artisans from complete ruin." These contentions made it no longer expedient for working people to have any part in the anti-imperialist struggle because its national character inspired futile hopes for working people to be delivered from exploitation without a class struggle. The draft stressed that it was unrealistic for the working people to expect national independence to free them from all oppression. This idea was expressed in the following way: "The mass of workers and peasants, who have not yet experienced enough oppression by their own national bourgeoisie, are selflessly and enthusiastically fighting for the independence of Turkey *in the belief* that by winning it they will set themselves free from all oppression and exploitation [Emphasis added—M.P.]".

This line of reasoning in the new programme was quite in accord with the premature conclusion which Mustafa Subhi made in the speech at the opening of the Party Congress: "The only hope for the ruined Turkey *now* [Emphasis added—M.P.] is communism".¹⁴⁶ The desire of the first Communists of Turkey to bring their people at once to real emancipation, not only national but social as well, was so great that they convinced themselves and were trying to convince others about the absolute inevitability of the Kemalist movement switching over to the track of socialist revolution within the shortest possible time limits. In consequence, the redrafted CPT Programme, contrary to its own contention that in the course of the national liberation struggle the working people's class consciousness

was being blunted, put forward a diametrically opposite argument at the same time. "The national liberation struggle now going on in Turkey," it said, "is creating a 'favourable environment' in which the ideas of class struggle and social revolution will develop enough to be actually applied." The possibility of the Kemalist movement being quickly switched over to the track of socialist revolution was emphasized also by a member of the CPT Central Committee, Ismail Hakki. In a memo to the Central Committee of the RCP(B) in the early January 1921 he said: "The Turkish Communist Party is *more than certain* [Emphasis added—*M.P.*] that the [Turkish] movement will eventually resolve itself into a class revolution by joining the mainstream of the international class struggle".¹⁴⁶ Moreover, the "end result" was to come before very long. It was Ismail Hakki again who, speaking before the Propaganda and Action Council on January 16, 1921, declared: "The day is not far off when a red banner will be run up and a red star will shine over Istanbul, the capital of what was once an imperialist Turkey."

While speaking up for a socialist revolution to be made at the earliest opportunity and trying to prove that it was quite possible, the first Turkish Communists exaggerated the degree of the organization of the communist movement and its influence on the masses out of all proportion. The message of greetings the First CPT Congress sent to Lenin claimed, for instance, that "The Turkish communist organizations, having matured under the glorious banner of the Third International, are now turning into a *powerful Party* [Emphasis added—*M.P.*] of the oppressed masses of Turkey and are ready to make the greatest of sacrifices on their way to a victorious social revolution."¹⁴⁷ To argue in favour of this assertion, the new CPT Programme predicted that the Party would be assured "*undoubted support and co-operation* of the proletarians, soldiers, peasants, smallholders, artisans, small tradesmen, democratic intellectuals and low-ranking officers. All these social groups will make up the *majority of the population* and, with support from that majority, the Communist Party *will not find it difficult* to strike root, solid and deep, on national soil and raise *large numbers* of staunch and dedicated members for achieving the objectives proclaimed by the present Programme and resolving the tasks it sets [Emphasis added—*M.P.*]"

How unrealistic was that picture of Turkish life drawn by the first Turkish Communists! They spoke and wrote about an early and inevitable escalation of the Kemalist movement into a socialist revolution, and yet just at that very moment the Kemalists plotted and, before long, carried out the savage destruction of some of the Central Committee members and a large number of propagandists of the newly-created Party. They spoke of their ability to ensure the "*rapid* dissemination of communist ideas among the working class and the poorest peasantry [Emphasis added—*M.P.*],¹⁴⁸ while in actual fact such work was just beginning and running into tremendous difficulties due, above all, to the fact that the bulk of the Turkish workers, not to speak of the peasants, were unprepared to accept the ideas of socialism. Finally, the first Turkish Communists claimed that they had created a "powerful Party", whereas what they had actually done was to take no more than the initial step on the long and tortuous road they had to travel to build the Party and wed it to the masses.

In Iran, the first communist groups appeared in 1919 in Tehran, Täbriz, Rascht, Mashhad, Anzeli, Astara, Gorgan and Ardebil. They were created underground, despite ruthless persecution, by representatives of the Baku Adalet centre.¹⁴⁹ The Iranian communist movement gained much ground in 1920 due to two important factors. First, there was a national liberation movement, led by Kuchik Khan, which got under way in the country's northern regions, especially in Gilan Province. It was directed against the British imperialists occupying the country and towards restricting the rule of a foreign-backed Shah, establishing trade and diplomatic relations with Soviet Russia, carrying through a number of democratic reforms, etc. Second, a landing party of the Soviet Caspian flotilla under F.F. Raskolnikov entered the Iranian port of Anzeli in May 1920 to recover the Soviet ships which had been driven away by the White Guards.

At Kuchik Khan's request, Soviet units came to the aid of the Iranian people in their liberation struggle. That support breathed a new lease of life into the Gilan movement and inspired the enthusiasm of the mass of the people who were increasingly active in the struggle against imperialism and the Shah. Kuchik

Khan's detachments began defeating British troops and soon captured Rascht, the main city of Gilan Province. A landing party of the Caspian flotilla entered that city, too, "in compliance with Comrade Mirza Kuchik Khan's persistent requests", Raskolnikov reported. The British beat a hasty retreat and started evacuating Ghaswin.¹⁵⁰ All that created fairly propitious conditions for the revolution to gain ground in Gilan and to spread to other provinces.

So the Communists had real opportunities opening up before them for free action in support of the on-going national liberation revolution so as to get its objectives realized to the fullest possible extent. There was only one way to achieve it, and that was by establishing a united anti-imperialist front with Kuchik Khan and with all the national revolutionary forces involved in the Gilan movement. The Communists' participation in such a front was also an important condition for strengthening their own organization and extending its ranks and as a means to win over the masses and to have them respect the Communists as selfless and able fighters for the freedom of the people. The objectives of organizationally and politically consolidating the Adalet and enlarging its membership were most urgent since the Party, in the absence of a proletariat, had to rely principally on an insignificant number of Iranians who had passed through a more or less successful school of class warfare in Russia. Naturally, the positions of the Communists inside Iran and, notably, in Gilan, were very weak. Raskolnikov wrote that although "steps [were] being taken to organize groups of the Persian Adalet Communist Party" that was "a slow process" because the organization of Communists did "not enjoy great popularity".¹⁵¹

The co-operation of Communists with Kuchik Khan began in the mid-1920s. The Revolutionary Military Council, which was then formed, comprised not only Kuchik Khan's closest associates but some Communists as well. However, that cooperation was short-lived. A "Left" group, who came to dominate the leadership of the Iranian communist movement, set themselves the fantastic task of immediately transforming the Gilan national liberation movement into a socialist revolution. The first step in that direction was to proclaim a Soviet Republic in Gilan. Then the "Left" Communists sought official endorsement of their course at the constituent Congress of the Iranian Communist Party.

The congress met in Anzeli from June 22 to 24, 1920. Of its 48 delegates, representing over 2,000 Party members, 24 had been sent by the communist groups of various cities and provinces of Iran proper, and the others were delegated, apparently, by groups based in Baku, the Trans-Caucasus and Turkestan.¹⁵² The congress was attended by representatives of the RCP(B). It renamed Adalet to the Iranian Communist Party, elected its Central Committee and approved its Programme and Rules,¹⁵³ heard local reports and discussed the current situation.

The debate on the ICP Programme and the current situation gave rise to a pitched battle between the "Left" and those who defended Lenin's propositions as set forth in the original outline of the "Theses on the National and Colonial Question," which subsequently became a resolution of the Second Congress of the Comintern. In the report on the current situation Sultan Zade tried to prove that Iran was quite prepared for a socialist take-over and therefore "the congress must say that the revolution in Persia must be a social revolution".¹⁵⁴ He also demanded that the call for a struggle against the Shah and the British imperialists should be complemented with a slogan for the immediate abolition of the landed estates.

However, there was no real ground for such a course. The Gilan movement was led by Iranian medium and small landowners and also by the merchants and some of the intellectuals normally representing the same social groups. Now, the agrarian reforms proposed by the "Left", with the peasantry being passive, as they were still far from being ready to rise against their landlords, could lead only to the national bourgeoisie departing from the revolution, the incipient unity of the anti-imperialist and anti-Shah forces breaking up and the revolution aborting. The congress rejected the draft resolution moved by Sultan Zade and adopted decisions in the spirit of Lenin's guidelines. "It is the duty of the Iranian Communist Party," its resolution stated, "to fight, together with Soviet Russia, against world imperialism and to support all forces in Persia which are in action against the British and the Shah's government and to rouse them to still more determined struggle," drawing the mass of workers and peasants into it.¹⁵⁵

However, the "Left", having lost the first point on the agen-

da—the debate on the current situation—took revenge on the second—the Party Programme.

The Programme ignored the nation's actual social and economic position altogether and contended that Iran's conditions "create a situation of the greatest revolutionary upsurge which, considering the weakness of the bourgeoisie, must inevitably develop from national to social".¹⁵⁶ The Programme proceeded wholly and entirely from the assumption that a proletarian revolution and a dictatorship of the proletariat were just the order of the day in Persia. The authors of that document were by no means impressed by the actual absence of a working class in the country. They presumed that its historical mission would be effectively carried out by the Iranian migrant workers who were in the adjoining regions of the Caucasus and Turkestan at the time. They were not embarrassed by the fact that the majority of the migrant workers consisted of paupers and the rag-tag who were infinitely far away from socialist ideals and that only a small fraction of them could actually get proletarianized while in Russia. They counted on Soviet Russia and, above all, on its armed forces as well as on the Persian military units which they had been forming in Turkestan and Baku mostly of the same paupers and the rag-tag. Let me note here that those units, once in Gilan, turned out to have little fighting ability and sometimes even defected to the enemy. Needless to say that they would certainly have nothing to do with socialist priorities.

The dual position taken up by the First Congress of the ICP on the cardinal issue of the character of the revolution that was going on and the appropriate tasks of the Communist Party enabled the reckless elements in the ICP Central Committee to follow through their left sectarian course in Gilan. The outcome of the Gilan revolution is well known: it was defeated, mostly, one might say, because of the "Left" mistakes of the ICP leaders who had broken off co-operation with Kuchik Khan. The Communist Party, however, continued to exist and, in the course of a struggle against sectarian elements who had long yet held a strong foothold in its leadership, gradually learned the right lessons from the defeat in Gilan. The Comintern helped the Party do so. As early as January 1922, the ECCI adopted its Theses on Work in Persia noting that "the victorious outcome of the national revolutionary movement is impossible without an alliance

between the proletarian and semi-proletarian elements, on the one hand, and the bourgeois-democratic elements, on the other"; that it was wrong to put forward any slogans for the Shah's government to be overthrown without delay and for "Persia to be Sovietized immediately", because, first, that meant running the risk of reckless action without the masses and, second, isolated "the ICP... from the great mass of the people who [were] *still far from having taken these slogans as their own*". The theses unequivocally specified that "all neglect of the local ethnic peculiarities, failure or inability to make a sober assessment of real forces and a desire to achieve an immediate outward revolutionary success *at any price* are all an *outright crime* against the revolution in the situation Persia is in [Emphasis added—M.P.]."¹⁵⁷

The communist movement in China began in 1920. However, the actual organization of that movement was preceded by the intense activities of revolutionary democratic intellectuals in studying and propagating the ideas of Marxism-Leninism. In China, the process of dissemination of scientific socialism, markedly intensified under the impact of the Great October Revolution, was fast gaining ground, involving relatively large sections of revolutionary intellectuals. Dual government* and never subsiding internecine wars, hampering police action to curb the activities of the supporters of Marxism, must have been contributing factors.

One of the pioneers of the communist movement in China, Zhang Guotao, who was subsequently expelled from the CPC, has a detailed story of how that new movement got underway in his country: "Chinese intellectuals, having found that, in spite of tremendous difficulties, the Russian Revolution was winning out, began to realize that it evidently had a powerful revolutionary theory at its bedrock or, at least, was very skilfully using Marxism. Besides, the Soviet slogans of 'national liberation' and of 'land, peace and bread' were just as attractive as the great slogan of the French Revolution 'Liberty, equality and fraternity'. Perhaps, their influence was still greater." Elsewhere in his book, Zhang Guotao writes: "News from Russia had the ef-

* There was a revolutionary government of Sun Yatsen in South China (Guangzhou, Shanghai) from 1917 on, and a government of militarists, supported by imperialist powers, in the North (Beijing).

fect of a clarion call in the dead of night." The situation in China was quite bleak, indeed, at the time, in 1919-1920, and, as Zhang Guotao says, "only the victory of the Russian Revolution and the Soviets' friendly gesture towards China [he means the Address of the Government of the RSFSR of June 25, 1919 to the Chinese people and the governments of South and North China—*M.P.*] inspired some hope. So the people who did not wish to succumb to melancholy and looked for a way out thought the victorious way of Marxism [in Russia] to be rather attractive." The author writes further on: "We were enthralled by the Russian Revolution, but we lacked Marxist training and had even less experience in applying it to the actual conditions in China." So it was then, Zhang Guotao went on to say, that "*people studying the course of the Russian Revolution were to be found everywhere, from the South up to the North* (Emphasis added—*M.P.*)".¹⁵⁸ That was an equivalent of a study of the theory of Marxism, as the Chinese revolutionaries saw it at the time.

It was the leading activists of the May 4 Movement who were the first to begin studying Marxism. The man who acted as the principal propagandist of scientific socialism among them was the revolutionary-democrat, Li Dazhao, who was the first in China to accept and learn this theory. It was he who had students—partisans of Marxism and other left doctrines—gather illegally around him to discuss and argue about the books on socialism they had read in the library of the Beijing University he was in charge of. Many entrenched themselves in that way in Marxist positions while others persisted in their adherence to anarchism, guild socialism or syndicalism.

The second main centre for the dissemination of Marxism in China was a small group of advocates of the theory of Marx in Shanghai, which was headed by Chen Duxiu, a big-calibre scholar and ideological leader of the movement for a new culture and for the regeneration of China.

The dissemination of the ideas of Marxism among the intellectuals assumed such wide proportions as to provoke the stiff resistance of the opponents of socialism both on the left (anarchists) and on the right (bourgeois reformist elements of the Western and the Chinese brand, such as John Dewey, Bertrand Russell, Zhang Dunsun and Liang Qichao). There was a hectic controversy in 1920 about socialism,¹⁵⁹ about the way of devel-

opment that could be acceptable for China—socialist or capitalist—and also about the possibility of a communist movement developing at all in China, backward as it was at the time. That controversy brought a stream of articles in newspapers and magazines about Marx and Lenin, Marxist socialism and Soviet Russia and its actual socialism, indeed, scores and even hundreds of articles “for” and “against”, full of lively interest and passion.

There were upwards of 300 “Marxist works” alone, prominent Soviet historian and Sinologist A. G. Krymov has tentatively estimated, in Chinese periodicals of different ideological complexions in 1920-1921.¹⁶⁰ One can imagine how much this number would have grown if it had been possible to determine how many articles and notes were concerned with discussing Soviet and Marxist problems in general, whether “for” or “against”. That would have been very important to know because even the publications “against”, contrary to the wish of the enemies of socialism, inevitably contributed towards arousing the interest of an ever greater number of people in the ideas of Marxism. Indeed, the desire to learn the fundamentals of scientific communism was common to a very large body of Chinese intellectuals, especially, university students. In 1922 things reached a point where the rector of Beijing University, Cai Yanpei, asked the Comintern representative in China, H. Maring, to recommend a “Marxist-trained” Russian or German in order to “employ him in the university as a professor of Marxist sociology”.

The communist movement in China in 1920 was confined to circles. Scattered partisans of Marxism were beginning to unite in small groups, declaring themselves Communists and members of a prospective Party and pledging themselves not only to study Marxism but to propagate it among workers. Late in August 1920, Chen Duxiu formed a communist circle of that type in Shanghai (10 members) and in mid-September Li Dazhao set up one in Beijing (9 members). As Zhang Guotao writes, all those present in Li Dazhao’s library at the time “endorsed the idea of forming the Party and declared themselves members”.¹⁶¹ With those two first groups actively co-operating, and also independently, communist circles began to be formed in other cities—Tianjin, Hankou, Guangzhou, Hong-Kong (Xianggan), Nanking¹⁶² and, apparently, in Changsha, Jinan and Chongqing.¹⁶³

Young Socialist leagues were arising in the same localities and

at about the same time. They were quite often sponsored by communist circles. Youth groups were seen as a reserve force and as a source from which to reinforce the Party membership. However, the youth leagues differed practically very little from the communist circles either by their social or even age composition (intellectuals and, predominantly, college students) or by their activities (they were principally engaged in studying whatever works of Marx, Engels and Lenin were available, and the socialist practice of the Soviets).

The organization of the communist movement in China was considerably accelerated by the great amount of ideological and practical assistance lent by representatives of the Comintern and the RCP(B). G. N. Voitinsky (subsequently a Comintern official and a Soviet Sinologist) arrived in Shanghai as early as April 1920, with his assistants—Titov, “who had graduated from the Oriental Institute”, and Serebryakov, a Korean public figure who used an assumed name. They had been sent to China by the Foreign Department of the Vladivostok Branch Office of the Far Eastern Bureau of the Central Committee of the RCP(B), with Comintern permission.¹⁶⁴ Ten representatives of the Comintern, the RCP(B) and the Trade Union International were in China from September to October 1920. Among them was Yang Mingzhai, who had become a Communist in Soviet Russia. They were helping the first Chinese Communists launch the oral and written propaganda of Marxism-Leninism.

Spontaneous and isolated at first, and subsequently organized team trips of young people wishing to become Marxists to Moscow were a very important factor in stimulating and advancing the emergent communist movement in China. The first Chinese Communists, with the help of Comintern officials, set up a school of Russian in Shanghai to facilitate their studies. It was training young supporters of Marxism who were sent to Soviet Russia to study.

Having got down to studying Marxism, the first Chinese Communists occasionally strove to work in a proletarian environment as well. A representative of the Chongqing circle said: “The members of our organization are constantly spreading the ideas of communism by clandestine conversations with students and workers and by distributing all kinds of pamphlets among them.” However, Marxist propaganda as such had no success as

yet at plants and factories. Only the Beijing members succeeded in drawing two railway workers into their circle¹⁶⁵, while others did not manage to do even that much. Later on, at the First Congress of the CPC, Chen Gungbo, representing the Guangzhou circle, said that the members of the circle had organized a Marxist club and got 80 people to join it, yet there was not a single worker among them. "It is very difficult for us to get into contact with them," he explained. That was the stark truth. Even attempts at persuading workers to unite in trade unions of a modern type were far from always successful.¹⁶⁶ Nevertheless, the Communists did not desist from their efforts to create trade unions and occasionally came quite near to doing so.¹⁶⁷

The enlightenment work of the first Communists at some railway workshops and at certain plants and factories had a great effect. In a number of places they created schools for workers and also for their children and taught there themselves. Besides, in 1920 Chinese Communists began to produce special newspapers for workers. Ten papers of that kind appeared in the middle of that year.¹⁶⁸ They could have played a substantial role in the class-based education of individual groups of the proletariat but for the illiteracy of the vast majority of workers and a considerable amount of anarchist material published in those papers.

Nevertheless, the attempts of the first Chinese Communists to win the workers over were very important because, first, they attested to their growing understanding of the historic role of the working class, and, second, they opened up the way for them to reach the proletarian masses.

The formation of communist circles was, unquestionably, an important step on the way to building the party. However, originally, these circles brought together rather diverse elements, including anarchists and adherents to other left trends and just nationalists who shared some of the widespread intellectual passion for socialism. Five out of the nine original members of the Beijing communist circle, for instance, were anarchists. Now, the Guangzhou circle was even called anarcho-communist. Such "partnership" could not last long.

The first Communists of China held a preliminary national conference, apparently, at the beginning or in the middle of March 1921, by way of preparation for the Party's constituent

congress¹⁶⁹. The conference declared the principles and priorities of the communist movement, set down some provisions for the prospective programme and adopted a current action plan. But its main achievement was in having started the organizational separation of the Communists from the anarchists. So the conference took a rather important step on the hard road it had yet to traverse in uniting the once scattered circles into a centralized Communist Party of China.

The Constituent Congress of Chinese Communists, attended by 12 (or 13) delegates from six (or seven) city communist groups and one group that was in Japan, opened in Shanghai on July 23, 1921, in the presence of two representatives of the Comintern.¹⁷⁰ It proclaimed the amalgamation of isolated communist groups into a single Party and elected an interim Central Committee headed by Secretary Chen Duxiu. The policy documents adopted by the Congress declared the firm intention to convert the then groups of communist intellectuals into a working-class Party and, to this end, it was suggested to "give great attention to organizing the workers and educating them in the spirit of communism".¹⁷¹ It was also found necessary to create trade unions by the industrial principle. That implied, consequently, the will to work for linking Marxism up with the labour movement. The Congress showed interest also in resolving the peasant question, declaring that Communists must participate in the activities of peasant associations, strive to lead them and, in the long run, to secure the nationalization of the land.¹⁷² Finally, the Party's general course was stated to be towards a socialist revolution and the dictatorship of the proletariat. All that was rather significant.

The trouble, however, was that, while proclaiming the objectives that required years of revolutionary action and the social and economic maturation of society to realize, the first Chinese Communists declared them to be the direct, short-term objectives. That meant, as a matter of fact, rejecting the intermediate democratic stage of the revolution and, therefore, naturally, dismissing not only the necessity but even the possibility of the co-operation of Communists with the national bourgeoisie and its anti-imperialist parties. It is indicative that the representative of the Guangzhou Communists, Chen Gungbo, speaking at the Congress, emphasized the difficulties of the struggle against the na-

tionalists, instead of speaking of conditions to be created for anti-imperialist co-operation with them. He proudly said that the members of the Guangzhou group were striving to "organize workers' associations independent from them [i.e., the Guomindang—*M.P.*]", whereas he should have called upon Communists to work within the existing trade union federations. The Congress emphatically demanded that the Party should "constantly hold quite definite positions, defend the exclusive interests of the proletariat, and enter into no relationship with other parties".¹⁷³ That is to say that China's first Communists were still rather far from understanding and accepting the idea of a united anti-imperialist front, put forward by the Second Congress of the Comintern.

One of the policy documents of the Congress stipulated that the Party's overriding objective was "by joining forces with the *revolutionary army of the proletariat*, to overthrow the capitalist classes [*Emphasis added—M.P.*]"¹⁷⁴ This argument arose from the first Chinese Communists' conviction that revolution is a one-off act of armed power takeover. It was, of course, necessary to have an army, preferably, an army of the proletariat, to carry it out. However, the first Chinese followers of Marxism were just setting out to win over the working class and a "revolutionary army of the proletariat" was still a very long way off. So what was to be done? For the first Chinese Communists believed a socialist revolution to be their immediate priority. Even the Party leader, Chen Duxiu, presumed that there was an ample "opportunity [to carry out] the power takeover by the Chinese Communist Party *within three years* (*Emphasis added—M.P.*)". To carry out that plan, he insisted "on shifting the centre of gravity of [the Party's] work to China's wild country because there it is easy to create their army since there are no Europeans there to stand in the way". (Chen Duxiu's position was reported by a representative the Far Eastern Secretariat of the Comintern in Shanghai, Lidin, in his letter of January 5, 1922 to B. Shumyatsky). That there was no proletariat in China's "wild country" did not embarrass Chen Duxiu. Just as Zhang Tailei, he expected, apparently, to knock together a pauper-ragtag hunghu force which was to carry out the planned revolutionary act.

As you see, the Marxist training of the first Chinese Commu-

nists was insufficient. They, like other early Oriental Communists, fell victim to left sectarian misconceptions. On the other hand, the Party was just in the making. It had not actually gone beyond circle activity as yet,¹⁷⁵ while the long and involved process of linking Marxism up with the labour movement was, in fact, in the preparatory stage.

The ideological, political and organizational evolution of the CPC, which had begun with active assistance from the Comintern and Soviet Communists went on for years parallel with the process of interaction and merger of internal and external communist trends. Indeed, the external trend was becoming an increasingly important component of the Chinese communist movement because the number of Chinese partisans of Marxism studying in Soviet Russia was rising all the time. There even was a Russian section of the CPC in Moscow, formed, apparently, after the Third Congress of the Comintern in 1921 by Zhang Tai-lei with support from the ECCI.¹⁷⁶ It is worth recalling that the Chinese division of the CUTE had 42 students in 1922. They made up 50% of the entire CPC which had a membership of a little over a hundred at the time¹⁷⁷. The Chinese Communists studying in Moscow represented so important a group, in terms of quantity and quality, that it came to be independently represented at the Third Congress of the CPC in June 1923.¹⁷⁸ Bao Huiseng (whose pen name was Ciu Laozhen), a delegate to the First (constituent) Congress of the CPC on behalf of the Guangzhou Communist Group, noted in his reminiscences that the sending of young people to Moscow to study was the only way for Chinese Communists and trade unionists to be trained.¹⁷⁹ Chen Duxiu even believed that it was necessary "to send several thousand Chinese to Russia for training so as to have a hard core of revolutionaries within 3 years [by the time of the victory of the socialist revolution]". The Chinese Communists who came back home from Soviet Russia played a great role subsequently in building up the Communist Party of China. In short, as another delegate to the First CPC Congress, Li Da, wrote, "the training of Chinese revolutionaries in Moscow had given the Party very great strength".¹⁸⁰

In India, communist circles began to appear in 1921-1922. A substantial role in creating them was played by the Roy-Mukhe-

rjee communist group which had been originally formed in Tashkent as early as October 1920. Many of the first Indian Communists entered the CUTE after they moved from Tashkent to Moscow. There they studied the fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism and the practice of socialist development in Soviet Russia. Subsequently, they passed the knowledge they had gained on to the national revolutionary intellectuals at home, who were mostly of the same origin, and worked to form communist groups of them.

A large amount of work in preparing the ideological and political conditions for the formation of the Indian Communist Party was carried on by M.N. Roy although his left sectarian views interfered with it. Using the connections he still had with national revolutionaries, M.N. Roy, in his personal correspondence with them and in printed articles, criticized their unfounded and harmful tactical tendencies for individual terrorism, undercover plotting and ignoring the mass of the people. In that way he did his bit to convert a large number of national revolutionaries to Marxism.¹⁸¹ His repeated imperative appeals to the Indian National Congress to show concern for the immediate interests of the working masses contributed towards radicalizing the left wing of the INC.

In 1921, M.N. Roy, as the head of the Provisional All-India Revolutionary Committee, sent three "envoys of communism"—Mohammad Ali, Mohammad Shafiq and Nalini Gupta, one after the other—to India and her borders. Apparently, Mohammad Ali arrived in Kabul in April 1921. There, acting under the Indian Revolutionary Committee's mandate of March 22, 1921, and a special letter of instruction handed to him, he was to "start organizing an All-India Revolutionary Party" and simultaneously "begin organizing a Communist Party in India by creating small groups in major cities". Besides, he was under instruction "to organize the printing of propaganda literature on the Indian border". It was noted in particular that "there must be a *new line* in propaganda, stressing the economic aspect of the struggle, the necessity of organizing working masses and turning the land over to peasants (Emphasis added—*M.P.*)". In reality, that "new line" was M.N. Roy's old precept of ignoring the national liberation movement and overestimating the level of working people's readiness for social struggle.

Mohammad Ali was successfully carrying out the mission he had been entrusted with. He established contact with members of the Kabul-based Indian national revolutionary community, striving to win them over to communism. As he said, "that was an interesting part of the work since those people did not have any more or less definite idea of the Russian Revolution and of the way its ideas could be fruitfully applied in other countries".¹⁸³ He succeeded in securing the consent of many national revolutionaries to "provide ... full moral support"¹⁸³ for the development of the communist movement in India. In particular, Mohammad Ali succeeded in impressing the ideas of communism on INC member Mota Singh, an outstanding Sikh, one of the leaders of the anti-imperialist Akali movement, who was then hiding in Afghanistan from persecution by the British authorities. Soon afterwards, Mota Singh declared his desire to become a Communist and Mohammad Ali, as he wrote to M.N. Roy, "acknowledged him as a member of the Party". After that, in the autumn of 1921, Mota Singh returned to Punjab and began to form the first communist group in North-West India in Jalandhar so as to get down to creating the Communist Party "all over India" later on, as he officially announced in newspapers.¹⁸⁴

Mohammad Shafiq, who had arrived in Afghanistan via Europe, joined Mohammad Ali in his work in Kabul in January 1922. A communist group, headed by Ghulam Hussain, was formed in Lahore with their active co-operation and began to operate there.

The Kabul activities of the Communists of the Tashkent-Moscow group showed them to have somewhat departed from left sectarian intransigence. They established and in every way extended contacts with the leaders of the left wing of the INC. Moreover, both of them and Abdul Haq, who had also returned from Soviet Russia, joined the INC Committee which was formed in Kabul in the summer of 1921 as a provincial branch of that Party and existed for a year.¹⁸⁵ Having thus recognized the necessity of co-operation of Communists and Congressmen, they, nevertheless, in an appeal to Congress, expressed their disbelief in its ability to fight for the economic demands of the working people of town and countryside and at the same time set the task of creating an All-India Revolutionary Party designed to become an organization of workers and peasants. They did

not yet see the actual ways of forming a united anti-imperialist front in India, nor the role and place the projected revolutionary party was to have in it.

An important function was carried out in India by Nalini Gupta. Having left Moscow in August 1921, he arrived in Calcutta only late in December, and stayed in his country for over two months.¹⁸⁶ During that time, N. Gupta more than once met young national revolutionaries, told them about the Land of Soviets and about the October Revolution, and thereby promoted the growth of the incipient communist movement in his country.¹⁸⁷ It was particularly important that he succeeded in gathering extensive information about the communist movement in India and contributed towards establishing links between its individual groups which had existed in isolation from each other until then, and also between them, the Comintern and M.N. Roy's foreign centre which had been set up in Berlin in the mid-1922.

Communist circles had sprung up on their own in other areas of the country by that time (late 1921-early 1922), in addition to the communist groups which had been created in North-West India under the direction of Mohammad Ali and Mohammad Shafiq. As stated in Nalini Gupta's memo of March 28, 1922 to the Executive Committee of the Comintern, that was, first, a student group of a socialist complexion in Bombay, formed around S.A. Dange late in 1921, which subsequently proclaimed itself to be the Radical Party of the Indian National Congress; second, the communist group in Madras, headed by Singaravelu Chettiar, once a prominent lawyer, of a fisherman's family; third, the communist group in Calcutta which was headed by Muzaffar Ahmad who edited two local Bengali newspapers of national importance at the time. Due to Nalini Gupta's activities, those three groups, not to speak of the communist units of the North-West, turned out, as already noted, to be connected between themselves and with M.N. Roy's foreign centre and the Comintern. It was "the Comintern that acquainted us with each other", Muzaffar Ahmad wrote subsequently.¹⁸⁸

Thirteen young Indians, mostly Communists, returned home early in 1922 after having completed their course of instruction at the CUTE. They were now anxious to join the national liberation struggle and to take part in preparations of the establishment of the Communist Party of India. However, they were all

captured and taken into custody. In 1922-1923, the British authorities staged a series of trials in Peshawar. The revolutionaries were charged with having participated in the so-called Moscow-Tashkent conspiracy designed to overthrow British rule in India. They were sentenced to between three and seven years' imprisonment.¹⁸⁹ The Peshawar trials were followed by the Kanpur Conspiracy Case (April-May 1924), that is a "Bolshevik conspiracy against the King-Emperor with a view to depriving him of sovereignty over British India by a violent revolution"¹⁹⁰ Of the eight men¹⁹¹ facing that charge three represented the Tashkent-Moscow communist group—Manabendra Nath Roy, Nalini Gupta and Shaukat Usmani. They, as well as two more Communists, were tried in their absence; three revolutionaries whom the authorities had managed to arrest (Sripad Amrit Dange, Muza-ffar Ahmad and Shaukat Usmani) were sentenced to four years' rigorous imprisonment.

The Peshawar and Kanpur trials were not only obvious evidence of the deadly fear the British colonizers had of the force of the Bolshevik influence on the Indians, but a clear indication of the vigorous revolutionary activity in India of members of the first Indian communist group which had been formed in Tashkent and Moscow. The trials did not achieve the purpose that the colonizers wanted them to achieve. The ideas of socialism were not discredited, interest of Indian society in them, far from flagging, increased. The communist movement gained ground and its ties with the Comintern, if clandestine, did not snap.

Colonialist repression seriously impeded the development of the communist movement, but could not stop it. The circles which ceased to function for a time were replaced by more of them, and their number rose. For instance, late in 1922 and early in 1923, Shaukat Usmani, back from Soviet Russia, formed two Marxist circles: one in Benares (Varanasi) among university students and the other in Kanpur. In May 1923 Usmani was arrested and the circles ceased to operate, but new ones sprang up. One of them—also in Kanpur—was established by a former national revolutionary Satya Bhakta. That circle declared itself even to be the Indian Communist Party and announced the practical steps it was taking to bring all communist groups together within the framework of one Party.¹⁹²

Such action had been taken even before Satya Bhakta by other

Communists of India.¹⁹³ And although it did not succeed, it was clear that the creation of an All-India Communist Party had become a pressing task. The Fifth Enlarged Executive of the Communist International (March-April 1925) called on the Communists of India to devote all their attention and energy to creating a solid and ideologically mature Party.¹⁹⁴ On the eve of the plenary session, on March 15, 1925, G.N. Voitinsky, Chief of the Eastern Department of the ECCI, wrote: "In India we are about to witness the creation of a Communist Party closely connected with the masses of workers and peasants." The first part of this statement is right, the second seems overoptimistic. There were still many difficulties to overcome before the Party could be formed and one of the most essential of them was just that India's workers were not prepared to accept the ideas of socialism.

In his December letters of 1922 to M.N. Roy, Singaravelu Chettiar, as Soviet Indologist M.N. Yegorova has noted, "often complains about the absence of people akin to him in spirit and the difficulties... connected with the nearly total absence of local support".¹⁹⁵ I believe these words mean just what they say and point up the low level of the class consciousness of the Madras proletariat. Just as everywhere else in the East, the first communist groups sprang up in India not in the midst of the working class at all, nor on the basis of the labour movement. However, their subsequent existence and amalgamation within a national Party of Communists hinged on an adequate base in the country's proletarian movement. Hence the quite natural desire of the first Indian Communists, whether in exile or inside India, to secure an enhancement of the class consciousness of the working class in the making, its increased pressure for organization and the transformation of the proletarian movement into a political struggle not only for national liberation but for its own social rights as well. Such problems, in the opinion of many Communists of India including Sripad Amrit Dange and Singaravelu Chettiar could be resolved within the framework of revolutionary-democratic workers' and peasants' parties. It is such parties, they believed, that could make the proletariat class-conscious, bring it nearer to accepting the ideas of socialism and in that way contribute towards incorporating workers in the communist movement and creating an all-India communist party.

The first organization of this kind, the Workers' and Peasants' Party of Hindustan, was proclaimed as an INC section by Singaravelu Chettiar, in agreement with other members of his communist group, at a mass meeting of Madras workers on May 1, 1923. The party's Manifesto had been worked out by Chettiar in co-operation with Abani Mukherjee who was in India on a Comintern mission from December 31, 1922, to March 1924. The Manifesto announced the party's goals as being the achievement of swaraj, i.e., the independence of India, and a considerable improvement of the economic condition of workers and peasants. The Manifesto contained a detailed programme of fighting for those goals.¹⁹⁶

Such parties, formed also in a number of other provinces of India, did contribute, in a way, towards bringing workers into the communist movement. However, it was up to the communist groups to resolve that problem. The workers' and peasants' parties substituted for them, as it were. Moreover, Communists were in actual practice trying to win workers' and peasants' parties over to Marxist positions. But that prevented them turning into mass organizations and, consequently, made their very existence pointless. In the end they were disbanded.

The unifying conference (constituent congress) of Communists was convened, after all, in Kanpur as late as December 1925 to finally declare the Communist Party of India established.¹⁹⁷ That important act was a result of sustained co-operation and progressive unification of two communist streams in India—internal and external. But, in point of fact, the constituent congress of the CPI was no more than the first step in the party's ideological and organizational evolution that went on for years yet.

As we have seen, a feature of the opening stage of the communist movement in the East was that it arose not only inside Asian countries but also beyond their confines, in the revolutionary communities in exile (there it happened, normally, somewhat earlier than it did at home). Later on, integrated communist parties began to be formed, usually in clandestine conditions, in the process of lasting co-operation and gradual merger of the two streams—internal and external. That is how it happened in India, China, Turkey and Iran, Korea and some other countries. The Fourth Congress of the Comintern in November

1922, found that the formation of independent communist parties "in almost all the countries of the East is a remarkable fact".¹⁹⁸

However, those parties were still weak and by no means numerous. The Communist Party of China had just a little over a hundred members in early 1922,¹⁹⁹ the Indian communist groups could not specify their strength even in 1925.²⁰⁰ The constituent congress of the Communist Party of India was attended, according to some information, by 500 delegates, while according to other sources—by 1,000 members, but those figures by no means reflected the actual membership of the communist groups because the proceedings of the Congress were open to whoever wished to attend them—it was enough to pay a small one-off contribution and to show sympathy for the ideas of socialism, Soviet Russia and Lenin.²⁰¹ The Communist Party of Iran had 1,000 people in it by the end of 1922, according to Comintern information, but only 500 of them paid their dues; and in Turkey there were 300 Party members by the same time.²⁰² Not even after holding their constituent congresses did the newborn communist parties go beyond the bounds of their circle activity. The Fourth Congress of the Comintern pointed out that "the overwhelming majority of these communist parties have yet to accomplish a great amount of internal work to get rid of dabbling, circle limitations, and many other shortcomings".²⁰³

The main difficulty of the Eastern communist parties in their opening stages consisted in that they had not yet secured a base of support among the emergent proletariat, nor could quickly overcome that major shortcoming because of a low social and economic level of the countries they operated in. In July 1922, the ECCI drew the attention of the Central Committee of the CPC to the fact that the Party "still consists predominantly of intellectuals and has no more or less appreciable contact with workers". In fact, at the time of its first two congresses the CPC still consisted only of intellectuals.²⁰⁴

In the Iranian Communist Party, things were different, at first glance. According to incomplete statistics, its membership in 1920 had 60% apprentices and workers employed in workshops, manufactories and other small businesses, 20% low-rank clerks, 17% artisans and 3% servicemen. However, Soviet Iranists S.L. Agayev and V.N. Plastun, quite correctly assessing

these figures, write: "Most of the Party membership within Iran were unprepared for political activity, having joined the ICP within one or two months following the proclamation of a Soviet Republic in Gilan in June 1920".²⁰⁵ Neither was the ICP's foreign-based membership satisfactory for it principally consisted of pauper proletarian elements and only a small number of oil workers. It is noteworthy that the Horasan-Astrabad regional ICP Conference in August 1921, considering the virtual absence of an industrial proletariat in the country, resolved to "aim not at creating a mass communist party, but [only] *preparing the hard core of the prospective mass Party*... and conducting educational work among the large masses [Emphasis added—M.P.]".²⁰⁶

The Communist Party of Turkey, which had been created shortly before that, was in about the same situation. A representative of the Propaganda and Action Council, Ephraim Esba, who had been sent to Turkey early in November 1920, wrote from Trebizond (Trabzon) on November 21 that "there are no communist organizations in Anatolia. There may be groups of sympathizers from a sprinkling of grass-roots intellectuals in two or three places. . . Isolated groups of opposition intellectuals sympathize with the Soviet system of government and communism, but they are incapable of organizing a revolutionary movement so far". In another letter, of December 23, Ephraim Esba pointed out that in Anatolia "communist organizations are weak, hardly active, as in Samsun, in particular". Esba found it possible to note only the Istanbul communist organization as one "working... seriously".

The first communist groups in India, formed in 1921-1922, as stated earlier on, could hold their constituent congress only at the very end of 1925. The attempts and projects for creating a communist party which had preceded the congress included the most indicative designs of the Bombay group of Communists which was headed by S. Dange. The Bombay Communists called for an All-India Socialist Workers' Party to be formed on two occasions, first in September 1922 and second in October 1924. Although they described the projected organization as "workers", they urged the left radical elements of the Indian National Congress, rather than the workers, to form one; they wanted the Party to struggle for the immediate interests of workers and peasants

but still considered that it had to be created within the INC framework, rather than among workers. As the Soviet Indologist, A.M. Melnikov, writes, the Bombay Communists only declared that the Party would set up organizations of workers, peasants and middle classes and establish "constant links between intellectuals and workers".²⁰⁷ In other words, the first Communists of India, even though they had already carried out a certain amount of work to study the fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism, still failed, apparently, even to imagine the possibility of a mass of workers being right within the Party. What they wanted was not so much a party of workers as one of intellectuals taking care of the workers.

The distance that originally separated the Eastern communist parties from the working class inevitably prevented the "principle of industrial units" from being applied, as the ECCI report of December 12, 1925, noted. The newly created parties everywhere consisted of territorial communist groups. Not even the CPC, working in a country with "big industrial centres", like Shanghai or Guangzhou, presented any exception to the common rule. So it is clear that the formation of communist parties was no fusion of socialism with the labour movement. It was just a major step forward in preparing the conditions for such a fusion at a later date. Eastern communist parties at first were rather fragile federations of small groups of revolutionary democratic and national revolutionary intellectuals making their way to Marxism. The first Eastern Communists had yet to negotiate a hard road to win over the working class so as to convert their communist parties, in the long run, into a genuine vanguard of the proletariat and gradually fuse socialism with the mature labour movement.

So the situation in the East was rather peculiar. The rise of the communist movement there had preceded the transformation of the proletariat into a class for itself and the development of the political struggle of the working class. The pre-capitalist conditions of the colonial East, therefore, created great natural difficulties in the way of a surging communist movement. These were due to considerable subjective difficulties—the anti-communist repressive policies of the colonizers and local authorities as well as the "infantile disorder of 'ultra-leftism'" which infected many leaders of the incipient communist movement.

Speaking at the Second Congress of the Communist International, Lenin even expressed his doubt as to the actual possibility of proletarian parties being formed in backward Eastern countries.²⁰⁸ However, he presumed that the Comintern had to form an "independent core of militants and Party organizations" there²⁰⁹ and "elements of prospective proletarian parties which will be communist not only by name".²¹⁰ Lenin knew that such elements had already appeared in the East. He was personally acquainted with many of the prospective Eastern Communists and made a good deal of effort to convince them of the fallacy of the left-sectarian tactics they usually adhered to.

So just at the turn of the 20th century, advanced revolutionary intellectuals of the East, in search of ways to deliver their countries from colonial enslavement and local despotism, came round to studying various socialist theories of the West. The Great October Revolution did much to accelerate the natural development of that process and translate it into a communist one. It was not only some of the leaders of the prewar pre-socialist movement (Li Dazhao in China, V. Chattopadhyaya in India, M. Subhi in Turkey, Haidar Khan Amougli in Iran), but also the new generation of revolutionary intellectuals who joined the national liberation struggle after the war, that found themselves attracted by the ideas of scientific communism in the context of a sweeping anti-imperialist upsurge of 1918-1923.

Members and organizers of the early communist groups and circles were, as a rule, most active in the national liberation struggle. It was by no means because they had already learned and accepted the theory of Marxism in its entirety that they were joining the communist movement. That had not yet happened. People who declared themselves partisans of Marxism and urged others to support and accept it knew little or nothing about that doctrine, as a rule. On November 5, 1920, the leaders of the Istanbul international group of Communists sent a letter to Soviet Russia's representative in Trabzon, M.P. Danilov. They asked him to help them establish contact "with the fraternal Russian proletariat" so as to "form their ideas", i.e., learn the essence of communist teachings. They explained their request in the following way: "Communism is the catchword of each revolutionary proletarian. But, unfortunately, it is so little known even

to those who can be called the propagandists of communism! A shortage of literature is a great misfortune".²¹¹ The same idea was expressed by Qu Qiubo, one of the prominent leaders of the CPC. Here is what he relates about himself and other young men of China who began to take interest in the ideas of socialism in 1919-1920: "We all felt infinite interest in discussions about socialism. However, our ideas largely resembled the views of young Russians in the 1840s".²¹² Groups of Indian revolutionaries often arrived in Tashkent via Afghanistan in 1920. At first, they usually did not know which of the groups of their fellow-countrymen existing in that city they had better join—the group of Communists, which had declared itself to be the Communist Party of India and was headed by M.N. Roy, or the Indian Revolutionary Association—a federation of a national revolutionary type headed by Abdur-Rabb Barq. A member of the group, Rafiq Ahmad, wrote later on about how one of the Indian groups which arrived in Tashkent at the end of 1920 had made its choice. "In those days", he pointed out, "we understood nothing about the Communist Party. However, we decided to work under M.N. Roy's leadership".²¹³

As I said, Asian revolutionary intellectuals, on their way to embracing Marxism, were originally not connected at all with the emergent movement of the working class, nor understood its significance as the maker of a new, socialist type of society. Even after having declared themselves Communists, many of the revolutionary democratic intellectuals snubbed workers, did not appreciate the class nature of the proletariat, often mixed it up with the mass of peasants or just poor and beggarly people, occasionally disputed the role of the proletariat in the coming revolution or saw it limited to that of a strike force. Zhang Guotao, speaking at the First (Constituent) Congress of the CPC, qualified the negative attitude of intellectuals to the working class as a serious impediment to the development of the communist movement in China. "They look upon the proletariat," he said, "as a sufficiently ignorant, poor and weak class to use in their own interest. This tendency of intellectuals to set much store by themselves while looking upon the proletariat as a negligible quantity is rather easy to note and, in consequence, it is much of a brake for the revolutionary movement among workers." That statement did not, however, stop Zhang Guotao from

claiming in a December 1922 article that neither the peasants nor the workers could be the main force of the revolution and that it was only the army and the intellectuals that were to play the decisive political role in China.²¹⁴ Mao Zedong, speaking in the debate at the Third Congress of the CPC in 1923, argued that "the workers have no political interests" and that, therefore, "a mass organization of workers, created by Communists, is impossible", and that, in general, "a revolution in China can be made only by the Russian armies which will back up our own military activities".²¹⁵ Qu Qiubo asserted on his arrival in Soviet Russia in 1920 that "the majority of the Chinese proletariat consists of peasants, and the number of workers is insignificant" and that "the majority of the Chinese workers are artisans".²¹⁶

A similar failure to understand the essence, composition and mission of the proletariat was shown by the first Communists of Iran (as Sultan-Zade or Alikhanov). Like Chinese Communists, Iranians were essentially counting on the army, intending to form one of numerous pauper or rag-tag elements whom they, to judge by all accounts, ranked among the Persian proletariat.

The attitude of Indian revolutionary democrats, on course for Marxism, to the working class has been forcefully expressed by one of the pioneers of the communist movement in India, S.A. Dange. In his book "Gandhi vs Lenin", which appeared in April 1921, he assessed the significance of workers only from the standpoint of their physical involvement in the national liberation revolution—the overriding task of the entire people of India. In that revolution, which was thought of as a series of non-violent acts by the mass of the people, the workers were to operate as the strike force that was to decide the outcome of the struggle. They were to deal the final blow at the colonizers, by calling and carrying through a general strike. "If we win", S.A. Dange surmised, "we will win only *by the help of the proletariat, i.e., the labourers and peasantry* [Emphasis added—M.P.]."²¹⁷ A characteristic position was taken up by M.N. Roy who wrote in 1920 that since the moment of subjugation of his country to the rule of British capital, 80% of its entire population had been converted to proletarians. That is to say that he, like Dange, considered all the peasantry making up the majority of the people of India to come within the class of the proletariat.

The reason why the patriotically-minded intellectuals of the

East turned to Marxism everywhere was by no means because they cared about the proletariat and its movement, which they hardly noticed, but because they looked for means to deliver their respective nations from the colonial yoke and the despotism of local rulers. The Great October Revolution demonstrated the validity of Marxism-Leninism in the struggle not only against domestic exploiters but against foreign subjugators as well. And then very many revolutionary patriotic intellectuals of the East began to pass over to Marxism. It will be no exaggeration to say that the communist movement arose in the East so early, still on precapitalist ground, just because there was a considerable number of revolutionary democrats and national revolutionaries who took great pains to find sure ways to save their peoples from colonial strangulation and did find them in Marxism-Leninism due to the Great October Revolution. Mao Zedong said that he had started his political activity after reading a book about the attempts of imperialists to carve up China. After that, he began studying literature and, in the long run, under the influence of the October Revolution, arrived at Marxism which he saw, he said later on, as the key to the national regeneration and salvation of China.

Zhang Guotao traversed a similar road on his way to Marxism. "With all of my heart and mind", he writes, "I sought a way to save my country".²¹⁸ He meant, by saying so, not only himself but China's revolutionary youth in general who were involved in a movement to bring about the nation's regeneration, create its new culture, and discard everything that was old and decrepit and that crippled their country and reduced it to such a deplorable state. Zhang Guotao writes further on that as early as 1919 Chinese revolutionary patriots arrived at the conclusion that "Marxism was the best prescription for curing China's ills".²¹⁹ He explained: "We fully recognized that it was due to the leadership of the Russian Communist Party and the revolution that Russia was able to register all of its achievements, overthrow the formidable conservative forces of the Czar, and resist alien pressure, which came from all sides. In short, Marxism had shed its brilliant rays". Hence the firm conviction that "China must follow the way of the Russian Revolution", which was, perhaps, first expressed by Chen Duxiu,²²⁰ who was one of those principally involved in forming the Communist Party of Chi-

na. Nor was he alone. Zhang Guotao writes that all "the most radically-minded intellectuals were inclined to follow the way of the Russian Revolution"²²¹. Many national revolutionaries everywhere arrived at the same conclusion. For instance, the Turkish revolutionary, B. Ferdi, recalling the road traversed, had this to say about the start of the communist movement in Turkey: "When the country's doors were opened to imperialist invaders... people of Istanbul and Anatolia as well as our compatriots who resided outside our country at the time at once formed communist groups which considered the way of the revolution followed by our Russian comrades to be the only way for our country to follow to free itself from imperialism."²²²

The way that M.N. Roy came to Marxism was rather typical of Eastern national revolutionaries. Having started his active struggle against British rule in India even before the First World War, he became a member of a clandestine revolutionary terrorist organization, "Anushilon samiti," in West Bengal. In 1915, M.N. Roy set off, on behalf of that organization, for a long trip through the countries of the Pacific to acquire arms and arrange for them to be shipped to India. In the summer of 1916 he arrived in the United States as an emissary of revolutionary nationalism. There, he for the first time began to study the works of Marx and in consequence, as he said afterwards, he embraced socialism except for its materialist philosophy. To escape persecution by American police, Roy went to Mexico. He was there at the time of the October Revolution. It produced a tremendous impression on that country's left socialist elements, M.N. Roy among them. All Mexican Left Socialists, including Roy, at once felt they wanted to become Communists. So M.N. Roy made a sudden leap from forceful nationalism to communism. Roy wrote also that his quick and relatively easy conversion was due to the attraction the Bolshevik programme on the ethnic issue had for him. In May 1920, M.N. Roy was already in Moscow, delegated to the Second Congress of the Communist International by the Mexican Communist Party which had been created in 1919 with his active participation.

A group of Indian national revolutionaries, led by Chattopadhyaya, arrived in Moscow in March 1921. Its members had been in Berlin and, for a time, in Stockholm during the First World War. For a number of years they co-operated with German im-

perialism in the hope of using it to liberate India from British imperialism. The October Revolution showed that they had better follow a different course. Many of them started passing over to Marxism, witness their arrival in Moscow for the Third Congress of the Comintern. There was a top-level dispute in the Comintern over who must be considered to represent the communist movement of India, the M.N. Roy group which had already unequivocally declared itself Communist, or the Chattopadhyaya group which had not yet definitely determined its credo. A Comintern official, K.M. Troyanovsky, who knew Indian revolutionaries in West European countries quite well because he had met with them before the revolution while in exile in Stockholm, took part in the dispute. "We", he wrote to the ECCI Minor Bureau on March 15, 1921, "have equal reason to trust or not trust politically both the Roy and the Berlin-Stockholm group because *they have all come from nationalism*. Roy's only great merit is in having been quicker to make that evolution" [Emphasis added—M.P.].²²³

It is curious enough that the efforts of the early Indian Communists to create the Communist Party were supported even by those radical nationalist elements who did not accept Marxist ideology at all. That was just what was noted in a letter of June 3, 1922 to M.N. Roy by Mohammad Ali who contacted Indian national revolutionaries in Kabul and urged them to opt for communism. "Those men", he pointed out, "had no more or less definite idea of the Russian Revolution and of the way its ideas can be effectively used in other countries. . . After I and, subsequently, Shafiq had spoken with them and set forth our ideas, they understood them. And although they did not agree with them completely, they did express their readiness to give our cause their full moral support. Since it is definitely known that our major objective at the present time is to organize a Communist Party in India, they are co-operating in every way they can in realizing this objective. . . They are not subscribing to the international aspect of our programme; the idea of nationalism is sacred to them".²²⁴ It is clear that Indian national revolutionaries, even those who were not accepting Marxism, valued the anti-imperialism of this doctrine and, therefore, were helping the Communists because they saw them as a great anti-imperialist force. This idea was remarkably expressed by Ho Chi Minh.

"At first it was my patriotism, not communism, that brought me to Lenin and the Communist International. Only gradually, by studying Marxist-Leninist theory, and through action and practical work, did I come to understand that only socialism and communism can rid the oppressed nations and working people all over the world of slavery. I saw how inseparably genuine patriotism and proletarian internationalism are bound up together".²²⁵ In fact, the communist movement in the East was profoundly patriotic in its very nature and by its very origin because it had emerged as a fusion of the most revolutionary component of the national liberation movement with Marxism-Leninism. That alone makes nonsense of the contentions of various bourgeois historians about the national liberation movement and Marxism being incompatible with each other and even hostile towards each other.

What logically attracted petty-bourgeois and bourgeois national revolutionaries (in colonies) and revolutionary democrats (in semi-colonies) everywhere in the East to Marxism was a combination of actual factors: first, their own radical anti-imperialism, anti-capitalism and anti-despotism; second, the inevitable failure of their conspiratorial and other methods of struggle which meant ignoring the mass movement of working people; third, the influence of the achievements of the international working-class and communist movement which were most forcefully demonstrated by the victory of the Great October Revolution and the construction of the Soviet state. It was quite natural in these specific historical conditions that it is the national-revolutionary and revolutionary-democratic intellectuals in Eastern countries that produced the first Communists and formed the first communist groups which gave rise to the communist movement. The working class in the East joined that movement later on, which was just as natural as it was for socialist ideology to be brought home to the proletariat from without, rather than for it to work it out on its own. That is what has actually happened in all the countries of Asia where the proletariat was just in the making, where it was still weak and had not yet developed enough to fight for socialist goals.

This demonstrates how utterly inconsistent and utterly unscientific is the claim of bourgeois historiography about the communist movement of the East having no national ground because,

supposedly, the proletariat of the backward Eastern communities could not yet be ready and, indeed, was not ready for such a movement. Such arguments were put forward in the Chinese debate on socialism back in 1920-1922 by Zhang Dunsun and Liang Qichao who initially helped their fellow intellectuals to learn about Marxism and also by John Dewey and Bertrand Russell who were in China at the time.²²⁶ However, while the opponents of socialism were at pains to invent some proof that a communist movement was unacceptable to China and that it was impossible to form a party of the proletariat there, that movement was in full swing and led to the actual formation of the Communist Party as early as 1921. And that was a perfectly natural process arising from the very ground that foreign imperialism had created in China just as in other Eastern countries. Zhang Guotao justly noted in his memoirs that the communist movement, like the Taiping Rebellion and the 1911 Revolution, were "principally brought about by the internal needs of China".²²⁷ The same internal needs were behind the rise and growth of the communist movement in India, Turkey, Iran and other countries of the oppressed East.

Consequently, the communist movement in the East, due to its anti-imperialism and under the influence of the October Revolution, arose from a sweeping upsurge of the national liberation movement, and not out of the advanced struggle of the working class (there was none as yet). It was not until sometime later that it acquired an adequate ground for itself in the movement of the proletariat which had grown as a class-conscious force in its own right. While in the advanced capitalist countries revolutionaries proceeded to Marxism from the labour movement and for the sake of labour's emancipation, in the East they followed a different route. There they passed over from the national liberation struggle to scientific communism, and only from that point on to the working class. In other words, only after having learned the fundamentals of the theory of Marxism-Leninism, in which they sought the key to salvation from the colonial yoke, did they begin to understand what the historic mission of the working class was and only then did they set course towards approaching it and turning the communist parties into genuinely proletarian ones.

The petty-bourgeois and bourgeois origin of most of the early

Communists of Asia, for all the inadequacy of their Marxist training, accounted for their outlook retaining for quite a long time the relics of revolutionary nationalism which transformed themselves into the "infantile disorder of 'ultra-leftism' ". That disorder which infected most of Asia's early Communists was to be seen in their failure to understand or their deliberate disregard for the fundamental distinctions between the social and economic conditions of independent countries under advanced or medium-developed capitalism and the backward multi-structural societies of most of the oppressed countries in the East. Accordingly, they overestimated the degree of the development of the Asian working class and its movement, denied the possibility and necessity of the coming bourgeois-democratic revolutions in Eastern countries and, consequently, rejected the principle of the right of nations to self-determination because of its supposedly bourgeois character and because even its exercise cannot at once mean realizing two objectives—those of achieving national independence and the social emancipation of working people. That is how it was, although it is this particular slogan that has quite recently brought national revolutionaries and revolutionary democrats over to Marxism. Those early Asian Communists declared themselves committed to socialist revolution and refused, for that reason, to recognize the anti-imperialist potentialities of the national bourgeoisie to be sufficient; rejected the possibility of making common cause with it even on a provisional basis and the necessity of supporting the national liberation movements because they did not pursue socialist objectives. Instead of painstaking and sustained work with the masses, they declared a reckless commitment to having revolutionary war organized from without as the initial factor of a socialist revolution. That was suggested as a way to make up for the immaturity of the working class and for its lack of preparation for carrying out its historic mission.

In short, the 'ultra-left' disorder of the early Eastern Communists consisted in mechanically following the Russian example ("following the way of the Russians"), its undialectical interpretation and disregard for the particular historical situation and the specific national circumstances of the East.

A sense of revolutionary impatience was yet another serious factor. While embracing Marxism in the name of patriotic am-

bitions, yesterday's revolutionary democrats and national revolutionaries hoped to use this new doctrine as a prescription for the *quick* accomplishment of a socialist revolution which would at once resolve that two-fold task of national and social liberation. So it is not by chance that some of them, on close examination of the teachings of Marx and Lenin, should at first have been disappointed and even considered giving up Marxism,²²⁸ since this doctrine made the revolutionaries determine their political tactics and strategy in relation to the social and economic conditions of their respective countries, while those conditions held out no promise whatsoever for a *quick and simultaneous* solution of the issues that agitated their minds.

Apparently, it was natural that the rapid conversion of national revolutionaries to the new Party could not be matched by just as quick and complete reshaping of their ideological and political views. So the left revolutionary outlook of the early Eastern Communists, while expressing their petty-bourgeois and bourgeois origin, was at the same time a form of transition of national revolutionaries from revolutionary nationalism to Marxism. It was a long and involved process for them to overcome the disorder —of "ultra-leftism" as it was for the new followers of Marxism in the East to learn this science adequately. Lenin wrote that backward economic relationships handicapped the Marxist education of revolutionaries who, under such circumstances, were not normally capable of learning Marxism to perfection and making "a determined break with all the traditions of the bourgeois world outlook".²²⁹ Zhang Guotao recalled, for instance, that China's first Communists, committed as they were to the idea of national liberation, "could not understand Marx's statement that the worker has no homeland" any more than they could understand the connection between a socialist revolution, which they considered to be the only essential thing, and a national democratic revolution.²³⁰ Many of the early Communists at first could not see at all why the East, where there were so many poor and dispossessed people, was less prepared for a proletarian revolution than the West. In fact, the delegation of the Bukhara Communist Party to the Third Congress of the Comintern, objecting to having been limited to non-voting powers, pointed out in a special message to the Congress that Bukhara was a "prominent and important bulwark of proletarian revolution

in the East" since it had a large number of "still surviving relics of primitive communism".²³¹

The left sectarian views of the early Communists of the backward, pre-capitalist East were generally natural just as it was natural that even in Germany in the 19th century, as Lenin said, "transitional, mixed and eclectic views between petty-bourgeois and proletarian socialism... predominated".²³² It was likewise natural for the Eastern communist parties to have few members originally, to be weak, to be out of touch with the working class for a time, and to be confined to circle activity for a relatively long period. All that, including the "left mistakes", as Lenin qualified the left sectarian views of the early Eastern Communist,²³³ constituted the teething troubles of the communist movement that was arising in Asia.

Lenin and the Comintern did all they could to help the early Communists overcome the failures and weaknesses of the movement. They called on Eastern Communists not only to back up the national liberation struggle of their peoples, but also to get most actively involved by all means in that struggle, and urged them to co-operate with all forces, including bourgeois forces, in action against imperialism and to create a united anti-imperialist front. At the same time they were required to preserve the ideological and organizational independence of the communist parties, to teach Communists to realize the particular priorities before them and to train them so that they could (in the long run not "from the outset", as M.N. Roy believed), put themselves at the head of the national liberation struggle of their respective peoples. One thing that was of particular importance for overcoming the left sectarian outlook of the early Eastern Communists was Lenin's criticism and correction, at the Second Congress of the Comintern, of the patently ultra-left so-called Supplementary Theses on the National and Colonial Questions presented by M.N. Roy.²³⁴ In that way, Lenin taught the budding Communists to identify their programme and base their activities on a scientific knowledge of the life of Asian nations and a Marxist understanding of social processes, rather than on the insecure ground of revolutionary self-will.

Advancing as it did in the direction indicated by Lenin and by the Comintern, the emergent communist movement in the East was surely, if slowly and painstakingly, overcoming its ail-

ments. Nowadays, after the collapse of the colonial system, the communist parties have become an important factor of societal development in most of the countries of Asia and Africa where they are leading the struggle of their respective peoples against the neocolonialism and imperialist Powers, for strengthening political sovereignty and achieving economic independence and for preparing the conditions for their countries to switch over to the track of non-capitalist development. In a number of the newly-free countries, the communist parties are the ruling parties in control of the process of progressive change.

- ¹ David N. Druhe, *Soviet Russia and Indian Communism, 1917-1947* (with an Epilogue Covering the Situation Today), Bookman Associates, New York, 1959, p. 53.
- ² John Patrick Haithcox, *Communism and Nationalism in India. M.N. Roy and Comintern Policy 1920-1939*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1971, p. 29.
- ³ *Indian Communist Party Documents 1930-1956* (with an Introduction by V.B. Karnik), The Democratic Research Service, Bombay, The Institute of Pacific Relations, New York, 1957, p. VII.
- ⁴ Schapour Ravasani, *Sowjetrepublik Gilan. Die sozialistische Bewegung in Iran seit Ende des 19th. bis 1922*, Druck AMS—Druck Berlin, Rechte beim Basis—Verlag, Berlin, p. 267.
- ⁵ *Documents on Communism, Nationalism, and Soviet Advisers in China. 1918-1927* (with an Introductory Essay by C. Martin Wilbur and Julie Lien-ying How), Columbia University Press, New York, 1956, p. 463.
- ⁶ See Arnold J. Toynbee, *A Study of History* (Abridgement of volumes VII-X) by D.C. Somervell, Oxford University Press, New York, London, 1957.
- ⁷ See T.N. Akatova, "Specific Aspects of the Formation of the Working Class in China" *May 4 Movement*, Moscow, 1971, pp. 102, 103 (in Russian).
- ⁸ See Jawaharlal Nehru, *The Discovery of India*, The John Day Company, New York, 1946, p. 356.
- ⁹ See T.F. Devyatkina, "The Impact of the October Revolution on the National Liberation Movement in India (1918-1922)", *The Great October Revolution and Oriental Nations*, Moscow, 1957, p. 275 (in Russian).
- ¹⁰ Frederick Engels, "The Condition of the Working-Class in England", Vol. 4, p. 308.
- ¹¹ Quoted in: L.P. Delyusin, "Qu Qiubo and Peng Shuzhi on the Problems of the Chinese Revolution", in: *Revolution of 1925-1927 in China*, Moscow, 1978, p. 82 (in Russian).
- ¹² Jawaharlal Nehru, *Glimpses of World History*, The John Day Company, New York, 1942, p. 717

- ¹³ Jawaharlal Nehru, *The Discovery of India*, p. 356.
- ¹⁴ See *The May 4 Movement of 1919 in China. Documents and Records*, Moscow, 1969, pp. 200, 88 (in Russian).
- ¹⁵ See "The Chinese Communist Party at the Third Congress of the Comintern (Report of the Chinese Delegation)", *Narody Dalnego Vostoka*, No. 3, 1921, p. 332.
- ¹⁶ See E.N. Komarov, "Afterword"; in: S.A. Dange, *The Origin of the Trade Union Movement in India*, Moscow, 1979 p. 104 (in Russian).
- ¹⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 51, 27.
- ¹⁸ S.G. Sardesai, *India and the Russian Revolution*, Communist Party Publication, New Delhi, 1967, p. 37.
- ¹⁹ For details on the Green Army see further on.
- ²⁰ See A.D. Novichev, "The Working-Class and Socialist Movement in Istanbul in the Years of the National Liberation Struggle (1918-1923)", in: *Problems of the History of the National Liberation Movement in the Countries of Asia*, Leningrad, 1963, pp. 116-121; R.P. Korniyenko, *The Labour Movement in Turkey. 1918-1963*, Moscow, 1965, pp. 16-19, 35-36, 38-39 (both in Russian).
- ²¹ *International Press Correspondence*, 12th December 1928, Vol. 8, No. 88, Special Number, pp. 1659-1676; No. 8, p. 1225, 29th Session, August 14, 1928.
- ²² *Kommunist* (Baku), December 15, 1920, p. 3. Here and hereinafter square brackets are by the present author.
- ²³ K. Kharnsky, "A Review of the Political and Economic Life of China", *Narody Dalnego Vostoka* (Irkutsk), No. 2, 1921, p. 159 (in Russian). K.A. Kharnsky is the author of the first Marxist essay on the history of China.
- ²⁴ V.I. Lenin, "The Second Congress of the Communist International", Vol. 31, pp. 242-243.
- ²⁵ Quoted in: P. Mif, *The Chinese Communist Party in Times of Crisis*, Moscow, 1928, p. 267 (in Russian).
- ²⁶ See M.A. Persits, "The Preparatory Stage of the Communist Movement in the East", in: *The Revolutionary Process in the East. History and Modernity*, Moscow, 1982, pp. 38-77 (in Russian).
- ²⁷ See *Documents of the Foreign Policy of the USSR* Vol. 1, Moscow, 1957, pp. 11-15, 34-35 (in Russian).
- ²⁸ V.I. Lenin, "Speech at a Plenary Meeting of the Moscow Soviet of Workers' and Peasants' Deputies. February 28, 1921", Vol. 32, p. 147.
- ²⁹ See Kemal Atatürk, *Selected Speeches and Statements*, Moscow, 1966, p. 272 (in Russian).
- ³⁰ Quoted in: A.M. Shamsutdinov, *National Liberation Struggle in Turkey*, Moscow, 1966, p. 57 (in Russian).
- ³¹ See F.I. Shabshina, *The Popular Uprising of 1919 in Korea*, Moscow, 1958, pp. 83-84, 206-207 (in Russian).
- ³² *Ibid.*, p. 140.
- ³³ *The May 4 Movement in China*, pp. 48, 49.
- ³⁴ Sun Yatsen, *Selected Works*, 1964, p. 334 (in Russian).
- ³⁵ See V.P. Ilyushechkin, "The May 4 Movement and Its Historical

- Significance" in: *The May 4 Movement*, Moscow, 1971, p. 15 et al. (in Russian).
- ³⁶ Li Dazhao, *Selected Articles and Speeches*, Moscow, 1965, pp. 59, 66-67 (in Russian).
- ³⁷ Sun Yatsen, *Selected Works*, p. 336 (in Russian).
- ³⁸ Jawaharlal Nehru, *Glimpses of World History*, pp. 712, 717, 721.
- ³⁹ Mustafa Kemal, *The Way of New Turkey*, Vol. II, Moscow, 1932, p. 167 (in Russian).
- ⁴⁰ Sun Yatsen, *Selected Works*, pp. 401.
- ⁴¹ Li Dazhao, "My Marxist Outlook", *Rabochii klass i sovremenny mir*, No. 2, 1971, p. 92 (in Russian). For the date of writing of this article by Li Dazhao see K.V. Shevelev, *From the History of the Formation of the Communist Party of China*, Moscow, 1976 (manuscript), p. 39 (in Russian).
- ⁴² *Narody Dalnego Vostoka*, No. 3, 1921, p. 326.
- ⁴³ See A.V. Raikov, *National Revolutionary Organizations in India in the Struggle for Freedom*, Moscow, 1979, pp. 14-22 (in Russian); M.A. Persits, *India Revolutionaries in Soviet Russia. Mainstays of the Communist Movement in the East*, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1983, pp. 18, 19.
- ⁴⁴ See A.D. Novichev, *The Working-Class and Socialist Movement in Istanbul in the Years of the National Liberation Struggle (1918-1923)*, pp. 107-108.
- ⁴⁵ See Y.M. Garushyants, "The Struggle of the Chinese Marxists for the Creation of the Communist Party of China", *Narody Azii i Afriki*, No. 1, 1961, p. 89.
- ⁴⁶ For details see M.A. Persits, *Revolutionaries of India in Soviet Russia*.
- ⁴⁷ See Y. Kostin, "Two Chinese Perceptions of the October Revolution", *Narody Azii i Afriki*, No. 5, 1967, p. 79.
- ⁴⁸ Qu Qiubo, *Essays and Articles*, Moscow, 1959, pp. 40, 45, 51. See also: *Bulletins of the Far Eastern Secretariat of the Comintern*, No. 1, February 27, 1921, p. 15 (both in Russian).
- ⁴⁹ *The First Congress of the Revolutionary Organizations of the Far East Collected Records*, Petrograd, 1922, p. 202 (in Russian).
- ⁵⁰ See M.I. Gubelman, "In Those Unforgettable Years", *Voprosy istorii KPSS*, No. 10, 1967, p. 135.
- ⁵¹ See M.I. Sladkovsky, "The Significance of Proletarian Internationalism in the Formation and Activities of the CPC", *Far Eastern Affairs*, No. 3, 1981.
- ⁵² Y. Kostin, "Two Chinese Perceptions of the October Revolution", p. 83.
- ⁵³ N.N. Timofeeva, "The Communist University of the Toilers of the East", *Narody Azii i Afriki*, No. 5, 1979, p. 37.
- ⁵⁴ V.I. Lenin, "Eighth Congress of the RCP(B)", Vol. 29, p. 161.
- ⁵⁵ *The First Congress of the Communist International*, Petrograd, 1921, p. 93 (in Russian).
- ⁵⁶ *Narody Dalnego Vostoka*, No. 2, 1921, p. 176.

- ⁵⁷ CPA IML, s. 17, r. 65, f. 322, p. 8, and also s. 17, r. 13, f. 905, p. 2 f.v.
- ⁵⁸ *Bulletins of the Far Eastern Secretariat of the Comintern*, No. 5, April 24, 1921 (in Russian).
- ⁵⁹ CPA IML, s. 122, r. 1, f. 29, p. 261.
- ⁶⁰ In the text: "nuclei".
- ⁶¹ *Ibid.*, s. 122, r. 1, f. 29, pp. 261-164.
- ⁶² *Ibid.*, s. 122, r. 1, f. 29, p. 268.
- ⁶³ *Kommunist* (Baku), September 1, 1920, p. 5.
- ⁶⁴ For details see N.N. Timofeyeva, *The Communist University of the Toilers of the East*; see also A.V. Pantsov's article in the present book.
- ⁶⁵ *Bulletins of the Far Eastern Secretariat of the Comintern*, No. 5, April 24, 1921, p. 2 (in Russian).
- ⁶⁶ See M.A. Persits, *Revolutionaries of India in Soviet Russia*.
- ⁶⁷ See *Documents of the History of the Communist Party of India*, ed. by G. Adhikari, Vol. 1 (1917-1922), People's Publishing House, New Delhi, 1971, p. 229.
- ⁶⁸ See V.A. Vodnev, "Mustafa Subhi's Early Political Activities", *Narody Azii i Afriki*, No. 5, 1982, pp. 119-123; Yuri Rozaliyev, "Mustafa Subhi—Revolutionary and Internationalist," *Asia and Africa Today*, No. 5, 1983, Sept.-October pp. 46-48. M.A. Persits, "Turkish Internationalists in Russia," *Narody Azii i Afriki*, No. 5, 1976, pp. 59-67; *The Awakening of Oppressed Nations*, Moscow, 1968, p. 67 (in Russian).
- ⁶⁹ *Narody Azii i Afriki*, No. 5, 1976, p. 62.
- ⁷⁰ CPA IML, s. 17, r. 4, f. 109, p. 3 f.v., p. 6 f.v..
- ⁷¹ CPA IML, s. 17, r. 4, f. 109, p. 13.
- ⁷² *Ibidem*.
- ⁷³ See M. Shakhtakhtinsky, "Turkish Revolutionaries on the 'Heroes' of Ganja and Karabakh", *Kommunist* (Baku), June 29, 1920, p. 2 (in Russian).
- ⁷⁴ CPA IML, s. 17, r. 4, f. 109, p. 6.
- ⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 12.
- ⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 12 f.v.
- ⁷⁷ See CPA IML, s. 122, r. 1, f. 29, p. 264 f.v..
- ⁷⁸ See A.M. Matveyev, G.B. Nikolskaya, "Foreign Nationals in the Communist Party of Turkestan (1918-1920)", *Scientific Papers of the Tajik State University*, 238th Issue, p. 38 (in Russian).
- ⁷⁹ See CPA IML, s. 122, r. 1, f. 29, p. 264 f.v..
- ⁸⁰ *Ibidem*.
- ⁸¹ *Kommunistichesky International*, No. 14, 1920, p. 2890 (in Russian).
- ⁸² See *Izvestia* (Tashkent), March 25 and 26, 1920 (in Russian).
- ⁸³ *Izvestia* (Tashkent), March 31, 1920.
- ⁸⁴ SACSA, s. 110, r. 1, f. 74, pp. 320-321.
- ⁸⁵ See M.A. Persits, "Revolutionary Chinese Organizations on the Territory of the Far Eastern Republic and Sun Yatsen," in: *Sun Yat-*

- sen, 1866-1966. *Collected Articles, Reminiscences and Records*. Moscow, 1966, pp. 356-363 (in Russian).
- ⁸⁶ See V.M. Ustinov, "Chinese Communist Organizations in Soviet Russia (1918-1920)", in: *Chinese Volunteers in Battles for Soviet Power*, Moscow, 1961, p. 42 (in Russian).
- ⁸⁷ See K.V. Shevelev, *For the History of the Formation of the Communist Party of China*, p. 74 (in Russian).
- ⁸⁸ Originally, the author of this article held a different view. See M.A. Persits, "Eastern Internationalists in Russia and Some Questions of the National Liberation Movement (1918-July 1920)", *The Comintern and the East*, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1979, pp. 77-78.
- ⁸⁹ In Soviet documents in Russian, the name of this man, apparently hailing from Guangzhou, was usually transcribed as Ang Nenghak.
- ⁹⁰ *Kommunist* (Baku), August 27, 1920, p. 1.
- ⁹¹ Evidently, it is just on account of the author's oversight that this document refers only to the nationalization of the property of foreign vested interests. In his other projects, An Lunghe invariably insists that the Chinese people must be free from oppression by any bourgeoisie, whether foreign or national.
- ⁹² CPA IML, s. 489, r. 1, f. 96, p. 2.
- ⁹³ See "The Chinese Communist Party at the Third Congress of the Comintern", *Narody Dalnego Vostoka*, No. 3, 1921, pp. 321-336; M.A. Persits, "From the History of the Evolution of the Communist Party of China (a Report Prepared by Zhang Tailei for the Third Congress of the Comintern as Historical Back-Ground)", *Narody Azii i Afriki*, No. 4, 1971, pp. 47-58 (both in Russian).
- ⁹⁴ *The Chinese Communist Party at the Third Congress of the Comintern*, p. 324 (in Russian).
- ⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 331.
- ⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 335-336.
- ⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 329-331.
- ⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 324.
- ⁹⁹ *Bulletins of the Far Eastern Secretariat of the Comintern*, No. 1, February 27, 1921, p. 18 (in Russian).
- ¹⁰⁰ Estimated from figures in *Narody Dalnego Vostoka* (Irkutsk), No. 2, 1921, pp. 212-217.
- ¹⁰¹ See M.T. Kim, *Korean Internationalists in Battles for Soviet Power*, Moscow, 1981, p. 15 (in Russian).
- ¹⁰² Jishun Pak (Pak Din Shun), "The Socialist Movement in Korea", *Kommunistichesky International*, No. 7-8, 1919, p. 1173.
- ¹⁰³ CPA IML, s. 17, r. 65, f. 322, p. 102.
- ¹⁰⁴ B. Shumyatsky, "The Communist International in the Far East", *Narody Dalnego Vostoka*, No. 1, 1921, pp. 67-68.
- ¹⁰⁵ See *Narody Dalnego Vostoka*, No. 2, 1921, pp. 187, 256.
- ¹⁰⁶ See G.F. Kim, *The Working Class of Korea in the Revolutionary Movement and Socialist Development*, Moscow, 1965, pp. 91-93 (in Russian).
- ¹⁰⁷ *Narody Dalnego Vostoka*, No. 2, 1921, pp. 220-211.

- ¹⁰⁸ Ibid., pp. 198-199.
- ¹⁰⁹ Ibid., p. 202.
- ¹¹⁰ Ibid., p. 200.
- ¹¹¹ See V.I. Lenin, "The Second Congress of the Communist International", Vol. 31, pp. 241-242.
- ¹¹² See, for instance, the theses presented to the Congress on the national colonial policy of Japan in Korea (*Narody Dalnego Vostoka*, No 1, 1921, pp. 85-86).
- ¹¹³ *Narody Dalnego Vostoka*, No. 2, 1921, p. 220.
- ¹¹⁴ Ibid., p. 227.
- ¹¹⁵ Ibid., p. 237.
- ¹¹⁶ Ibid., p. 239.
- ¹¹⁷ Ibid., p. 257.
- ¹¹⁸ See M.A. Persits, *Revolutionaries of India in Soviet Russia*, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1983, pp. 37-96.
- ¹¹⁹ See *Izvestia (Tashkent)*, May 7, 1920 (in Russian).
- ¹²⁰ *The Party Archives of the Uzbek Republic*, s. 60, r. 1, f. 194, p. 2 (in Russian).
- ¹²¹ See *Volya Truda*, November 30, 1918, p. 3.
- ¹²² See *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States. 1919, Russia, United States*, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, 1937, pp. 190-191, 193.
- ¹²³ Quoted in: Y. Kostin, "Two Chinese Perceptions of the October Revolution", *Narody Azii i Afriki*, No. 5, 1967, p. 78.
- ¹²⁴ Quoted in: Turkey. *The Main Economic-Political Report (No. 1)*, Moscow, January 1, 1922, p. 84 (ORSCA, s. 5402, r. 1, f. 546).
- ¹²⁵ See A.M. Shamsutdinov, *The National Liberation Struggle in Turkey*, p. 151; R.P. Korniyenko, *The Labour Movement in Turkey. 1918-1963*, Moscow, 1965, p. 16 (both in Russian).
- ¹²⁶ See A.D. Novichev, *The Working-Class and Socialist Movement in Istanbul in the Years of the National Liberation Struggle (1918-1923)*, pp. 111-112.
- ¹²⁷ See R.P. Korniyenko, "The Origin of the Communist Movement in Turkey (1918-1920)", in: *The Great October Revolution and Turkey*, Tbilisi, 1982, pp. 28-29 (in Russian).
- ¹²⁸ See ORSCA, s. 5402, r. 1, f. 533, p. 1.
- ¹²⁹ See R.P. Korniyenko, *The Labour Movement in Turkey. 1918-1963*, pp. 23-24.
- ¹³⁰ CPA IML, s. 583, r. 1, f. 170, p. 2.
- ¹³¹ R.P. Korniyenko, *The Origin of the Communist Movement in Turkey, 1918-1920*, pp. 29-31.
- ¹³² See *The Constitution of the Green Army* (ORSCA, s. 5402, r. 1, f. 546, pp. 98-102; A.M. Shamsutdinov, *The National Liberation Struggle in Turkey. 1918-1923*, pp. 140-149, 154.
- ¹³³ See *Information about the Trials of Communists in Ankara* (ORSCA, s. 5402, r. 1, f. 540, pp. 7, 9—in Russian).
- ¹³⁴ See R.P. Korniyenko, *The Origin of the Communist Movement in Turkey (1918-1920)*, p. 31.

- 135 ORSCA, s. 5402, r. 1, f. 540, p. 10.
- 136 Ibid., p. 15.
- 137 See A. M. Shamsutdinov, *The National Liberation Struggle in Turkey. 1918-1923*, p. 158.
- 138 *Kommunist* (Baku), September 13, 1920, p. 4.
- 139 Ibidem.
- 140 See *The Programme of the Turkish Communist Party* (in old Turkish), Baku, 1920. Translated by Mamed Shakhtakhtinsky.
- 141 ORSCA, s. 5402, r. 1, f. 53, p. 2.
- 142 A.Y. Skachko, *Report on the Central Committee of the CPT and Its Performance Submitted to the Propaganda and Action Council of the Peoples of the East in October or November 1920* (see: ORSCA, s. 5402, r. 1, f. 53, p. 4, in Russian).
- 143 ORSCA, s. 5402, r. 1, f. 561, pp. 1-6.
- 144 Ibid., p. 5.
- 145 See *Kommunist* (Baku), September 13, 1920, p. 4.
- 146 CPA IML, s. 583, r. 1, f. 170, p. 2.
- 147 *Kommunist* (Baku), September 15, 1920.
- 148 From the speech by Mustafa Subhi at the First Congress of the CPT—quoted in: A.M. Shamsutdinov, *The National Liberation Struggle in Turkey 1918-1923*, p. 159.
- 149 M. Torabi, *Geistesgeschichtlicher Ursprung, Klassenbasis und organisatorische Ausformung der kommunistischen Bewegung im Iran*, Münster, 1977, pp. 200-201.
- 150 ORSCA, s. 130, r. 4, f. 464, p. 102.
- 151 ORSCA, s. 130, r. 4, f. 464, p. 91.
- 152 See M. Torabi, pp. 207-208.
- 153 See *Kommunist* (Baku), July 12, 1920, p. 3.
- 154 ORSCA, S. 5402, r. 1, f. 156, p. 40.
- 155 Ibid., p. 46.
- 156 Programme of the Persian Communist Party (Bolsheviks), adopted by the Party's First Congress, June 23-25, 1920, p. 6 (in Russian).
- 157 Theses of the Executive Committee of the Comintern on Work in Persia. *Persia. Main Economic and Political Report, No. 1*, Moscow, January 1, 1922 (ORSCA, s. 5402, r. 1, f. 522, pp. 129, 126, 127).
- 158 Zhang Guotao, *The Rise of the Chinese Communist Party. 1921-1927*, Vol. 1, Lawrence-Manhattan-Wichita, 1971, pp. 121-122, 88, 92, 136.
- 159 See L.P. Delyusin, *Dispute about Socialism. From the History of the Social and Political Thought of China in the Early 1920s*, Moscow, 1962, p. 23 (in Russian).
- 160 See A.G. Krymov (Guo Shaotang), *Social Thought and Ideological Battle in China in 1917-1927. Autosynopsis of a Doctoral Dissertation*, Moscow, 1962, p. 23 (in Russian).
- 161 Zhang Guotao, *The Rise of the Chinese Communist Party. 1921-1927*, Vol. One of the Autobiography of Zhang Guotao, The University Press of Kansas, Lawrence, Manhattan, Wichita, 1971, p. 111. Zhang Guotao may well have been mistaken, and in reality the Shanghai and Beijing circles had been formed earlier on. Zhang Tailei

maintains in the report to the Third Congress of the Comintern, written in June 1921, that it happened in May 1920 (see *Narody Dalnego Vostoka*, No. 3, 1921, p. 333).

¹⁶² See *Report by the Delegate of the Chinese Communist Party, Comrade Zhang Tailei, to the Third Congress of the Communist International* (CPA IML, S. 372, r. 1, F. 434, p. 11 (in Russian)).

¹⁶³ I say "apparently" because Zhang Guotao cites evidence which is somewhat different from Zhang Tailei's communications. In his memoirs, Zhang Guotao maintains that communist circles were also created in Jinan as well as by Mao Zedong in Changsha. Besides, he writes that it was only Young Socialist League branches, not communist groups, that were organized in Tianjin, Hanjing, Hangzhou, Wuhu, Anqin, Chegdu and Chengqing (pp. 128, 132). The first part of these claims appears to be true to fact. It may be recalled, of course, that the First Congress of the CPC (July 23-August 5, 1921) was attended only by delegates from Communist circles, and, indeed, not even from all of them. Since Jinan and Changsha were represented at that Congress, communist groups must be presumed to have existed in those cities. Mao Zedong could hardly have been present at the Congress as a delegate from the Changsha communist circle if there had been none. Yet, the rest of Zhang Guotao's statement cannot be accepted in full, at least, with respect to Tianjin. There is a document whereby a Comintern representative, Rumyantsev, reported to the ECCI on April 5, 1921 that "Comrade Zhang Tailei of the Tianjin Organization of Chinese Communists has been confirmed" as China's representative in the Far Eastern Secretariat of the Comintern (Zhang Tailei was in Irkutsk at the time). Now for Chongqing. The 'Report on the Chongqing Communist Organization in Jiehuang' (See *The First Congress of the Revolutionary Organizations of the Far East. Collected Documents*, Petrograd, 1922, pp. 202, 203, in Russian) indicated that the communist circle in Chongqing (Sichuan Province) was created as early as March 1920. This date may be mistaken, yet it is clear that the Chongqing communist group existed by the time of the First Congress of the CPC, and was also supposed to send its representative to the Congress. In any event, H. Maring, reporting the rise of the communist movement in China to the ECCI on September 4, 1921, wrote about the Shanghai centre headed by Chen Duxiu: "A small group spreading [propaganda of Marxism] in eight places [Emphasis added—M.P.]". Zhang Tailei referred to seven communist groups. Perhaps, by the end of 1921, Maring had fuller information and the Congress was attended by a representative of Chongqing as the 13th delegate from the eighth circle.

¹⁶⁴ *Report to the Executive Committee of the Comintern on the Organization and Activities of the Eastern Nationalities Section of the Siberian Bureau of the Central Committee of the RCP(B)*. Even before the Eastern Nationalities Section was formed in July 1920, Soviet communist organizations of a number of cities of the Far East and

Eastern Siberia had established their own contacts with revolutionaries in China and Korea, with Comintern permission.

¹⁶⁵ See Zhang Guotao, *op. cit.*, p. 128.

¹⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 119, 120.

¹⁶⁷ See *The Recent History of China. 1917-1927*, Moscow, 1983, p. 81; A.I. Kartunova, *The Policy of the Communist Party of China on the Labour Issue on the Eve of the Revolution of 1925-1927*, Moscow, 1983, pp. 40-41 (both in Russian).

¹⁶⁸ A.I. Kartunova, *The Policy of the Communist Party of China on the Labour Issue*. . . pp. 38-39.

¹⁶⁹ An account of the conference was given by Zhang Tailei, who made a report on communist work in China at a meeting of the Far Eastern Secretariat of the Comintern in late in March 1921, i.e., almost immediately upon his arrival in Russia. In any event, as early as March 27, 1921. B. Shumyatsky cabled to the ECCI that "the Party organizers who have arrived from Shanghai have made a circumstantial report on the work carried out in China as well as on the state of the organization and the measures to be taken in the near future". It was also reported that "an additional report will be submitted to the Comintern because of its great interest".

Zhang Tailei arrived in Irkutsk, apparently, on March 21. On the following day, the Organizing Bureau of the Far Eastern Secretariat of the Comintern confirmed him as Secretary of the Chinese Section, and on March 23, he was officially put on the roll of the Far Eastern Secretariat of the Comintern and attached for administration to the Fifth Army Political Department. I think that Zhang Tailei could not have known so much about the conference and given so detailed an account of it if the conference had taken place after his departure from China for Irkutsk (See B. Shumyatsky, "From the History of the Young Communist League and the Communist Party of China," *Revolyutsionnyi Vostok*, No. 4, 1928, pp. 204, 213 et al; M.A. Persits, "From the History of the Evolution of the Communist Party of China", *Narody Azii i Afriki*, No. 4, 1971, Moscow, pp. 47-51; "The Chinese Communist Party at the Third Congress of the Comintern," *The Peoples of the Far East*, No. 3, 1921, pp. 321-336 (all in Russian).

¹⁷⁰ See M.A. Persits, "From the History of the Evolution of the Communist Party of China", p. 51; K.V. Shevelev, "From the History of the Formation of the Communist Party of China", *Far Eastern Affairs*, No 5, 1980, pp. 152-153; Ciu Laozhen "Before and After the Formation of the Communist Party of China" (published by Y. Garushyants), *Rabochii klass i sovremennost'*, No. 2, 1971, p. 122 (all in Russian).

¹⁷¹ See: an unsigned note on the First Congress of the CPC "The Congress of the Communist Party of China", *Narody Azii i Afriki*, No. 6, 1972, p. 153.

¹⁷² See K.V. Shevelev, *From the History of the Formation of the Communist Party of China* (manuscript), pp. 126-127 (in Russian).

- ¹⁷² In my article "From the History of the Evolution of the Communist Party of China" (p. 57), this phrase was mistakenly attributed to a delegate of Guangzhou Communists for which I offer my apologies to the readers and my gratitude to K.V. Shevelev who noticed the error.
- ¹⁷⁴ Quoted in: K.V. Shevelev, *From the History of the Formation of the Communist Party of China* (manuscript), p. 122.
- ¹⁷⁵ See V.I. Glunin, "The Comintern and the Rise of the Communist Movement in China", *The Comintern and the East*, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1979, p. 284.
- ¹⁷⁶ See Y.M. Garushyants, "Liu Shaoqi: Starting Out", *The Fourteenth Scientific Conference on "Society and the State in China". Theses and Reports*, 1983, p. 230 (in Russian).
- ¹⁷⁷ N.N. Timofeeva, *The Communist University of Working People of the East*, p. 37 (in Russian).
- ¹⁷⁸ V.N. Glunin, "Pressing for a United National Front in China", *Far Eastern Affairs*, No. 4.
- ¹⁷⁹ Ciu Laozhen, *Before and After the Formation of the Communist Party of China*, p. 120 (in Russian).
- ¹⁸⁰ Quoted in: Y. Kostin, "Two Chinese Perceptions of the October Revolution", *Narody Azii i Afriki*, No. 5, 1967, p. 83 (in Russian).
- ¹⁸¹ For details see A.V. Raikov, *National Revolutionary Organizations of India in Battle for Freedom*, pp. 202-213 (in Russian).
- ¹⁸² Quoted in: T.F. Devyatkina, M.N. Yegorova, A.M. Melnikov, *The Origin of the Communist Movement in India*, Moscow, 1978, p. 156 (in Russian).
- ¹⁸³ See *ibidem*.
- ¹⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 162-163
- ¹⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 86, 155-156.
- ¹⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 164-168.
- ¹⁸⁷ See A.V. Raikov, *National Revolutionary Organizations of India in Battle for Freedom*, pp. 204, 205.
- ¹⁸⁸ Muzaffar Ahmad, *Myself and the Communist Party of India*, Calcutta, 1968, p. 78.
- ¹⁸⁹ Muzaffar Ahmad, *The Communist Party of India and Its Formation Abroad*, National Book Agency Private Limited, Calcutta, 1962, pp. 40-54; S.M. Mehdi, *The Story Behind "Moscow-Tashkent Conspiracy Case"*, Charajit Singh Pasricha, Proprietor, Punjabi Publishers, New Delhi, 1967, pp. 3-4.
- ¹⁹⁰ See *Recent History of India*, Moscow, 1959, p. 161. (in Russian).
- ¹⁹¹ See *Two Years of Fighting and Working. A Review of the Performance of the Executive Committee and Sections of the Comintern from the IV to V Congress*, Moscow, 1924, p. 70 (in Russian).
- ¹⁹² See A.B. Reznikov, *The Strategy and Tactics of the Communist International on the National and Colonial Question*, Moscow, 1978, pp. 174-175 (in Russian).
- ¹⁹³ See *ibid.*, p. 176
- ¹⁹⁴ See G.N. Voitinsky, "The Colonial Question at an Enlarged E.C.C.I.

- Session", *The Communist International*, No. 4, 1925, p. 66 (in Russian).
- 191 T.F. Devyatkina, M.N. Yegorova, A.M. Melnikov, *The Origin of the Communist Movement in India*, p. 218 (in Russian).
- 192 See *ibid.*, pp. 229-231.
- 193 For details see *ibid.*, pp. 285-306; A.B. Reznikov, *The Strategy and Tactics of the Communist International on the National and Colonial Question*, pp. 174-176; A.M. Melnikov, L.V. Mitrokhin, "The First Indian Communist Conference and the Founding of the Communist Party of India", *Questions of History*, 1973 (in Russian).
- 194 See V.I. Lenin and the *Communist International*, Moscow, 1970, p. 474 (in Russian).
- 195 See T.N. Akatova, *The Role of the National Factor in the Labour Movement of China. 1919-1927. The Revolution of 1925-1927 in China*, Moscow, 1978, p. 138 (in Russian).
- 200 This follows from the CCCI Report of December 12, 1925 On the Development of the Communist Movement.
- 201 See *New Age*, February 6, 1966, Vol. XIV, No. 6, New Delhi.
- 202 CPA IML, s. 491, r. 1, f. 338, p. 1.
- 203 V.I. Lenin and the *Communist International*, p. 474 (in Russian).
- 204 See V.A. Krivtsov, V.A. Krasnova, *Li Dazhao. From Revolutionary Democratism to Marxism-Leninism*, Moscow, 1978, p. 125 (in Russian).
- 205 S.A. Agayev, V.N. Plastun, *The Communist and National Liberation Movement in Iran in the 1920s. The Comintern and the East. A Critique of the Critique*, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1981, p. 286.
- 206 See *Persia. Main Economic and Political Report No. 1*, Moscow, January 1, 1922 (ORSCA, s. 5402, r. 1, f. 522, p. 124) (in Russian).
- 207 T.F. Devyatkina, M.N. Yegorova, A.M. Melnikov, *The Origin of the Communist Movement in India*, p. 263 (in Russian).
- 208 See V.I. Lenin, "The Report to the Commission on the National and the Colonial Questions, July 26", Vol. 31, pp. 241-242.
- 209 *Ibid.*, p. 244.
- 210 V.I. Lenin, "Preliminary Draft Theses on the National and the Colonial Questions", Vol. 31, p. 150.
- 211 ORSCA, s. 5402, r. 1, f. 533, p. 11.
- 212 Qu Qiubo, *Essays and Articles*, Moscow, 1959, p. 40 (in Russian).
- 213 Muzaffar Ahmad, *The Communist Party of India and Its Formation Abroad*, p. 29.
- 214 See L.P. Delyusin, *Dispute About Socialism*, p. 145 (in Russian).
- 215 Quoted in: V.I. Glunin, "Pressing for a United National Front in China" (for the 50th Anniversary of the Third Congress of the CPC), *Far Eastern Affairs*, No. 4, 1973, p. 130.
- 216 *Bulletins of the Far Eastern Secretariat of the Comintern*, No. 1, February 27, 1921, p. 14 (in Russian).
- 217 S.A. Dange, "Gandhi versus Lenin", *Documents of the History of the Communist Party of India*, Vol. 1, 1917-1922; Ed. with introductory

and explanatory notes by G. Adhikari People's Publishing House, 1971, New Delhi, p. 301.

²¹⁸ Zhang Guotao, *The Rise of the Chinese Communist Party 1921-1927*, Vol. 1, p. 32.

²¹⁹ Ibid., p. 99.

²²⁰ Ibid., pp. 88, 89.

²²¹ Ibid., p. 121.

²²² Quoted in: A.M. Shamsutdinov, *The First Congress of the CPC, Brief Reports of the Institute of the Peoples of Asia*, Vol. XXX, p. 236 (in Russian).

²²³ Quoted in: T.F. Devyatkina, M.N. Yegorova, A.M. Melnikov, *The Origin of the Communist Movement in India*, p. 85 (in Russian).

²²⁴ See *ibid.*, p. 156.

²²⁵ Ho Chi Minh, *On Lenin and Leninism*, Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, Moscow, 1971, p. 116.

²²⁶ For details see L.P. Delyusin, *Dispute about Socialism*, pp. 45-47, 57-62, 88-89 (in Russian).

²²⁷ Zhang Guotao, *The Rise of the Chinese Communist Party, 1921-1927*, p. 120.

²²⁸ See Y.M. Garushyants, *Liu Shaoqi: Starting out in Life and Revolution*, p. 230.

²²⁹ V.I. Lenin, "Differences in the European Labour Movement", Vol. 16, p. 348.

²³⁰ Zhang Guotao, *The Rise of the Chinese Communist Party, 1921-1927*, p. 101.

²³¹ CPA IML, s. 490, r. 1, f. 198, p. 14.

²³² V.I. Lenin, "Petty-Bourgeois and Proletarian Socialism", Vol. 9, p. 438.

²³³ See *Lenin Miscellany XXXVII*, Moscow, 1960, p. 226. (in Russian).

²³⁴ For details see A.B. Reznikov, *The Strategy and Tactics of the Communist International on the National and the Colonial Question*, pp. 66-111 (in Russian); M.A. Persits, *Revolutionaries of India in Soviet Russia*, pp. 94-120.

COMINTERN, CPSU(B) AND IDEOLOGICAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL EVOLUTION OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA

By M. F. Yuriev and A. U. Pantsov

The Great October Socialist Revolution in Russia, while giving a powerful stimulus to the struggle of the subject Eastern nations for liberation, asserted the special historic mission of Russia's victorious proletariat in the revolutionary movement in Asian and African countries. As the class exercising its dictatorship in a huge Euro-Asian country, the class carried by history to the forefront of the world-wide anti-imperialist struggle, the industrial proletariat of Soviet Russia had the greatest-ever possibilities for aiding the national liberation and the nascent Communist movements in Eastern countries. "It is unquestionable," Lenin pointed out in 1920, "that the proletariat of the advanced countries can and should give help to the working masses of the backward countries, and that the backward countries can emerge from their present stage of development when the victorious proletariat of the Soviet Republic extends a helping hand to these masses and is in a position to give them support".¹ Without an alliance of the oppressed Eastern peoples with the Russian working class, the victory of the national and, subsequently, of social revolutions in the East would have been impossible. The assistance the Soviet Republic provided in the training of revolutionaries was one of the most important forms that alliance assumed along with the moral and material support of the revolutionary movement in Eastern countries and co-operation with Eastern revolutionaries in creating their political organizations and working out their strategies and tactics.

True to their proletarian duty, Lenin's Party and the international communist movement as represented by the Comintern always gave much attention to the theoretical training of Oriental revolutionaries. Despite the immense difficulties arising from

the Civil War, the foreign invasion and the subsequent daunting task of rebuilding the war-ravaged economy, Soviet Communists started a full-scale effort in this sense right on the following day after the victorious October Revolution. "We", Lenin wrote in 1918, "have not refused to help a single friend or comrade in misfortune in every way we could and with everything at our disposal."²

Among those representatives of the revolutionary forces of the East who received particularly great assistance, there were the revolutionaries from China who, in considerable numbers, had cast their lot in with the movement of Communists in one way or another by the time they arrived in Russia.

Our concern in this article is to show the role that the Comintern and the CPSU(B) played in promoting the ideological and structural evolution of the Communist Party of China and encouraging the first Chinese followers of Communism to commit themselves to the organized Communist movement.

Ideological and Theoretical Positions of the First Followers of Communism in China

The October Revolution started off the process of the change-over to the positions of Marxism-Leninism by a substantial number of left-wing workers of the Chinese revolutionary patriotic and revolutionary-democratic movement, some of whom were up, together with Sun Yatsen³, against the Manchurian Qing dynasty, and, after it had been overthrown, against the Yuan Shikai dictatorship⁴ and against the militarist cliques, for a democratic republic.

The Marxist outlook of the first activists of the Chinese Communist movement was shaped in an involved setting. The actual organization of the movement was not consequent on any particularly long development of Chinese Marxist thought and, in fact, coincided with the early stage of this process. China had known practically no Marxism until the early 1920s.⁵

First knowledge of Marx and scientific socialism reached China at the very end of the 19th century. It was sketchy and conflicting, being available at first only to an extremely restricted group of advanced intellectuals. Scientific socialism at the time had nothing about it as yet to set it apart from many

other socialist theories in the eyes of the Chinese democrats.⁶ As Mao Zedong recalled later on, in April 1945, in the new times "few people, here in China, except a small number of students studying abroad, knew [what Marxism was like—*M.Y., A.P.*]. Neither did I know that there had been such a man as Marx in the world. . . We . . . had no idea that there was some imperialism or some Marxism in the world. . . Once there had been men like Liang Qichao and Zhu Zhixin, who mentioned Marxism. There was said to have been someone else who had translated Engels' 'Socialism: Utopian and Scientific' [the reference is to Shi Cuntun—*M.Y., A.P.*] for a certain magazine. But, after all, I saw none of [those publications—*M.Y., A.P.*] at the time, or if I saw any, I did no more than glance at them, without paying any particular attention".⁷

Only under the impact of the victorious October Revolution in Russia, which had "ushered in a new era in world history, the era of the political rule of the proletariat, which is to supersede the era of bourgeois rule",⁸ did Marxism begin to spread in China at a faster pace.

Nine works of Marx and Engels were translated and published, either integrally or in part, from October 1917 to July 1921, including *The Communist Manifesto*, *Wage Labour and Capital*, Preface to the first volume of *Capital*, fragments from *Anti-Dühring*, *Critique of the Gotha Programme*, *Poverty of Philosophy*, *Socialism: Utopian and Scientific*. The first eleven works of Lenin appeared in Chinese: "Revolutionary Democratic Dictatorship of the Proletariat and the Peasantry", "Political Parties in Russia and the Tasks of the Proletariat", "A Great Beginning" (twice), "From the Destruction of the Age-Old Order to the Creation of a New One", speeches at the Eighth and Ninth Congresses of the RCP(B), "Economics and Politics in the Age of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat" (twice), "Speech at the Third All-Russia Congress of the National Economic Councils", "Terms of Admission to the Communist International", and the first two paragraphs of the first chapter of *The State and Revolution*, "Louisblanquism".⁹ At the same time works by A. Bebel and A. V. Lunacharsky were published in the *Xin Qingnian* (New Youth) magazine, the mouthpiece of revolutionary democracy, and writings by K. Kautsky and W. Liebknecht in other publications. Biographies of Marx, En-

gels and Lenin ran into several editions.¹⁰ Upwards of 300 Marxist works were published in various press organs from 1919 to 1921.¹¹

The foremost man in propagating the ideas of Marxism-Leninism at the time was Li Dazhao. He welcomed the overthrow of tsarism and in his articles of 1918 he noted the history-making world-wide importance of the October Revolution: "The Russian Revolution . . . is a socialist and profoundly social revolution which will triumph all over the world".¹² "Although Bolshevism has been created by the Russians", Li Dazhao wrote, "yet it reflects the awakening of humanity in the 20th century".¹³

In 1918-1919, Li Dazhao started a course of political economy, historical materials and history of socialist doctrines at Beijing University, and illegally taught Marxism to students. In his articles of 1919 he considered the life of workers and peasants and called upon intellectuals to get down to enlightening the working masses, drawing closer to them and merging with them.¹⁴

Yet it would be an oversimplification to present Li Dazhao's evolution from revolutionary democratism to Marxism as free of misconceptions and of the influence of anarchism and other forms of unscientific socialism. For example, in the first few years following the October Revolution he imagined the replacement of capitalism by socialism would take place as a "triumph of the principle of mutual aid" in the spirit of the theory of "biosociological law of mutual aid", advanced by P. Kropotkin, a prominent anarchist.¹⁵

However, the progressive perception of the experience of the Russian Revolution helped Li Dazhao set out on the right track. The factors that moulded his Marxist outlook were the certain development of capitalism in China, the involvement of the working class in the political struggle arising from the May 4 Movement,¹⁶ the disappointment of foremost Chinese intellectuals with bourgeois and petty-bourgeois doctrines which gave China no clue to resolve her problems. The mounting struggle against imperialism and against the old Confucian ideology, which developed under the influence of the October Revolution and in close association with preceding democratic actions, like the Xinhai Revolution,¹⁷ resistance to the Yuan Shikai dictatorship, and the movement for a new culture,¹⁸—created favour-

able conditions for scientific socialism to spread among the foremost contingents of revolutionary democratic intellectuals and radical students. Li Dazhao came up with the first systematic account of the basic propositions of Marx's and Engels's teachings for the first time in China in his article "My Marxist Outlook" which appeared in the *Xin Qingnian* magazine in May 1919.

It was due to Li Dazhao's intense effort in propagating Marxism that a good many of those involved in the May 4 Movement came to recognize the universally important history-making role of the proletariat, appreciating the applicability of scientific socialism in China, rejecting nationalistic and pan-Asiatic views, and accepting internationalism as one of the ideological foundations of political activity. Along with his public dissemination of Marxism, Li Dazhao carried on clandestine organizational and educational work, using Beijing University's library he was in charge of. Together with other representatives of the revolutionary wing of the May 4 Movement, he was defending Marxist positions in the ideological battle against bourgeois reformists, nationalists and anarchists.

Yet another man known as active in propagating Marxism and organizing the Communist movement in China was Chen Duxiu. He participated in antimonarchist underground activities in Anhui Province and in the Xinhai Revolution, and was one of the leaders of the struggle for a new culture, against the Confucian dogmas, for the establishment of a democratic order in China, and for the medieval Wenyan language in literature to be replaced by the current spoken Baihua. Chen Duxiu founded a number of progressive publications, including the *Xin Qingnian* magazine, and was one of the leaders of the May 4 Movement in 1919.

There were other men actively involved in the struggle against the monarchy and the Yuan Shikai dictatorship among the revolutionary democrats who had devoted themselves to Marxism. Just like Li Dazhao and Chen Duxiu, they personified continuity between the liberation struggle led by Sun Yatsen and the Communist movement in China. Those were Lin Bouyouye, Dong Biwu, Wu Yuchisang and Nan Hancheng, to mention just a few.

Qu Qiubo and Zhang Tailei were still teenagers when they started their revolutionary activities little by little. Both were

active in the May 4 Movement in Beijing and Tianjin and fell victim to official reprisals. Both were initiated into Marxism by Li Dazhao as they studied the Russian language in Beijing.

The international Communist movement lent a wide range of assistance to early Chinese Marxists in propagating Marxism-Leninism, consolidating their ranks and creating the Communist Party of China. Comintern officials, with G.N. Voitinsky at their head, sent to China in the spring of 1920, first met with Li Dazhao in Beijing and then, with his co-operation, with Chen Duxiu in Shanghai. They helped the latter organize a Communist group which included Li Da, Li Hanjun, Chen Wangdao, Shi Cuntung (according to various sources, this happened in July or August 1920). In October (according to some sources, in September) 1920, Li Dazhao set up a Communist group in Beijing, including Deng Zhongxia, Liu Zhenjing, Luo Zhanglung, Zhang Guotao, Zhang Shenfu. Communist groups were formed in other cities from the autumn of 1920 to the spring of 1921: in Guangzhou (Tan Pingshan, Tan Zhitang, Chen Gungbo), Wuhan (Bao Huiseng, Dong Biwu, Chen Tanqu), Changsha (Mao Zedong, He Shuheng), Jinan (Wang Jingmei, Deng Enming), and also one in Tokyo (Zhou Fohai). Communist groups arose also in the early 1920s among the revolutionary-minded Chinese youth studying and working in France and Belgium.

The work of propagating Marxist-Leninist teachings was carried on, apart from Communist groups, by their supporters in various revolutionary democratic societies and in progressive publications. These included, for example, the *Xin Qingnian* and *Meizhou pinglun* (Weekly Review) magazines edited by Chen Duxiu and Li Dazhao; the *Shaonian Zhongguo* (Young China) society, founded with Li Dazhao's co-operation in June 1919, and its mouthpiece under the same name. Li Dazhao organized the first society for the study of Marxism in China in Beijing in March 1920. Qu Qiubo founded the *Xin Shehui* (New Society) magazine in Beijing. Yun Daiying established *Liquan Shushe* (Public Good book society) in Hubei and he also published the *Wuhan Pinglun* (Wuhan Weekly Review). Wang Jingmei organized a *Lixin Xuehui* group (Society for the Encouragement of Newborn Things) in Jinan and published a magazine under the same name. Mao Zedong and Cai Hesen created a *Xinmin xuehui* (National Regeneration Society) in Chang-

sha in April 1918, and launched the *Xiangjiang Pinglun* (Xiangjiang Review) magazine in July 1919. Democrats published the *Xin Jiangxi* (New Jiangsi) magazine in Nanchang, *Zhejiang Pinglun* (Zhejiang Review) in Hangzhou, *Xingqiri* (Sunday) in Chengdu. In Tianjin, Zhou Enlai, back from Japan at the start of the May 4 Movement, organized the publication of a mouthpiece of Tianjin Amalgamated Student Association. He and Deng Yingchao launched a journal under the same name in August 1919.¹⁹ However, isolated articles and extracts from major works by the classics of Marxism-Leninism, still less the writings by various interpreters and popularizers of Marxism, published in these and other editions, could not provide the overwhelming majority of Chinese democrats with an integrated account of the new doctrine. It is not by chance that the *Zhungguo Qingnian* (Chinese Youth) magazine, the mouthpiece of the Central Committee of the Chinese Socialist Youth League, should have stressed in March 1924 that "it is next to impossible to study the teachings of Marx by the publications now available in China. Not even his [Marx's—*M.Y.*, *A.P.*] minor works, such as *Criticism of Political Economy*, let alone his voluminous *Capital*, have been translated.²⁰ None of Marx's, Engels's and Lenin's major works had been translated in China right until the 1930s.²¹

Let me note that for various reasons far from all Chinese radicals, anxious to repeat the "experience of the Russians", had a chance to read what was then scarce Marxist literature. Liu Shaoqi, who was a member of the Socialist Youth League since 1920, recalled that on joining the SYL, he "knew only that socialism was a good thing. I heard about Marx, Lenin, the October Revolution and the Party of Bolsheviks . . . However I had no clear and full idea of what Socialism was like, nor of how it was to be brought about".²² "Our notions about the essence of socialism and its various trends were vague, like morning haze", Qu Qiubo, one of the first Chinese followers of communism, wrote.²³ The theoretical level of most of Chinese left democrats was revealed by Sheng Youe²⁴ who confessed that, before their Soviet training, most of them, including himself, "had only a weak background in traditional Chinese philosophy and very little knowledge of 'bourgeois' or modern Western philosophy".²⁵

Marxist publications which appeared in China in the late 1910s and in the early 1920s as well as early translations of

works by Marx and Engels and theoretical Comintern studies had, besides, a great number of mistakes and, occasionally, gross distortions of Marxism, which led to certain propositions of Marx's teachings being misinterpreted by Chinese revolutionaries.²⁶ Many of them saw Marxism in the light of its anarchist and revolutionary-democratic interpretations. That was due, above all, to the fact that practically all the early followers of communism in China had variously experienced the influence of those non-Marxist doctrines; moreover, it is the anarchists and revolutionary-democrats who were most active at the time in translating and commenting on Marx.²⁷

Yet another obstacle in the way of the right perception of Marxist ideas was the inadequacy of the notional vocabulary in Chinese social sciences owing to the country's undeveloped social-class structure. Such basic categories of modern sociology, as "proletariat", "bourgeoisie", "class", to mention just a few, were just getting translated into Chinese, though not always adequately and sometimes even mistranslated altogether.²⁸

A further impediment to the proper response to Marxism-Leninism in China was the pressure that the specific, traditional notions about the world, morality and ethics, which were integral to the common outlook of various strata of Chinese society and manifested themselves ideologically as well, exerted on the mentality of the Chinese followers of communism.²⁹ So it is natural that Chinese revolutionaries, having thoroughly realized, as R. Felber, a GDR Sinologist, has underlined, "the impotence of the old feudal order that has outlived itself and calling for a stout battle against the despotic system with its mendacious morality, quite often came under the influence of those traditions, whether they saw it or not".³⁰ What had its effect, furthermore, was the incomplete class differentiation of Chinese society, the youth and immaturity of the proletariat, and the separation from it even of those representatives of revolutionary democracy who were going over to Marxist positions.³¹ All that made Marxism for a long time not quite clear to many in the early stages of the communist movement in China.

These handicaps to the propagation and perception of Marxist theory in China materially affected the ability of the early Chinese Communist groups and the CPC to withstand the direct ideological effect of the semicolonial and semifeudal social en-

vironment. Nationalist ideas still appealed to many Chinese followers of communism. One reason behind this power of attraction was that the process of modern-type nation-building, due to a certain advance of capitalism, gathered speed as the communist movement was taking shape in China. In an imperialist-subjugated country, this stimulated the growth of nationalist feeling which literally overwhelmed intellectuals and hindered the ripening of the class sentiments of other sections of Chinese society just beginning to be politically active—the proletariat and the peasantry. Nationalism, which had a “historical justification” in China, just as throughout the Orient,³² was the main structural element of the ideology of revolutionary democracy which the prospective Chinese followers of Marxism were moving from on their way to it.

It was on the nationalist ground that CPC members were developing their non-Marxist views of all kinds, objectively rooted in China’s overall social and economic backwardness.

For example, ever since the origin of the Chinese Communist Party, it had a trend, now overt, now covert, to belittle the significance of ideological and theoretical training, particularly of the rank-and-file Party membership. There was a fairly widespread view that the Party had a kind of “natural division of labour”, that is, there were the leadership who directed Party activities, and an army of rank-and-file doers who were by no means obliged to know theoretical problems. Views of this kind were put down, notably, in “The Decision Concerning the Constitution of the Chinese Communist Party”, adopted by the Second CPC Conference in 1922, which stressed: “As we are neither lecturing intellectuals nor fanatic revolutionists, we need not go to the universities, research clubs and libraries. As we are the fighting political party of the proletariat, we only need to go among the masses, to organize a ‘mass party’ ”.³³

It is not difficult to see how much that action programme had in common with the ideas of the *Rabochee delo* group,³⁴ which functioned within Russian Social Democracy late in the 19th century and early in the 20th century and, to quote Lenin, defended “freedom from all integral and pondered theory”.³⁵ The above statement was akin to the points made in Bakunin’s and Nechaev’s “Revolutionary Catechism”,³⁶ in which, as Marx and Engels wrote, “thought and learning are absolutely forbid-

den to the young as mundane occupations that could lead them to doubt the all-destructive orthodoxy".³⁷

The affinity of the ideological positions of many followers of communism in China, members of the "Workers' Cause" group and Bakuninists, naturally, was not accidental. Such concepts could take shape only on account of the immaturity of the revolutionary movement in socially and economically underdeveloped countries with centuries-old traditions of absolutism.

A number of CPC leaders adhered to non-Marxist views, in fact like those of "The Revolutionary Catechism", regarding some of the fundamental principles of building their organization. A bureaucratic work-style was implanted in the Communist Party, as a matter of fact, right from the start. Communists' attempts to discuss whatever issues were not clear to them, their doubts or differences were, as a rule, cruelly suppressed. It is not by chance that the very concept of "democratic centralism" should have appeared in CPC documents for the first time as late as January 1925, at the Fourth Congress of the CPC.³⁸ and it was included in the Party's Constitution at its Fifth Congress as late as May 1927.³⁹ Reviewing the early documents of Chinese followers of Marxism, dealing with various questions of the organization of Party life, one may note that points many of them contained were extremely reminiscent of "The Revolutionary Catechism" by the peremptory assertion of the authority and infallibility of the central leadership. For instance, the above-mentioned "Decision Concerning the Constitution of the Chinese Communist Party" said: Every comrade should be trained by the Party to almost military discipline in his action. . . No matter in what place and at what time, his speech should be the Party's speech, his actions such as would be prescribed by the Party. He should not possess any individual interest apart from the Party's. Any activity apart from the Party's control is completely his individual activity and not the Party's activity; it becomes the anarchical Communism".⁴⁰ Like Russia's most extreme anarchists of the 1860s, many CPC leaders must have sought to make any member of their organization a kind of ideal "iron revolutionary" that would have suppressed all of his own personal desires and would be infinitely devoted to the Party leaders.

Of course, not all the Party leaders adhered to anti-democratic views on matters of organization during the first years of the

existence of the CPC. The best representatives of the communist movement strongly opposed all underestimation of the ideological and theoretical training of the Party membership. Relying on the material and theoretical assistance of the Comintern, Chinese Communists launched special Party schools and training groups in various periods. A university, using the facilities of the South-Eastern Institute of Shanghai, was established by Deng Zhongxia, Qu Qiubo, Zhang Tailei and others, in 1923; it was the head training centre for Chinese Communist leadership right until 1925. China's first Party School was then founded in Beijing, as directed by the CPC Central Committee, under its Northern Bureau and Li Dazhao personally. Luo Yinung was appointed its rector shortly afterwards, and Zhao Shiyan and Chen Qingyan became its professors. The school existed for about three months and its students got some grounding in the problems of party-building, Marxist political economy, the history of the world communist movement and the international situation.⁴¹ In 1926, the CPC began launching short-term Party schools (with a course of instruction ranging from two or four weeks to three months) for lower-level leadership.⁴²

Many Chinese revolutionaries learned the ABC of Marxism at long-established Guomindang educational institutions of the times of the united front, organized with the resources of the Comintern and the CPSU(B). There were, in particular, the Huangpu (Whampoa) Military Academy, which was opened in May 1924 (Communists co-operated in it until mid-1927)⁴³ and the peasant movement courses in Guangzhou and Wuhan (1924-1927).⁴⁴

The Party press (according to some sources, in 1920-1927 Chinese Communists had at least 18 newspapers and magazines published in different localities⁴⁵) was the principal means of the general theoretical education of Party members.

Considering the objectives set by the Comintern, Chinese Communists were most emphatically posing and constructively resolving various issues of organization of Party educational work and ideological and theoretical training at many Party forums. The decisions of the May 1924 Enlarged Plenary Session of the Central Executive Committee of the CPC, the Fourth Party Congress, the October 1925 and July 1926 Enlarged Plenary Sessions of the Central Executive Committee of the CPC and the Fifth

Party Congress were of the greatest importance in that context in the period from 1920 to 1927.⁴⁶ The training of the newly admitted members and the conduct of cultural, political and educational work among Communists were made incumbent upon the Party groups by the Constitution of the CPC adopted by the Fifth Party Congress.⁴⁷

Yet, quite often the decisions of the congresses and plenary sessions, to judge by available documents, did not determine the activities of local Party bodies. For example, although the May 1924 Enlarged Plenary Session of the Executive Committee of the CPC, having deplored neglect of the priorities of Party education, outlined a wide-ranging action programme to correct the mistakes of the past, many Party officials continued to ignore the importance of theoretical training. In consequence, as admitted at the Fourth Congress of the CPC, "educational work and Party propaganda have not yet become effective . . . There has been no sufficient agitation and explanation work either in or outside the Party. . . Political education in the Party has been in very insignificant proportions".⁴⁸ By mid-1926, the Party required at least 35 trained district committee officials, 160 local committee officials, as many special technical staff, whereas the Party's hard core in positions of responsibility counted no more than 120 at the time,⁴⁹ while the CPC total membership was 12,000.⁵⁰ The shortage of theoretically trained leadership was sorely felt also in the beginning of 1927⁵¹ and by the middle of 1928, there erupted what was called a "leadership crisis" in the CPC, as Party leaders admitted. "We are losing our workers every day [in the context of white terror after the 1925-1927 revolution—*M.Y. A.P.*], but we cannot make up for it", Zhou Enlai stated at the Sixth Congress of the CPC. "The main reason for it was the group failure to educate their members."⁵²

So the general theoretical level of the CPC membership during its first formative years was not high in spite of the intense activities of many Chinese Communists with a view to organizing effective ideological and educational work in the Party. The evolution of the mentality of many of those involved in the communist movement in China from national revolutionism to scientific, Marxist-Leninist world outlook was slow and conflicting. In these conditions, the role of international factors, above all, of the theoretical and practical help of Soviet Communists and the

international communist movement and in the training of Marxist forces of the Chinese revolution was steeply rising.

Initial Theoretical Training of Chinese Revolutionaries in Soviet Russia

In the first few years after the October Revolution, the CPSU(B), realizing that it was extremely difficult for revolutionaries to come straight from China for training, concerned itself above all with the ideological and political education of the Chinese working people who found themselves on the territory of Soviet Russia for a variety of reasons.

According to various estimates, there were between 300,000 and 400,000 Chinese nationals in Soviet Russia in 1917-1920.⁵³ Most of them were general workers contracted by the tsarist government during the First World War. There were a good many pauper proletarians and ruined peasants who had been driven into Russia by want. Special Chinese sections were opened within the departments for the affairs of nationalities in the executive committees of local Soviets in various cities after the October Revolution with a view to organizing the ideological and political education of the Chinese in Russia.⁵⁴ With the support of the Soviet government, Chinese workers themselves created their own organizations in Moscow, Petrograd, Yekaterinburg, Kharkov, Perm and a number of other industrial centres and in some of the country's Eastern regions early in 1918.⁵⁵ An All-Russia Association of Chinese Workers, with a membership of between 400,000 and 600,000, was constituted in Petrograd in the first half of December of 1918.⁵⁶

Chinese nationals in Soviet Russia were getting increasingly involved in the Communist movement. That tendency was greatly facilitated by the special Chinese sections created in areas where Chinese nationals lived, within the framework of local Party organizations—regional and district committees of the CPSU(B), and Communist groups in the Chinese units of the Red Army.⁵⁷ Communists actively co-operated with the Central Executive Committee of the All-Russia Association of Chinese Workers ever since it started functioning, and Communist groups were at work within the Association's local branches. The general guidance of Party work among the Chinese in Russia was pro-

vided first (from November 1918) by the Chinese section of the International Propaganda Department of the Central Bureau of Muslim Organizations of the Central Committee of the CPSU (B),⁵⁸ and then, from July 1, 1920, by the Central Organizing Bureau of Chinese Communists under the Central Committee of the CPSU (B).⁵⁹

The Bolshevik Party set much store by the structural, ideological and political consolidation of the revolutionary associations of Chinese working people in Soviet Russia. It used the associations for building up communist influence on Chinese workers and peasants, educating them in the spirit of proletarian internationalism, and promoting those most devoted to the cause of the working class for training as national revolutionary cadres.

During the Civil War, the Soviet authorities accorded the revolutionary-minded Chinese, many of whom served with the Red Army, an opportunity to study at various military-political schools and Party courses both in the rear and on the front-lines. For example, the International Regiment of the 5th Army of the Eastern Front had a special instruction unit for commanding officers, with 200 Chinese on the rolls. The Combined Political Department of the 5th Army and the East-Siberian Military District had an International Party School in 1921 training many nationalities, including Chinese and Koreans.⁶⁰ Instruction was given through interpreters. Scores of Chinese revolutionaries were studying together with other foreign Communists at the agitator courses of the Central Federation of Foreign Groups under the Central Committee of the CPSU (B).⁶¹

Soviet Communists realized that Chinese-born revolutionaries who turned out to bear witness to, and sometimes got actually involved in pitched class battles in Russia "are to be a link between the movement which already exists in Soviet Russia and that which will appear in China before long".⁶² So did the leaders of Chinese workers and Communist organizations. For instance, the Organizing Bureau of the Chinese Communists under the Far Eastern Bureau of the CPSU (B) stated in its Constitution: "The Chinese Communists consider it their direct duty to the proletarians of all countries to accomplish a social revolution⁶³ in China and organize the working class of China".⁶⁴ The Communist group of the Third Congress of the All-Russia Association of Chinese workers, in a letter of June 26, 1920, to

Lenin also declared itself determined to bring about the emancipation of the 500 million working people of China.⁶⁵ In 1920, the Central Organizing Bureau of Chinese Communists even drafted a plan for an armed drive on Beijing to overthrow the reactionary government of North China.⁶⁶ All these facts indicate that the organizations of Chinese working people aimed at training Chinese emigrants for revolutionary action at home. As early as 1920, a member of the Organizing Bureau, Liu Qian (Liu Jiang, Fyodorov)⁶⁷ went to Shanghai to contact Sun Yat-sen who headed the national revolutionary movement in China.⁶⁸ Some of the emigrants who had passed through a school of class warfare in Russia subsequently rose to prominence in the national revolutionary and Communist movements in China, as Yang Mingzhai and Liu Changsheng.⁶⁹

The proliferation of Communist groups and consolidation of centralized guidance of the Chinese Communist movement in Soviet Russia as well as the rising tide of the national anti-imperialist movement in China made increasingly clear the need for well-trained revolutionary forces. That was obvious also to Chinese immigrants who more than once asked the People's Commissariat for the Affairs of Nationalities⁷⁰ to organize a central political school for them.⁷¹

Yet there was still no regular and centralized training of Chinese revolutionaries in Russia in 1917-1920.

Training of Chinese Revolutionaries in the 1920s and 1930s

With hostilities over in most of the Russian Federation and the national liberation movement mounting in the East, notably in China, the organization of systematic assistance to the revolutionary forces of the countries of the region in leadership training became an urgent priority. There was an increased demand for a special central school to enable young freedom-fighters coming straight from their respective countries to learn Marxism-Leninism along with the strategy and tactics of revolutionary action and military art to apply when they eventually got back home.⁷² A proposal for an educational institution of that kind to be created was made at the Second Congress of the Communist International on July 26, 1920. Speaking before the Congress, H. Maring, of the Communist Party of Dutch India,

declared: "The Third International must give the leaders of the Far Eastern movement the opportunity of staying here for half a year and go through some course in Communism so that they can get a proper understanding of what is taking place in Russia, that they may be able to carry into life the ideas of the theses [of the Second Congress of the Comintern on the national and colonial questions—*M.Y., A.P.*], and extend their work in the colonies for the realization of Soviet organizations. . . We, here in Russia, must give the Eastern Communists the opportunity to get a theoretical education in Communism so as to help make the Far East an active member of the Communist International".⁷³

Late in 1920 and early in 1921, the People's Commissariat for the Affairs of Nationalities got down to drawing up a curriculum for a special short-term school with a one-time enrolment of about a thousand students of various nationalities, including Chinese.⁷⁴ On February 3, 1921, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU(B) decided to set up Eastern courses under the auspices of the People's Commissariat for the Affairs of Nationalities.⁷⁵ On February 10, 1921, the Central Committee of the CPSU(B) resolved that the courses be called a University of the Toilers of the East.⁷⁶ A resolution on the subject was passed by the All-Russia Central Executive Committee on April 21, 1921.⁷⁷ Soon afterwards, that educational institution was named the Communist University of the Toilers of the East (CUTE). Its mission was to train political workers from among working people of the Soviet Eastern regions, "contract and autonomous republics, autonomous regions, industrial communities and ethnic minorities".⁷⁸ However, it had yet another task right from the outset—that of training revolutionary leadership for the foreign Orient, including China.⁷⁹

The opening of the CUTE in Moscow signified that the theoretical training of Chinese revolutionaries in Soviet Russia had gone a stage ahead. In 1921-1925 and in the 1930s, it was the co-training of revolutionaries from various Eastern countries at common educational institutions. In 1925-1930, there was a special college in Moscow to train Chinese revolutionary leadership. The creation of the Sun Yatsen University of Working People of China (as it was known in 1925-1928) had been prompted by the pressing need for Marxist-educated revolutionary work-

ers involved not only in the Communist movement but also in the national liberation movements as the national anti-imperialist revolution had begun in China. With the revolution defeated and most ruthless white terror launched in China, the UWPC was renamed late in September or early in October 1923 to become Communist University of Working People of China (CUWPC)⁸⁰. It was at that time, too, that Chinese CUTE students were transferred to it. The CUWPC's priority, as its mouthpiece the *Gungchan zazhi* (Communist Journal) emphasized, was the Marxist education of the "core of the mass Communist movement in China, Bolshevik forces of the Chinese revolution".⁸¹ In the summer of 1929, the Russian name of the CUWPC was changed into Communist University of Chinese Working People.⁸² It was closed down in the autumn of 1930.

It was the International Lenin School that was the centre for the instruction of Chinese revolutionary youth for a number of years afterwards. The training of the leadership of the CPC and of the Communist Youth League of China went on also at the Central Young Communist League School. The Chinese Department at the CUTE was reopened in the mid-1930s only to exist for under two years. The National and Colonial Problems Research Institute, which branched off from the CUTE in 1937, started training students who arrived from abroad. The Chinese of the CUTE passed over to the newly established institute, making up nearly half its total student body in the late 1930s.⁸³

There were some other establishments for Chinese revolutionaries to receive their training in the USSR in the 1920s and in 1930s along with the CUTE, UWPC, CUWPC, the International Lenin School and the Central Young Communist League School. A CUTE branch was opened in Irkutsk in the summer of 1922 by decision of the Agitation and Propaganda Department of the Central Committee of the CPSU(B) in December 1921. It was intended for the express purpose of training representatives of Far Eastern peoples, including the Chinese.⁸⁴ A political education department was set up under the military-political school of the People's Revolutionary Army of the Far Eastern Republic, by decision of the Far Eastern Bureau of the CPSU(B), in June 1922, for Chinese partisans in Manchuria, who had practically no Communist influence in their detachments.⁸⁵ A Chinese Lenin School⁸⁶ as well as a Soviet Party School for young

Chinese workers functioned in Vladivostok since the mid-1920s. The latter's teaching staff was made up essentially of graduates of the Sun Yatsen University.⁸⁷ "Labour Movement" training courses were set up in Moscow in 1932, on the initiative of A. Lozovsky (S. A. Dridzo), General Secretary of the Red International of Trade Unions (Profintern),⁸⁸ for Chinese graduates of Soviet educational establishments who were preparing to return home. At those courses, A. Lozovsky and other high officials of the Comintern and the Profintern taught young revolutionaries the art of organizing the strike movement of the working class, trade union work, etc.⁸⁹ Some Chinese passed through a course of vocational training at various industrial enterprises in Soviet Russia.⁹⁰ There was, furthermore, a number of special groups to train CPC leadership.⁹¹

The Bolshevik Party lent tremendous assistance to Chinese Communists in training the military forces of the revolution. To this end, China's patriots were admitted to the M.V. Frunze Military Academy, N. G. Tolmachev Military-Political Academy, the Military-Theoretical Flying School, the Artillery School, military training establishments in Kiev and elsewhere. Instruction of Chinese commanders went on also at the Vystrel (Shot) Courses⁹². In an official message to the military academies, the People's Commissar for Defence pointed out that they "must prepare . . . the commanders of large military units in China".⁹³ At the request of one of the CPC leaders, Zhou Enlai, the Soviet Union organized the military training of Chinese Communists, who arrived in Moscow under Comintern auspices or otherwise, at special military courses.⁹⁴

The selection of students from China and the constitution of study groups depended on the current political situation in China, the nature of the institute (Communist university, general political school, military academy) and the actual importance which the CPC and Guomindang governing bodies attached to the educational establishment in question.

For instance, the selection of candidates for admission to Communist schools of university rank fell entirely within the scope of the ECCI, the Central Committee of the CPSU (B) and the Central Committee of the CPC. The formation of Chinese groups at general political higher school as well as (in the period of the united national front of 1924-1927⁹⁵) at military

colleges and academies was under the joint control of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR⁹⁶ and the Central Executive Committee of the Guomindang with the participation of the Central Committee of the CPC. After the break-up of the united front, the right of selecting the prospective students of Soviet military schools passed to the Chinese delegation to the ECCI. A large amount of work for the preliminary selection of Chinese students to study in the USSR was carried on by Soviet and Comintern officials in China. A so-called Foreign Language School was organized in Shanghai back in September 1920, with the direct co-operation of ECCI representative G. N. Voitinsky and also M. F. Kuznetsova and Yang Mingzhai, for socialist-minded young people who wanted to go to Moscow to study.⁹⁷ Another man who was active in setting it up was Yu Xiusung, Secretary of the Shanghai Socialist Youth League, who made himself its technical secretary. The students of the school (it trained several groups of 10 to 20) were primarily engaged in studying the Russian language which was taught by Yang Mingzhai. Chen Wangdao, China's first translator of *The Communist Manifesto*, who was a member of the Shanghai Communist Circle, arrived once a week to give a lecture on Marxism.⁹⁸ It was logical to presume that other members of the Shanghai Communist organization were invited to teach at the school, although they could not give their students a good grounding in scientific socialism because of the low level of Chinese Marxist thought at the time. In the spring (evidently, in April or May) of 1921, the first fourteen graduates of the school, having studied for eight months, went to Soviet Russia on recommendation and with the mediation of Yang Mingzhai. The group comprised some of those who subsequently became prominent CPC leaders—Liu Shaoqi, Ren Bishi, Peng Shuzhi, Luo Yinung and Xiao Jingguang.⁹⁹

A special Educational Commission, headed by Yang Mingzhai and Bao Huiseng, was created in Shanghai early in 1921, as reported by Bao Huiseng, one of the first followers of Communism in China. His job was to select the worthiest representatives of Chinese young socialists to be sent to Moscow.¹⁰⁰ According to some sources, Dong Biwu was on the commission.¹⁰¹

The fairly successful performance of the Foreign Language School and the Educational Commission was due, first of all,

to the fact that China's youth, whose advanced elements were at pains to find a way out of the crisis situation of their country, were extremely keen on the events in Russia and the experience of the CPSU(B). One of the natural effects of that was, notably, the gradual transformation of the celebrated "movement for diligent work and judicious learning" of the early 1920s which was intended to induce Chinese workers and students abroad (in Western Europe) to study.¹⁰² Russia was beginning to replace Western Europe in the minds of many young Chinese. For example, a new "Society for the Study of Russia" (it was established by men like Mao Zedong, Fang Weixia, and He Shuheng) was opened in Changsha late in August in 1920. It set itself the aim of "agitating for diligent work and judicial learning in Russia" as well as for people to be sent over there for an on-the-spot study of the situation.¹⁰³ According to a report by Xiao Jingguang, the Society was in contact with the Foreign Language School in Shanghai and sent its members there to be helped on to Soviet Russia.¹⁰⁴

In the middle of 1921, the CUTE, which was admitting most Chinese revolutionaries, had 35 students from China (36, according to other sources), and 42 in 1922.¹⁰⁵ In percentage, the students of the CUTE's Chinese sector constituted an appreciable proportion of the entire Communist Party membership and of the Socialist Youth League (in April 1924, for example, it had 9% of the CPC membership).¹⁰⁶ Most of the students came from non-proletarian strata. That was due to the fact that intellectuals predominated in the Communist movement in China (just as, incidentally, in other countries¹⁰⁷) in the initial period.

The methods used to select students to study in the USSR were modified to meet the changing circumstances upon the formation of the united national front of the Communist Party and the Guomindang in China. A central selection committee was formed in Guangzhou on October 7, 1925, following the proposal of M. M. Borodin, political adviser to the Guomindang Central Executive Committee, following the decision to inaugurate a general political University of Working People of China, named after Sun Yatsen, in Moscow. It comprised prominent leaders of the National Party and the government—Tan Yan-kai, Guo Yingfen and Wang Jingwei. Borodin became a Com-

mittee adviser. Student selection got under way in a number of the country's major cities, as Guangzhou, Shanghai, Beijing and Tianjin. In Shanghai this job was supervised by Communists Yang Mingzhai and Yun Daiying and also a Guomintang man, Zhu Jiqing. Following sophisticated three-stage examinations, a 310-man contingent was recruited (180 from Guangzhou, 100 from Shanghai, Beijing and Tianjin, 10 apiece from three military schools, those of Hunan, Tianjin and Huangpu.) A further 30 men—relatives of influential Guomintang officials—were included, without any examinations, in the group of students already selected.

As evidenced by Deng Wenyi, one of the first students of the Sun Yatsen University, Guomintang right-wingers tried with might and main to prevent Communists from being sent to Moscow.¹⁰⁸ In consequence, 90% of those picked in Canton, where the rightwingers' positions were fairly strong, turned out to be Guomintang members, whereas the majority of the students from Shanghai, Beijing and Tianjin were members of the CPC.¹⁰⁹ On the whole, the proportion of Communists and YCL members in the total number of those selected must have been rather high. At least, according to V. I. Glunin's figures, 103 (over 87%) out of the first 118 UWPS students were Communists and YCL-members.¹¹⁰ The dispatch was carried out in batches of 50-60, and dragged on till the summer of 1926.¹¹¹ The first group, which comprised, in particular, Chiang Kaishek's son Jiang Jingguo, arrived in Moscow in November 1925. Those who had to wait between 4 and 5 months before they could sail from Canton (there were 100 of them) had preparatory courses of Russian organized for them by the Soviet advisers to the Guomintang Central Executive Committee.¹¹²

Chinese political émigrés, Communists and those of the Guomintang, who lived in various countries of the world, were selected by the Party organizations they worked for. Some of the political émigrés arrived in Soviet Russia on their own initiative. One of the largest groups (12 men) of émigré youth, members of the Communist Party of China and of the Socialist Youth League of China, came to study at the CUTE from France in the spring of 1923. It comprised some of the most active members of the European branch of the CPC (set up in Paris in the winter of 1922)—Wang Ruofei, Xiao San (Emi Xiao), Chen

Qiaonian, Chen Yannian, Zhao Shiyao.¹¹³ Ten men, mostly members of the Guomindang, who had been studying in Germany, enrolled at the UWPC on January 6, 1926,¹¹⁴ and a further ten Communists and YCL-members, who studied in Belgium and France, did so in the autumn of the same year.¹¹⁵ Many students were coming from the United States and the Philippines. Some Chinese residing in Soviet Russia were also sent to the CUTE and the UWPC to study.

With the first academic year over, the UWPC had to make a fresh enrolment. One of its teaching staff, S. A. Dalin, was sent to China, by Comintern decision, to supervise the selection of the new students.¹¹⁶ Largely due to his efforts, the ties connecting revolutionary China with the centre of theoretical and practical training of the hard core of the Chinese national liberation movement, as the UWPC was, never snapped either in 1926 or in the early half of 1927. Groups of Chinese youth continued to arrive in Moscow throughout that period from South and Central China, above all, to study at the UWPC as well as the CUTE and various military schools. Three batches of commanders and political officers arrived at the Sun Yatsen University in August 1926, late in 1926 and early in 1927 from various units of the People's Army of Feng Yuxiang, and a large group of students arrived from North China in the winter of 1926.¹¹⁷ By the opening of 1927 the University had upwards of 500 students.¹¹⁸ Their social composition reflected the united national front that existed in China, they came from the petty and big bourgeoisie, landed classes, workers and peasants.

On July 26, 1927, the Guomindang Central Executive Committee officially severed all relations with the Sun Yatsen University and banned Guomindang members from attending the UWPC.¹¹⁹ That action followed immediately after the Guomindang had broken off the national front with the Communists inside China. Over 100 students left the University and returned to China. So the Guomindang men withdrew on their own accord from selecting and making up student groups for that university. The right to send students to study at the UWPC was left to the Communist Party. The consequent reorganization of the UWPC into a Communist University required the character and the conditions of student selection to be changed accordingly. As early as 1927, the UWPC Pro-Rector, P. A. Mif pointed

in a report to the Chinese commission of the Comintern to the need to cut the number of non-Communists and non-YCL-members at the university down to 20% of the student body.¹²⁰ At least, half the students were now to be picked from among industrial workers. The only ones to be admitted for training from among the Chinese living outside China were Communists and YCL-members having a certain record of service in the field of social activities and, above all, those from among educated workers. It was stipulated that candidates for enrolment at the UWPC were not to stay there for more than five years. The UWPC administration, however, granted the possibility of the university admitting a certain number of non-Party people, above all, from among workers and the poorest of peasants,¹²¹ provided they would make up no more than one-third of the total student body.

The first group of some 200 men completed their course of instruction at the University by the end of 1927.¹²² Most of them returned to China to resume their work. Some of the graduates were kept at the UWPC as translators, instructors and research associates, while many continued with their studies at various military and military-political academies of the Soviet Union.

A group of prominent CPC officials arrived to study at the university in the autumn of 1927. Some of them, notably, Wu Yuzhang and Lin Boqu, had held high offices in the Guomindang's Wuhan government up to the July coup (i.e., the break-off of the united front with the CPC by the Guomindang in July 1927). A large group of young workers and peasants, principally members of the CPC and the Young Communist League of China, involved in the Nanchang uprising (August 1, 1927)¹²³ and in the "autumn harvest" uprisings (1927),¹²⁴ and activists of the trade union, youth and women's movements¹²⁵ entered the UWPC late in 1927 and early in 1928. A number of delegates to the Sixth Congress of the CPC, which met outside Moscow, were sent to the UWPC upon its conclusion in August 1928. Among them was one of the Party's founding members, the 52-year-old He Shuheng. At its inception, the CUWPC had a student body of about 600.¹²⁶

So a considerable number of revolutionaries from China—high officials of the Guomindang and top leaders of the Com-

munist Party received their general political, military and professional as well as technological education in the USSR in the 1920s and 1930s. There was a ramified network of higher international schools organized for them. Over a thousand Chinese revolutionaries were trained at the UWPC-CUWPC.¹²⁷ A large proportion of commanders and political officers of the Chinese Red Army and the Guomindang's National Revolutionary Army (from regimental level upwards) had their training at various Soviet military schools. According to some sources, out of the 118 top leaders of the Chinese Communist Party in the 1920s-1940s who studied abroad, 80 men (i.e., some 70%) received their Marxist training in the Soviet Union.¹²⁸ Over half of them (47) were full or alternate members of the Central Committee of the CPC, and 15—members of the Central Committee's Politburo in various years subsequently.

Practical and Theoretical Problems of the Training of Chinese Students

It was the organization of the training of Chinese students at the Sun Yatsen University, subsequently the CUWPC, that provided the clearest evidence of the scale of Soviet assistance.

Hardly had the newborn Soviet state recovered from the scars of the Civil War and imperialist invasion than it shouldered the full burden of expenses for the facilities the students had to be provided with. A Sun Yatsen University Association was set up to lend all possible material assistance to the UWPC in the USSR. Its members were both individuals and institutions who regularly paid their established dues. The Association's resources were refunded also through donations and proceeds from lecturing and publishing activities which its members carried on.¹²⁹ A tremendous contribution to financing the activities of the UWPC and CUWPC was made by the Profintern which had the bulk of its means coming from the Soviet trade unions.¹³⁰ According to some estimates (we do not have exact figures), the university's annual budget came up to just about 10 million roubles.¹³¹ The money was spent mostly under three headings: 1) administrative needs; 2) scholarships and salaries for professors and other staff members; and 3) student recruitment and repatriation of graduates.

The Soviet side offered free financial support to the university. That had to be admitted even by those who were hostile towards the Communist movement. For example, according to Sheng Youe, "the Russian authorities were not without pain in getting this job done" as it required some hard currency which the Soviet Government hardly possessed at the time.¹³² Now, the expenses of the Guomindang Central Executive Committee and the Central Committee of the CPC for the maintenance of their men were extremely insignificant and covered no more than the students' travelling expenses as far as Vladivostok.¹³³ They were fully provided for by the Soviet State right from their arrival in Vladivostok and up to their return to China. The university administration and the Soviet Government cared even about the families of worse-off students in China. A Mutual Assistance Fund was set up to maintain the families of the dispossessed students at the UWPC. Some of the fund was made up of monthly deductions from the students' scholarships, yet it was the university that contributed the bulk of it.¹³⁴ Great attention was also given to children born in the USSR to the University graduates who were to return to China for clandestine work and so had to part with their families for a time.

In spite of the dire straits it was in, the Soviet state, at the cost of a tremendous exertion, did everything possible to create normal conditions for the Chinese students to live and study.

Even recreational facilities were well organized for them. The best of ballet and opera companies and famous stage actors performed at the university community centre. During their holidays, they were free to go either to holiday centres or to a summer student camp at Tarasovka, a village just outside Moscow. Besides, they had guided tours arranged for them to see the sights and museums of Moscow or journeys to Leningrad and even to the Crimea and the Caucasus.¹³⁵ "We", Sheng Youe recalls, "enjoyed every summer both as foreign tourists and as members of the big Soviet family".¹³⁶

Principal attention, naturally, was given to providing the requisite academic facilities. In doing so, the university's administration was drawing on the experience of the Communist University of the Toilers of the East. The staff of both colleges had one concern—to make the most effective arrangements for classes, work out special methods of teaching for an audience

that was still under a heavy ideological influence of patriarchal national traditions and, as stated earlier on, was little familiar not only with Marxist teachings, but even with the terminology of contemporary social, political and economic sciences. Of course, the level of the initial general education of the students was rather different. But at the CUTE and the UWPC-CUWPC, students who had not even the most elementary knowledge, coming principally from the families of workers and the poorest of peasants, were studying side by side with graduates of Chinese colleges and universities, like the Beijing National University of Law and Political Sciences, the Sun Yatsen University of Guangzhou, Shanghai University and even ex-students of foreign schools of university rank, as the Göteborg University, Sorbonne, the French-Chinese Institute in Lyons,¹³⁷ the Labour University in Charleroi (Belgium)¹³⁸ and elsewhere. However, as noted above, the Marxist theoretical education of that category of Chinese students was also unsatisfactory.

The CUTE and UWPC-CUWPC students were divided into several academic groups for instruction in accordance with their different knowledge levels. For example, those of the Chinese sector at the CUTE were grouped in seven circles (5-6 men in each), and those at the Sun Yatsen University—in eleven 30-40 men).^{138a} Such a division was dictated by the students' age and Party status, apart from the level of their general education. For instance, in 1926-1927, the UWPC had a so-called "Theoretical Class" comprising leading officials of the Guomindang and the CPC, including Deng Xiaoping.¹³⁹ A special circle was organized in 1928 for CPC members over 40-50. Among them were Wu Yuzhang, Lin Boqu, He Shuheng, Xu Teli and Ye Jianying.¹⁴⁰

Both universities had preparatory departments (like workers' faculties) to provide preliminary training for little prepared prospective students.

The CUTE and the UWPC-CUWPC had accelerated instruction groups—special circles of translators formed principally of the most endowed students. The translators had special classes arranged for them. They were supplied with outlines and synopses of lectures as well as specialist literature. Student translators were attached either to the Chairs or to individual circles. There were two translators at the CUTE in 1921—Li Zungwu and Qu

Qiubo (the latter assisted at lessons of social disciplines).¹⁴¹ The accelerated instruction groups at the UWPC-CUWPC included Wang Ming, Dong Yixiang, Sheng Youe, Yu Xiusung, Yang Shangkun and same others.¹⁴² Sheng Youe and Yang Shangkun worked also as translators at the Chair of the History of Social Systems.¹⁴³

The high demand of the revolutionary movement for trained forces made it imperative of instruction to be limited to a very short term. Originally, the CUTE ran seven-month course and a three-year term from the 1922/23 academic year on, and a four-year course from 1927-1928. Instruction at the UWPC went on for two years, and the projected course at the CUWPC was three years.¹⁴⁴

The Sun Yatsen University had an extremely crowded curriculum. Its major department provided instruction in the following key subjects: Russian and a Western language (English, German or French), History of the Chinese Revolutionary Movement, History of the Russian Revolution, History of Eastern Revolutionary Movements, History of Western Revolutionary Movements, History of the Evolution of Social Formations, Philosophy (Dialectical and Historical Materialism), Political Economy (the essential requirement was to know Karl Kautsky's work "The Economic Doctrine of Karl Marx"), Economic Geography, a Special Course of Leninism.¹⁴⁵ Roughly the same subjects were studied at the CUTE which, besides, offered a course of the History of the CPSU(B) and the History of the Communist International.¹⁴⁶ Linguistic training was extremely intensive. During the first term, the students studied Russian six days a week, four hours a day. The object of the lessons was to teach the students to read social and political texts and to talk on these subjects, which was extremely important for the young revolutionaries. Great attention was given to military training. Students were not only studying the theory of military art but had some practice at military camps outside Moscow. The high standard of such training was acknowledged by many Huangpu graduates who learned of how this kind of instruction was organized at the university.¹⁴⁷

The preparatory department provided instruction in Chinese, history, geography, arithmetics and social sciences.¹⁴⁸

The teaching staff of the CUTE and the UWPC-CUWPC

comprised the best professors available in Moscow, mostly those who had graduated from the Institute of Red Professors¹⁴⁹ and the Sverdlov Communist University.¹⁵⁰ In 1922-1923, the CUTE, for instance, had 165 lecturers and "circle leaders", including 28 professors, and in 1925-1926 the university had a teaching staff of 146.¹⁵¹ The Communist University of Working People of China had a teaching staff of over 150 in 1928.¹⁵²

A special system of instruction, consisting of four stages, was worked out by the professors and the staff of the CUTE and the UWPC-CUWPC. In the first stage professors gave lectures pointing out to students what they should note down. The lectures were followed up by homework—the students studied the requisite literature recommended by their teachers. Controversial and unclear questions were discussed during classroom consultations. In the third stage, the professors individually asked students the questions they were supposed to answer without preparation. Then came a dispute in which the teacher acted only as an intermediary, while the debate was conducted by the students themselves who were quite often defending different viewpoints. The teacher wound it up.¹⁵³ So CUTE and UWPC-CUWPC teachers were giving their students a certain amount of information on the subjects they were to study and at the same time trained them to think for themselves, express their views clearly and distinctly and make out their case with good arguments to bear them out.

Chinese students often had top officials of the Executive Committee of the Comintern and the Profintern and of the Central Committee of the CPSU(B), speaking before them. They heard such personalities as N. K. Krupskaya, A. Lozovsky, D. Z. Manuilsky, W. Pieck, J. V. Stalin and Sen Katayama. The students met with CPC leaders who came to Moscow, such as Deng Zhongxia, Qu Qiubo, Zhang Guotao and Zhou Enlai, who kept the students informed of the situation in China, gave lectures and talks.

The organization of effective instruction of Chinese revolutionaries was hampered by a shortage of contemporary political, philosophical and economic literature in Chinese. That made it necessary for the educational institutions where students from China were trained to organize a special effort to compile manuals and other similar literature intended for Chinese rea-

ders. They also had to arrange for the requisite publications to be translated into Chinese and reprinted. The first steps were taken to this end as early as 1921. Under instructions from the Rector of the Communist University of the Toilers of the East, G. I. Broido, CUTE circle leaders and translators, including Russian-speaking Chinese, were obliged to translate lectures.¹⁵⁴ Such practice was extensively applied later on at the UWPC and the CUWPC. Translated lectures and sometimes synopses were circulated in all kinds of ways: passed round in scrolls, duplicated, copied in wall newspapers. A special collection of translated lectures was issued at the CUTE in 1925.¹⁵⁵ A widespread practice was to publish translations in the Chinese-language *Jianjin bao* (Forward) newspaper which appeared in Moscow late in 1925 and early in 1926. It was nominally the mouthpiece of the Preparatory Committee for Organizing the Association of Chinese Emigrés in Russia, while being actually produced by Chinese CUTE students. The editor was Yu Lun (the penname of Liu Bouzian, subsequently prominent leader of the Communist movement in China). The circulation of some issues (altogether 20 issues appeared) came up to between 3,000 and 6,000.

Along with the translation of lectures, an extensive effort was under way at the CUTE and the UWPC-CUWPC to organize the translation into Chinese of works by Marx, Engels, and Lenin, documents of the Comintern and of the CPSU(B), and writings by propagandists of Marxism. Originally, students from China made up brief synopses and summaries of Lenin's works,¹⁵⁶ and then passed on to regular classes of translation. Their translations were published mostly as pamphlets produced by screening at the CUTE and the UWPC-CUWPC printshops as well as pamphlets and books in the Chinese Worker Publishing House which was, to all intents and purposes, a subsidiary of the State Publishing House (Gosizdat).

To keep Chinese students informed of the basic documents of the Comintern, the CPSU(B) and the CPC, of international affairs and the progress of socialist development in the Sun Yatsen University issued, besides, a special Chinese journal *Guoji pinglun* (International Review) which, by content, resembled the Comintern's International Press Correspondence while the CUWPC published an information journal *Meizhou*

yaolan (Weekly Review) and also *Gunchan zazhi* (Communist Journal) which carried works by leaders of the Chinese Communist Party and materials about the CUWPC.

The staff and students both at the CUTE and at the UWPC-CUWPC as well as at the research establishments attached to them carried on a large amount of research. In 1922-1923, the CUTE had an office of social sciences which was a branch of the National Scientific Association of Orientalogy. In the spring of 1924, the CUTE set up an office of Orientalogy and colonial policy, which concentrated its efforts on making up an Orientalist library. The latter was designed, first of all, to serve the academic process. It had 5,000 books stocked up in 1926 in spite of a dire book shortage. The office received the latest Orientalist publications in Western and some in Oriental languages as well as 123 periodicals, including 82 magazines and 41 newspapers.¹⁵⁷ Periodicals were coming from China, too. Chinese students studied hard under the guidance of the office staff. In 1926, they helped put out a collection of charts illustrating the economy and imperialist exploitation of China.

The so-called newspaper circles, originally established at the CUTE, were one of the ways used to attract students to research activity. In 1927, there were five national circles of that kind, including a Chinese one. The students were digesting some factual material coming from China and making up news bulletins, charts and cartograms.¹⁵⁸ In January 1925, the CUTE set up a Research Group to enlist the services not only of professors of history but also of students at the top of the group. The group published a Declaration about the need to collect material, process it and pass it on for discussion, translation into foreign languages and publication.¹⁵⁹ Chinese students were invited to co-operate.

A National and Colonial Research Association (NCPRA) was organized, with that group as its backbone, in November 1927. During two years of its operation within the CUTE framework,¹⁶⁰ the Association played a great role in promoting the academic process at the University and contributed towards getting it going at the UWPC-CUWPC. The NCPRA conducted Marxist-Leninist research into the social and economic problems of the East and prepared teaching and research staffs for Oriental Communist universities, including

the CUTE and the UWPC-CUWPC. It had two sections, one dealing with the Soviet East and the other, with the Foreign East. In 1929, the latter drew up a course of instruction on Xinjian to be given not only at the CUTE but also at other academic institutions.¹⁶¹

Speaking of research as it was organized at the Sun Yatsen University, it is worth noting that it had a Sinology Unit established soon after it had been founded. The plan the unit was working on comprised compiling a glossary, digesting two latest works on the history of China (including one by the outstanding exponent of the Chinese reformation movement, Liang Qichao) and preparing press reviews and other things.¹⁶² On January 1, 1928, the Sinology Unit was reorganized into a China Research Institute attached to the UWPC.¹⁶³ Both the unit and the institute had a considerable number of Chinese students engaged in research. They worked in co-operation with the best of Marxist-educated Sinologists like M. Volin (the first Director of the China Research Institute, in charge of a history group), S. A. Dalin (he was in charge of the Sinology Unit in 1927), P. A. Mif (who succeeded Volin as Director of the China Research Institute), M. G. Andreev, M. M. Kazanin, G. S. Karamura, and G. B. Erenburg, to name just a few.

Soviet members of the staff of the China Research Institute and the UWPC—CUWPC carried on extensive work in co-operation with Chinese students to resolve complex problems of reforming the Chinese written language.¹⁶⁴ University staff also attempted to standardize contemporary socio-political and socio-economic terms of the Chinese language.¹⁶⁵ A lithographically printed Sino-Russian dictionary, which is still considered one of the best of its kind, was compiled and issued in 1927 under the direction of V. S. Kolokolov, a leading member of the staff of the China Research Institute.

A major element of the Marxist-Leninist training of Chinese students was the party political work launched with support and assistance from Soviet Communists with a view, first and foremost, to convincing the students that they were on the right track and to cultivate their fervent devotion to the cause of the revolution. The abolition of the Moscow branches (district committees) of the CPC and the Chinese Young Communist League, whose leaders, like many of the early followers of Commu-

nism in China, had adhered to ultra-leftist views on the questions of ideological and theoretical training of the membership and party-building, in the summer of 1926, had a favourable effect on party work. The theory and practice of the top officials of those district committees have gone down in history as "raphaelism" (after the assumed name of one of the leaders of the Moscow branch of the CPC in 1925-1926, Ren Zhuoxuan—Raphael.¹⁶⁶ It had another name—"Moscow Regionalism".¹⁶⁷

Prominent Chinese economist Sun Yefang (known also as Sung Liang, who studied in the USSR in the mid-1920s) quoted Ren Zhuoxuan in 1941 as having claimed, in particular, that "theoretical study is the concern of party leaders only".¹⁶⁸ A special programme, drawn up by the "Raphaelists", called "A Concrete Guide to the Work of Training"¹⁶⁹, designed to regulate all aspects of life of the members of the Moscow branches of the CPC and of the Young Communist League of China, actually banned Chinese students from "wasting time" studying theory. The extreme nationalism of the "Raphaelists" showed itself in that the Chinese revolutionaries who were just beginning to study scientific socialism were not permitted even to learn Russian. Now, regarding the principles of internal party life, the "Concrete Guide to the Work of Training" asserted textually the following: "We should destroy family, local, and national concepts . . . Destroy unity based on sentiments—sentimental unity is petty bourgeois—We build our unity on Party interests . . . We must employ in our work for the Party the same kind of interest we have in love and literature—Love and literature are the foundation of romanticism".¹⁷⁰ How amazingly similar this statement is to the comments by Bakunin and Nechaev in the "Revolutionary Catechism": "The revolutionary is a dedicated man. He has neither personal interests, nor affairs, nor feelings, nor attachments, nor property, nor even a name. . . All feelings of affection, all the softening feelings of kinship, friendship, love and gratitude must be stifed in him by a unique and cold passion for the revolutionary cause. . . The nature of the true revolutionary excludes all romanticism, all sensitivity, all enthusiasm, and all involvement".¹⁷¹

With "Raphaelism" defeated, a special role in Party educational work began to be reserved for public party meetings and study circles on current political affairs in which practically all

students participated. The meetings and circles discussed all the major issues of international life and socialist development in the USSR, resolutions of the Comintern congresses and ECCI plenary sessions, and the decisions of the congresses and conferences of the CPSU(B) and CPC, and the main problems of the internal life of the Universities themselves. The debates usually resolved themselves into heated discussions, largely due to the well-thought-out conduct of the circle leaders and speakers at the meetings, normally members of the university staff and of the CPSU(B). Anyone engaged in the debate was free to state any opinion he liked provided he had scientific arguments to bear it out. The meetings were of great educational value, all the more so since, as I stated earlier on, the forms of the ideological battle inside China's political parties remained extremely backward in the context of the undeveloped social structure of Chinese society.

Internationalist education was a major aspect of the Party work which members of the CUTE and UWPC—CUWPC staff carried on among the Chinese revolutionaries. Both universities were real schools of proletarian internationalism. The men who were in charge always gave paramount attention to overcoming any form of ethnic strife among the students, rightfully presuming that "young Communists of the countries going through the age of primitive accumulation, with weak Communist organizations just a few years old, and few proletarian forces or none at all, cannot avoid being nationalist".¹⁷²

One of the ways of bringing students of different ethnic backgrounds together at the CUTE, where Chinese were studying side by side with working people of nearly a hundred nationalities,¹⁷³ was what came to be known as an 'information trio'. There was, for example, an information trio composed of representatives of the Korean, Japanese and Chinese sectors. One of its objectives was to arrange an exchange of opinion between members of different sectors on matters concerning the academic process and university life as well as on the problems of the region. The trio's major priority was to promote the co-operation of the students of the three sectors "for subsequent joint work in the Far East".¹⁷⁴

UWPC students were in close contact with the multilingual staff of the CUTE. The students of both universities met in

joint sessions to mark various anniversary dates in the life of the Chinese people, gave recitals and staged theatricals. For example, the CUTE and UWPC students gathered together three times in the first half of 1926. Their first meeting in the CUTE community centre was devoted to the third anniversary of the February 1923 strike of the workers of the Beijing-Hankou Railway. The meeting they held on February 7 was attended by students of over 70 nationalities, apart from the Chinese. On March 12, the multiracial student body of the CUTE and the UWPC assembled again, this time in commemoration of the anniversary of Sun Yatsen's death. A little later representatives of both universities attended a meeting to see off Hu Hanmin, an influential Guomindang leader, who was leaving for Moscow.¹⁷⁵ CUTE students as well as those of other educational institutions of Moscow—the Sverdlov Communist University, the Markhlevsky Communist University of Western Ethnic Minorities¹⁷⁶ also often attended lectures at the UWPC, particularly those given for the entire student body—on the history of the Chinese revolutionary movement and the history of social formations.¹⁷⁷

An important element of the internationalist education of Chinese youth was numerous student organizations at the CUTE and UWPC-CUWPC—community centres, academic and educational councils, boards of monitors, executive boards, health and physical training councils, mutual assistance funds, auditing commissions and courts of honour. The internal organization of both universities was built on the principles of a commune. The chairman and other officials of a commune were elected at a general membership meeting. They were responsible for keeping discipline, assisting the administration in economic and other affairs, organizing student recreation and publishing wall newspapers. The communes had mutual assistance funds at their disposal.¹⁷⁸

Throughout the period of their stay in the Soviet Union, the Chinese students felt deep friendship on the part of Soviet people. Sheng Youe recalls the tremendous enthusiasm and joy of Soviet working people welcoming news about the National Revolutionary Army of China moving into Shanghai on March 22, 1927: "A wave of joy seemed to sweep across Russia", Sheng Youe writes. "There were meetings of celebration in Leningrad, Kharkov, Odessa, Kiev, and many other cities, some of the congratulatory messages of which were published in *Pravda*",¹⁷⁹

The Soviet people's friendly disposition, their fraternal assistance and solidarity with the Chinese Revolution were a major factor of the internationalist education of Chinese students. During their stay in Soviet Russia most of them gained a good deal of experience in actual vocational and technical work at industrial enterprises in Moscow. The CUWPC administration, for example, unequivocally set themselves the task of enabling students who had no trade at all to learn those of spinners, weavers, fitters and electricians. Apart from working at Moscow's plants and factories, CUWPC students trained in mechanical and engineering shops within the framework of the university itself. The CUWPC curricula reserved a certain amount of time for the students to learn factory trades.¹⁸⁰

Along with actual work at factories, Chinese students participated in educational and propaganda activities, as well as trade union and YCL work at enterprises. In the 1926/27 academic year, for example, CUTE students were assigned, in agreement with the Krasnaya Presnya District Committee of the CPSU(B), to 24 metal-working, chemical, printing and other establishments whose party organizations helped them gain a certain amount of experience in organizing the masses.¹⁸¹

The students were trained and educated amid hectic ideological and political controversy. A certain influence was exercised on some of the students by the Trotskyite opposition which operated first overtly until the end of 1927 and then covertly at international schools. A Trotskyite underground organization was formed within the UWPC in August 1928.¹⁸² It maintained close contact with the underground Trotskyite leadership in Moscow and received direct instructions from it. Its supporters staged meetings and debates and contributed their articles to wall newspapers, seeking to make the students distrust the course of the Comintern and the decisions of the ECCI-led Sixth Congress of the CPC and strove to rally all the disgruntled, doubting and wavering individuals behind themselves. The 'Trotskyites' struggle against the Comintern attracted for a time some members of the CPC and YCL who studied at the Sun Yatsen University and succumbed to a feeling of despair and pessimism following the defeat of the Revolution of 1925-1927. The Trotskyites teamed up with the so-called University Workers Oppositionists consisting of students of working-class background displeased

with a crowded curriculum as well as some nationalistically-minded members of the CPC and the Guomindang¹⁸³ and "vanguardists" of the YCL.¹⁸⁴ The latter were, as a matter of fact, trying to get out of the control of the party bodies, speaking out for the Young Communist League to play some "vanguard" role vis-à-vis the Party.

An unfavourable effect was produced on students by certain tactical mistakes of some Comintern leaders who largely adhered to "left"-sectarian views on the role of the national bourgeoisie in the Chinese Revolution and the social character of the Guomindang and overestimated the level of the capitalist development of China and the degree of the class self-awareness of the working masses.¹⁸⁵ A "left"-sectarian influence on Chinese students was exercised by the Indian revolutionary M. N. Roy¹⁸⁶ who spoke before the students of the CUTE and the UWPC.¹⁸⁷ What made it easier for his ideas to produce their effect was, in particular, that the Chinese Communists were urged to give preference to a study of Roy's views, as recorded in the Comintern's "Supplementary Theses", adopted by the Second Congress of the Comintern, by Stalin who repeatedly insisted on the CPC proceeding from Roy's theses rather than Lenin's precepts.

Once in Soviet Russia, a new world that was in a state of flux and quest, Chinese youth could not avoid experiencing the strongest emotion and impatience. "A youngster from the East", Qu Qiubo wrote, "full of ardent hopes, fragile, weak in body and soul, was overwhelmed by the entire diversity of new impressions and new sounds".¹⁸⁸ The Chinese actively supported all new and unusual forms of student organizations—communes, courts of honour, numerous clubs and circles. All that, unquestionably, produced a positive effect on students, contributed towards spreading communist influence among them and stimulated social activity. At the same time, young revolutionaries had a burning desire to do the same thing that had been done in Russia in their own country by whatever way they could. Such an ambition quite often led Chinese youth, who had not enough experience and knowledge, to develop leftist and reckless aspirations.

Leftist sentiments were likewise stimulated by the fact that resolutions and decisions of the Comintern, used in the process of instruction provided for Chinese students, were not quite

accurate and sometimes even distorted in a leftist sense.¹⁸⁹

There were certain shortcomings in the academic process, too, the principal one being the inadequacy of Oriental, above all, Chinese material in the curricula. According to N. N. Timofeeva, the CUTE had come right up to resolving the problem of "orientalizing" social and economic disciplines only upon the creation of the NCPRA (i.e., at the end of 1927).¹⁹⁰ Oriental problems accounted for only 35% of the course of general history at the CUTE even in the 1935/36 academic year (10% in preceding years).¹⁹¹ That circumstance, resulting as it did from the overall inadequacy of the Marxist analysis of the social and economic development of Oriental countries at the time, could not but lead to the students more effectively learning and digesting the material on the history and social evolution of the countries of the West than those of the East, and were often prone to certain scholastic tendencies.

The latter circumstance, however, was quite natural. It was, as a matter of fact, an indication of the inevitable stage of the theoretical progress of Chinese revolutionaries who had generally grasped the essence of the ideas of Marx and Lenin during their term of instruction but had not completely realized the creative character of the most advanced social theory. Now, an aptitude for a flexible application of the Marxist method to the specific conditions of the revolutionary struggle was developed by the best representatives of the Chinese Communist movement later on as they got more involved in revolutionary activities at home. It had taken years of persistent struggle, gains and failures for the knowledge acquired at the educational institutions of Soviet Russia to be transplanted from the realm of theory into the plane of political practice.

However, that detracts nothing from the value of the assistance which the Comintern and the CPSU(B) lent to the Chinese Revolution in the theoretical training of the Marxist hard core and in the ideological and organizational evolution of the Communist Party of China.

The international schools of the USSR played a great part in propagating Marxism among radical Chinese youth and contributing towards extensive penetration of the ideas of the October Revolution into China. They were the best educational insti-

tutions by the standards of the day which trained competent leadership of the communist and national liberation movements in that country. One will be perfectly justified in applying to them the comment made by the *Qianjin bao* newspaper addressed to the UWPC: "The Sun Yatsen University is a product of the October Revolution, it is unique and has nothing to match it in history. In the narrow sense of the word, it is the training ground to produce fighters for the liberation of the Chinese nation and, in the larger sense, it is a powerful impulse for the Chinese and world revolutions".¹⁹² The operation of these schools can rightfully be regarded as an important landmark not only in the history of Soviet-Chinese friendship but also in the history of the national liberation and Communist movements in China. It is in Soviet Russia that quite a number of young Chinese coming to Moscow to study for the first time absorbed advanced social ideas and joined the revolutionary struggle. Many non-party democrats and left Guomindang supporters joined the Communist Party while studying in Moscow.

The assistance which the Comintern and the CPSU(B) lent to the Chinese Revolution in leadership training and the persistent and thoughtful work with the Chinese revolutionaries who were studying in the USSR proved to be one of the most important factors in promoting the evolution and advancement of the Marxist-Leninist and internationalist trends in the CPC. The help given by the international movement of Communists to the heroic people of China in every stage of their struggle conclusively attests to the effect of proletarian internationalism seen by Communists as a principle which demands "first, that the interests of the proletarian struggle in any one country should be subordinated to the interests of that struggle on a world-wide scale, and, second, that a nation which is achieving victory over the bourgeoisie should be able and willing to make the greatest national sacrifices for the overthrow of international capital."¹⁹³

¹ V. I. Lenin, "The Second Congress of the Communist International", Vol. 31, pp. 243-244.

² V. I. Lenin, "The Chief Task of Our Party", Vol. 27, p. 161.

³ Sun Yatsen (1866-1925)—a great Chinese revolutionary democrat, the first President of the Chinese Republic.

⁴ Yuan Shikai (1859-1916)—a major Chinese militarist, the second

President of the Chinese Republic; he established a regime of military dictatorship.

- ⁵ See V. I. Glunin, "The CPC in the National Liberation Movement of the 1920s (for the Sixtieth Anniversary of the CPC)", *Narody Azii i Afriki*, 1979, No. 6, pp. 36-47.
- ⁶ For more details about the spread and reception of Marxism in China in modern times see L. N. Borokh, "Reception of Western Sociological Ideas in China (the early 20th century)", *Narody Azii i Afriki*, No. 6, 1979, pp. 36-47, L. P. Delyusin, *Dispute About Socialism in China*, Moscow, 1980; V. A. Krivtsov, V. A. Krasnova, *Li Dazhao. From Revolutionary Democratism to Marxism-Leninism*, Moscow, 1978; A. G. Krymov, *Social Thought and Ideological Battle in China (1900-1917)*, Moscow, 1972; M. A. Persits, "The Preparatory Stage of the Communist Movement in Asia", *The Revolutionary Process in the East. History and Modernity*, Moscow, 1982, pp. 38-76 (all in Russian).
- ⁷ Mao Zedong, "The Course of the Seventh Congress", *Hungqi*, No. 14, 1981, p. 4.
- ⁸ V. I. Lenin, "Notes of a Publicist", Vol. 33, 1973, p. 206.
- ⁹ See Zhang Jinglu, "Chronology of the Publication of Major Works by Marx and Engels in China", *Xin jianshe*, No. 5, 1953, pp. 20, 21; Zhang Yungui, "Chronology of Lenin's Works in Chinese", *Lishi yanjiu*, No. 4, 1960, p. 48.
- ¹⁰ See *A Review of Periodicals of the May 4 Movement Period*, Vol. I, Beijing, 1958, pp. 444, 446 (in Chinese).
- ¹¹ See A. G. Krymov (Guo Shaotang), "Social Thought and Ideological Battle in China in 1917-1927", Abstract of a Doctoral Thesis, Moscow, 1962, p. 23 (in Russian).
- ¹² Li Dazhao, *Selected Articles and Speeches*, Moscow, 1965, p. 63 (in Russian).
- ¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 81.
- ¹⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 87-97.
- ¹⁵ See A. G. Krymov, *op. cit.*, pp. 336-337.
- ¹⁶ The May 4 Movement of 1919 was an anti-imperialist (and, ideologically antifeudal) mass movement in China in the wake of the October Revolution in Russia.
- ¹⁷ The Xinhai Revolution of 1911-1913 was a bourgeois revolution in China, which brought down the Manchurian Qing Empire.
- ¹⁸ The movement of a new culture was launched by advanced Chinese intellectuals in 1915. It was directed against the sway of feudal ideology.
- ¹⁹ *Lectures on the history of the CPC*, Vol. I (Wuhan), 1982, p. 14 (in Chinese).
- ²⁰ Bing Bing, "Bibliography of Marx's Doctrine". For the Society for the Study of Social Sciences in Nanjing, *Zhongguo Qingnian*, No. 24, 1924, p. 4.
- ²¹ F. Bebel, "Great Ideas of the October Revolution and China", *World Economics and International Relations*, No. 10, 1967, p. 136 (in Russian). It is worth noting that the major works of Marx and

- Engels were translated in Russia 20 to 30 years before the formation of the RSDLP—in the late 1860s and 1870s.
- ²² Liu Shaoqi, "Speech in the Palace of Sport", Moscow, December 7, 1960; *Pravda*, December 12, 1960.
- ²³ Qu Qiubo, *Travel Notes on New Russia. Writings on Current Public Topics*, Moscow, 1979, p. 34 (in Russian).
- ²⁴ Sheng Youe (pen names: Sheng Zhongliang and Mickiewicz) joined the Chinese communist movement in the mid-1920s while an undergraduate at the Beijing National University of Legal and Political Sciences. In 1926-1930 he attended classes at one of the Soviet Union's international universities. Back in China, he shared the leadership of the Shanghai CPC organization. Upon being arrested by the Guomindang in 1934, he betrayed the cause of communism.
- ²⁵ Sheng Youe, *Sun Yatsen University in Moscow and the Chinese Revolution. A Personal Account*, Centre for East Asian Studies, The University of Kansas, New York, 1971, p. 63.
- ²⁶ For details about the translation of major Marxist documents see: A. V. Pantsov, "Documents of the Second and Fourth Congresses of the Comintern on the National and the Colonial Questions and their Distribution in China (1920-1924)", *National and Social Movements in the East*, Moscow, 1986, pp. 23-58 (in Russian).
- ²⁷ For details see: Y.Y. Stabutova, *Anarchism in China. 1900-1921*, Moscow, 1983; K. V. Shevelev, "The Formation of the Communist Party of China" (1917-1921), Master's Thesis, Moscow, 1974 (both in Russian); *Biographic Dictionary of Chinese Communism. 1921-1969*. Vol. I, by Donald W. Klein, Anne B. Clark, Harvard University Press, Cambridge (Mass.), 1971; E. Snow, *Red Star over China*, London, 1937; Zhang Guotao, *The Rise of the Chinese Communist Party*, Volume One of the Autobiography of Zhang Guotao, Lawrence, 1971, pp. 42, 44, 50, 90, 110.
- ²⁸ For example, "socialism" was translated late in the 19th century and early in the 20th century by such phrases as "anmin xue" (science of reassuring the people), "saihui" (reward society), "saidang" (reward party), "renquinzhui" (mass principle). The term "she-huizhui" (literally, social principle) appeared in 1902; it is still in use as equivalent of "socialism" (see: L. N. Borokh, *Perception of Western Sociological Ideas in China. Early 20th century*, pp. 37, 40). For a review of translations of various social and political terms into Chinese, see also: V. G. Gelbras, "Class: Fact or Fiction?", *The Working Class and the Modern World*, No. 2, 1974, pp. 130-141; A. A. Krushinsky, "The Meaning of 'Geming' in Modern Political Texts", *The Eleventh Scientific Conference "Society and State in China". Theses and Papers*, 1980, pp. 199-205; A. V. Pantsov, "CPC Debate over 'Mao Zedong's Ideas', *The Working Class and the Modern World*, No. 3, 1982, pp. 44-47; Y. Y. Staburova, "Followers of Marxism and Anarchists in China (1919-1921)", *China. Search of Ways of Social Development*, Moscow, 1979, p. 133 (all in Russian).

- ²⁹ See V. G. Burov, *Modern Chinese Philosophy*, Moscow, 1980, p. 110 (in Russian).
- ³⁰ R. Felber, "Li Dazhao's Attitude to the Traditions of Old China", *China: Society and State*, Moscow, 1973, p. 229 (in Russian).
- ³¹ See V. I. Glunin, *The Comintern and the Rise of the Communist Movement in China (1920-1927)*, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1979, pp. 280-344; L. P. Delyusin, *Dispute about Socialism in China*, Moscow, 1980 (in Russian); *Lectures on the History of the CPC*, Vol. I (Wuhan), 1982, pp. 15-16 (in Chinese).
- ³² V. I. Lenin, "Address to the Second All-Russia Congress of Communist Organizations of the Peoples of the East, November 22, 1919", Vol. 30, 1965, p. 162.
- ³³ *The Communist Movement in China*, An Essay Written in 1924 by Chen Kungpo. Ed. With an introduction by C. Martin Wilbur, 1966, Octaron Books, Inc., New York, p. 129.
- ³⁴ *Rabochee delo* (Workers' Cause) was a group of supporters of "economism"—an opportunist trend in Russian Social Democracy, grouping around a magazine of the same name, published in 1899-1902 by the League of Russian Social Democrats abroad.
- ³⁵ V. I. Lenin, "What Is To Be Done?", Vol. 5, p. 369.
- ³⁶ "The Revolutionary Catechism" was the charter of the Russian anarchist society *Narodnaya rasprava* (People's justice), believed to have been written by M. A. Bakunin and S. G. Nechaev.
- ³⁷ *The Hague Congress of the First International. September 2-7, 1872. Minutes and Documents*, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1976, p. 579.
- ³⁸ At that time the phrase "democratic centralism" was translated into Chinese as "minzhude jiquanzhui" (literally, the principle of democratic one-man rule). (See *Resolutions and Declarations of the Fourth Congress of the CPC*, 1925, p. 96 (in Chinese).)
- ³⁹ A new translation of the term "democratic centralism"—"minzhu jizhuzhizhi" (literally, the system of democratic concentration). (See *The Constitution of the CPC*, Moscow, 1928, p. 2 (in Chinese)).
- ⁴⁰ *The Communist Movement in China...*, *op. cit.*, p. 130.
- ⁴¹ See *Biographies of Personalities of the History of the CPC*, Vol. 8. Xian, 1983, p. 87 (in Chinese); Xu Juezai, "Developments Arising from the Spread of Marxism in China", *Xin shiqi*, No. 11, 1981, p. 27.
- ⁴² *Cadres, Commanders, and Commissars. The Training of the Chinese Communist Leadership, 1920-1945*, by Jane L. Price, Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado, 1976, p. 41.
- ⁴³ See S. Kalachev, "Whampoa (for the Fourth Whampoa Output—October 1926)", *Canton*, No. 1 (10), 1927, pp. 160-187; M. Yuriev, "How the Communist Party of China Trained Revolutionary Army Leadership (1924-1927)", *Collected Articles on the History of Far Eastern Countries*, Moscow, 1952, pp. 43-54 (all in Russian); *Pages from the History of the Whampoa Military Academy (1924-1927)*, Guangzhou, 1982 (in Chinese); Zhou Enlai, *Selected Works*, Vol. I, Beijing, 1981, pp. 151-159.
- ⁴⁴ See A. M. Malukhin, *The Chinese Peasantry in the Revolution of*

- 1925-1927, Moscow, 1974, pp. 107-108; M. F. Yuriev, *The Revolution of 1925-1927 in China*, Moscow, 1968, pp. 144-147 (both in Russian).
- ⁴⁵ See *An Analysis of Newspapers and Magazines of the Communist Party of China*, Tokyo, 1976, pp. 17-75 (in Japanese); *Resolutions and Declarations of the Fourth Congress of the CPC*, p. 87.
- ⁴⁶ See *Dangbao*, May 20, 1924; *Resolutions and Declarations of the Fourth Congress of the CPC*, pp. 86-100; *The Communist International*, No. 11, 1925, pp. 90, 94; *Resolutions of the Third Enlarged Plenary Session of the Central Executive Committee of the CPC*, 1926, pp. 24-35 (in Chinese); *Xiangdao*, No. 194, 1927, p. 2102.
- ⁴⁷ See *The Constitution of the CPC*, p. 4.
- ⁴⁸ *Resolutions and Declarations of the Fourth Congress of the CPC*, pp. 87, 88-89.
- ⁴⁹ See *Resolutions of the Third Enlarged Plenary Session of the Central Executive Committee of the CPC*, pp. 47-48.
- ⁵⁰ See "Meeting of the Enlarged ECCI Eleventh Session, Moscow, Nov. 28, 1926. The Situation in China", *International Press Correspondence*, 30th December 1926, Vol. 6, No. 91, pp. 1589-1592.
- ⁵¹ See *Xiangdao*, No. 194, 1927, p. 2102.
- ⁵² *Verbatim Report of the Sixth Congress of the CPC*, Book 4, Moscow, 1930, pp. 16-17.
- ⁵³ See *Novy Mir*, No. 4, 1959, p. 115 (in Russian); M. A. Persits, "Eastern Internationalists in Russia and Some Questions of the National Liberation Movement (1918-July 1920)", *The Comintern and the East. The Struggle for the Leninist Strategy and Tactics in National Liberation Movements*, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1979, p. 73; N. A. Popov, "Chinese Units in Defence of the Soviet Republic During the Civil War (1918-1920)", *Voprosy istorii*, No. 10, 1957, p. 110; V. M. Ustinov, "Chinese Communist Organizations in Soviet Russia (1918-1922)", *Chinese Volunteers in Battles for Soviet Power (1918-1922)*, Moscow, 1961, p. 39 (all in Russian).
- ⁵⁴ *Zhizn natsionalnostei*, February 2, 1921.
- ⁵⁵ *Izvestia*, September 22, 1918; A. F. Osetrov, "The Great October Revolution and Chinese Workers in the Soviet Ukraine", *Narody Azii i Afriki*, 1967, No. 2, pp. 81-86; N. A. Popov, *Chinese Units in Defence of the Soviet Republic in the Civil War*, p. III; V. M. Ustinov, *Chinese Communist Organizations in Soviet Russia*, p. 41 (all in Russian).
- ⁵⁶ *Pravda*, December 15, 1918.
- ⁵⁷ M. A. Persits, *Eastern Internationalists in Russia and Some Questions of the National Liberation Movement...*, p. 87; N. A. Popov, "Chinese Proletarians in the Civil War in Russia", *Chinese Volunteers in Battles for Soviet Power (1918-1922)*, Moscow, 1961, p. 35 (in Russian).
- ⁵⁸ *The Eighth Congress of the CPSU(B), March 1919*, Minutes, Moscow, 1959, p. 498 (in Russian).
- ⁵⁹ *Izvestia Tsk RKP(B)*, July 17, 1921; V. M. Ustinov, *Chinese Com-*

Communist Organizations in Soviet Russia, p. 45. By the Central Committee's decision of September 2, 1920, the Central Organizing Bureau of Chinese Communists was transferred to Chita, the Far East, where it was reorganized at about the same time into the Organizing Bureau of Chinese Communists under the Far Eastern Bureau of the Central Committee of the CPSU(B) (See M. A. Persits, *Eastern Internationalists in Russia and Some Questions of the National Liberation Movement...*, p. 102).

⁶⁰ N. A. Popov, *Chinese Units in Defence of the Soviet Republic in the Civil War*, p. 120; by the same author, *Chinese Proletarians in the Civil War in Russia*, p. 35 (both in Russian).

⁶¹ V. M. Ustinov, *Chinese Communist Organizations in Soviet Russia*, p. 44 (in Russian).

⁶² *Pravda*, June 30, 1920.

⁶³ The first Chinese Communists who appeared in Russia at the time had a very weak background in theory. They did not see that the short-term prospect in China was for a national, rather than socialist, revolution. They thought an external, military factor to be basic to that revolution (for more on that see the article by M. A. Persits in this book).

⁶⁴ Quoted from M. A. Persits, *Eastern Internationalists in Russia and Some Questions of the National Liberation Movement...*, p. 103.

⁶⁵ See V. M. Ustinov, *Chinese Communist Organizations in Soviet Russia*, p. 45 (in Russian).

⁶⁶ See M. A. Persits, *Eastern Internationalists in Russia and Some Questions of the National Liberation Movement*, p. 114.

⁶⁷ Liu Qian, no biography available.

⁶⁸ M. A. Persits, *Eastern Internationalists in Russia and Some Questions of the National Liberation Movement...*, p. 114.

⁶⁹ Yang Mingzhai arrived in Russia before the overthrow of tsarism. After the October Revolution he joined the CPSU(B). In 1920 under instructions from the Vladivostok Branch of the CPSU(B), he accompanied, as interpreter, a group of high Comintern officials sent to China to contact the revolutionary movement. He worked in Moscow until 1927, and then was one of the CPC leadership in Tianjin. Liu Changsheng (he was known also under another assumed name, Luo Ying; his true name was Wang Xiangbo, 1904-1967) arrived in Russia in 1922. He worked as a stevedore in Vladivostok and was active in the local transport workers' union. He was a member of the CPSU(B) from 1923, and a member of the CPC from 1928. Alternate member of the Seventh CPC Central Committee and a full member of the Eighth CPC Central Committee. Vice-Chairman of the All-China Federation of Trade Unions from 1953 to 1967. He was killed by hungweibings on January 20, 1967.

⁷⁰ One of the central government bodies of the RSFSR and the USSR in 1917-1924.

⁷¹ *Zhizn natsionalnostei*, May 28, 1921.

⁷² Intensive training of Chinese Party and government officials for work within the Chinese community in Russia went on in the

meantime. An International Institute of Education was opened for the purpose in Vladivostok in 1931. It had two departments: Chinese and Korean, (see *Vestnik Dalnevostochnogo otdeleniya AN SSSR*, Nos. 1-2, 1932, p. 34.

- ⁷³ *The Second Congress of the Communist International. Proceedings of the Petrograd Session of July 17th, and of the Moscow Sessions of July 19th—August 7th 1920*, Publ. Office of the Communist International, Moscow, 1920, p. 146.

⁷⁴ *Zhizn natsionalnostei*, January 13, 1921.

- ⁷⁵ *Pod znamenem Ilyicha*, May 8, 1926. According to other sources, the decision to inaugurate a special Party and government school for working people of outlying Eastern provinces was taken by the Central Committee of the CPSU(B) back in January 1921 (see *Zhizn natsionalnostei*, January 26, 1921).

- ⁷⁶ *Ibid.* On April 18, 1924, the CUTE was placed under the auspices of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR, following the abolition of the People's Commissariat for the Affairs of Nationalities. From 1929 to 1937 (right up to its reorganization) it was under the control of the National and Colonial Problems Research Association, and in 1937-1938—under the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR. The CUTE was closed down in 1938.

- ⁷⁷ See *Zhizn natsionalnostei*, May 22, 1921; *Collected Ordinances and Regulations of the Workers' and Peasants' Government*, Moscow, No. 36, 1921, p. 194; *Pod znamenem Ilyicha*, May 8, 1926.

- ⁷⁸ *Zhizn natsionalnostei*, May 14, 1921.

- ⁷⁹ See *Zhizn natsionalnostei*, May 22, 1921; *Pod znamenem Ilyicha*, May 8, 1926. It is worth noting that by the time the CUTE was opened, there already existed educational establishments in Soviet Russia which provided Marxist-Leninist training for activists of the national liberation and communist movements in the countries of the Near and Middle East. For instance, a Socialist Eastern Academy was opened to this end in Baku in 1920 (see *Kommunist* (Baku), October 15, 1920). The first group of students completed their term of instruction at the advance courses of the Eastern Action and Propaganda Council in mid-January 1921 (see *Zhizn natsionalnostei*, March 17, 1921). The CUTE, however, was the first school for systematic training of revolutionaries from most Eastern countries, including China.

- ⁸⁰ The reorganization of the UWPC into a Communist higher school (reshaping of curricula, political party work, modification of the rules of admission) dragged on right up to the beginning of the 1929/30 academic year (See G. V. Yefimov, "From the History of the Communist University of Working People of China", *Problemy Dalnego Vostoka*, No. 2, 1977, p. 173.

- ⁸¹ *Gungchan zazhi*, No. 1, 1920, p. 5.

- ⁸² The University's Chinese name was changed only once, in 1928. Until the autumn of 1928, it was "Sun Zhungshan daxue" ("Sun Yatsen University"), and then "Zhungguo laodong gungchanzhui daxue" ("Communist University of Working People of China").

- ⁸⁶ See N. N. Timofeeva, *The Communist University of the Toilers of the East (CUTE), 1926-1938*, *Narody Azii i Afriki*, No. 5, 1979, p. 41.
- ⁸⁷ See N. N. Timofeeva, *The Communist University of the Toilers of the East (CUTE) (1921-1925)*, *Narody Azii i Afriki*, No. 2, 1976, p. 52.
- ⁸⁸ See M. A. Persits, *Eastern Internationalists in Russia and Some Questions of the National Liberation Movement*, p. 115.
- ⁸⁹ See N. N. Timofeeva, "The Communist University of the Toilers of the East (CUTE), 1926-1938, p. 40 (in Russian).
- ⁹⁰ See *Sun Yatsen University in Moscow and the Chinese Revolution*. A Personal Account by Sheng Youe, Centre for East Asian Studies, The University of Kansas, New York, 1971, p. 71.
- ⁹¹ The Red International of Trade Unions (Profintern), an international federation of revolutionary trade unions. Existed in 1921-1937.
- ⁹² Sheng Youe, *op. cit.*, p. 66.
- ⁹³ For example, Feng Wulan, the daughter of Feng Yuxiang, Commander of the so-called People's Army, had her training at the Moscow Aviation Factory in the latter half of the 1920s (see Sheng Youe, *op. cit.*, p. 137).
- ⁹⁴ See A. M. Grigoriev, *The Revolutionary Movement in China in 1927-1931 (Problems of Strategy and Tactics)*, Moscow, 1980, p. 271 (in Russian).
- ⁹⁵ "Vystrel" (Shot)—higher courses for officers, established in 1918 for retraining commanding and political officers of the land forces.
- ⁹⁶ Quoted in: R. A. Mirovitskaya, *The Soviet Union and the CPC (Late 1920s—Early 1930s). Experience and Lessons of the History of the CPC (for the Party's Sixtieth Anniversary)*, p. 202 (in Russian).
- ⁹⁷ R. A. Mirovitskaya, *op. cit.*, p. 202.
- ⁹⁸ The united national front in China in 1924-1927 rested on the co-operation of the National Revolutionary Party of the Guomindang and the Communist Party.
- ⁹⁹ The Central Executive Committee of the USSR was the Soviet Union's top policy-making body in 1922-1935 between the All-Russia Congresses of Soviets which elected it.
- ¹⁰⁰ See Ciu Laozhen (Bao Huiseng), "Before and After the Formation of the Communist Party of China" (Published by Y. M. Garushyants), *Rabochii klass i sovremennyy mir*, No. 2, 1971, p. 120; *Renmin ribao*, August 14, 1983; Xiao Jingguang, "Before and After Training in the Land of Soviets", *Geming shi ziliao*, Beijing, No. 3, 1981, p. 6 (in Chinese); D. Klein, A. Clark, *Biographic Dictionary of Chinese Communism*, Vol. 1, p. 241, Vol. 2, p. 982.
- ¹⁰¹ See Xiao Jingguang, "Before and After Training in the Land of Soviets", p. 6.
- ¹⁰² *Ibid.*, p. 7.
- ¹⁰³ See Ciu Laozhen, *Before and After the Formation of the Communist Party of China*, p. 121.
- ¹⁰⁴ D. Klein, A. Clark, *Biographic Dictionary of Chinese Communism*, Vol. 2, p. 983.

- ¹⁰⁹ The post-war business recession in Western countries and the drastic fall of the demand for Chinese labour were also an important factor behind the changed character of this movement. (For more details about the "Diligent Work and Judicious Learning" movement in Western Europe, see Y. Y. Staburova, *Anarchism in China*, pp. 106-114 (in Russian); *Pages from the History of the "Diligent Work and Judicious Learning" Movement in France*, Beijing, 1979 (in Chinese).
- ¹¹⁰ See Li Rui, *The Start of Comrade Mao Zedong's Revolutionary Activity*, Beijing, 1957, p. 145 (in Chinese); Xiao Jingguang, "Before and After Training in the Land of Soviets", p. 6.
- ¹¹¹ Xiao Jingguang, "Before and After Training in the Land of Soviets", p. 6.
- ¹¹² See Jiang Kanghu, *Travel Notes About New Russia*, Shanghai, 1923, p. 35 (in Chinese); N. N. Timofeeva, *The Communist University of the Toilers of the East (CUTE) (1921-1925)*, p. 50 (in Russian). *Pod znamenem Ilyicha*, April 26, 1924.
- ¹¹³ "The relative dominance of intellectuals in the early days of the movement was to be observed everywhere and not only in Russia" (V. I. Lenin, "How Vera Zasulich Demolishes Liquidationism", *Collected Works*, 1977, p. 394).
- ¹¹⁴ See *Sun Yatsen University in Moscow and the Chinese Revolution. A Personal Account by Sheng Youe*, Centre for East Asian Studies, The University of Kansas, New York, 1971, p. 18.
- ¹¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 16.
- ¹¹⁶ See V. I. Glunin, *The CPC and United Front Tactics, 1921-1924* (manuscript), p. 114 (in Russian).
- ¹¹⁷ For example, a little over 200 out of the original 340 (students reached the UWPC by February 1926 (see *Qianjin bao*, February 12, 1926).
- ¹¹⁸ See *Unbending Communists*, Vol. 4, Beijing 1984, p. 309 (in Chinese). *Sun Yatsen University and the Chinese Revolution...* by Sheng Youe, pp. 21-22.
- ¹¹⁹ See Xiao Jingguang, "Before and After Training in the Land of Soviets", pp. 13-14; Jiang Zemin, "Days of Diligent Work and Judicious Learning in France and Belgium", *Geming shi ziliao*, Beijing, No. 3, 1981, p. 80; D. Klein, A. Clark, *Biographic Dictionary of Chinese Communism*, Vol. 2, p. 912.
- ¹²⁰ See *Sun Yatsen University and the Chinese Revolution...*, by Sheng Youe, p. 102.
- ¹²¹ See Jiang Zemin, "Days of Diligent Work and Judicious Learning in France and Belgium", p. 84.
- ¹²² See S. A. Dalin, *Chinese Memoirs. 1921-1927*, Moscow, 1975, p. 176 (in Russian).
- ¹²³ See *Sun Yatsen University in Moscow and the Chinese Revolution*, by Sheng Youe, pp. 30, 137-138, 147.
- ¹²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 67.
- ¹²⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 45-46.
- ¹²⁶ See G. V. Yefimov, *From the History of the Communist University*

- of China, p. 173 (in Russian).
- ¹²¹ Ibid.
- ¹²² The first (40) UWPC students left the University in the spring of 1927, several months ahead of the end of the term. They were called upon by the Executive Committee of the Comintern to go to China with ECCI representative M. N. Roy and a member of the Politburo of the CPC Central Committee, Tan Pingshan.
- ¹²³ The Nanchang Uprising was started by Communists in the units of the National Revolutionary Army of the Guomindang in Nanchang, Jiangxi Province, on August 1, 1927. It was a reaction to the Guomindang's disruption of the united front.
- ¹²⁴ The "Autumn Harvest" uprisings were a series of actions organized by the CPC in villages of Central and South China in the autumn of 1927. Along with the Nanchang Uprising, they marked off the Soviet period of the Chinese Revolution.
- ¹²⁵ See A. M. Grigoriev, *The Revolutionary Movement in China in 1927-1931*, p. 161 (in Russian); *Sun Yatsen University in Moscow and the Chinese Revolution*, by Sheng Youe, p. 49.
- ¹²⁶ Sheng Youe, *op. cit.*, p. 42.
- ¹²⁷ Ibid., p. 79.
- ¹²⁸ Estimated from: D. Klein and A. Clark, *Biographic Dictionary of Chinese Communism*, Vol. 2, pp. 1056-1057.
- ¹²⁹ G. V. Yefimov, *From the History of the Communist University of Working People of China*, p. 170 (in Russian).
- ¹³⁰ See Sheng Youe, *op. cit.*, p. 42.
- ¹³¹ See *ibid.*, p. 51.
- ¹³² See *ibid.*, pp. 51-52.
- ¹³³ Ibid., p. 29. Quite often the Chinese side avoided bearing any of the expenses to provide for the students. In December, 1926, the Guomindang government could not even pay the 3,000 yuan required for the trainees selected by the Guomindang Central Executive Committee to be sent to Moscow (see S. A. Dalin, *Chinese Memoirs*, p. 292) (in Russian).
- ¹³⁴ Sheng Youe, *op. cit.*, p. 52.
- ¹³⁵ See *ibid.*, pp. 82-84, 91-92.
- ¹³⁶ See *ibid.*, p. 92.
- ¹³⁷ This institute was created in the autumn of 1921 by Chinese anarchists under the "Diligent Work and Judicious Learning" programme in France (for details see Y. Y. Staburova, *Anarchism in China*, pp. 111-112. It had upwards of a hundred students from China, including some later-to-be prominent CPC leaders, such as Cai Hesun, Li Lisan, Li Weihsan, Chen Yi, and Xu Teli.
- ¹³⁸ The Labour University in Charleroi was established by Belgian Socialists for Belgian workers' children. Yet its administration threw its doors wide open to young Chinese who were offered free lodging and had special preparatory courses set up for them (for details see Jiang Zemin, *Days of Diligent Work and Judicious Learning in France and Belgium*, pp. 74-84). Some CPC leaders, who rose to promi-

nence later on, such as Nie Rongzhen and Liu Bojian, received their training there.

¹³⁸ *Pod znamenem Ilyicha*, April 26, 1924; G. V. Yefimov, *From the History of the Communist University of Working People of China*, p. 172 (in Russian).

¹³⁹ Sheng Youe, *op.cit.*, p. 69.

¹⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 71.

¹⁴¹ Both Qu Qiubo and Li Zungwu (the latter was also known as Li Zhungwu) arrived in Moscow as early as January 1921 as correspondents of the Beijing newspaper *Chen bao* (Morning). (See Xiao Jingguang, "Before and After Training in the Land of Soviets", p. 11; Jian Kanghu, *Travel Notes About New Russia*, p. 35 (both in Chinese); D. Klein and A. Clark, *Biographic Dictionary of Chinese Communism*, Vol. 1, p. 241.

¹⁴² *Renmin ribao*, August 14, 1983; Sheng Youe, *op. cit.*, p. 77.

¹⁴³ *Sun Yatsen University in Moscow and the Chinese Revolution*, by Sheng Youe, p. 77. This course was taught in the first year, and was an indispensable introduction to all social sciences—history, political economy, and philosophy—for students who had a weak background in Marxism (see S. A. Dalin, *Chinese Memoirs*, p. 176).

¹⁴⁴ See N. N. Timofeeva, *The Communist University of the Toilers of the East (CUTE) (1921-1925)*, p. 50; *Pod znamenem Ilyicha*, May 8, 1926; G. V. Yefimov, *From the History of the Communist University of Working People of China*, pp. 171, 174 (in Russian); *Qianjin bao*, December 18, 1925; *Sun Yatsen University in Moscow and the Chinese Revolution*, by Sheng Youe, p. 61.

¹⁴⁵ See Sheng Youe, *op.cit.*, pp. 61-65.

¹⁴⁶ See *The Communist University of the Toilers of the East*, Collection of Assignments No. 2, Moscow, 1930, p. 48; N. N. Timofeeva, *The Communist University of the Toilers of the East (CUTE) 1926-1938*, p. 31.

¹⁴⁷ Sheng Youe, *op. cit.*, p. 65.

¹⁴⁸ See *ibid.*, p. 75.

¹⁴⁹ The Institute of Red Professors functioned in 1921-1931 as a higher school which trained teachers of social sciences as well as research, party and government staff.

¹⁵⁰ The Sverdlov Communist University was the first educational establishment in the Soviet Republic to train party and local government staff. It existed from 1919 to 1932.

¹⁵¹ See N. N. Timofeeva, *The Communist University of the Toilers of the East (CUTE) (1921-1925)*, p. 50; N. N. Timofeeva, *The Communist University of the Toilers of the East (CUTE), 1926-1938*, p. 34 (both in Russian).

¹⁵² See Sheng Youe, *op. cit.*, p. 51.

¹⁵³ See *ibid.*, pp. 80-81.

¹⁵⁴ See G. Broido, "The Communist University of the Toilers of the East", *Zhizn natsionalnostei*, January 26, 1921.

¹⁵⁵ See *Lectures on Political Economy* (Written down by Chinese students of the CUTE), Moscow, 1925 (in Chinese).

- Some translators—graduates of the UWPC—have, on their return home, even published translations of lectures under their own names, as did, for instance, Han Lianxian, a former UWPC student. The preface to his publication was written by a noted Guomindang leader, Hu Hanmin (See Sheng Youe, *op. cit.*, p. 57).
- ¹⁵⁶ See N. N. Timofeeva, *The Communist University of the Toilers of the East (CUTE)*, 1921-1925, p. 54.
- ¹⁵⁷ See N. N. Timofeeva, *The Communist University of the Toilers of the East (CUTE)*, 1926-1938, p. 35.
- ¹⁵⁸ *Pod znamenem Ilyicha*, April 26, 1924; *Revolutsionny Vostok*, No. 1, 1927, p. 134.
- ¹⁵⁹ N. N. Timofeeva, *The Communist University of the Toilers of the East (CUTE)*, 1921-1925, p. 54.
- ¹⁶⁰ Late in 1929, the NCPRA was separated from the CUTE to be constituted as a major Soviet informal professional organization.
- ¹⁶¹ See N. N. Timofeeva, *The Communist University of the Toilers of the East (CUTE)*, 1926-1938, pp. 35-38.
- ¹⁶² See G. V. Yefimov, *From the History of the Communist University of Working People of China*, p. 175 (in Russian).
- ¹⁶³ See V. N. Nikiforov, *Soviet Historians on the Problems of China*, Moscow, 1970, p. 127 (in Russian).
- ¹⁶⁴ Wu Yuzhang was one of the first to consider a reform of the Chinese written language at the UWPC and at the China Research Institute. Upon graduation from the University in 1930, he worked for a time as instructor of the Soviet Party School for Chinese workers in Vladivostok, being a member of a district committee for the Latinization of the Chinese written language, and directed the Chinese section of the movement for the abolition of illiteracy. In the meantime, he compiled a handbook and a Latinized dictionary of the Chinese language on the basis of the Beijing dialect. In 1931, he participated, along with Lin Boqu and Liu Changsheng, in the First Conference on the Latinization of the Chinese Written Language in Vladivostok. From 1955 right up to his death (in 1966) Wu Yuzhang was Chairman of the Chinese Written Language Reform Committee under the State Council of the PRC.
- ¹⁶⁵ Sheng Youe, *op. cit.*, p. 4.
- ¹⁶⁶ Ren Zhuoxuan studied and worked in France in the early 1920s. It is there that he must have joined the Chinese Communist movement. In 1925-1926, as a student, first of the CUTE and then of Sun Yatsen University, he was Acting Secretary of the Moscow Branch of the CPC. In 1927, approximately a year after he returned to China, he left the Party and moved over to a counter-revolutionary position. In the 1930s and 1940s, he appeared, under the pen-name of Ye Qing, as a "theorist" of Chinese Trotskyism.
- ¹⁶⁷ This name was used, in particular, at the 6th Congress of the CPC (see *Verbatim Report of the 6th Congress of the CPC*, Book 4, p. 2) (in Russian).
- ¹⁶⁸ "Comrade Sung Liang's Letter to Comrade (Liu) Shaoqi", Liu

Shaoqi, *On the Party (Collected Articles)*, Dalian, 1947, p. 345 (in Chinese).

¹⁶⁹ For the full text of the document translated into English, see *Documents on Communism. Nationalism and Soviet Advisers in China, 1918-1928*, Ed. by C. M. Wilbur, New York, 1972, pp. 135-137. ¹⁷⁰ Ibid., p. 135.

¹⁷¹ Quoted from: *The Hague Congress of the First International, September 2-7, 1872, Minutes and Documents*, pp. 599-600.

¹⁷² "G. Broido's Reply to M. Safarov", *Pod znamenem Ilyicha*, February 7, 1924.

¹⁷³ N. N. Timofeeva, *The Communist University of the Toilers of the East (CUTE), 1926-1938*, p. 32.

¹⁷⁴ *Pod znamenem Ilyicha*, February 23, 1924.

¹⁷⁵ See *Qianjin bao*, February 12, 1926, March 19, 1926.

¹⁷⁶ The Markhlevsky University of Western National Minorities, which functioned from 1921 to 1936, trained people of Western ethnic backgrounds inhabiting the USSR as political leadership.

¹⁷⁷ See S. A. Dalin, *Chinese Memoirs*, p. 176; Sheng Youe, *op. cit.*, p. 35-36.

¹⁷⁸ See N. N. Timofeeva, *The Communist University of the Toilers of the East (CUTE), 1921-1925*, p. 55.

¹⁷⁹ Sheng Youe, *op. cit.*, p. 120.

¹⁸⁰ See G. V. Yefimov, *From the History of the Communist University of Working People of China*, p. 174.

¹⁸¹ See *Revolutionny Vostok*, No. 1, 1927, pp. 136-137.

¹⁸² Sheng Youe, *op. cit.*, pp. 166-167.

¹⁸³ Chiang Kaishek's son, Jiang Jingguo, was one of the most active members of the Trotskyite opposition at the UWPC.

¹⁸⁴ Sheng Youe, *op. cit.*, pp. 209-226.

¹⁸⁵ For details, see V. I. Glunin, "The Comintern and the Rise of the Communist Movement in China (1920-1927)", *The Comintern and the East. The Struggle for the Leninist Strategy and Tactics in National Liberation Movements*, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1979, pp. 280-344; *The Communist International. A Short History*, Moscow, 1969, p. 264 (in Russian); K. K. Shirinya, *The Strategy and Tactics of the Comintern in the Struggle Against Fascism and War (1934-1939)*, Moscow, 1979, p. 101 (in Russian).

¹⁸⁶ M. N. Roy (1892-1948) was active in the Comintern since 1920. He was an alternate member of the ECCI from 1922 and a full member from 1924. He produced his own leftist "solution" to the national-colonial question. Expelled from the Comintern late in the 1920s.

¹⁸⁷ From one of M. N. Roy's speeches before the students of the UWPC and the CUTE, see *Qianjin bao*, February 12, 1926.

¹⁸⁸ Qu Qiubo, *Selected Writings* (translated from the Chinese), Moscow, 1975, p. 26 (in Russian).

¹⁸⁹ For details see A. V. Pantsov, *Documents of the Second and Fourth Congresses of the Comintern on the National and Colonial Questions and Their Circulation in China (1920-1924)* pp. 35-36, 43-46.

- ¹⁹⁰ See N. N. Timofeeva, *The Communist University of the Toilers of the East (CUTE)*, 1926-1938, p. 36.
- ¹⁹¹ Ibid., p. 40.
- ¹⁹² *Qianjin bao*, December 18, 1925.
- ¹⁹³ V. I. Lenin, "Preliminary Draft Theses on the National and the Colonial Questions", *Collected Works*, Vol. 31, p. 148.

THE LEFT FORCES AND THE ISLAMIC REGIME IN IRAN (1979-1983)

By S. L. Agaev

With the national democratic struggle gaining in scope and intensity in the developing countries, the Communists and other left forces have to tackle fundamentally new problems which do not lend themselves to customary solutions. The new, sometimes unmatched situations arising in some countries require a special theoretical study which has often to be made during the course of day-to-day revolutionary battles and an intense ideological struggle. The simultaneously growing importance of the policy of rallying all national patriotic forces together within a united progressive front makes it imperative for the Communist and Workers' parties to do their best to discover the particular ways and means of contributing towards the ideological evolution of the left-radical organizations in the direction of revolutionary democratism and that of revolutionary democrats in the direction of scientific socialism.

The achievement of these objectives is hampered, as a rule, by the low level of the social consciousness of the masses and often by the involvement in the revolutionary movement of some conservative-minded political forces which quite frequently secure a leading role for themselves rather easily in these conditions. However, the relapses of dogmatism and sectarianism which are possible in situations of this kind as well as other mistakes of a theoretical, tactical and strategic character detract nothing from the heroism and self-sacrifice of the left parties and organizations and their boundless devotion to the cause of the national and social emancipation of the working people of their respective countries.

A large-scale anti-monarchist and anti-imperialist revolutionary movement got under way in Iran in early 1978, involving practically all social groups, except a sprinkling of the big finan-

cial and industrial bourgeoisie closely connected with the Shah's court and transnational corporations. The united front that had been spontaneously established to oppose the monarchy and American imperialism brought together the workers of modern and traditional (artisan and semi-artisan) enterprises, traditional urban middle classes (small-time and medium businessmen, tradesmen and handicraftsmen), the "new" middle classes (those of "liberal professions", scientific and technical staffs, employees of the public and private sectors, and students), marginal elements (such as hawkers, pedlars, day labourers, etc.), "career" rag-tag proletarians and numerous masses of rural migrants, knocked out of their villages in the last decade by the Shah's agrarian reforms, who had either joined the already overcrowded urban underground world or found refuge and support in the communities formed by mosques. It is the last two groups, which had just awakened to political life but were not yet versant in politics and were unlettered for the most part that constituted the main strike force of the revolution.

Because of that and a number of other natural factors,¹ the revolutionary movement in Iran followed religious slogans and developed under the direct control of the Muslim (Shiite) clergy. In the specific conditions that had developed in the country, this interclass social group turned out, at a certain stage, to be capable of expressing the immediate demands of the national democratic struggle, connected with the elimination of the monarchy and imperialist domination, in a form that was the easiest for the masses to grasp. The powerful, if spontaneous, drive of large sections of the people for social justice and a major overhaul of public life in keeping with distinctive national and cultural traditions found expression in the slogans of the "Islamic Republic" and "universal Islamic justice", which had been put forward by religious leaders.

However, the national democratic aspirations of the masses were expressed by the clergy, naturally, as much as they reflected, their own corporative interests. Those interests consisted, however, in creating such social conditions as could perpetuate the foundations of the social and economic status of the ministers of religion and keep them in political control. That predetermined the major distinguishing features of the action programme of the clergy—anti-Western (traditionalist and largely even fun-

damentalist) in its main thrust, Islamic integrationist by its political content and petty-bourgeois-populist by its social orientation. These distinguishing features showed themselves in full measure upon the achievement of the short-term goal of the revolutionary struggle—the deposition of the Shah's regime; but even after that they showed themselves sometimes in such a form as to be easily identified in the public mind with a commitment to consistent anti-imperialism, building up the alliance of all popular forces and assuring common well-being.

The unity of different elements of the clergy, based on their common corporative interests, did not, naturally, prevent them from having their intrinsic contradictions which were a more or less adequate reflection of social antagonisms. The clergy could be clearly seen to be divided into an extremist radical group, conservative centre, a moderate liberal wing and all other political currents that existed in society. But the presence of real common foe, the Shah's regime, and of a potential one—among those social-political forces in the revolutionary camp which could oppose the political supremacy of the clergy and the implementation of their action programme, prompted most religious leaders to restrain, at least, their internal strife, if not to compose their differences. The close cohesion of the clergy was a major condition of effective struggle for the achievement of its ultimate objectives and—as an indispensable component—for the consolidation of the Islamic political movement that was taking shape under the auspices of the ministers of religion and incorporating representatives of practically all social groups.

Now, the heart and soul of this most powerful political movement in Iran was the Ayatollah (otherwise known as Imam) Ruhollah Mousawi Khomeini who not only successfully regulated the relationship of the centripetal and centrifugal tendencies among the various groups of the clerical camp, but became a near absolute arbiter of the "balance of forces" that had developed in the country between the Islamic and other political trends—liberal and left.

The liberal movement—generally pro-bourgeois but with various shades of domestic and foreign policy orientation (ranging from pro-Western to nationalist)—was made up primarily of representatives of the "new" urban middle classes whose specific interests rather markedly diverged from the aspirations of the

clergy. Some of them held purely secular positions while others regarded the Shiite brand of Islam as no more than a cultural tradition, an expression of national identity and, accordingly, the "facing" of what was, essentially, a liberal democratic regime after Western (bourgeois) or social-democratic models. The ideal of Shiite theocracy, cherished by the clergy, though clothed in modern forms of parliamentary representation, repelled not only the manifestly pro-Western right-wing liberals, not only the left-liberal (nationalist and socio-democratic in spirit) circles but also the Islamic-minded centre liberals.

The right-wing trend within the liberal camp had totally discredited itself in the last couple of months that the monarchy was still there. The consent of Shahpur Bakhtiar, the leader of the pro-Western right-wing liberals, to accept the post of Prime Minister offered to him by the Shah and his attempts to stem the revolutionary wave "from above" received no open support even among the majority of the liberals who preferred to join the common front of the anti-Shah and anti-imperialist struggle in the context of the mounting nation-wide popular movement. In the social aspect, Bakhtiar's policy reflected the interests of big and medium business whose representatives spoke up for continued capitalist development, but without the political excesses of the Shah's authoritarian regime.

The left movement—generally, a popular, anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist movement—was formed essentially of representatives of the educated urban classes and various sections of working people connected, in one way or another, with modern or near-modern forms of production. The incomplete process of capitalist differentiation of society and the consequent immaturity of class contradictions predetermined the diversity of the left movement which, along with the Marxist-Leninist People's Party of Iran (Tudeh), comprised different paramilitary youth organizations which were in various stages of evolution from left radicalism to revolutionary democratism. The most important among them were the "Self-Sacrificing Guerrillas of the Iranian People" (Fedayeen) and "Fighters for the Sacred Cause of the Iranian People" (Mojahedin). Small left-radical factions broke away from these organizations at every turn of the revolutionary struggle in the conditions that had developed in the country, adding to what was already a motley spectrum of left-

extremist forces which did not, however, have any social weight to speak of.

The People's Party of Iran (PPI)—the country's oldest party—represented the most organized contingent of the left forces, though considerably weakened by reprisals. Banned since 1949, it had to shift the centre of its activity abroad in the early 1950s. For about fifteen years, the Tudeh Party, taking advantage of any opportunity to engage in the anti-monarchist and anti-imperialist struggle, supported and spread all of Ayatollah Khomeini's pronouncements against the Shah and US imperialism. Having resumed its practical activities in the country with the start of the revolutionary movement, the Tudeh Party declared that it was totally behind all the (anti-Shah and anti-imperialist) revolutionary initiatives of the clergy and recognized, wholly and entirely, the Imam's leading role in the Revolution. The Party's top priority was party-building which it had to carry on in the difficult conditions of the revolutionary struggle.²

The organization of the Fedayeen, which had taken shape in the latter half of the 1960s in the context of the guerrilla struggle against the Shah's regime, declared itself to be an "independent Marxist-Leninist" group. To make out its case for armed methods of struggle, it argued that it had to take the working class and other anti-dictatorial and anti-imperialist forces out of the state of "apathy and indifference", show them the vulnerability of the Shah's regime and thereby contribute towards their organizing, advancing their political understanding and going over from passive support for the embattled guerrilla vanguard to active involvement in combat operations.³ However, from the latter half of the 1970s, the Fedayeen drastically reduced the scale of their armed action, concentrating on underground political activities. In the revolution that had developed from 1978 on, they combined their participation in nation-wide peaceful demonstrations with local armed actions. Yet, all the time they had to oppose the attempts of the clergy to keep them isolated from the mainstream of the anti-Shah struggle. In their statements they emphasized the importance of "ideological pluralism" in the revolutionary movement since "any claim to monopoly over our revolution would only result in undermining" it.⁴

The organization of the Mojahedin, which had been formed at about the same time as the organization of the Fedayeen and which had traversed just about the same road from guerrilla fighting to underground political activity and back again to local armed actions,⁵ tried right from the start to "unite" the dogmas of the Islamic religion with the precepts of Marxism, recognizing it as a "guide to action"; and for that reason it was called "Islamic-Marxist". Although on the eve of the revolution, the religious activists dissociated themselves from "purely" Marxist elements,⁶ the organization of the Mojahedin remained the left-most and the most democratic group at the junction of the secular and Islamic revolutionary forces. In the course of the anti-Shah struggle, the Mojahedin exhibited their unmistakable desire for a closer relationship with Khomeini's supporters, who, however, treated them with reserve—as the left that were using Islamic ideology for their own ends.

One thing that distinguished relations between the three main contingents of the left forces just before and during the anti-Shah struggle was the absence of any official contacts or tactical alliances, mutual estrangement and sometimes even ill-feeling. For example, the Fedayeen kept publicly accusing Tudeh of "right-wing opportunism" while Tudeh accused the Fedayeen of "infantile leftism". That, naturally, did not contribute to resolving what was the common problem for all left forces—that of creating a broad national and political base, while the clergy could still use what remained, in particular, of the consequences of the reformist policy of the Shah's regime among the industrial proletariat (which was incidentally, even less numerous than civil servants). Because of the characteristic uncertainty of social and class frontiers and the consequent motley political spectrum, the Islamic trend was least prone to rupture at class and political levels in virtue of its populist-integrationist programme which was easy for the public mind to grasp.

The undivided control of the revolutionary movement by the clergy was shaken only once (and not for long) during the armed uprising of February 9-11, 1979.

Khomeini was committed to a peaceful power takeover and regarded it both as a logical consummation of the methods of "militant non-violence", which he had encouraged until then, and as the best way of keeping the revolutionary tide within

Islamic banks and getting it to produce an "Islamic Republic". The driving motives were simple enough: to avoid an armed confrontation of the people with the army and a possible strengthening, in such circumstances, of the left organizations, especially the Fedayeen and the Mojahedin, which were all the time calling for armed struggle. Intense negotiations between the emissaries of Khomeini and Bakhtiar, who operated through intermediaries, with the participation of representatives of the Armed Forces, in one form or another, went on right up to February 11.⁷

However, all top-crust combinations turned out to be upset. The attempt of the Shah's Guard of "immortals" to "punish" the ground staff of an air base outside Tehran in the evening of February 9 for having been involved in popular demonstrations the day before sparked off an armed uprising in Tehran. The strike back against the "immortals", by large masses with detachments of the Fedayeen and the Mojahedin, as well as small armed groups of PPI members at their head, resolved itself into an all-out rising against the old regime.

As the rising went on, the religious quarters almost completely lost control over the situation. But once it triumphed, the clergy rather easily and quickly regained their leading positions among the revolutionary masses, who saw them as their natural leaders, and then completely cut the left forces off from the real sources of political power.⁸

The events on February 9-11, which Khomeini rather presumptuously called an "Islamic Revolution", made it quite clear once more that the balance of social-class forces at grass-roots level changed heavily in favour of the religious leadership. The strike force of the uprising—the organizations of the Fedayeen and the Mojahedin—not being political parties in the full sense of the term, found themselves ill-prepared in the new conditions to lead the masses.

So the revolution won out; power passed to Khomeini's followers.

The first day of the victory of the armed uprising turned out to be the last day of that relative unity which had existed within the Iranian political opposition throughout the entire period

of the anti-Shah revolutionary actions from January 1978 to February 1979. The unanimous joint struggle of all political organizations for overthrowing the monarchist regime gave way to a close confrontation of diversified and often conflicting concepts of Iran's republican future.

The effort to preserve the popular unity which had earlier been achieved at grass-roots level assumed added significance in the new setting. The left organizations generally (though each in its own way) strove to make this unity work for the revolutionary process to move on along the national democratic track beyond the framework of capitalism. However, the top clergy, who had established supreme control over state power, used that unity for a different purpose, to wit, for institutionalizing an "Islamic Republic" with its religious-egalitarian ideal dating from the times of the Prophet Muhammad and Imam Ali.

It was by no means a simple thing for such a purpose to be achieved in the context of a modern (or even half-modern) state which was, besides, at the height of a revolutionary upsurge. Without the aid of technocracy, the clergy could not at once lay hold on all basic instruments of running society, while attempts at establishing "order and security" indispensable for a change-over to "Islamic rule" could have discredited the religious leaders in the eyes of the revolutionary-minded masses and thereby strengthened the positions of the left forces.

Ayatollah Khomeini, unofficial Head of State, who exercised the broadest-ever and in no way limited powers, must have perfectly realized all the dangers and, equally, possibilities of the situation that had arisen. His choice of Mehdi Bazargan (engineer by training), representative of the pro-Islamic and reformist-minded centre-liberal establishment, as Prime Minister as early as February 5, 1979, gave quite a few political advantages to the clergy. Bazargan had the support not only of the greater part of liberal intellectuals, both moderate and close to the left elements, but also of market traders, small and middle businessmen, employees of public and private enterprises, and officers of the Armed Forces. That could certainly help retain overall control over the situation in the country, all the more so since the new Premier came out at once for the revolution to be terminated as the Shah's regime had been overthrown.

True, the desire to restore "order", common to the leader of the Revolution and to the Prime Minister, meant different things: it was a means for the former and an end for the latter. But that is just what gave the religious top leadership, now entrenched as sovereign power, an opportunity to use the policy of a civilian cabinet in their own interest without losing the prestige of the "fathers of the nation". So by having the Prime Minister set out to dismantle the revolutionary committees and revolutionary tribunals, which had arisen as a result of the revolutionary initiative of the masses during the course of the anti-Shah struggle, the clergy brought those primary institutions of people's rule under their full control, converting them into an instrument of the "Islamic Revolution". The same happened to the self-management committees of factory and office staffs. On the other hand, while giving undeclared support to Bazargan in restoring the old army and security agencies as instruments of stabilizing the general situation, the clergy formed their own pretorian "Islamic Revolution Corps" of unemployed youth devoted to Khomeini to the extent of self-sacrifice.

In the social field, the basic differences between the supreme religious authority and the Cabinet arose from the way they reflected the interests of small and middle commercial and business capital constituting their main class base. The policy of religious leaders expressed those interests not directly, nor consciously and consistently, but just by its general objective substance. Subjectively, for the clergy as a group anxious to uphold its right to exist, it was more important to meet the immediate needs of the mass of the people making up its main political base of support in creating an "Islamic Republic". The Bazargan government, on the other hand, was pressing for the middle and small commercial and business elements to turn to account forthwith the positive achievements of the Revolution, which the clergy had objectively helped promote but could not use in full measure because of its integrationist-populist policy.

For all the distinctions, Khomeini's Islamic populism found more or less effective expression for a while in the social reformism of Bazargan who, under pressure from the clergy, had to carry through a whole series of patriarchal, charitable and paternalist measures. Largely due to that, numerous instances of social protest which took place in the country during the first few

months after the February victory, did not amount to full-scale opposition to the authorities. All that various population groups demanded was the earliest possible satisfaction of those of their aspirations which they associated with the victorious popular revolution and which, they thought, had already found expression in the slogans of the religious leadership about "universal Islamic justice". At the same time, a number of measures of an objectively anti-imperialist character, affecting also the positions of a limited stratum of the local monopolistic bourgeoisie, were carried out within the limits of the clergy's anti-Western isolationist ambitions.

Bazargan, who originally expected to have his government rule unchallenged, tendered his resignations many times from March 1979 on in protest at the restriction of the powers allowed to him. And, indeed, the operation of all his ministries was not only controlled but often duplicated by a kind of shadow Cabinet formed of clericals. Each time Khomeini declined the requests addressed to him so as not to create favourable conditions for the opposition political forces whose relative loyalty to the Imam himself was assured just by the Bazargan government acting as a buffer. At the same time, he refrained from giving unqualified support to the Premier to avoid being equated with the government which the public accused of encroaching on the revolutionary gains, but which turned out, after all, to be no more than a helpless adjunct of the ruling clergy. Finding his way perfectly well in the dialectics of a "stabilizing conflict," Khomeini, like a rabid integrationist, would not publicly support any one of the political groups (including Islamic), leaving it to all of them to fight out the right to interpret the "Imam's line".

The extremely involved situation, which had developed in the country following the February victory, was exacerbated by general disarray at lower levels and thoroughly disguised artful political scheming in the "higher-ups". It markedly affected the situation in the left camp. The close and informal co-operation, typical of the activities of the left forces throughout the entire period of anti-Shah revolutionary action, especially in the days of the February armed uprising, did not lead to the creation of the necessary conditions for tactical, let alone organized, alliances even between the groups which followed generally similar

policy guidelines. For all the certain community of the short-term demands and ultimate objectives, the three major left forces of Iran—the Fedayeen, Mojahedin and Tudeh—abided by dissimilar political lines regarding the new regime.

The Tudeh Party declared right after the February revolution that it was ready to “earnestly support all the decisions” of the new authorities,⁹ designed to meet the immediate needs of the people, and that it based its strategy and tactics on unconditional support for the “Imam’s revolutionary, anti-imperialist line”. It sought to explain its attitude to the new regime by stressing the need to foil the plots of imperialism and the domestic counter-revolution and create opportunities for the government to meet the aspirations of the people.¹⁰ In other cases, Tudeh motivated its position by stating that Khomeini represented a “popular majority”, i.e., a united popular front spontaneously established at grass-roots level.¹¹ It was constantly emphasized at the same time that Khomeini’s “progressive views stand in no contrast to the line of the Party,”¹² indeed, were close to it. The latter argument had earlier been put forward on the grounds, notably, of a virtual “identity” of the religious concept of “homogeneous society”, not divided by any class conflicts, and the Marxist ideal of a “classless society” which can only be created through a struggle of classes.¹³ The religious leadership’s ambiguous and conflicting statements were subsequently often interpreted by Tudeh also from positions which, in its opinion, could evidently be best conducive to a leftward shift of government policy and thereby contribute to the continued development of the revolutionary process.

In its practical activities, the Tudeh Party proceeded from an analysis of the alignment of political forces, which presupposed the existence of two trends in the country—the “Islamic front” and a kind of “front for democracy”. Each of them comprised different elements: from revolutionary and radical to right-Islamic in the former, and from faithful revolutionaries and democrats to the forces favouring a compromise with the old regime and even the counter-revolution, in the latter. Since both trends were viewed as an “unnatural combination”, the task was to get them “broken up” and “disunited” so as to follow that up by bringing the similar forces closer together on a new, “natural” basis.¹⁴ In other words, the bulk of the left organizations

and all liberal groups were "included" by Tudeh within one trend just on the grounds that they stood at this juncture for the development of political democracy. Now, since the Tudeh Party itself gave priority to fighting for "social democracy", it appeared, to judge by all accounts, to present itself as a self-determined trend of scientific socialism.

This analysis of the alignment of the nation's political forces determined the peculiarity of the "united popular front" slogan launched by Tudeh right from the start as the major instrument of advancing the revolution along the "popular democratic and anti-imperialist path". The programme for setting up such a front, published in the *Mardom* newspaper, the Tudeh Party's mouthpiece, late in February, 1979, was based on support for Khomeini's initiatives in creating an "Islamic Republic". This programme, as the Party Plenary Meeting stated a few days before, was designed to "unite all forces of the Revolution—from the consistent followers of Ayatollah Khomeini to members of the Tudeh Party of Iran and other forces of the revolutionary left wing". It appealed "to all fighting groups which are following the path of Ayatollah Khomeini", to the Mojahedin, Fedayeen and other organizations and groups to consider the Party's proposals.¹⁵

So it was the unconditional support of the "Imam's line" that had to be the basis of the united popular front proposed by the People's Party of Iran. Since, however, other left forces did not respond to the Tudeh appeal, it turned to them less and less frequently as time went on. True, some of the party documents still referred for some time to the affinity between Tudeh and Mojahedin reaffirmed the desire for co-operation with them, and said that the organization of the Fedayeen consisted of "revolutionary and patriotic elements" and so on and so forth. However, from the end of 1979 on Tudeh started to rank members of political groups that did not follow "Imam Khomeini's line" among the left extremist and sectarian forces.¹⁶

Such an approach to the united front problem can be explained by the PPI leadership's judgement that there already existed a close alliance of the people's revolutionary forces, with Khomeini at their head, at grass-root level, and therefore formalizing it organizationally at political level was of no essential importance. Party leaders noted that for all the significance

of the intellectuals who constituted a privileged group under the Shah's regime, too, the Revolution "cannot progress . . . without the intervention of the great masses of the people who find themselves expressed through Khomeini and Islam. That is the fundamental problem".¹⁷ At the same time the Party leaders had stressed even before the February victory that the "composition of the 'united front' that we have proposed is of secondary importance. It is the common programme that is of paramount importance to the Tudeh Party".¹⁸

That did not, however, mean striking off the agenda the urgency of a close relationship between Khomeini as the generally recognized leader of the existing popular majority and Tudeh as the party of scientific socialism capable of providing this majority with so clear, grounded and consistent a programme that this majority needed so much. The Party leaders pointed out more than once that the united front proposed by the PPI was open to "all—from the left forces of Khomeini to the Tudeh Party".¹⁹ The *Mardom* newspaper invariably stated that "only Imam Khomeini and the Tudeh Party are genuinely anti-imperialist forces of Iran". So it was Khomeini's followers alone that, as a matter of fact, the PPI considered to be authentically left forces, apart from itself.

There was a typical interview of the Party leadership for the *Iranian* weekly in July 1979. The answer to the question: What has been the reaction to the Tudeh plan for uniting all the left parties under one standard? was: Nobody has approached us officially so far, but our programme has been virtually adopted by the other Parties mentioned, and nobody has yet declined it as impractical, irrational or anti-national. . . The reasons for which the left forces have not yet united are insignificant; you can see that because they are fulfilling our programme. Khomeini's followers provide a good example—their programme is very much like ours. We have ideological differences impeding an open political alliance. We understand that it is difficult for the traditionally anti-Communist-minded Islamic forces to co-operate with Tudeh openly. But we are satisfied that they have, as a matter of fact, turned our programme into one of all national forces. . . Therefore, we believe that such an alliance has been created and is operating.²⁰ The answer to the question: Is the present Islamic leadership progressive or reactionary? was:

The important thing for us is Khomeini's personal point of view and his policy. We consider him to be a unique personality in the history of Iran and in the Third World's struggle against imperialism. He can be compared with Nehru and Sun Yatsen. Khomeini's policy is progressive in all aspects.²¹

The Party's leadership, to judge by all accounts, felt there were realistic possibilities for winning Khomeini over to Tudeh and for a genuinely progressive evolution of the top clergy. It proceeded from the view that "pure Islam defends the rights of the oppressed strata of society" and that real social contradictions can constrain the followers of Islam to "make a certain choice" at a "certain moment". Secular leaders, such as Nasser and Qaddafi were invoked to bear out those arguments, as a rule.²² The "certain moment" must have meant a situation like the Suez crisis of 1956.

The People's Party consistently adhered to the political line it had worked out, even when all the conservative elements of the general political course of the authorities made themselves quite manifest. But it did not pass them over at all but linked the respective aspects of government policy with the Bazargan government's accommodating attitude towards imperialism and the local exploiter classes. From as early as April 1979, the Party's documents were increasingly critical of the Cabinet, yet invariably reaffirmed the Party's support for Khomeini. This kind of policy of "alliance and criticism", pursued by the People's Party from then on, was unequivocally confirmed by the members of the Politburo of the PPI's Central Committee.²³ At the same time it was noted that "the conservative aspects of the Islamic Republic are of secondary importance".²⁴

In its theoretical analysis, Tudeh proceeded from the assumption that there was "dual rule"²⁵ in the country—by the Bazargan government which had "generated a power against that of the people and the leadership of Imam Khomeini",²⁶ and the Imam expressing the demands of the revolutionary camp.²⁷ One expression of the confrontation between them, as the PPI Central Committee's statement of April 30, 1979 pointed out, was Bazargan's desire to abolish the "Islamic Revolution Corps". The detachments of that corps, created by the clergy as a counterweight not only to the old Army units but also to the guerrilla contingents of the left forces were qualified in the statement

as "the armed groups of the people" and "one of the key gains of the Revolution".²⁸ By bringing out and confronting the two lines in the policy of the nation's ruling establishment, the PPI must have aspired to stop the trend that most clearly prevented the popular revolution going deeper. In a *France Presse* interview on May 11, the Party leaders maintained that Ayatollah Khomeini was displeased with such conservative aspects of the government's activities as the preservation of major treaties and agreements with imperialism and encouragement of the private sector in the economy.

In spite of the persecution (shadowing, surveillance, arrests, raids, etc.) and harassment by Muslim extremists, the PPI strove to be well to the fore in all the activities of the Islamic political forces. And still it remained in isolation not only from the religious leadership but also from many rank-and-file members of the Islamic movement.

Neither did the position of the People's Party of Iran meet with understanding of other left forces, particularly the organization of the Fedayeen which qualified the PPI's above-quoted statements as "betrayal" of the interests of the people and "flirting" with the theocratic regime that was being established in the country. In its "Short-Term Programme", the Fedayeen demanded, in particular, that the nation's highest bodies of power should not be appointed "from the top" from among the clergy and allied intellectuals, but should be formed of representatives of local people's organizations and should include workers, peasants, civil servants, tradesmen, artisans, teachers, students and, finally, the clergy.²⁹ Just like the Mojahedin, the Fedayeen were emphatically refusing to comply with the demand of the new authorities for the surrender of weapons, declaring their intention to keep them "until the full victory of the people". The disarming of some detachments of the people and the arming of other detachments and setting Islamic groups against the left forces, said the statements and leaflets of both organizations, led to a split of the united revolutionary front and to the weakening of the democratic movement as a whole.

However, for all the community of their basic structures, semi-legal position and many policy planks, the Fedayeen and the Mojahedin had no organizational contacts of any kind—be-

cause of ideological and certain tactical differences. While the Fedayeen who considered themselves Marxists and atheists did not see any need to prop up the new regime in any way except in its objective anti-imperialist acts, the Mojahedin, who ranked themselves generally within the Islamic movement, found it possible to give a certain measure of support for the country's Islamization as they saw them as elements of the struggle against imperialism and social oppression. Yet both organizations had certain sympathy towards each other and often acted together in practice—notably at factories and in oil-fields where they sometimes joined forces in opposing Islamic committees headed by mullahs appointed “from above” instead of self-governing organizations of working people. On the whole, however, both the Fedayeen and, still more so, the Mojahedin refrained so far from any direct confrontation with the regime since, in their opinion, for all of its conservatism, it represented numerically vast sections of the people and they never questioned the authority of Ayatollah Khomeini.

Subsequently, the organizations of the Fedayeen and the Mojahedin exhibited differences of consistency in following the political course originally adopted. The Fedayeen, who considered their top priority to be to do away with the vestiges of the Shah's regime and its agents in the country, to bring pressure to bear both on the religious top leadership and the government to compel fundamental social and economic reforms, and to oppose a theocratic regime being installed in Iran, faithfully adhered to this line for months. The Mojahedin, on the other hand, while manifesting clear signs of a departure from what was about the same course, began, as early as March and April 1979, to profess their desire for co-operation with the new regime on the grounds of a common anti-imperialist struggle to defend the gains of the Revolution and advance the revolutionary process in the country. Moreover, the organization more than once expressed itself willing to place its armed contingents under the direct control of Khomeini or other religious leaders. However, the appropriate proposals remained unanswered.

The organization of the Mojahedin, which remained loyal to Khomeini but was not recognized either by him or by his government, found itself in a rather peculiar situation. Nevertheless, unlike the Fedayeen and like the Tudeh Party, it subsequently

levelled its criticisms only at the Bazargan government (and sometimes at Khomeini's entourage). All that created certain opportunities for the organization of the Mojahedin and the PPI to draw closer together; it is not by chance that the latter's leaders should have qualified the Mojahedin at the time as the "most democratic tendency" in the Islamic movement.³⁰ But there were no real changes in the relationship between these two political organizations.

The Mojahedin as well as the Fedayeen preferred in that period to make common cause with left liberal circles whose representatives, with a lawyer, Hedayatollah Matin-Daftari at their head, created a National Democratic Front (NDF) in March 1979 which was intended to bring together different political groups and trends "behind a common platform of struggle for the preservation and development of the democratic gains of the Iranian people". The Front's left-of-centre programme reflected, in a concentrated form, the basic short-term demands of the majority of liberal groups and left organizations, such as the Fedayeen and the Mojahedin. The NDF was joined by many political groups, a number of women's, student and community organizations; the Fedayeen and the Mojahedin having declared their support for the Front's positions, took an active part in most of its activities. However, in the circumstances that had developed in the country, the newly-created front could not fulfill the function it was supposed to fulfill as a really uniting centre of all of the nation's liberal democratic and left forces.

The People's Party of Iran stayed out of joint activities of left liberal and some of the left forces but, speaking through its mouthpiece, the *Mardom* newspaper, expressed its own attitude to the problem of democratic freedoms in the country which those forces were pressing for. The paper qualified such freedoms as one of the most important gains of the revolution, giving the political forces an opportunity to get actively involved in the public dialogue so essential in the context of the transitional period the country was living through, with the foundations of independence and democracy being laid. At the same time, the PPI mouthpiece did not find it possible to confirm the NDF's misgiving about the inevitability of suppression of democratic freedoms by the authorities because, it argued, Khomeini had

all along been a "defender of the people". In such conditions, the paper said, irresponsibility could divide the partisans of the revolution and play into the hands of its enemies.³¹ At the same time, the paper spoke up against what was a typical way of bourgeois liberalism in posing the abstract problem of democratic freedoms and called for using them with a sense of public duty. In that context, the paper took to task those who, on the grounds of defending the freedoms, tried to replace the struggle against imperialism by a struggle against the sway of the clergy, and urged all the parties and groups to follow the PPI's example in backing up the "popular majority" and conducting a policy of "alliance and criticism" in respect of its political leadership within reasonable limits.³²

Other left forces and left-liberal circles abided by a different point of view. NDF leaders declared at a news conference in Tehran on May 23 that the anti-imperialist movement was inseparable from the struggle for democracy and that the ambition of religious groups to obtain a "monopoly" of power was fraught with danger for the common struggle of Iran's progressive forces against imperialism and for democratic rights. In this connection, the *Mardom* newspaper assailed those left and liberal forces which, although warning about a "fascist peril", held it to mean "Khomeini's consistent anti-imperialist leadership". In the paper's opinion, however, the presence of so grave a threat to the revolution was connected not with a "progressive clergy" but with the acts of imperialism and all kinds of right and left internal forces attacking "Khomeini and Tudeh" from the right and from the left.³³

A week after that comment, early in June 1979, the authorities made public a Press Bill providing for one to three years' imprisonment for the publication of any items that might be considered injurious to the "Islamic Revolution". The Bill touched off a storm of protest in the left and liberal press which saw it as one of the dictator's ways. Even the People's Party of Iran, normally supporting all the initiatives of the country's top leadership, qualified the Press Bill as "not consistent with the purposes and spirit of the Revolution". The Bill became law on August 6, signalling a change-over from systematic pressure on the press to a total cancellation of the relative freedom of the press which had existed after the February victory.

The differences between the PPI and other left forces showed themselves also in the reaction to the measures taken by the authorities to create a new, Islamic structure of state power. The first act of the authorities in this direction was the referendum of March 30-31 in which the people were to say whether they wanted a monarchy or an "Islamic Republic"?

The People's Party, having immediately supported the idea of the referendum and declared itself for an "Islamic Republic", explained its position by insisting on the primacy of content over form and by the argument that Khomeini connected the appropriate concept with the objectives of assuring Iran's genuine independence, granting democratic freedoms to the entire people, enhancing the well-being of working people and ending oppression and exploitation. The Mojahedin took part in the voting with certain reservations. To begin with, they considered the choice that was offered to be too limited, which, in their opinion, compelled many to vote for the "Islamic Republic" only because of their hatred for the former monarchist regime. Besides, they criticized the very idea of the referendum since, they asserted, the people had, as a matter of fact, already voted against the monarchy by their participation in the Revolution. The Fedayeen, on the other hand, who considered that the religious ideal of the "Islamic Republic" had little to do with the hopes the mass of the people reposed on that concept, boycotted the referendum.

According to official estimates, there was a 92.5% turnout in the referendum, with less than one per cent voting against the "Islamic Republic".

Iran was declared an Islamic Republic on April 1, although the new regime still had neither a constitution nor any other written laws except those in the Koran and the Shariate.

The left forces tried to use the lessons of the March referendum on the eve and during the course of the elections held on August 3, 1979, for the so-called Advisory Council (or Council of Experts) designed to consider the draft Constitution before its endorsement by a nation-wide referendum (prior to the February victory, Khomeini had more than once promised that the Constitution would be adopted by a genuinely representative Constituent Assembly or Constitutional Assembly). Although the Mojahedin polled about 300,000 votes, the Fedayeen—100,000,

and the PPI—47,000, not a single left (indeed, not a single non-religious organization) got any seat on the Council due to the voting procedure adopted. It turned out to comprise almost exclusively representatives of the clergy and a few secular leaders closely connected with them. The government had to come forward with a promise to hold “in the future” an investigation of numerous complaints against vote-rigging, but it never did. Nor were there any official statistics of the exact turnout. Western press estimates put it at under 73% this time.

Right after the elections, the authorities launched their long-prepared offensive against the opposition. Since the populist-integrationist anti-Western thrust of the Islamic movement still preserved a number of points of convergence with the popular, anti-imperialist line of the left movement, the ruling clergy felt the main threat to them at this juncture came from the activities of the liberals and, notably, their left-of-centre elements trying to bring all opposition forces together behind their platform. It is not by chance, therefore, that the official offensive against the opposition should have started with a number of major reprisals against the leaders of the left-liberal trend.

But neither were the left forces “overlooked”. It was right then, in August 1979, that the authorities cracked down on the PPI, the Fedayeen and the Mojahedin, having closed down their headquarters and the editorial offices of their publications. The left organizations had to go half underground. Along with that, the armed Fedayeen groups openly joined the movement for the national autonomy of Iranian Kurdistan where the authorities had just considerably stepped up their earlier “undeclared war” against Kurdish guerrilla detachments.

However, the authorities aimed not so much at destroying the opposition of organizations altogether as at bringing them into submission by isolating and demoralizing their leadership. The possibility of all the groups of left forces definitely going over to a clandestine, illegal position—with many of them still keeping a large stock of the weapons they had never handed over to the authorities, and, more particularly, in the context of sharply intensified armed action by ethnic minorities—could have represented a greater danger to the “Islamic Republic” than their open, let alone officially conducted activities. Besides, the joint armed struggle against the regime could make for a closer consol-

idation of all left forces which would, probably, have had an adverse effect on the clergy's ability to mobilize the masses for institutionalizing the idea of the "Islamic Republic".

In an effort to secure the most favourable conditions for realizing this particular objective, the religious leadership expected to deprive the opposition by a preventive and pre-emptive strike, of any possibilities for hindering the adoption of the "Islamic Constitution".

Right from early September 1979, after, on Khomeini's instructions, the Advisory Council set about revizing the earlier relatively democratic draft Constitution with a view to making it "a hundred per cent Islamic", the authorities launched an operation to bring the "lost souls" back into the bosom of Islam.

In that context, a relatively liberal Act was passed to "purge" the Civil Service, and the ruling about some publications closed down in August began to be reconsidered.³⁴ Restrictions on the activities of the People's Party were lifted, making it thereby the only officially legalized left organization. However, in the provinces where PPI branches had been crushed, the Party obtained no opportunity to enjoy even those limited freedoms which it came to enjoy in the capital. Such a course of action by the authorities was manifestly directed towards keeping the Party under control and depriving it of opportunity to work with the masses, particularly, among the working class.

At the same time, the authorities would not officially sanction the activities of the Fedayeen and Mojahedin in a bid (evidently, to keep the left forces divided), warning them against changing over to an illegal status. Now, the left-liberal opposition drastically slowed down its social activity from then on, and quitted the political stage altogether before long.

The August developments had practically no effect on the general political line of the People's Party. The PPI Central Committee statement of September 24, 1979, again referred to Khomeini's course for "strengthening the alliance of all revolutionary forces", while the campaign for suppressing left organizations and closing down their newspapers, headquarters and offices was attributed to groups of "right extremists" directed by counter-revolutionary elements. The Party's specific objectives in this situation were defined as follows: "We must not give any pretext for further slithering in the reactionary sense. Some-

body is working for a showdown. The task of the left forces is not to fall into the trap... Everything depends on Khomeini. He has the support of the people. If he shifts to the right, the people will follow him... Our entire policy is to avoid giving Khomeini up to the Islamic Right."³⁵

However, the People's Party made an essential correction in the assessment of the current situation. Early in October, 1979, the PPI Central Committee noted a serious rightward shift affecting all areas of the country's social, economic and political life.³⁶ But that shift was also connected only with the activities of the Bazargan government which, as the Party leadership pointed out at a news conference for local and foreign journalists on October 8, had done nothing to improve the working people's living conditions, establish the rights of the elected committees of factory and office staffs and realize the peasants' eternal dream of the land. The prospect of a "progressive" evolution of the supreme religious leadership, far from being dismissed, was treated as even more probable.³⁷ At the same time, it was once more stated that it was necessary to create a "united front" to safeguard the revolution from the scheming of internal and external reaction and bring it to full victory.

In the meantime, the majority of the people following behind the clergy began to develop a feeling of weariness and disappointment. The elections of city councils on October 12 showed a drastic fall in the turnout; in many towns it was no more than 8%.³⁸

An economic crisis, the continuing growth of unemployment and of the cost of living, corruption and profiteering reanimated mass discontent. The pressure of young people for democratic freedoms fused with the women's movement for equal rights, the workers' struggle for the factory committees to be made operational in defending their interests, and the movement of the unemployed for the right to work and the struggle of the landless peasants for the land. A tidal wave of popular risings swept a number of Iranian cities in the closing days of October, with students and all youth in the vanguard. Risings of that kind were not by themselves a new development in post-February Iran; what was new was that they were against capitalism and, in a number of instances, even against the regime. It became clear that the majority of the people were striving to make the

revolution yet more democratic and anti-imperialist, although, by and large, they did not question the authority of the religious leaders.

That kind of mood could not fail to tell on the clergy and, generally, on the Islamic political movement whose possibilities for manipulating the public opinion were still far from used up. Moreover, various groups in the multi-faced and multi-structural clerical camp tried in a variety of ways to transform the mood of the masses into specific political action. Most active in those days was the radical extremist wing of the Islamic movement whose representatives sharply criticized the internal and, above all, foreign policy of the Bazargan Cabinet (as, supposedly, contradicting the "Imam's line") and cried out for a "new revolution", a "second revolution", a "revolution in the revolution", etc.

The nation was on the threshold of major developments.

The student demonstrations in the early days of November 1979, which had shortly before that taken place under pronounced social slogans, took on an exclusively anti-American character in response to the calls of religious leaders, above all, Khomeini, for stepping up the struggle against the US.

On November 4, about 400 "militant students" broke into the US Embassy in Tehran and took its staff hostage, demanding the return to Iran of the former Shah who had been given permission two weeks before to enter the US for medical treatment. The action of the "Muslim students", led by Muhammad Moussavi-Khoeini, Hojjatoleslam (the second most important spiritual leader after the Ayatollah) got at once the official approval of the Imam who called the incident a "second revolution, even bigger than the first one". Bazargan had to tender his resignation which was accepted without delay this time. (Subsequently, in December 1979-January 1980, the authorities brought off the destruction of the centre wing of the liberal camp grouping around Ayatollah Shariat Madari, whereupon this camp was actually off Iran's political stage.

Following the Bazargan government's resignation, it was representatives of the Islamic movement that took over the reins of government undivided. They inaugurated fundamental economic, social and cultural reforms and promised to take steps

towards improving the working people's living conditions. In actual fact, however, the emphasis was on the Islamic radicalization of the entire political, social and family life of citizens, and the hostage conflict that had by then erupted with the US was used to the hilt for defusing the revolutionary passion of the people. The war between Iran and Iraq, which broke out in September 1980, turned out to be yet another red-herring drawn across the path of the revolutionary masses. (It was widely exploited by the US ruling quarters together with the hostage issue in its global strategy.)

A referendum to endorse the "Islamic Constitution" was held in Iran on December 2 and 3, a month after the seizure of the American Embassy. The nation-wide uplift generated by the confrontation with the US led to the turnout rising appreciably since the October municipal council elections. It was close on 72%, according to official estimates (99% of them were reported to have voted for the Constitution), though foreign media put it at only 40-50%.

Unlike other organizations, the People's Party of Iran took an active part in the referendum, reserving, however, the right to make its own amendments subsequently to some of the provisions of the fundamental law. Although the Constitution, while officially granting the Imam exclusive rights and powers, established what actually amounted to a theocratic regime in Iran, the PPI considered that the measures it proclaimed for the country's Islamization could serve as a base for major economic and social change.³⁹ In this connection, the Party leaders stressed more than once that what mattered most to the PPI was not the religious form of the revolution but its social content, that is, its popular spirit, at the same time it actually acknowledged sometimes that the essence of the new Constitution was Islamic.⁴⁰

The People's Party of Iran showed in its statements and through pronouncements by its top leaders that it regarded the seizure of the US Embassy and the subsequent fall of the Bazar-gan government as developments which radically changed the internal political situation and bore out the analysis it had earlier made of the possibilities for advancing the revolutionary process. These developments were seen as the opening of a new phase of the revolution with the defeat of the bourgeois-reform-

ist line of Bazargan, who sought to keep the national economy within the framework of capitalism and pursue a collaborationist policy in respect of the US, and a victory of the left, radical forces of the Islamic movement striving for a "popular democracy" (as distinct from formal bourgeois democracy), far-reaching anti-imperialist change and fuller involvement of the mass of the people in action against the big bourgeoisie.⁴¹

The new phase of the revolution was characterized as a period of struggle against imperialism in the social and economic field. Having strengthened the influence of the radicals and set course for direct reliance on the people, Khomeini, according to statements by PPI leaders, stimulated a deep-rooted mass movement which could not only eliminate little by little the elements which hampered the development of the revolution but also opened the way to major social and economic change.⁴² So he created the conditions for a broad-based popular front that the PPI had been pressing for all along. In consequence, the Party called for greater support of the "Imam's line" despite certain philosophical and ideological differences with him, which it declared to be of "secondary" importance beside the general convergence of policy guidelines.⁴³

So the PPI's political line underwent practically no change in the new setting, except a considerably enhanced assessment of the policy of Iran's supreme religious leadership and still more crystallized commitment to a united popular front. The earlier "slogan of a broad popular front implying the unity of all patriotic forces supporting Imam Khomeini's line"⁴⁴ was complemented with important changes in the analysis of the alignment of political forces in the nation. In the new conditions, the Party's leadership found there were two fronts in Iran—revolutionary and counter-revolutionary; the PPI considered itself to be actively involved in the former,⁴⁵ while holding the "left opportunists" to belong to the latter.⁴⁶

In its assessments, the Party evidently proceeded from the fact of its official legalization by the authorities; in any case, members of the Party leadership had always claimed that Khomeini had acknowledged the PPI's influence on the masses and therefore had begun to reckon with its opinion.⁴⁷ "We have shown what we are worth in a way," they said. "That is just what counts."⁴⁸ But the legalization was as far as ever from giv-

ing the Party any immunity against incessant attacks from the Islamic authorities, although it declared that it had never enjoyed such broad liberties.

Tudeh's consistent and persistent support for the "Imam's line" was meeting not only with hostile mistrust of its opponents but also doubts of its supporters. In November 1980, the Party leadership came forward with a public explanation on the following alternative: either the Party was conducting a hypocritical policy or it considered the Islamic Republic as a "step towards a Communist society". The former argument was rejected on the grounds that the Party had never renounced its principles and demands, in spite of all the difficulties and dangers of the struggle for the ideals of scientific socialism in a society where religion had become a political factor. This time, the latter argument was emphatically rejected, too. Now, the support for the "Imam's line" was motivated by the fact that, however specific, the Islamic Republic had predominantly positive features due to the struggle against imperialist rule, for restrictions to be imposed on local capitalists and landed classes and the immediate needs of millions of working people to be met.⁴⁹ Therefore, the Party was giving its utmost support to the Islamic Republic.⁵⁰

In a climate of mass euphoria following the seizure of the US Embassy, other left organizations also could progressively assure themselves a practical opportunity for relatively open activity although the arrests of their members outside and sometimes even inside Tehran were a common occurrence.

In that period, the authorities were particularly hard on the organization of the Fedayeen whose Kurdish groups were still involved, arms in hand, in the autonomist movement of Iranian Kurdistan. While never considering the seizure of the embassy to have been a really anti-imperialist act, the Fedayeen still welcomed the exposure campaign of the "Muslim students—followers of the Imam's line" because they saw it as a possible means to make the popular revolution socially more effective. The authorities, on their part, constantly urged the people to deal with the Fedayeen just like they had dealt with the Shah's henchmen; the organization's anti-imperialist meetings were more than once attacked by raiders who injured about 200 Fedayeen on March 7, 1980 alone.

Right after the seizure of the US Embassy, the organization of the Mojahedin made several attempts at normalizing its relations with the regime within the meaning of the anti-imperialist struggle. With war threats coming from the US, it called on all its members and supporters early in the third decade of November, 1979, to stand up against a possible imperialist invasion and offered to the authorities to create people's militia detachments and organize their military training. However the Mojahedin were quickly cold-shouldered: a few days later, Khomeini, having announced general military training of Iranians, entrusted the job to the "Islamic Revolution Corps". Nevertheless, the Mojahedin organization supported that plan. Subsequently, it invariably voiced approval of the action of the "followers of the Imam's line" in exposing the US and Bazargan's supporters. Along with that, the Mojahedin were vocal against the instigation of internal strife, pointing out that it was playing into the hands of American imperialism.

By and large, the Mojahedin organization, far from being allowed to take any part whatsoever in the process of decision-making, was not, as a matter of fact, so much as recognized as an Islamic group. Many top leaders of the ruling clergy declared it to be even more harmful to the "cause of the Islam" than Marxist organizations, since the latter were openly professing their atheism. The leader of the Mojahedin, Massoud Rajavi, was denounced as an agent of the SAVAK, the deposed Shah's notorious secret police, while all the members of the organization were officially dubbed "hypocrites". The displeasure of the religious leaders was provoked, notably, by the Mojahedin's appeals for actually implementing declared anti-imperialist slogans and the opinion quite often expressed by their leadership that "the struggle on two fronts" (against the US and the USSR), which the clergy were pressing for, would inevitably lead to a compromise with American imperialism.⁵¹ All Mojahedin-sponsored meetings, even those officially authorized, invariably ended in large groups of thugs attacking and manhandling members of the organization. The harassment of the organization and ransacking of its branch offices were a common occurrence as well.

Official persecution of the left forces went together with energetic efforts to enforce the provisions of the "Islamic Constitu-

tion" concerning the new, Islamic structure of state power. The Presidential election of January 25, 1980 was an important step in that direction.

The left forces had neither technical nor actual possibilities for nominating their candidates. The Tudeh Party could not do so because, according to the "Islamic Constitution", only a faithful Mohammedan could be a President. The attempt of the Mojahedin, who counted themselves involved in the Islamic movement, to nominate their leader Massoud Rajavi was blocked by Khomeini who declared that the individuals who had not voted for the Constitution could not be elected President. Considering it necessary to give its support to the leader who would stand closest to the "Imam's line", the PPI called on its followers to cast their votes for the candidate of the Islamic Republican Party (IRP), the leading political organization of the Islamic movement, headed by religious leaders.

However, the Imam held his own view on the issues relating to the election of the President who, although a mere figure-head under the Constitution, was entitled to the status of second in command in the state. Being a supporter of the "order", but careful not to put the clergy in a position like that of the Bazargan government in its day, Khomeini was still striving to make the political supremacy of the religious leaders safe by bringing forward the technocrats obedient to the clergy. To this end, he accorded undeclared support for the "independent" candidate of the Islamic movement, Abol-Hassan Bani-Sadr, who had been his closest adviser for economic affairs.

The outlook of Bani-Sadr, who had polled only 75% of the total vote in the Presidential election, was extremely vague and uncertain. It eclectically combined the idea of the "Islamic Republic" with the concept of the modern "technocratic state", Islamic radical views on economic development with liberal ideas of "democratic pluralism", and scathing criticism of transnational corporations with arguments in favour of a Middle East—Western Europe—Japan axis.⁵²

Having at one time played quite an important part in removing the Bazargan government from office and having now become the first President of the Islamic Republic, Bani-Sadr found himself, by the logic of things, in the same position as the first republican Prime-Minister. With a view to consolidating his

power by breaking up all the "self-styled centres of decision-making", the President tried to reduce the influence of the "Organization of Muslim Students—Followers of Imam Khomeini's Line". Moreover, he did whatever he could to bring the religious leaders back to the mosques on the grounds that "all Richelieus and Mazarinis" had to wield only "supragovernment power". By so challenging the positions of the leading political centres of the "popular majority", the President sought to win it over by promising to establish "order and security" in the name of "constructive work" for creating an "Islamic economic system". Objectively, Bani-Sadr, just as Bazargan before him, expressed the mood of the small and middle commercial and business community who had not yet lost their hope of making the greatest possible use of the achievements of a popular anti-imperialist revolution in their interest. A similar political design was behind the President's foreign policy platform which, in spite of its occasional sharp criticism of American imperialism, was, in fact, intended to implant a pro-Western option.

The policy of a "stabilizing conflict", within which the originally civilian presidential authority enjoyed supreme patronage, offered quite definite possibilities also for the Islamic Republican Party which now saw Bani-Sadr as its deadly enemy. Trying in every way to discredit the President in the eyes of the people, the IRP leaders contemptuously called him a "liberal". They strained every nerve in the parliamentary elections, which was a further important step towards creating the Islamic structure of state power, to make up the setback they had suffered in the Presidential election.

The left forces took an active part in the parliamentary elections which were held in two rounds—in March and May 1980. However, the officially established voting procedure prevented the election of even a single member of left organizations whose candidates were, besides, quite often simply crossed out on the grounds that they could not be considered faithful Mohamehdans. Yet even in such circumstances, the candidates of the Mojahedin polled 530,000 votes, the Fedayeen 200,000, and the PPI—59,000 in the first round.⁵³ Nearly 70% of the seats in Parliament went to the Islamic Republican Party and related organizations, and the rest to Bani-Sadr's followers and other groups.

Parallel to the parliamentary elections, the authorities were busy putting through full-scale measures in April to June 1980 for promoting the "Islamic Cultural Revolution", especially by a crackdown on all left organizations at colleges and universities which were important centres of political activity. Hundreds of the Left were killed and thousands wounded in consequence.⁵⁴

In those circumstances, the political positions of the left organizations tended to change in tune with the general realignment of political forces in the nation in the first half of 1980.

As time went on, the PPI was growing, as it did under the Bazargan government, more critical of the "executive leadership" whose policy was presented as opposed to the "Imam's line". In an interview for the *Ettela'at* newspaper, the PPI leadership said in March 1980: "The glorious Iranian Revolution, with the leadership of Imam Khomeini having played a most important part in every stage, inflicted a powerful blow upon the rule of imperialism. . . However, during this year more effective measures could have been taken to eradicate the domination of imperialism in this country. . . But, unfortunately, it must be said that the Iranian Revolution has not gone beyond the limits of unfounded slogans during this period. . . The dependence of certain vitally important areas on US-led imperialist robbers has remained at about the same level. There are more of the despaired and disgruntled every day, and it is the counter-revolution, first and foremost, that derives its benefit from so unsound a situation. Today, one can note with regret that the executive leadership, falling under the influence of counter-revolutionary elements, is gradually departing from the principles of consolidation and development of the Iranian Revolution." The threat to the gains of the Revolution, the PPI estimated, came also from the foreign policy course of the "executive leadership"—"the course of collaboration with imperialism and enmity towards the world's anti-imperialist forces, and, above all, the "socialist nations".⁵⁵

Considering Bani-Sadr to be as much of a "liberal-bourgeois leader" as Bazargan, the PPI saw his policy as the main reason behind the incipient disintegration of the popular anti-imperialist unity. At the same time, Khomeini's political line was regarded as a progressive alternative of "bourgeois democracy" which

was strongly opposed, in the PPI leadership's opinion, by the "Organization of Muslim Students—Followers of the Imam's Line".⁵⁶ The Party still considered that its major objective was to build the unity of the revolutionary, anti-imperialist and democratic forces of the Iranian people so that they could "consistently bring off the national democratic development".⁵⁷ That, as before, implied the political trends devoted to the "Imam's line". The resolution of the plenary meeting of the PPI Central Committee in March 1981 said: "The meeting regards as principled and correct the Party's policy of support for Imam Khomeini's anti-imperialist and popular line, the line of consistent struggle against imperialism, Zionism and counter-revolution, and also against liberalism, dogmatism and attempts to monopolize power".⁵⁸ The plenary meeting found it necessary for the Party to carry on that policy.

In June 1980, the Fedayeen openly splintered into a "minority" pressing for the continued military aid to the Kurdish autonomist movement and against backing up the ruling regime, and a "majority" which had concluded that the armed solution of the Kurdish problem was unacceptable and that there had to be a realistic attitude towards the objectively anti-imperialist tendencies of the policy of the religious leadership.⁵⁹ The position of the Fedayeen "majority" was bringing its political line closer to the tactical and strategic course of the People's Party. That made it appreciably easier for both organizations to coordinate their political platforms and concert their actions.

Now, speaking of the political positions of the Mojahedin, one must say that their organization was progressively hardening its attitude to the activities of the ruling clergy, which came as a consequence not only of the increased reprisals against them but also of the sharpening infighting within the Islamic movement.

Having obtained the majority of seats in Parliament and created an obedient government late in the summer of 1980, the Islamic Republican Party barred President Bani-Sadr almost altogether from national decision-making before long. Under the circumstances, the President showed a proclivity for a tactical alliance with the Mojahedin and some other political groups opposed to the authorities. In the course of the war with Iraq,

which had begun in September that year, the President was doing his best to win over the Army. All that prompted Imam Khomeini in the long run to change his mind about Bani-Sadr. In June 1981, the Majlis voted to declare Bani-Sadr "politically incompetent", accusing him of having disrupted the economy and departed from the "Imam's line", whereupon he was removed from office.⁶⁰ Late next month, the former President, together with Rajavi, the leader of the Mojahedin, fled the country in secret.

The course of events connected with the removal of Bani-Sadr and involving fierce street clashes between his opponents and supporters, the organization of the Mojahedin published a "military-political communique" of June 18 declaring its intention to "carry out mass punishments of the criminals guilty of counter-revolutionary acts".⁶¹ On their part, the authorities cracked down on the organization with a wave of widespread reprisals which exceeded all similar campaigns yet undertaken in scope and victims. The reply of the Mojahedin was to launch a full-scale campaign of terrorism against religious and political leaders.

Violence and terrorism were hanging like a thunder-cloud over the nation's entire political and social life.

The events of mid-1981, which marked a new stage of the crisis-ridden development of the Islamic Republic of Iran, were treated in some sections of the clerical establishment as a "third Islamic revolution".

One thing that was new in the country's political life was that from then on the clergy had for the first time openly assumed responsibility for the actual running of state affairs. Hojatoleslam Ali Khamene'i became the nation's President in September 1981. All other government posts were filled either by religious leaders or by secular leaders devoted to them.

The change-over to direct rule by the clergy, while in no way contributing to the establishment of the full unity of opinion in the higher corridors of state power, put the religious leaders generally in the position in which the Bazargan government and Bani-Sadr's presidential authority had been until then. The establishment of "law and security" became the key note of the internal political activity of the legislative, judicial and exec-

utive institutions constantly requiring the lower bodies of power to be faithful in observing the "sacred principle" of private property and ending arbitrary practices and "illegal" confiscations. The drafts of the agrarian reform and other more or less progressive changes, which had been moved earlier on, were either blocked or completely emasculated. In the continuing struggle against the terrorist activities of the Mojahedin and various other left-radical organizations and in the expectation of a pro-monarchist counter-revolution, the authorities little by little stopped, as a matter of fact, appealing to the masses. The place of the popular majority which had earlier been periodically brought out into the city squares and streets to "demonstrate the unity of the people and the Imam", was taken over by the "Guardian Corps of the Islamic Revolution" and other paramilitary organizations created by the clergy. The populist-integrationist colouring of the slogans handed down from above was retained only inasmuch as it was necessary for waging the war against Iraq and preventing mass opposition to the Islamic regime.

At the same time, the most influential wing of the Islamic ruling establishment, with no more "scapegoats" like the Bazargan government or Bani-Sadr's presidential authority, succeeded in making up the "losses" to some extent by using the reactionary and outspokenly procapitalist Hojjatie group formed by the clergy. That group frustrated some of the relatively progressive measures declared by the regime, which permitted the followers of the "Imam's line" to preserve their reputation as speakers for the "interests of the people". In this case, the Islamic leaders made rather weak and purely outward attempts, designed for mass consumption, to counteract the Hojjatie chiefs, whereas in matters relating to the modification of the principle of the Imam's one-man sovereignty, they struck out at Hojjatie so hard as to force it to declare itself disbanded in the summer of 1983.

So the basic differences inside religious circles, just as their common contradictions in the past with the Bazargan government and President Bani-Sadr, concerned principally the form of state structure which each of the trends within the ruling camp proposed to adjust to its own group interests. As for the attitude to the basic problems of social-economic development, they all demonstrated amazingly identical consistency: while, at

first, objectively representing, in one way or another, the interests of small- and middle-commercial and business capital, they fairly quickly exhibited a trend towards a closer relationship in practical activities with the big bourgeoisie, as well.

The People's Party of Iran, in its statements in June 1981, welcomed the removal of President Bani-Sadr as yet another blow at the positions of the "liberal bourgeois forces . . . inclined to surrender to imperialism" and as a "great victory for the truly revolutionary forces supporting Imam Khomeini's popular and anti-imperialist policy". Expressing the hope that "this victory will open a new stage in the deepening and further development of the revolution", the PPI Central Committee called upon the country's supreme leadership to "act with revolutionary firmness but allow no intensification of forcible, repressive practices".⁶²

In a statement of September 6, 1981, the PPI Central Committee explained the "spread of blind terrorism in Iranian society" by stating the "imperialism has managed to split and incite against each other the forces which, taking a similar stand in the struggle for political, economic, military and cultural independence, for freedom and social progress, could act in a united front". It laid much of the blame for it also on the leadership of the Mojahedin and the Fedayeen (minority), who, in the opinion of the PPI leadership, had misguided their adherents as to the tactics and strategy of the revolutionary struggle. The statement urged the authorities to end the bloody confrontation so that the rank-and-file membership of these organizations could return "into the channel of revolutionary construction".⁶³

In November 1981, the People's Party of Iran and the Organization of People's Fedayeen (majority) came forward with a joint statement entitled "How to Overcome the Difficulties of Defending, Strengthening and Expanding Our Glorious Revolution". As a source of the said difficulties, along with the plots of external and domestic counter-revolution, it pointed up the "shortcomings and negative phenomena stemming from inexperience, mistakes, narrow-mindedness, subjectivism and misjudgement on the part of a sizable section of the pro-revolutionary forces and responsible leaders of the Islamic Republic of Iran". It was as a result of these phenomena, the statement said, that the Revolution had failed to achieve its objectives of strengthen-

ing national independence, winning individual and social freedoms for the great mass of the people and establishing social justice.⁶⁴

Having appealed for the unity of all the forces committed to the purposes of the Revolution, the People's Party and the Organization of People's Fedayeen (majority) considered their joint statement as "the first step to lay the foundations of such unity". Although this lengthy document mentioned the name of Khomeini only to bear out the criticism of "omissions on the part of the revolutionary authorities", the appeal for unity was addressed, as a matter of fact, only to the followers of the "Imam's line". The leadership of the organization of the Mojahedin and other groups involved in the armed struggle against the regime was said, in fact, to belong to the camp of the counter-revolution. True, the statement emphasized the need "to draw a distinction between the leaders of these organizations and their young supporters whom they have misled", the task it set before the rank-and-file Mojahedin was just to "make the utmost efforts to neutralize their leaders' betrayal".⁶⁵

So the PPI's earlier strategy of united popular front, now largely supported by the Organization of People's Fedayeen (majority), practically remained unchanged. While admitting that the "weakness of the policy pursued by the government is the lack of a clear-cut programme for resolving the main problems of the Revolution", the Party leadership still considered that a united people's front had to rest chiefly on "co-operation and united action by Muslim fighters, the adherents of Imam Khomeini's line, and true advocates of scientific socialism".⁶⁶

In its analysis of the political development of Iran, Tudeh, just as the People's Fedayeen (majority), proceeded from the belief in the Islamic regime's continued anti-imperialist orientation. But there was more to it. Both organizations presumed (and not without good reason in some respects) that to oppose this regime would mean opening the way to power for the counter-revolutionary forces in the shape of pro-monarchist and right-liberal opposition entrenched in and, especially, outside the country. Hence the alternative of either backing up the regime or allowing the counter-revolution to take hold.⁶⁷

The Mojahedin, the Fedayeen (minority) and some other groups which had risen in arms against the regime, considered

it, on the contrary, to be reactionary. They believed (and they were, unquestionably, not far from the truth) that the regime was spearheading its reprisals not so much against the weak and demoralized counter-revolution as against the genuinely revolutionary forces anxious for the Revolution to be yet more popular and more anti-imperialist. Besides, the Mojahedin, as Muslim progressives, differed from the supreme religious leadership in understanding "Islamic unity". While the latter regarded it as already existing uniformity, not broken by any class conflicts, the Mojahedin presumed that the first thing to do to achieve such unity was to establish a social balance, which could be done only through class struggle. Now, since the object of the present struggle was to defend democracy, it was necessary to unite all the forces having a stake in it, up to and including the leaders of the Islamic movement (like Bani-Sadr) who did not accept the established theocratic regime.⁶⁸

In an interview for the Lebanese *Al-Hawadess weekly* (August 27, 1981) Rajavi said that the organization he led was fighting for "advanced and democratic Islam". In the event of victory, he said, Iran would be declared a Democratic Islamic Republic which would be based on "fair social relations" and would leave all political and religious trends free to act. Besides, some observers noted that from the middle of 1981 on, the leadership of the organization had "slowly but clearly moderated their own social and political positions".⁶⁹

The head-on struggle of the Mojahedin against the regime, undertaken on the ground most dangerous for it—in the name of Islam and in the halo of its martyrs—assumed fairly wide proportions in the latter half of 1981. The support given to the organization by many in the civil service and even some of the clergy allowed it to put through a number of large-scale operations. However, the terrorist character of Mojahedin actions got no support from the mass of the people and, consequently, the organization's attempts to pass over from the tactics of political assassinations to the tactics of street fighting ended in failure. So did the Mojahedin appeals to Iran's workers to stage a general strike and to the Army to rise against the regime.⁷⁰

By the end of 1982, the authorities had succeeded in substantially reducing the scope and effect of the terrorist activities of the Mojahedin and other armed opposition groups. The grad-

ual stabilization of the established regime went together with a far-reaching purge to remove the members and supporters of all left organizations, including Tudeh and the People's Fedayeen (majority) from the administration and from more or less important posts in industry, colleges and universities. There was no let-up in the campaign of closing down the offices and missions of left forces in provinces, harassing their mouthpieces, arresting and jailing their activists without trial, open official instigation of a clampdown on the left. The pledges of support from Tudeh and People's Fedayeen (majority) for the "Islamic Revolution" were dismissed as a tactical exercise. The leadership of many non-Islamic political organizations, even those officially authorized, had to pass over to a semi-legal status for safety.⁷¹

On May 18, 1982, the PPI addressed an open letter to the "esteemed brothers", the authorities of the Islamic Republic of Iran, in connection with the harassment and persecution of the Party as a result of which it had been "virtually deprived of the possibility of carrying out political work". The letter, called "Thwart the Plot of the Iranian Revolution's Enemies", said: "The foremost aim of all the counter-revolutionary plots is to wipe out both political trends (the supporters of Imam Khomeini's political line and PPI supporters)".⁷² Further on, Tudeh again declared its earnest desire for close co-operation with the true adherents of the "Imam's line", the desire based on long-term, rather than time-serving and passing, interests.

By the end of 1982, the PPI had somewhat updated its theoretical analysis of the national situation. In particular, it clearly referred to the separation of two religious trends: the "traditional and conservative" trend opposing progressive social and political change, and the trend of "revolutionary Islam" connected with the "revolutionary activity of the masses". It was noted that "Khomeini has spoken mainly in defence of the interests of the mass of working people". The difficulties which had arisen in the country were regarded as a product of religious ideology itself providing the breeding ground for religious fanaticism and "fascist-type groups in Islamic guise". Proceeding from the "fact that the revolution cannot develop without the involvement of the intermediate strata, that these strata join the revolution with their own convictions", the Party considered it its duty "to be where the masses are". But this aim was still seen together with

the need "to tackle the key task facing all the contingents of Iran's revolutionary forces—to strengthen unity and overcome disagreements".⁷³

However, the general course for co-operation between the followers of Khomeini and the People's Party of Iran continued as valid as ever. In a statement published in October 1982 for the Party's 41st anniversary, the PPI Central Committee again urged the "unity of the Islamic revolutionary forces supporting the Imam's line with all other revolutionaries, especially with the supporters of scientific socialism".⁷⁴ The Party leadership, to judge by all accounts, proceeded from the inevitable prospect of a close and open confrontation starting before long between the two religious trends inside the ruling establishment. "The destiny of our revolution," the document noted, "depends on the outcome of the struggle between these two trends—the line of Imam and the line of the right-wing opposition forces."⁷⁵ The former line was called "anti-imperialist people's revolution".

In the meantime dramatic developments were in the offing. On December 26, 1982, the Iranian news agency (IRNA) transmitted a statement by one of the regime's high-ranking leaders, close to Khomeini, Speaker of Parliament, Hojjatoleslam Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani, who unequivocally admitted that the Islamic authorities had not agreed at once to remove the liberals and the Left from the political stage because they could contribute towards strengthening the Islamic Republic. It was clear that the authorities were getting ready for a total smash-up of the surviving left-wing organizations.

The presentiment of the danger that was threatening the Party can be clearly seen in the PPI documents published in March 1983, already after the developments in question had got under way. Some points made by the Party leadership clearly indicated that there were no differences of principle between the two religious trends. In particular, it was noted that the struggle between the said trends "unfortunately, . . . went on at the surface and not deep down", that "representatives of both (groups) persist in their views . . . with reference to Islamic dogma" and that, moreover, some of the parties to the "anti-imperialist people's revolution" had joined the "right-wing opposition forces" on a platform against the followers of scientific socialism. The latter circumstance was explained by "political am-

bitions, ideological narrow-mindedness, and anti-Communist prejudice" that "limit their horizons" and "deficiencies" in the activities of those involved in the "anti-imperialist people's trend" and their failure to understand who were their enemies and who their "true friends".⁷⁰

All that brought with it the following fundamental conclusion: "This dangerous reactionary trend so far has failed to win the approval of the regime as a whole. It is opposed by the realistic policy of some members of the ruling quarters, primarily followers of Imam Khomeini's anti-imperialist popular line. . . . There is still some hope that truly revolutionary Muslim forces will realize on encountering difficulties as they try to advance the Revolution that these difficulties can be surmounted only if anti-imperialist forces unite. . . ."⁷¹ This conclusion was based on the following two major arguments. The first was: "The highest power echelon, which comprises diverse groupings held together solely by their unquestioning 'recognition' of Imam Khomeini, is torn by irreconcilable contradictions that have to do above all with the approach to key social and economic issues",⁷² and the second: the ruling regime's "revolutionary wing . . . sincerely advocates fundamental changes for the benefit of the disinherited".⁷³

A major turn of events, which directly told not only on the PPI's activities, but also on the destinies of the entire Revolution, came about when the authorities arrested many Tudeh Party leaders and activists on February 6, 1983 on trumped-up charges of "spying" and "undermining state security". The Party was officially banned in May of the same year. Thousands of PPI members and supporters had been arrested by that time.⁵⁰ Simultaneously, in an effort to discredit the Party altogether, the authorities staged disgraceful television "shows" in which they forced some of their victims, having been subjected to physical as well as moral and psychological torture, to "confess" their alleged "spying activities" and grossly misrepresent the history of the Tudeh Party and Iranian-Soviet relations. In that context, the PPI's Committee Abroad declared in an address to the Party members and supporters that "the arrested comrades from among the Party leaders do not have any powers in the Party as long as they are in captivity and under torture. Their statements, recommendations and actions, no doubt imposed on them

and contrary to their ideological and political persuasions and to the course of the People's Party of Iran, have no legal force, nor anything to do with the PPI's activities either in the past, or at present, or in the future".⁸¹

Reprisals against the Tudeh Party, which had come much as a surprise to its leadership, at first had no reflection on the Party's overall position. The PPI statements, published in February-April 1983, linked those reprisals only with the scheming of right-wing reactionary forces which were supposedly resisted all the time by representatives of the "revolutionary" trend in the ruling regime, who, however, because of their "inconsistency", "hesitations" and "lethargy", could not make any major change in favour of the working masses and retreated under pressure from the right-wing forces and imperialism.

The Party credited itself with having all along resolutely supported the "Islamic revolution" and having told its members right after the February victory of 1979 to hand over whatever weapons they had to the authorities, and early in 1981, in obedience to Islamic laws, submitted all requisite documents about its activities to the Ministry of the Interior and the full list of the members of the Party leadership with their home addresses and other information. At the same time, it expressed regret both over the "abuse of this information" and because the "patriotic elements of the regime have retreated in the face of the brazen onslaught of the ultraright forces". Yet they still found Khomeini to be committed to the "anti-imperialist and popular orientation" and often repeated the earlier calls for "popular unity".⁸² Late in April, a PPI member asserted in a *Le Monde* interview that not everything had yet been lost, that if Khomeini appealed directly to the people, the Revolution could still be spared the danger, and that even now "our policy of support for the Islamic revolution has not changed".⁸³

After the Iranian authorities had staged the above-mentioned television "shows", the PPI's Committee Abroad said, in particular, that the "honour" of having invented such stories "goes to the ancestors of today's torturers—Hitler, Mussolini, and the like". Iran's ruling top crust was warned against an "imminent fall into the whirlpool of medieval autocracy and captivity",⁸⁴ while its right-wing representatives were called "usurpers of the people's power" who "in their euphoria of total power and

brigandage ... no longer regard themselves answerable to God, if they at all believe there is a god. They impute to themselves command of people's bodies and souls".⁸⁵ Khomeini was not mentioned in that statement.

In December 1983, the Plenary Session of the PPI Central Committee adopted a new approach to the "unity of Iran's democratic, revolutionary and anti-imperialist strata" in the struggle against the "reactionary ruling camarilla". It made a special mention of the Mojahedin organization and called for a "positive reconsideration" of relations with it as well as the progressive revolutionary organizations of the Kurdish people and the "militant Muslims ... who still seek independence, freedom and social justice".⁸⁶

By that time the so-called "third Islamic revolution", which had removed not only real but even imaginary opponents of the power of the Shiite clergy from the nation's political arena, had practically accomplished all the tasks it had set itself. The "Islamic revolution", which was an expression of the crisis of the genuinely popular anti-monarchist and anti-imperialist revolution which had begun in February 1979 and reached its culminating point in May 1983, opened up the way for a bourgeois counter-revolution.

The internal political development of Iran, which was determined in the period under review by the efforts of the clergy to stabilize their power once and for all and the struggle of the country's left forces for their right to exist within the framework of the "Islamic Republic" and for enhancing the social meaning of the revolution, are most instructive. It is quite clear that the extremely involved and contradictory political reality of the Islamic Republic of Iran had from the very start been generating an urgent demand for a political line adequate to the obtaining conditions, free from an oversimplified analysis and one-sided solutions. It is not by chance that the rather inessential distinctions between the attitudes of each of the three left-wing groups to the emerging "Islamic rule", which came to light right after the February victory, in the long run developed into two diametrically opposite modes of approach to the theocratic regime already established. However, any black-and-white assessments would be just as much of an illusion in this case as, evidently, the

hope to win the popular majority without a real struggle for establishing the political alliance of all of the nation's left forces.

In a discussion in the editorial office of the Paris magazine *Révolution* late in 1981, a member of the Foreign Affairs Department of the Central Committee of the French Communist Party, Alain Gresh, expressed the following idea: "Indeed, when the Tudeh Party underlines the gains of the revolution and supports the existing power so as to consolidate them and when the Mojahedin denounce the infringements upon liberties and want to battle for democracy, I am just about tempted to find them all to be right. The problem—but it is not for us, in Paris, to resolve it—is the balance between these two elements which has to be found to appraise them in their totality.

"Indeed nothing can be worse than playing into the hands of the counter-revolution in the name of democracy. But we know, too, . . . that wherever a revolution has restricted democracy, flouted the liberties and silenced the popular movement, all that has struck back at it in the end".⁸⁷

The idea of a "balance" between the possible extremes has enough evidence to bear it out in the world revolutionary experience which has already witnessed attempts at winning popular majority both through unconditional support for its social and conservative leadership and through direct confrontation with it. In any case of this kind, the path to the masses has turned out to be strewn with dangerous traps either in the shape of lures to tempt the "grass-roots" over by accords with the "higher-ups" or illusions regarding the approval by the general public of the conspiratorial and terroristic activities, if of a revolutionary kind. The application of the methods of the alliance and the struggle, available in the revolutionary stock-in-trade, has so far been effective only if so combined as not to condemn the revolutionary vanguard to sitting back and waiting for the mass of the people to have trained themselves through their own political experience and at the same time would not prod them into "jumping" the necessary stages of the acquisition of this experience by the masses.

Nothing has ever or anywhere served the cause of winning popular majority committed to conservative leadership more than the effective co-operation of all progressive political forces united by a common aspiration to bring about a leftward shift of

the policy of this leadership on the basis of straightforward (and, of course, constructive) criticism of any anti-democratic aspects of its actions. In any case, only such co-operation has proved capable of raising some obstacles in the way of the tactics, imposed "from above", of opposing and dividing all opposition groups with a view to bringing some of them into submission and forcing others out of existence (depending on the character of the problems set and resolved).

What made the problem more complicated in the case of Iran was that the religious leadership of the popular majority combined social conservatism with political radicalism and anti-Communism with objective anti-imperialism. Besides, the subjective rejection of the capitalist way of development by the Islamic populist regime obscured for a time the approach to follow in the country's further societal development while the victory of the liberal (right-wing and centre) forces, the secular circles of the Islamic movement and its right-wing religious elements would at once have imparted a more outspoken character to its bourgeois and pro-Western orientation. All that indisputably called in a sense of imagination in applying the fundamental principles of revolutionary theory, strategy and tactics, but in no way permitted those principles to be forgotten or even underestimated.

One thing that acquires special significance with respect to the present-day setting of Eastern countries is that the attempts to regard the local political movements as a direct and immediate expression of the quite definite class interests, ignoring such indirect factors as socio-corporative ambitions, can produce rather negative practical political consequences. The available experience indicates that theoretical assessments, based on such premises of the character of the Islamic political movement and the main directions of political propaganda, thereby determined, create the danger of:

- interpreting the populist form of the Islamic regime operating on behalf of the working masses but contrary to their basic interests as an expression of its popular essence;

- assessing the integrationist policy of the Islamic regime directed towards the full and comprehensive integration of the Muslim community based on the existing social-class structure, not only as a struggle for "popular anti-imperialist unity" but

also as a manifestation of the ideal of a "classless society";

—treating the fundamentalist views of the ruling clergy, preaching the egalitarian tenets of the Koran in the way they were supposedly translated into reality in the times of Prophet Muhammad and Imam Ali as no more than "secondary, purely philosophical differences" with the Marxist theory of classless society;

—qualifying the theocratic regime being implanted in the country with the aim of establishing a dictatorship of clergymen and depriving working people of the right to create independent class organizations, as a "progressive" alternative to the bourgeois liberal-democratic system;

—taking the limited and, essentially, passive anti-imperialism of the clergy, developing along the lines of anti-Western isolationist trends, as a real struggle against imperialism, capable of spilling over even into the area of social and economic change;

—citing as an example of such change not only the enforced measures for nationalizing some of large-scale industry and banks, practically never changing anything about the country's social and economic structure, but even paternalistic charity undertakings funded with oil revenues.

The relevant statements and pronouncements can, of course, be interpreted as a kind of "advances" to the Islamic regime. These advances are payments under future settlements but as such these pronouncements were proved wrong by the mere possibility of something like the 1956 Suez crisis happening again and, in particular, such political behaviour of Iran's clergy as was then typical of the revolutionary democracy of Egypt. The problem, however, was evidently, in taking full account of the fundamentally new and historically unique situation, which developed in Iran, arising from the aspiration of the clergy to give the Islamic forms of a popular revolution a substantive meaning and, on that ground, to have their corporative objectives realized by creating the world's first Shiite theocracy. Indicative enough was the position of the Fedayeen (majority) who succeeded, to judge by all accounts, in keeping their militant organization alive while backing up the Islamic regime.

No doubt that in the coming class and political battles, the left forces of Iran will take full account of the tragic lessons of the thorny path they have had to traverse during the last few

years. "We are confronted," Lenin wrote at the time of the Stolypin counter-revolution, "by a *specific* historical period with *specific* conditions for the birth of a new revolution. It will be impossible to master these specific conditions and prepare ourselves for this new revolution if we operate only in the old way. . . ."⁸⁸

- ¹ For details see R. Ulyanovsky, "The Iranian Revolution and Its Specific Features", *Kommunist*, No. 10, 1982.
- ² *World Marxist Review*, No. 12, 1981.
- ³ 19 bahman. *Daneshjun*, No. 2, 1976; *Charik* 1977/78, 1978/79.
- ⁴ *The Christian Science Monitor*, January 23, 1979.
- ⁵ E. Abrahamian, "The Guerrilla Movement in Iran, 1963-77". In: *MERIP Reports*, No. 86, 1980.
- ⁶ Shahram Chubin, "Leftist Forces in Iran", *Problems of Communism*, July-August 1980, Vol. XXIX, pp. 15-16.
- ⁷ S. L. Agaev, *Iran, Past and Present (Ways and Forms of the Revolutionary Process)*, Moscow, 1981, p. 212 (in Russian).
- ⁸ For details see A. B. Reznikov, "The Collapse of the Monarchy in Iran (January-February, 1979)", *The Revolutionary Process in the Orient. History and Modernity*, Moscow, 1982, pp. 356-376 (in Russian).
- ⁹ *Morning Star*, February 14, 1979.
- ¹⁰ *Pravda*, February 17, 1979.
- ¹¹ *Al-Anba*, June 3, 1979.
- ¹² *The New York Times*, February 14, 1979.
- ¹³ *Newsweek*, No. 5, January 29, 1979, p. 52; *Révolution*, No. 37, November 14, 1980, p. 17.
- ¹⁴ *L'Unità*, 20 Settembre, 1979.
- ¹⁵ *Information Bulletin*, Prague, Vol. 17, No. 10/1979, p. 17.
- ¹⁶ *Al-Safir*, December 2, 1979; *Al-Sakafat al-Jadida*, No. 1-2 (117), 1980, pp. 61, 62; *Comment*, No. 17, August 16, 1980, p. 267.
- ¹⁷ *L'Unità*, 20 Settembre 1979.
- ¹⁸ *Newsweek*, No. 5, January 29, 1979.
- ¹⁹ *L'Humanité*, 4 avril, 1979.
- ²⁰ *Iranian*, July 4, 1979.
- ²¹ *Ibid.*
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NAME INDEX

A

Abduh, Mohammad—102
 Abdulhamid II, Sultan—53
 Abrahamian, E.—377
 Acharya, Prativadi—199
 Agaev, S.L.—377
 Agayev, Bahram—210
 Agayev, S.P.—90, 257, 281
 Ahmad, Muzaffar—253, 254,
 280, 281
 Ahmed, Rafiq—208, 261
 Akatova, T.N.—271, 281
 Akhmetov, A.G.—124
 Alderson-Smith, Gavin—165, 178
 Alexander II—35
 Ali, Imam—340, 370, 376
 Ali, Mohammad—199, 224, 251-
 53, 265
 Alikhanov—211, 262
 Alves, Nito—84
 An Longhe—216-20, 275
 Andreev, I.L.—177
 Andreev, M.G.—313
 Andropov, Yu.V.—110, 125
 Arkatov, V.A.—90
 Aung San—64-67
 Awogu, F. Olisa—171, 168

B

Bagir—50
 Baguma, Rweikiza—149, 175
 Bakhtiar, Shapur—336, 339
 Bakunin, M.A.—34, 35, 58, 291,
 314, 323

Bani-Sadr, Abol-Hassan—360,
 361, 364-66, 368, 378
 Bao Huiseng—250, 288, 301
 Bao Pu—202
 Barakatullah, Maulvi—199
 Barq, Abdur R.—181, 199, 261
 Bazargan, Mehdi—340-42, 346,
 349, 355, 356, 359-62, 364
 Bebel, A.—285
 Belelyubsky, F.—34
 Belinsky V.G.—73, 113
 Ben Bella, Ahmed—151
 Benda, Harry J.—124
 Benneh, G.—165, 178
 Bhakta, Satya—254
 Bill, James A.—378, 379
 Bing Bing—321
 Borodin, M.M.—302
 Borokh, L.N.—321, 322
 Bose, S.C.—62, 90
 Boumedienne, Houari—131, 147,
 148, 151, 156, 157
 Broido, G.I.—311, 330, 332
 Brutents, K.N.—109, 124, 125
 Burov, V.G.—322

C

Cabral, Amilcar—21, 84, 86, 155,
 164, 176, 178
 Cai, Alexander—221
 Cai Hesen—197, 288, 329
 Cai Yuanpei—203, 245
 Canovan, M.—172
 Chattopadhyaya, V.—260
 Chen Duxiu—106, 202, 244, 245,

248-50, 263, 278, 287, 288
 Chen Gungbo—247, 248, 288
 Chen Kungpo—323
 Chen Qiaonian—303-04
 Chen Qinguan—293
 Chen Tanqu—288
 Chen Wangdao—288, 301
 Chen Yannian—304
 Chen Yi—329
 Chernyshevsky, N.G.—33, 34, 73,
 74, 94
 Chettiar Singaravelu—253, 255,
 256
 Chiang Kaishek—59, 303, 332
 Chubin, Shahram—377, 378
 Ciu Laozhen—279, 280, 327
 Clark, A.—327-30
 Clark, Edmund—144, 173, 175
 Cohen, Ronald—165, 178

D

Dahm, Bernhard—90
 Dalin, S.A.—304, 311, 328, 329,
 331, 332
 Damachi, Ukandi G.—173
 Dange, Sripad A.—253-55, 258,
 262, 272, 281
 Danilov, M.P.—260
 da Vinci, Leonardo—100
 de Decker, H.—164, 178
 Delyusin, L.P.—57, 89, 124, 271,
 277, 281, 282, 321, 323
 Deng Enming—288
 Deng Wenyi—303
 Deng Xiaoping—308
 Deng Yingchao—289
 Deng Zhongxia—288, 293, 310
 Desfosses, Helen—164, 178
 Deva, Narendra—61
 Devyatkina, T.F.—271, 280-82
 Dewey, John—244, 267
 De Wilde, John—178
 Dobrolyubov, N.A.—73
 Dong Biwu—287, 288, 301
 Dong Yixiang—309
 Druhe, David N.—179, 271
 Dziegiel, Leszek—166, 178

E

Engels, Frederick—26, 35, 42, 43,
 46, 89, 95, 110, 112, 113, 122,
 123, 125, 127-29, 158, 160,
 171, 172, 177, 197, 246, 271,
 285-87, 289, 291, 311, 319, 321
 Entelis, J.P.—147, 173, 175
 Erasmus—100
 Erenburg, G.B.—313
 Esba, Ephraim—258
 Etienne, B.—131, 172

F

Fang Weixia—302
 Fanon, Frantz—108, 114, 126,
 147, 175
 Felber, R.—290, 322
 Feng Wulan—327
 Feng Yuxiang—304, 327
 Ferdi, B.—264
 Foster-Carter, A.—177
 Francos, Ania—176
 Fridman, L.A.—133, 136, 173
 Frunze, M.V.—300

G

Gabriel, Claude—84
 Gafar-Zade, Asadullah—210
 Gandhi, Mahatma—49, 60, 63,
 104, 105, 185, 192, 281
 Garushyants, Y.M.—273, 279,
 280, 282, 327
 Gavrilov, Yu. N.—109, 124
 Geidar Khan, Amu-Agly—211
 Gelbras, V.G.—322
 Ghosh, Aurobindo—103
 Ginsberg, S.—228
 Glunin, V.I.—280, 281, 303, 321,
 323, 328, 332
 Goldberg, N.M.—89
 Gorbachev, Mikhail—91
 Gordon, A.V.—91, 123
 Goryachev, M.K.—174
 Grechko, P.K.—125
 Gresh, Alain—374
 Grigoriev, A.M.—329
 Grigoriev, A.S.—122

Gubelman, M.I.—273
Guo Yingfen—302
Gupta, Nalini—251, 253, 254

H

Haidar Khan, Amougli—260
Haithcox, John P.—179, 271
Hajioglu, Saleh—229
Hakki, Ismail—229, 238
Han Lianxian—329
Häncel, H.—173
Haq, Abdul—252
Hashemi-Rafsanjani, Akbar—370
Hayward, Fred—149, 175
He Shuheng—288, 302, 305, 308
Herzen, A.I.—33, 34, 73, 74, 94,
113, 125, 163, 178
Hill, Francis—144, 149, 162, 174,
175, 177
Hitler, Adolf—372
Ho Chi Minh—265, 282
Holmquist, Frank—154
Hopkins, N.S.—164, 178
Hopkins, Raymond F.—176
Hu Hanmin—316, 331
Huntington, S.P.—147, 175
Hussain, Ghulam—252
Hyden, Goran—151, 161, 173,
174, 176, 177

I

Idi Amin—141
Ikbāl, M.—123
Ilyushechkin, V.P.—272
Ioffe, A.A.—203
Issa, Shivji—178

J

Jacquemot, Pierre—131, 172, 173,
175
Jiang Jingguo—332
Jiang Kanghu—328
Jiang Zemin—329, 332

K

Kabweguere, T.B.—165, 178
Kalachev, S.—323

Kamkov, B.D.—45
Kara-Murza, G.S.—313
Karnik, V.B.—179
Kartunova, A.I.—279
Katsman, V.J.—174
Kaufman, A.S.—90
Kaunda, Kenneth—176
Kautsky, Karl—285, 309
Keatinge, E.B.—166, 178
Keita, Modibo—164
Kemal, Mustafa—54, 55, 66, 67,
189, 195, 230, 272
Khanukayev, A.—211
Kharnsky, K.A.—186, 272
Khlebarova, I.—170, 178
Khomeini, Ruhollah M.—335,
337-39, 341-46, 348-51, 353-
55, 357, 359-64, 366, 367, 369,
370, 372
Khoros, V.G.—47, 127, 172, 177
Kim, G.F.—275
Kim, M.T.—275
Kiva, A.V.—122
Klein, D.—327-30
Kobetsky—222
Kokin, M.D.—55, 89
Kolokolov, V.S.—313
Komarov, E.N.—272
Korniyenko, R.P.—272, 276
Kostin, Y.—203, 273, 276, 280
Kostyuchenko, V.S.—124
Kosukhin, N.D.—122
Krasin, Yu.A.—122, 126
Krasnova, V.A.—281, 321
Kriege, Hermann—85
Krivtsov, V.A.—281, 321
Kropotkin, P.—287
Krupskaya, N.K.—310
Krushinsky, A.A.—322
Krylov, V.V.—126
Krymov, A.G.—245, 277, 321
Kuchik Khan, Mirza—52, 65, 66,
239, 240, 242
Kuusinen, Otto—185, 204
Kuznetsova, M.F.—301

L

Laroui, Abdallah—100, 123
Lavrov, P.L.—34, 35

Leca, Jean—131, 149, 172, 175
 Lele, Uma—154, 176
 Lenin, V.I.—9, 10, 13, 14, 16,
 22, 24, 26-48, 51, 52, 72, 76-
 78, 82-93, 95, 97, 98, 105, 110,
 115, 119-26, 128, 129, 146,
 158-60, 172, 175, 177, 186,
 189, 194, 197, 203, 223, 227,
 236, 238, 241, 245, 257, 260,
 269, 270, 272, 273, 276, 281-
 86, 289, 291, 311, 318-21, 323,
 328, 332, 377, 379
 Levin, Z.I.—103, 124
 Li Da—250, 288
 Li Dazhao—106, 107, 191, 195,
 244, 260, 273, 281, 286-88,
 293, 321, 322
 Li Dia Chong—207
 Li Dong Hwi—221
 Li Hanjum—288
 Li Lisan—329
 Li Rui—328
 Li Seng—221, 224
 Li Weihai—329
 Li Zungwu—201, 308, 328
 Liang Qichao—244, 267, 285,
 313
 Liao Huangping—202
 Lidin—249
 Liebknecht, W.—285
 Lin Boqu—305, 308, 330
 Lin Bouyouye—287
 Liu Bojian—329
 Liu Changsheng—297, 325, 330
 Liu Qian—297, 325
 Liu Shaoqi—202, 280, 289, 301,
 329, 330
 Liu Zhenjing—288
 Locke, John—100
 Lohia, Ram—61
 Lozovsky, A.—300, 310
 Lunacharsky, A.V.—285
 Luo Jue—202
 Luo Yinung—293, 301
 Luo Zhanlung—288

M

Machel, Samora—117
 Majid, Abdul—224

Malukhin, A.M.—323
 Manuilsky, D.Z.—310
 Mao Zedong—262, 263, 278,
 285, 288, 302, 321, 322
 Mariátegui, José C.—165, 178
 Maring, H.—203, 245, 278, 297
 Martov, L.—45
 Martyshev, O.V.—27, 122, 124,
 125
 Marx, Karl—26, 35, 42, 83, 85,
 89, 90, 94-98, 108, 110, 113,
 120, 122, 123, 125-29, 158,
 160, 171, 177, 196, 197, 200,
 219, 227, 244-46, 264, 269,
 284, 285, 287, 289-91, 301,
 309, 321
 Masani, Minoo R.—61
 Matin-Daftari, Hedayatollah—
 349
 Matveyev, A.M.—274
 Maximos, S.—228
 McGowan, P.J.—155, 176
 Mehdi, S.M.—280
 Mehta, Asoka—61
 Meliksetov, A.V.—58, 89
 Melnikov, A.M.—259, 280-82
 Mif, P.A.—272, 304, 313
 Mikhailovsky, N.K.—37, 88, 89
 Mill, John S.—100
 Miller, A.F.—54, 89
 Minsker—222
 Mirovitskaya, R.A.—327
 Mitrokhin, L.V.—281
 Montesquieu, Charles—100
 Moore, Thomas—220
 Moshi, H.P.—143, 174
 Mossiu, Ali—50
 Moussavi-Khoeini, Muhammad—
 355
 Muhammad, Prophet—340, 376
 Mukherjee, Abani—225, 256
 Mussolini, Benito—372
 Mutin, Georges—173

N

Nan Hancheng—287
 Narayan, Jay—61
 Nasser—26, 71, 346

Navshirvan, Zainetullah—229-30
 Nazmi—209
 Nechaev, S.G.—291, 314, 323
 Nehru, Jawaharlal—60, 65-67,
 78, 89, 90, 108, 180, 193, 271-
 73, 346
 Nejat, Ethem—229, 231, 236
 Nellis, John R.—145, 175
 Nelson, J.M.—147, 175
 Neto, Agostinho—84
 Nguyen Nghe—121, 126
 Nicolson, A.—172
 Nie Rongzhen—329
 Nikiforov, V.N.—330
 Nikolskaya, G.B.—274
 Nkrumah, Kwame—21, 84, 90
 Novichev, A.D.—272, 273, 276
 Nyerere, Julius—136, 137, 141,
 144, 145, 148, 161, 168, 169,
 173-75, 177, 178

O

Ogarev, N.P.—73
 Ollawa, Patrick E.—176
 Osetrov, A.F.—324
 Ottawa, Marina—152, 176

P

Pak Din Shung—221, 222, 275
 Pak Syng Mang—221
 Pantsov, A.V.—274, 283, 322, 332
 Patwardhan, Achyut—61
 Pavlova, V.V.—173
 Pavlovich, M.P.—80
 Peng Shuzhi—202, 271, 301
 Persits, M.A.—179, 272-76, 279,
 282, 321, 324, 325, 327
 Phadke, Vasudev B.—59
 Pieck, W.—310
 Plastun, V.N.—257, 281
 Plekhanov, G.V.—14, 77, 87, 89
 Popov, N.A.—324, 325
 Potemkin, Y.V.—172, 173
 Pozdorovkina, E.G.—173
 Pozo, Castro—165
 Pratap, Mahendra—199
 Prigarina, N.I.—123
 Proudhon, Pierre—58

Pu Shiji—202
 Pyatnitsky—222

Q

Qaddafi, Muammar—77, 346
 Qu Qiubo—180, 201, 261, 262,
 271, 273, 281, 287-89, 293 308-
 10, 318, 322, 330, 332
 Quick, Stephen—177

R

Raffinot, Marc—131, 172, 173,
 175
 Rai, Lala Lajpat—183
 Raikov, A.V.—273, 280
 Rajavi, Massoud—359, 360, 364,
 368
 Raskolnikov, F.F.—239, 240
 Ravasani, Schapour—179, 271
 Ren Rishi—202, 301
 Ren Zhuoxuan—314, 330
 Renan, Ernest—100
 Resnick, Idrian—168, 178
 Reznikov, A.B.—280-82, 377
 Rivière, Claude—150, 156, 175,
 176
 Rousseau, Jean Jacques—123
 Roy, Manabendra N.—48, 62,
 65, 90, 225, 251-55, 261, 262,
 264, 265, 270, 271, 318, 331,
 328, 332
 Roy, Ram Mohan—102, 103
 Rozaliyev, Y.—274
 Russell, Bertrand—244, 267
 Rybakov, R.B.—103, 124

S

Safarov, M.—332
 Sagadeyev, A.V.—125
 Saint-Simon, Claude—100
 Sakher, Y.M.—123
 Samarkina, I.K.—178
 Sardesai, S.G.—183, 272
 Sattár—50
 Schorr, Bianca—62, 90
 Sen Katayama—310
 Senghor, Leopold—125
 Serebryakov—246

Séréni, J.F.—176
 Sere-Ratsimandisa, Georges—163, 178
 Shabshina, F.I.—272
 Shafiq, Mohammad—199, 224
 251-53, 265
 Shakhtakhtinsky, M.—275, 274
 Shamsutdinov, A.M.—272, 276, 277, 282
 Shariat Madari, Ayatollah—355
 Sheng Youe—289, 307, 309, 316, 322, 327-32
 Shevelev, K.V.—214, 273, 275, 279, 280, 322
 Shi Cuntun—285, 288
 Shirinya, K.K.—332
 Shumyatsky, B.—222, 223, 249, 275, 279
 Singh, Mota—252
 Skachko, A.Y.—235, 236, 277
 Sladkovsky, M.I.—273
 Snow, E.—322
 Spiridonova, M.A.—45
 Sprinzak, E.—177
 Staburova, Y.Y.—322, 328, 329
 Stalin, J.V.—310, 318
 Starushenko, G.B.—122
 Stein, L.—174
 Stolypin, D.A.—159
 Stren, Richard E.—176
 Stryker, Dirck—164, 178
 Subhi, Mustafa—55, 198, 206, 208, 209, 212, 229, 231, 236, 237, 260, 274, 277
 Sukarno—63, 65, 90
 Sukhanov, N. (Gimmer N.N.)—45
 Sultan-Zade—211-13, 241, 262
 Sun Yatsen—49, 55-59, 65-67, 106, 182, 191, 192, 195, 202, 243, 272, 273, 284, 287, 297, 298, 300, 302-04, 316, 320, 346
 Sun Yefang—314
 Sung Liang—330

T

Tan Pingshan—288, 332
 Tan Yankai—302

Tan Zhitang—288
 Temmar, Hammid—172
 Tilak, Bal Gangadhar—59, 60, 89, 183
 Timofeeva, N.N.—273, 274, 280, 319, 326-28, 330-32
 Titov—246
 Tkachev, P.N.—34, 88, 123
 Tolmachev, N.G.—300
 Torabi, M.—277
 Touré, Sékon—150, 175
 Toynbee, Arnold J.—179, 271
 Trapeznikov, S.P.—177
 Troyanovsky, K.M.—265

U

Ulyanovsky, R.A.—12, 110, 123-25, 172, 176, 377
 Usmani, Shaukat—208, 254
 Ustinov, V.M.—275, 324

V

Van Dunem, Ze—84
 Vanli, K.—228
 Villensky-Sibirsky, V.D.—204
 Virabov, A.G.—172, 173
 Vivekananda, Swami—99, 105-107, 123, 124
 Vodnev, V.A.—274
 Vodovozov, V.V.—39
 Voitinsky, G.N.—246, 255, 280, 288, 301
 Volin, M.—313
 Voltaire—123
 Vorona, V.I.—126

W

Wacirah, H.K.—155, 176
 Wang Jingwei—288, 302
 Wan Ming—309
 Wang Ruofei—303
 Wang Weizhou—201
 Wang Wunguo—218
 Weidenfeld, L.—172
 Wu Yuchisang—287
 Wu Yuzhang—305, 308, 330

X

Xiao Jingguang—301, 302, 327-29

Xu Juezai—323

Xiao San—303

Xu Teli—308, 329

Y

Yang Mingzhai—202, 246, 297, 301, 303, 325

Yang Shangkun—309

Yang Xun—220

Yao Zuobing—201

Ye Jianying—308

Yefimov, G.V.—326, 328-32

Yegorova, M.N.—255, 280-82

Yerasov, B.S.—121, 126

Yu Jun—311

Yu Sunghua—201

Yu Xiusung—301, 309

Yuan Dashi—202

Yuan Shikai—56, 57, 284, 286, 287, 320

Yun Daiying—303

Yuriev, M.—283, 323

Z

Zakaria, Rahmat Ali Khan—208

Zasulich, V.I.—122, 123, 158, 177, 338

Zhang Dunsun—244, 267

Zhang Guotao—202, 243-45, 261, 263, 264, 267, 269, 277-79, 282, 288, 310, 322

Zhang Jinglu—321

Zhang Shenfu—288

Zhang Taili—182, 196, 219, 220, 249, 250, 275, 277-79, 287, 293

Zhang Yungui—321

Zhao Shiyan—293, 304

Zholkovsky, K.E.—172

Zhou Enlai—197, 289, 294, 300, 310, 323

Zhou Fohai—288

Zhu Jiqing—303

Zhu Zhixin—285

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